University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series

Volume I



SRĪBHĀSYA OF RĀMĀNUJA

EDITED BY

R. D. KARMARKAR

PART I : Catuḥsūtrī

Printed by K. G. Sharangapani at the Aryabhushan Press, 915/1 Shivajinagar, Poona 4.
and
Published by Shri W. H. Golay, Registrar, University of Poona, Poona 7 (India)

पुण्यपत्तनविद्यापीठपुरस्कृता संस्कृत-प्राकृत-ग्रन्थमाला

प्रथमो ग्रन्थः

रामानुजविरचितं

श्रीभाष्यम्

सर परशुरामभाऊ-महाविद्यालयस्य भूतपूर्वप्राचार्येण
भाण्डारकर-प्राच्य-विद्या-संशोधनमन्दिरस्थसंशोधनविभागस्य भूतपूर्वाध्यक्षेण
करमरकरकुलावतंसेन दामोदरसूनुना रघुनाथशर्मणा
विरचितैराङ्ग्लभाषानुवादटिप्पण्यादिभिः समेतम्

चतुःसूत्र्यात्मकः प्रथमो विभागः



पुण्यपत्तनविद्यापीठाधिकृतैः
१८८१ शाके] [१९५९ खिस्ताब्दे
प्राकाश्यं नीतः

UNIVERSITY OF POONA SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT SERIES
Volume I

Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja

edited
with a complete English Translation, Introduction,
Notes and Appendices

By

Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar

Ex-Principal, Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona ;
Ex-Director, Post-Graduate and Research Department,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

Part I

(comprising the *bhāṣya* on the first four *sūtras*)

POONA
1959

Dedicated to
the Sacred Memory of

Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar

who, well and truly, laid the foundations of
Modern Indian Critical Scholarship
in the field of
Sanskrit and Prakrit Studies.

FOREWORD

In 1954, the authorities of the University of Poona decided to start a series of publications called "The University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series". This Series is to include critical editions of valuable works in Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit languages, which are hitherto unpublished or whose critically edited texts are not available or whose publication has become necessary for some other reasons. Accordingly, the Editorial Board, appointed by the Executive Council of the University, invited proposals from teachers of Sanskrit and Prakrit languages, connected with the University, for works to be included in the Series.

After a careful consideration of the several proposals, which had been received, the Editorial Board decided to undertake the publication of a critical edition of the *S'rībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja as the first volume in the Series.

The first four *sūtras* (*Catuḥsūtrī*) in the *S'rībhāṣya* are prescribed as a part of one of the papers for the M. A. examination in Sanskrit (*Vedānta*) by the University of Poona, as well as by several other Indian Universities. The excellent edition of the *S'rībhāṣya* with notes in Sanskrit by Mahāmahopādhyāya Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXXII, 1916) as also the English translation of the *S'rībhāṣya* by George Thibaut (Sacred Books of the East Series, Volume XLVIII, Part III, 1904) have long been out of print. It was, therefore, felt that a complete new edition of the *S'rībhāṣya* with English translation, introduction, and critical notes would meet the urgent need of both teachers and students of this basic text of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. This edition of the *S'rībhāṣya* is to be issued in three parts. Part I, which comprises the *bhāṣya* on the first four *sūtras*, is being published today and is expected to be followed by the remaining two parts in quick succession.

The present editor of the *S'rībhāṣya*, Professor R. D. Karmarkar, has long established himself as an eminent teacher of Sanskrit, particularly of *Vedānta*, and his several contributions on the subject have received wide recognition. It is, I believe, quite in the fitness of things that the "University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series" should be inaugurated with a work edited by this respected senior Sanskritist of Poona.

The fact that the first volume in this new Series, started by the University, is being dedicated to Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar, the pioneer of critical Sanskrit scholarship in modern India, indeed, augurs well for the Series. At the same time, it places upon the sponsors of the Series some obvious responsibilities.

Ṛṣipañcamī
7th September, 1959
University of Poona
Poona 7.

R. N. DANDEKAR,
General Editor.

PREFACE

The *S'rībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja has always found an honoured place in the curriculum of Sanskrit studies at the Universities in India. It is an authoritative work, representing the Vaiṣṇava tradition and Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view in Indian philosophy. Its English translation by George Thibaut has been long out of print. It was thought desirable that a fresh edition, containing the text and translation, should be brought out to meet the pressing need of the students who want to study the *S'rībhāṣya*.

Fortunately, the text proper of the *S'rībhāṣya* is, more or less, settled, and there are no problems as such confronting the editor here. The text of the edition in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series has been mostly followed in this edition. It has, however, been suitably re-arranged into separate paragraphs, and modern punctuation (the use of colons, semicolons etc.) has been freely resorted to, instead of the tiresome *daṇḍa* in the older editions. It is hoped that this would make the text more acceptable to the modern student.

The translation, on the whole, is made as literal as possible, without sacrificing clarity or the English idiom. This has not always been an easy task, as Rāmānuja's style is, often, very cumbrous and involved. I am aware that, at some places, the translation also has become equally involved. All that I can say in defence is that I have done my best to minimise the awkwardness by means of suitable explanations, inserted, here and there, within brackets in the translation itself, and the detailed notes at the end.

This first Part of the *S'rībhāṣya* contains the text of the *bhāṣya* on the first four *sūtras* (the *Catuḥsūtrī*), with translation and notes in English, and a general Introduction comprising such topics as Rāmānuja's life and works, Rāmānuja's philosophy, and the criticism of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*. Parts II and III

will contain the text of the *Bhāṣya* on the remaining *sūtras*, with English translation and notes, and a general critical survey of the tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of philosophy, as represented by the *S'rībhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*, and a comparison of Rāmānuja's explanations of several *sūtras* with the explanations offered by other Bhāṣyakāras. A complete index of the topics will be appended to Part III.

In the preparation of this work, I have received useful suggestions from my students Miss Nalini Paradkar, Miss Usha Akolkar, Miss Godavari Shahane, Miss Narmada Shahane, and others. Dr. Miss Sulochana Nachane, Dr. Mrs. Shilavati Oke, Dr. R. L. Joshi, and Miss Sudha Deo have also helped me in various ways. I heartily thank all of them.

Lastly, I must thank the authorities of the University of Poona, specially Professor R. N. Dandekar, University Professor of Sanskrit, for unstinted help throughout. The staff of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute placed at my disposal the whole library there, and I cannot be sufficiently grateful to them. The managers of the Aryabhushana Press richly deserve my thanks for printing this work fairly speedily.

Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, Poona 4
Ṛṣipañcamī
7th September, 1959

R. D. KARMARKAR

CONTENTS



Abbreviations Used In The Text

ABORI — *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*


I. 1. 3, etc. — Sūtra 3 in the First Pāda of the First Adhyāya, etc.

आ. सि.	Ā. Si.	Ātmasiddhi आत्मासिद्धिः
ईशा.	Īśa.	Īśāvāsyopaniṣad ईशावास्योपनिषद्
ऋ.	Ṛg.	Ṛgveda ऋग्वेद
ऐ. ऐतरेय	Ait.	Aitareyopaniṣad ऐतरेयोपनिषद्
का.	Kā.	Kāṭhakopaniṣad काठकोपनिषद्
के.	Kena.	Kenopaniṣad केनोपनिषद्
कै.	Kai.	Kaivalyopaniṣad कैवल्योपनिषद्
कौ.	Kau.	Kausītaki-brāhmaṇopaniṣad कौषीतकिब्राह्मणोपनिषद्
गीता	Gītā	Bhagavadgītā भगवद्गीता
गौडपाद्	Gauḍ.	Gauḍapādakārikā गौडपादकारिका
चू.	Cū.	Cūlikopaniṣad चूलिकोपनिषद्
छा.	Chā.	Chāndogyopaniṣad छान्दोग्योपनिषद्
जै. सू.	J. S.	Jaiminisūtra जैमिनिसूत्रम्
तै.	Tait.	Taittirīyopaniṣad तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्
तै. आ.	Tait.Ā.	Taittirīyāraṇyaka तैत्तिरीयारण्यकम्
तै. ब्रा.	Tait. Br.	Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मणम्
ना.	Nā.	Nārāyaṇopaniṣad नारायणोपनिषद्
नृ. ता.	Nṛ.	Nṛsiṁhatāpinī नृसिंहतापिनी
नृ. पू.	Nṛ. Pū.	Nṛsiṁha-pūrvatāpinī नृसिंहपूर्वतापिनी
पा. सू.	Pāṇ. Sūtra	Pāṇinisūtra पाणिनिसूत्रम्
प्र.	Pra.	Praśnopaniṣad प्रश्नोपनिषद्
बृ.	Bṛ.	Bṛhadāraṇya-kopaniṣad बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्
ब्र. सू.	Br. Sū.	Brahmasūtra ब्रह्मसूत्रम्
म. ना.	M. N. M. Nā.	Mahā-nārāyaṇopaniṣad महानारायणोपनिषद्
मनु.	Manu	Manusmṛti मनुस्मृति
महा. भा.	Mbh.	Mahābhārata महाभारतम्
मु.	Mu.	Muṇḍakopaniṣad मुण्डकोपनिषद्
श्वे. श्वेता.	Śve. Śvet.	Śvetāśvata-ropaniṣad श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्
स.	San.	Sanatsujātīya सनत्सुजातीयम्
सुबालोप-निषद् सुबाल, सुबालोप.	Subālo-paniṣad	Subālaśrutyupa-niṣad सुबालश्रुत्युपनिषद्
सू.	Sū.	Sūtra सूत्र

INTRODUCTION

I RĀMĀNUJA : HIS LIFE, DATE AND WORKS

The genealogical tree of Rāmānuja can be shown as follows :—



Rāmānuja (or in Tamil, Ilaya Perumal) was named Lakṣmaṇa by his maternal uncle, Mahāpūrṇa. We do not know much of the childhood of Rāmānuja. He was married at the age of sixteen by his father, who died shortly afterwards. He received his early education with his cousin, Govinda. Then Rāmānuja approached a reputed teacher viz. Yādavaprakāśa who conducted classes in the Vedānta, at Conjeevaram. This was the turning point in the career of Rāmānuja. With his cousin, Rāmānuja underwent the studies in the Vedānta, assiduously. But Yādavaprakāśa's interpretations of Vedic passages were not quite up to his satisfaction. For instance, in the famous Vedic passage, 'तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवाक्षिणी' the word कप्यास was explained by Yādavaprakāśa to mean the back-bone of a monkey. Rāmānuja, having heard it, began to weep, taking it as an insult to God. He explained the word to mean 'a lotus', with three different etymologies as follows :—

(1) कपि = The Sun ; hence कप्यास = What is made to blossom by the Sun.

(2) कपि = Water; hence कप्यास = What has water for its base or producing cause.

(3) कपि = Stem; hence कप्यास = What stands on the stem.

This caused a breach between Rāmānuja and Yādavaprakāśa.

Once at the invitation of the ruler of the place, Yādavaprakāśa and Rāmānuja— the preceptor and the disciple— went to the royal palace. Yādavaprakāśa was asked to cure the princess, who was possessed by a ghost. The ghost was reluctant to go away, even though Yādava exercised his power. But at the command of Rāmānuja the ghost disappeared. By this incident, Yādava became more jealous, of Rāmānuja.

Yādava was already annoyed with Rāmānuja and arranged a plot, according to which the latter was to be thrown into the Ganges. But Rāmānuja could escape death as his cousin divulged the plot to him. He retired to Conjeevaram, under the guidance of a kind hunter and huntress.

Rāmānuja, at the instance of his mother, settled down at Conjeevaram, as a house-holder and became a devotee of Devarāja. Having heard much of Yāmuna, from Mahāpūrṇa, his maternal uncle, Rāmānuja started with him for Śrīraṅgam. Yāmuna had also seen Rāmānuja among the disciples of Yādavaprakāśa, and had a great desire to have Rāmānuja as his own disciple. But, when Rāmānuja and Mahāpūrṇa arrived at Śrīraṅgam, they saw that the funeral ceremony of Yāmunācārya was about to commence. Rāmānuja was taken close to the body to see the great master for the first and last time. When he saw the body, he discerned three fingers of Yāmuna's right hand as twisted. Rāmānuja was told that the master had three unfulfilled desires. viz.

(1) to write an easy commentary on the Brahmasūtras,

(2) to convert the people to the 'Prapatti' doctrine of Vaiṣṇavism, and,

(3) to compose many works on Śrīvaiṣṇavism. Rāmānuja promised to fulfil these desires and the fingers straightened.

After the funeral ceremony was over, Rāmānuja returned to Conjeevaram and resumed his duties of devotion to God. As he found

that his wife's behaviour was discourteous to Mahāpūrṇa's wife and other poor people, Rāmānuja sent her to her father's house and renounced the domestic life at the age of thirty or thirty-two. Thus accepting the fourth āśrama, Rāmānuja propagated the Vedāntic learning, from the view-point of qualified monism. He had many disciples amongst whom was Yādavaprakāśa, his former preceptor, who had tried to assassinate him. He was named Govindadāsa, who under this name, wrote the 'Yatidharmasamuccaya'.

The Cola ruler Kulottuṅga I, being a bigoted Śaiva, wanted to demand assent from every body, to the doctrine — 'शिवात् परतरं नास्ति'. It seems that because of some important conversions, Rāmānuja along with his propagandists had been earmarked for being captured. Rāmānuja was summoned to appear at the court. But Kuruthalvar personated him and went to the Cola court, while Rāmānuja fled in the garb of a house-holder, from Śrīraṅgam to Toṇḍānur, in the kingdom of Hoysala Biṭṭi Deva, who was later on converted by Rāmānuja from Jainism to Vaiṣṇavism.

The following are the important incidents in the life of Rāmānuja—

(1) Rāmānuja's conversion of Yādavaprakāśa, his preceptor.

(2) His conversion of Yajñamūrti, an Advaitin.

(3) Settlement of the Smārta-Vaiṣṇava dispute about the God at Tirupati.

(4) The Cola persecution of Rāmānuja.

(5) The consecration of the Govinda temple at the foot of the Tirupati Hill.

DATE

According to the traditional account, Rāmānuja lived for 120 years — from 1017[1] A. D. to 1137 A. D. His long life covered three reigns of the Cola — (i) Kulottuṅga I, 1070 A. D. to 1118 A. D.; (ii) Vikrama Cola, 1118 A. D. to 1135 A. D.; (iii) Kulottuṅga II, 1123 A. D. to 1146 A. D. Rāmānuja's active life might therefore be safely referred to the last quarter of the eleventh century and the first quarter of the twelfth century A. D.

1. Dr. Radhakrishnan, however, gives 1027 A. D. as the date of Rāmānuja's birth.

Rāmānuja in the latter period of his life settled at Śrīraṅgam and worked zealously for the propagation of Vaiṣṇavism. We need not take the various episodes (some of which are mentioned above), referred to by his admirers at their face-value. Tradition also says that Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras was named Śrī-Bhāṣya by the goddess Sarasvatī herself, when he visited Kāśmīra and defeated the Pandits there. Rāmānuja's Sampradāya came to be known as 'Śrī-Sampradāya.'

As regards the interpretation of the passage from the *Chāndogya*, 'कप्यासमिवाक्षिणी ।'...'तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमिवाक्षिणी' there is no doubt that the story connected with it has come from the brain of some clever Pandit. According to Śaṅkara, कप्यास means 'a monkey's posteriors'. As many as six different interpretations mentioned by Taṅkātreya had been offered of 'kapyāsa' long before Śaṅkara. There is no particular reason to accept one and reject the others, as J. A. B. van Buitenen rightly remarks 'Taṅka's six explanations including Śaṅkara's are from a modern scientific point of view curiosities, but not therefore devoid of significance : folk-etymologies often help us to understand the associations that went with certain terms in certain ages and milieux.'[1]

Anyway Rāmānuja appears to have been an emotional intelligent person with plenty of drive in him. No wonder therefore, if he had excited a feeling of jealousy amongst his contemporaries.

WORKS OF RĀMĀNUJA

The *Divyasūricarita*, written in Tamil, by Garuḍavāha, who was a contemporary of Rāmānuja, clearly points out that the following nine works were composed by Rāmānuja.

(1) *Bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtras (i. e. the *S'rībhāṣya*).
(2) *Bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*.
(3) *Vedāntadīpa*.
(4) *Vedāntasāra*.
(5) *S'araṇāgatigadya*.
(6) *S'rīraṅgagadya*.
(7) *S'rīvaikuṇṭhagadya*.
(8) *Nityagrantha*.
(9) *Vedārthasaṅgraha*.

1. *Taraporewala Memorial Volume* (Published by the Deccan College Research Institute), p. 343.

(1) In the *S'rībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja has interpreted the Brahmasūtras, from the Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view; while doing so, he has tried his best to refute the Kevalādvaita, propounded by Śaṅkara. Whatever he has to say against Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja has done so fully on the first sūtra — viz. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. The remaining portion of his bhāṣya is not so important.

(2) In the *Gītābhāṣya*, Rāmānuja has laid stress on the doctrine of devotion and has pointed out that mere knowledge would not lead to salvation.

(3) The *Vedāntadīpa* is also an abridgement of the *S'rībhāṣya*. It is comparatively a bigger work than the 'Vedāntasāra', (about 250 pages). There is no summary at the end of the adhikaraṇas.

(4) The *Vedāntasāra* in a small abridgement of the *S'rībhāṣya* itself. At the end of each 'adhikaraṇa', the summary of the same is given in one or more stanzas. The whole work is in prose (about 150 pages).

(5) The *S'araṇāgatigadya* is a stotra work in prose about one hundred lines. Four stanzas from the '*Bhagavadgītā*' are incorporated in this work. It is full of long compounds sometimes consisting of more than forty words. These hundred lines are divided into twenty-four sections. Rāmānuja's idea of God possessed of all auspicious qualities, and other general tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy are found here without discussion.

(6) The *S'rīraṅgagadya* is also a prose-stotra, in about twenty-five lines, with two stanzes. Rāmānuja has completely surrendered to God's feet and has requested him to make his mind spiritual. According to his own view of philosophy, Rāmānuja says that he would like to be a permanent servant of the Lord.

(7) In the *S'rīvaikuṇṭhagadya*, which is about sixty-five lines, Rāmānuja, at the beginning, bows down to Yāmunācārya. Herein also the same doctrine of grace is repeatedly brought to notice.

(8) The *Nityagrantha* which is otherwise known as the *Bhagavadārādhanakrama*, is a small treatise (fifty pages) on the doctrines of the Pāñcarātrāgama. It is also held in high respect in the Rāmānuja tradition.

o

(9) The *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Rāmānuja is an important treatise in the Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vedānta, the main objective of which is the refutation of the views held by Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, as regards the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. It also gives a clear-cut representation of various doctrines of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. It occupies a unique place in as much as it serves as a commentary on the Upaniṣads, though not in a conventional sense or form. In fact, we can say with Prof. Hiriyanna that it is a small independent work which explains in a masterly way Rāmānuja's philosophical position, and points out the basis for it in the Upaniṣads.

II PREDECESSORS AND SUCCESSORS OF RĀMĀNUJA

(A) ĀLVĀRS

The Vaiṣṇava tradition names twelve Ālvārs who were regarded to be manifestations of divine wisdom. They are as follows:—

(1) Poygei Ālvār or Saroyogin
(2) Bhūtat Ālvār or Bhūtayogin
(3) Pey Ālvār or Mahadyogin
(4) Tirumaliśai Ālvār or Bhaktisāra
(5) Namm Ālvār or Śaṭhakopa
(6) Madhurakavi Ālvār
(7) Kulaśekhara Ālvār
(8) Periy Ālvār or Viṣṇucittam
(9) Aṇḍāl or Godā
(10) Toṇḍardippodi Ālvār or Bhaktāṅghrireṇu
(11) Tiruppāṇ Ālvār or Yogivaha
(12) Tirumangai Ālvār or Parakāla

The traditional date ascribed to the earliest Ālvār is 4203 B. C. and to the latest one, 2700 B. C. But the date ascribed by modern research to the activities of these Ālvārs is the seventh or the eighth century A. D., which was the period of a great Vaiṣṇava movement in the Cola and the Pāṇḍya countries and also of the Advaitic movement of Śaṅkarācārya.

Works of the Ālvārs

(1-3) **Peygai, Bhūtat** and **Pey Ālvārs** composed the three sections of one hundred stanzas each of 'Tiruvantadi'.

(4) **Tirumalisai Ālvār** composed the hymns which are known as Nan-mukham Tiruvantādi' (96 stanzas), and 'Tirucaṇḍavṛttam'.

(5) **Namm Ālvār** was born of a Śūdra family at Kurukur. He was the most voluminous writer among the Ālvārs. His works are—

(i)	*Tiruvṛttam*	— 100 stanzas
(ii)	*Tiruvaśiriyam*	— 7 ,,
(iii)	*Periya-tiruvantādi*	— 87 ,,
(iv)	*Tiru vay mori*	— 1102 ,,

(6) **Madhurakavi** was the disciple of Namm Ālvār who was regarded by the former as the incarnation of Viṣṇu.

(7) **Kulaśekhara** was a great devotee of Rāma. His chief work is *Peru-māl-tiru-mori.*

(8) **Periy Ālvār** was born at Śribiṭṭiputtūr. His chief works are *Tirupall'āṇḍa* and *Tiru-mori.*

(9) **Āṇḍāl,** adopted daughter of Periy Ālvār, was passionately devoted to Śrī Kṛṣṇa and considered herself to be one of the Gopīs. She was married to the God Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. Her chief works are *Tirupāvai* and *Nacchiyār.*

(10) **Toṇḍardi podiyālvār** was born at Maṇḍangudi. His chief works are *Tirumalai* and *Tirupalliya–reruchi.*

(11) **Tiruppāṇālvār** was brought up by a low-caste person. He wrote *Amalam-ādibirān,* in ten stanzes.

(12) **Tirumaṇgai** was born in the thief-caste. His chief works are—

(i) *Periya tirumori,*

(ii) *Tirukuru dāṇḍakam,*

(iii) *Tiruneḍun dānḍakam,*

(iv) *Tiruverugutt-irrukai,*
(v) *S'irīya tiru maṇḍal,*
(vi) *Periya tiru maṇḍal*

The '*Nāl-āyira-divya prabandham*' contains all the works of the Ālvārs. It is treated on par with the Vedas in the Tamil country.

(B) Ācāryas :

Rāmānuja's predecessors—Ācāryas—in the Viśiṣṭādvaita school as such are the following —

(1) Baudhāyana
(2) Guhadeva
(3) Bhāruci
(4) Brahmanandin
(5) Dramiḍācārya
(6) Śrīparāṅkuśa
(7) Nāthamuni
(8) Yāmunamuni
(9) Kapardin

(1) **Baudhāyana** is the famous Vṛttikāra of Pūrva and Uttara-mimāṁsā-Sūtras. According to the *Prapañca-hṛdaya*, Baudhāyana composed a bhāṣya, which was called *Kṛtakoti* on the Pūrvamīmāṁsā as well as the Uttaramīmāṁsā-sūtras, and this bhāṣya was abridged by Upavarṣa.[1] Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya says—'भगवद्बौधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः संचिक्षिपुः.' On several occasions, Rāmānuja quotes the views of the Vṛttikāra. Śabarasvāmin also refers to a Vṛttikāra who is probably Baudhāyana and not Upavarṣa. Commentators on the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara remark that some of the views referred to by Śaṅkara there, were held by the Vṛttikāra. The Vṛttikāra referred to in the *Gītābhāṣya* (II. 11, IV. 18) may be the same person.

1. Svāmī Ādidevānanda, in his notes on the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* (pub. by Ramakrishna Math, Madras), p. 60, remarks that Baudhāyana and Upavarṣa are identical.

Baudhāyana cannot be placed later than the first or the second century A. D. For, Śabara could not have lived later than the fourth century A. D., and Upavarṣa who was much earlier than Śabara, abridged Baudhāyana's 'vṛtti'. He is said to be the direct disciple of Vyāsa, in which case he would have to be placed far earlier.

(2) **Guhadeva** is mentioned by Rāmānuja in the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, as one of the Śiṣṭas, who approved of ' Viśiṣṭādvaita '. Nothing more is known about him.

(3) **Bhāruci** is mentioned in the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* and the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*. He is perhaps the same Bhāruci who wrote on Dharmaśāstra, and was specially concerned with the *Viṣṇudharmasūtra*.

(4) **Brahmanandin** is referred to in the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* among the Vedānta teachers after Bhāruci and before Draviḍācārya. He is also known as Taṅkācārya[1]. The Vākyakāra mentioned in the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* is held to be this Brahmanandin by Madhusūdanasarasvatī in his commentary on it. Rāmānuja in his *S'rībhāṣya* has several times quoted the Vākyakāra who is said to have declared that ' Saguṇa Brahman ' was the object of Upāsanā. Bhāskara in his bhāṣya says that the Vākyakāra approved of the ' Pariṇāmavāda '. His work appears to be a sort of ' Vārttika' on the Vedāntasūtras.

(5) **Dramiḍācārya** (Draviḍācārya) is referred to as one of the Śiṣṭas, in the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, by Rāmānuja. According to Madhusūdana-sarasvatī, this Dramiḍācārya composed a bhāṣya on Brahmanandin's terse sentences. Rāmānuja has quoted him as the Bhāṣyakāra, on several occasions. He seems to be earlier than Śaṅkara. He composed a bhāṣya on the Vedantasūtras and a vast commentary on the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*. Śaṅkara refers to his own commentary on the *Chāndogya* as ' alpagrantha ' as compared to the Dramiḍabhāṣya on the *Chāndogya*. He has been referred to as Ācārya by Saṅkara in his bhāṣya on the *Chāndogya*. He must have flourished before 750 A. D., as he was earlier than Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(6) **Śrīparāṅkuśa** is the same as the famous Namm Ālvār known as Śaṭhakopa. (His works are referred to already.)

---

1. Notes on *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, p. 160.

(7) Nāthamuni : According to tradition, he was in direct contact with Namm Ālvār (Śaṭhakopa). He was born in the village called Vīranārāyaṇa. His father's name was Īśvarabhaṭṭa and his son's name was Īśvaramuni. He wrote three works — (i) *Nyāyatattva* (ii) *Puruṣanirṇaya* (iii) *Yogarahasya*. Nāthamuni is also described as a great yogin who practised the Yoga of ' eight aṅgas. ' He lived in the middle of the tenth century A. D. His disciple, Śrīkṛṣṇa Lakṣmīnātha wrote an extensive work on the doctrine of ' Prapatti. '

(8) Yāmunācārya : He was otherwise called Ālvandār. He was the son of Īśvaramuni and grandson of Nāthamuni. He was born in 918 A.D. and is said to have died in 1038 A.D.(?) As he became a king, he lived happily for a long time. He took no notice of Rāmamiśra from whom he learnt the Vedas. Rāmamiśra, once got an opportunity to teach Yāmuna, the ' *Bhagavadgītā*, ' which created the spirit of detachment in him. Then he renounced everything and became a great devotee. Yāmuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded as prominent. Yāmuna was very fond of Namm Ālvār's works. He wrote six works —

(i) *Stotra-ratnam*
(ii) *Catuḥ-ślokī*
(iii) *Āgama-prāmāṇya*
(iv) *Siddhitraya*
(v) *Gītārthasaṅgraha*
(vi) *Mahāpuruṣanirṇaya*

(1) The *Stotraratnam* consists of sixty-five verses in which Yāmuna describes the beauty and the greatness of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Reading these verses only, Rāmānuja was deeply attracted to Yāmuna.

(ii) The *Catuḥślokī* consists of only four verses (as is clear from its name) in praise of Lakṣmī.

(iii) In the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, Yāmuna has tried to establish the highest authority of the Pāñcarātra literature.

(iv) The *Siddhitraya* is the most important work of Yāmunācārya. The three ' siddhis ' are (I) *Ātmasiddhi* (II) *Īśvarasiddhi* and (III) *Saṁvitsiddhi*.

The *Ātmasiddhi* gives a detailed discussion as regards the exact nature of Ātman and Paramātman, along with all the philosophical controversies.

The *Īśvarasiddhi* proves the existence of God as the creator of the world.

The *Saṁvitsiddhi*, which is available at present, consists of only 207 stanzas. The meaning of ' Advitīya-śruti ', reality of the world, refutation of Avidyā, refutation of the Jīvaikatva-theory as well as the Jīvanānātva-theory (due to the plurality of Avidyās), are the topics dealt with in the *Saṁvitsiddhi*.

(v) In the *Gītārtha-saṅgraha* Yāmuna observes that the means to the attainment of the ultimate goal of life is devotion. The Yoga in the *Gītā*, according to him, is the ' bhakti-yoga.'

(9) **Kapardin :** Although he is not referred to among the Viśiṣṭādvaita teachers in the *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, he is metioned in the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, as a Śiṣṭa, by Rāmānuja.

SUCCESSORS OF RĀMĀNUJA

Following are some of the important followers of Rāmānuja, who by their valuable contribution to the Viśiṣṭādvaita literature, kept the tradition alive.

(1) **Sudarśana Sūri** (1220 A. D.) wrote a commentary viz. *S'rutaprakāśikā* on the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja. It is the principal commentary, which has been again commented upon by Vīrarāghavadāsa and Vādhūla Śrīnivāsa. He inspired later writers in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, and was designated as Vedavyāsa Bhaṭṭācārya. He wrote three other works —

(i) *Sandhyāvandana–bhāṣya*

(ii) *Vedārthasaṁgraha–tātparya–dīpikā*

(iii) *S'rutapradīpikā.*

(2) **Veṅkaṭanātha** (1268–1369 A. D.), a gigantic scholar and a prolific writer, was a gifted poet. It is said that he lived by ' Uñcha-vṛtti ' and spent all his life in writing philosophical and religious works. It was in his time that Malik Kafur, a general of Alā-ud-din invaded the Deccan, harassed the Hindus and destroyed the temples— which is referred to by Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Abhīti-stava.*

In the field of poetry, he wrote the following works —

(i) *Yādavābhyudaya*, a work on the life of Kṛṣṇa,

(ii) *Haṁsa–sandeśa*,

(iii) *Subhāṣitanīvi*, a didactic poem,

(iv) *Saṁkalpa–sūryodaya*, an allegorical drama in ten acts, which describes the troubles and difficulties of the human soul in achieving perfection.

His important works in philosophy are as follows —

(i) *Nyāya–pariśuddhi*, a comprehensive logical work of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school.

(ii) *Nyāya-siddhāñjana*, a supplementary work to the *Nyāya-pariśuddhi*.

(iii) *S'atadūṣanī*, directed mainly against the Śāṅkara school.

(iv) *Tattva-ṭīkā*, a commentary on the *S'rībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja.

(v) *Adhikaraṇasārāvali*, a summary of the general topics in the Śrībhāṣya.

(vi) *Vāditraya-khaṇḍana*, a small pamphlet for the refutation of Śaṅkara, Yādava and Bhāskara.

(vii) *Seśvaramīmāṁsā*, which interprets the Sūtras of Jaimini, in a manner, different from that of Śabara. It is claimed that in all matters of doubt and dispute, the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra should be interpreted so as to be not in conflict with the Vedānta-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, who was the teacher of Jaimini.

He wrote many more works in Tamil also.

(3) **Varada-Deśikācārya** (known by various names), son of Veṅkaṭanātha, was also a great writer, like his father. In his *Tattva-traya-culaka-saṅgraha*, he summarizes in Sanskrit the contents of the Tamil *Tattvatraya-culaka* by his father, wherein, the fundamental doctrines as regards soul, matter and God, according to Śrīvaiṣṇavas are described. His other works are as follows —

(i) *Vyāvahārika-satyatva-khaṇḍana*

(ii) *Prapattikārikā*

(iii) *Rahasya-traya-culaka*

(iv) *Carama-guru-nirṇaya*

(v) *Phala-bheda-khaṇḍana*

(vi) *Nyāsa-tilaka-vyākhyā* etc.

He lived till the beginning of the fifteenth century A. D.

(4) **Meghanādārī** (13th cent. A. D.) wrote the following works —

(i) *Nayana-prakāśikā*, a commentary on Rāmānuja's *S'rībhāṣya*.

(ii) *Bhāva-prabodha*

(iii) *Mumukṣūpāya-saṅgraha*

(iv) *Naya-dyumaṇi*, one of the most recondite works in the Viśiṣṭādvaita school

(5) **Kūranārāyaṇa** (1380 A. D.) wrote the *Upaniṣadvṛtti*.

(6) **Parakāla Yati** (1390 A. D.), otherwise known as Kuṁbhakoṇa Tātācārya, wrote the following works —

(i) *Mitaprakāśikā*, commentary on the Śrībhāṣya.

(ii) *Draviḍaśrutitattvārtha Prakāśikā*

(iii) *Adhikārasaṁgrahavyākhyā*

(iv) *Vijayīndra parājaya*

(v) *Rahasya-traya-sāra-ṭīkā*.

(7) **Raṅgarāmānuja** (15th cent. A. D.) was the disciple of Parakāla Yati and Vatsya Anantācārya. The important works written by him are as follows —

(i) *Mūlabhāva Prakāśikā*

(ii) *Nyāyasiddhāñjana-vyākhyā*

(iii) *Dramiḍopaniṣad-bhāṣya*

(iv) *Viṣaya-vākya-dīpikā*

(v) *Rāmānuja-siddhānta Sāra*

(vi) *Chāndogyopaniṣad-prakāśikā*

(vii) *S'ārīraka-śāstrārtha-dīpikā*, an independent commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*.

(8) **Srīnivāsadāsa** (15th cent. A. D.), son of Devarājācārya and a pupil of Veṅkaṭanātha, wrote the following works —

(i) *Nyāyasāra*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi.*
(ii) *S'ataduṣaṇī-vyākhyā-sahaśra-kiraṇī.*
(iii) *Viśiṣṭādvaita-siddhānta*
(iv) *Kaivalya–S'ata–dūṣaṇī*
(v) *Durupadeśa–dhikkāra*
(vi) *Nyāsa–vidyā–vijaya.*

(9) **Śrī Saila Śrīnivāsa** (15th cent. A. D.) wrote

(i) *Virodha–nirodha*
(ii) *Bheda–darpaṇa*
(iii) *Advaita–vana–kuṭhāra*
(iv) *Sāradarpaṇa*, etc.

(10) **Caṇḍa–māruta–mahācārya** (1410 A. D.) wrote

(i) *Upanyāsa* a commentary on the *S'rībhāṣya*,
(ii) *S'atadūṣaṇīṭīkā*
(iii) *Advaita–vidyā–vijaya*
(iv) *Parikara–vijaya*
(v) *Pārāśarya–vijaya*
(vi) *Brahmavidyā–vijaya*
(vii) *Vedānta–vijaya*
(viii) *Sadvidyā–vijaya.*

(11) **Nārāyaṇamuni** (1415 A. D.) wrote *Vedānta–rakṣā* and *Tattvasaṁgraha.*

(12) **Saṭhakopa Yati** (10th cent. A. D.) composed the following works —

(i) *Brahmalakṣaṇa–vākyārtha–saṁgraha*
(ii) *Brahma–śabdārtha–vicāra*
(iii) *Vākyārtha–saṁgraha*
(iv) *Brahmasūtrārtha–saṁgraha*
(v) *Brahma–lakṣaṇa–vākyārtha*
(vi) *Divya–prabandha*
(vii) *Bhāva–prakāśikā–dūṣaṇoddhāra*

(13) **Srīnivāsa** (17th cent. A. D.), son of Govindācārya and a pupil of Rāmānujadāsa, wrote two important works—

(i) A commentary on the *S'rutaprakāśikā* of Sudarśana.

(ii) *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, a compendious exposition of the teachings of the Viśiṣṭādvaita.

III THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA PHILOSOPHY OF RĀMĀNUJA

Rāmānuja can legitimately claim to be the best exponent, if not the founder, of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system of philosophy. He himself respectfully acknowledges in his works the debt he owes to his predecessors, Baudhāyana, Taṅka, Dramiḍa and others.

It can be easily surmised how Rāmānuja came to hold the Viśiṣṭādvaita view. A protagonist of the Bhakti-school, Rāmānuja naturally had to hold fast to admitting a Parama-Puruṣa, — a personal high god. Passages from the Purāṇas, especially the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* and the *Bhagavadgītā* amply support him in this attitude. But at the same time he could not ignore the passages from the Upaniṣads that directly point to the Highest Brahman, being without a second. (Rāmānuja is, like Śaṅkara, a 'Śruti-Śaraṇa'). How to get out of this position, where two contradictory concepts are propounded, was the question before Rāmānuja. Happily, he hit upon the idea for which he had the support of the Śruti-passages, 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्... ' etc. (सुबालो—७·१) 'यः अन्तर्यामि अमृतः... ' which directly refer to the Highest Being, the Ātman and the 'Antaryāmin', and the whole world as the body of the Highest and thus was evolved the Viśiṣṭādvaita-concept.

Thus Rāmānuja came to hold that while the Highest Puruṣa alone was there (cf. एको देवो नारायणः ...), the 'Cit' (Individual Souls) and the 'Acit' (non-sentient) divisions of the world could not be regarded as apart from the Parama-Puruṣa, as they formed his body. So the three together — Puruṣottama, the Individual Souls and the non-sentient world, form the entire whole, which is the Highest Reality. Rāmānuja thinks that this is the only reasonable solution which does proper justice to the various statements in the Upaniṣads and makes full use of what is called the 'Sarvaśākhāpratyaya Nyāya.'

Rāmānuja can be called an Advaitin, because he holds the Highest to be only one, But the Advaita is particularised or circumscribed by

the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' elements. (This, of course, is a very weak point in the system which is vehemently attackd by the Advaitins). According to Rāmānuja, the Advaita is particularised by the 'Ātma-Śarīra-bhāva' and the 'Prakāra-prakāri-bhāva'. Hence the name 'Viśiṣṭādvaita'.

In order to prove that the Viśiṣṭādvaita in no way conflicts with the Advaita-passages in the Upaniṣads, Rāmānuja has recourse to the following ways —

(1) The true meaning of expressions 'Nirguṇa' 'Nirviśeṣa' etc. cannot be 'void of *all* attributes'; for, the Śruti itself speaks of the Highest being possessed of qualities like 'Satyakāmatva' 'Apahatapāpmatva' etc. 'Nirguṇa' must therefore mean 'void of qualities fit to be abandoned', and 'Nirviśeṣa,' 'void of *certain* Viśeṣas *only*, and *not* of *all* Viśeṣas'.

(2) Rāmānuja gives a new interpretation of the 'Sāmānādhikaraṇya' concept, and makes an elaborate attempt to show that expressions like 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ...' do refer to only one Reality, although the individual expressions give a viśiṣṭa-idea.

(3) In interpreting the Śruti-passages, one must take the help of the Itihāsa and Purāṇa passages also, otherwise, one would fail to understand the right meaning, as is pointed out in the famous passage—

इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत्। बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ॥

and the *Bhagavadgītā*. Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya, refers to some passages in the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, and vehemently tries to refute the Advaitic interpretation put on them.

(4) The promiscuous use of expressions like 'वेत्ति' 'प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' 'उपास्ते' in the 'Upakrama' and the 'Upasaṁhāra' of a section or Adhyāya, clearly shows that 'Jñāna' (which is acknowledged by all to be the only means of salvation) means something more than mere knowledge, viz. Dhyāna, Upāsanā and Bhakti.

(5) The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-view that 'the Āmnāya' or the Vedic passages are 'kriyārtha', must be interpreted in an extended sense to refer to the highest aim, and not merely to the actual sacrificial act.

(6) All words, as a matter of fact, must be taken ultimately to refer to the Highest, whatever their prima-facie or denotative import might be.

(7) The distinction between 'Nirvikalpaka Jñāna' (as meaning 'merely something without any attributes') and 'Savikalpaka Jñāna' (as meaning 'associated with the four attributes of Jāti, Guṇa, Kriyā and Saṁjñā) is without any foundation. (According to Rāmānuja, 'Nirvikalpaka' itself is associated with the above four attributes connected with 'Savikalpaka'. And 'Savikalpaka' only means the idea of continuity of these attributes as found in similar objects).

(8) The 'Satkhyāti' is the only right 'Khyāti'. Everything that exists or is experienced even in dreams etc., is real.

Rāmānuja armed with these views claims that the Viśiṣṭādvaita idea alone gives a comprehensive picture and is therefore more reasonable and appropriate, besides being in conformity with the important Śruti and Smṛti texts.

The tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita-school may very briefly be summarised under the three topics — God, World and Man — as follows :—

(1) **God** — Viṣṇu (Nārāyaṇa) is the Paramapuruṣa or Puruṣottama, the Paramātman or the Lord. He is possessed of all auspicious qualities and has all his desires fulfilled and so, whatever he does has no reference to himself.

He creates the world, sustains it and also destroys it. The Individual Souls ('Cit') are also created by him; they as directed by the Lord become the enjoyers in the world, in conformity with their own 'karmans'. The God, however, has a partiality for those who are constantly devoted to him and blesses them with special favours. The Lord does not insist on any special offerings to him by his devotee. He is mainly concerned with the spirit of devotion itself. The offering of a mere leaf or a flower in the right spirit is quite sufficient[1].

Viṣṇu is described as having four hands, holding the discus Sudarśana, the mace Kaumodaki, the conch (Pāñcajanya) and the lotus. His vehicle is Garuḍa and he is waited upon by Nārada, Tumburu and the Released Souls.

---

1. पत्रं पुष्पं फलं तोयं यो मे भक्त्या प्रयच्छति।
तदहं भक्त्युपहृतमश्नामि प्रयतात्मनः॥ (भगवद्गीता ९.२६)

The nature of the devotion to the Lord is usually described to be nine-fold.[1] Gradually proceeding step by step, from श्रवण etc., the Soul ultimately is sure to reach the goal. He must not, however, allow any unwarranted break in his contemplation of the Lord. The precepts of the Śāstras and the observance thereof, constant devotion to the Lord, are the only means of being dear to the Lord, who alone can declare who is fit or unfit for his special favour.

Later on, the system, as has happened in the other systems of philosophy as well, became degenerated and emphasis was laid upon the outward ritual. Thus, in addition to the nine-fold Bhakti mentioned above, the following eight modes of worship came in vogue.

(1) Imprinting the marks of Viṣṇu's characteristic weapons, conch-shell etc., on the body, (2) Putting up a vertical mark on the forehead, (3) muttering of Mantras, (4) drinking of the 'Pādodaka' (water used in washing Viṣṇu's feet), (5) eating of the 'Naivedya'—(some eatable) offering made to Hari after the worship, (6) serving Viṣṇu's devotees, (7) fasting on the 11th day of the fortnight, and (8) offering of Tulasī-leaves. We might as well mention here the two ways in which Viṣṇu's grace is looked upon. The followers of Rāmānuja-school compare Viṣṇu and his devotees to a female-monkey and her cub. (The female-monkey does her very best to protect the cub by holding it fast to her abdomen. The cub also on its part tries to cling to the mother closer and closer). The followers in the south give the illustration of the cat and the kittens. (The cat protects the kitten of its own accord, the kittens doing nothing; similarly the God offers the grace Himself). Southern India is rightly proud of the fact that almost all the well-known philosophers in India lived and established themselves in the south, e. g. Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and others. This may be perhaps due to the fact that South India was comparatively free from the disturbances due to wars etc. with foreigners. At the same time, it must be admitted that most of these philosophers had their training perfected by visits to the celebrated seats of learning at Vārāṇasī and other places in Northern India.

(2) **World** — The world ('Acit') is created by Viṣṇu. It is also said to be 'Anādi' and is at the proper time dissolved by the

1. श्रवणं कीर्तनं विष्णोः स्मरणं पादसेवनम्।
अर्चनं वन्दनं दास्यं सख्यमात्मनिवेदनम्॥

Lord. It is created to serve as a 'bhogya', or an object of enjoyment by the Individual Souls. It is, however, not quite apart from the Lord. It is, in fact, the Śarīra (body) of the Lord, but does not contaminate the Lord with its blemishes. The various divisions and modifications in the world are just the 'Prakāras' as directed by the Lord.

(3) **Man** — This represents the 'Cit' element (i. e. the Individual Souls). The Individual Souls also form the body of the Lord. Though their own past actions determine their position in general, they have full freedom of the will to act as it pleases them. By observing strictly the rules and regulations ordained by the Śāstras in respect of the duties of the different 'Varṇas' (castes) and 'Āśramas' (the stages of life), the Souls can better their position by performing their 'Karmans' in a spirit of a dedication to the Lord himself. This 'niṣkāma' spirit may not be realized sometimes even in many births, but the progress achieved is never retarded and the Soul can always come nearer and nearer the goal, viz. salvation, which consists in reaching the Viṣṇu-loka or Vaikuṇṭha and in having the privilege of being near the Lord and serving Him.

The 'Liberated Soul' can enjoy all that he wishes for, in the Vaikuṇṭha in any form which he commands at will or even without a body. The only restriction placed upon his power is that he cannot participate in the act of creating etc., of the world, also in the special possessions of Viṣṇu, like Lakṣmī, the Kaustubha etc.

Other Souls who do not behave in this manner are subjected to the tortures in hell and have to pay for their misdeeds, till they are reborn according to their deserts.

IV RĀMĀNUJA AS A PHILOSOPHER

Rāmānuja's main task is to propound the doctrine of Bhakti, which, according to him, is the natural culmination of right knowledge about the Highest, viz. Viṣṇu, and to show that the Advaita-doctrine of Māyā or Avidyā is not supported either by the Śruti-texts read as a whole or by any recognised means of proofs. In advocating the doctrine of a personal god who is to be won over by devotion, and who alone can dispense Mokṣa for the devotee, and in regarding the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' elements as the body of the Paramapuruṣa, Rāmānuja appears to be confronted with more and more logical difficulties, making his remedy worse than the disease. Thus —

Rāmānuja was well aware that the Scriptural passages support the Advaita-idea, as well as the existence of the 'Cit' (i. e. Individual

Soul) and the 'Acit' (i. e. non-sentient) elements. The most obvious solution to reconcile these conflicting ideas according to Rāmānuja is to regard the Highest to be a composite entity and to call this 'oneness' as associated with the 'Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa-bhāva' or the Ātma-Śarīra-bhāva'. As Rāmānuja regards everything as real, he cannot get away from the fact that in his opinion there are three real entities, howsoever one may try to camouflage this. In other words, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is no Advaita at all; it is not Dvaita either; it may be called 'Traita' as a matter of fact. To plead that the 'Cit' and 'Acit' elements are very closely associated with the Paramapuruṣa without contaminating him with their blemishes, is but evading the issue. Taking the familiar instance of a Citrapaṭa (a many-coloured piece of cloth), one finds that though the Citrapaṭa can be comprehended as a whole entity, the fact remains that it cannot be called one ('Advaita') in the face of the distinct divisions that are noticed therein. Presumably, Rāmānuja likens the whole situation to a big mansion with two wings. But this cannot in any way be called 'Advaita.'

In regarding the creation etc. of the world as a reality, Rāmānuja cannot explain how the situation stood at the very beginning of the creation. Did the Lord have any materials at his disposal? If so, how and where did he get them? To say that the Saṁsāra is 'Anādi' is no answer. The Lord created the 'Cit' and 'Acit' out of his own 'Saṁkalpa' and this he could do on account of his wonderful powers. — This is a lame argument and further, Rāmānuja in that case has no right to complain when the Advaitin also claims that his 'Avidyā' or 'Māyā' can equally function like that, on account of some wonderful power. Thus both the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita are obliged to assume some power which cannot be logically proved, and one can do no better than to fall back upon the dictum 'अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावाः न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।' and the well-known rule in carrying on debates, 'उभयोरेव समो दोषः परिहारश्च वै समः । नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥'

Rāmānuja's idea about Mokṣa being at the disposal of the Lord is also open to objection. The Lord is said to pick and choose. This smacks of partiality and favouritism. The argument that the Lord does this in conformity with the 'Karmans' of the Jīvas (he acts as Śaṅkara remarks 'ईश्वरः पर्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः'), does not help in any way, as that would detract from the over-all supreme power of the Lord.

The attack of Rāmānuja on the Advaitin's doctrine of Avidyā,— that Avidyā has no resort, it would but screen the Highest, it cannot

be proved to have a separate existence by any means of proof, there would be endlessness if the 'Anādi-Avidyā' requires something else to produce it etc.—also misses its mark. The same objections *mutatis mutandis* can be raised against the conception of the Paramapuruṣa.—Where does he stay? Is he all powerful to do and undo things and change the 'Svabhāva' of anything? Does he require the help of something else to carry on his self-appointed task etc.?—Possibly the answer will be that the Paramapuruṣa or Viṣṇu is self-born, stays in Vaikuṇṭha, and is able to achieve His object in some mysterious manner etc. But these answers would hardly satisfy a rationalist. The Advaitin can easily brush aside these as a mere fancy. He is not simply concerned with them, as he would not be concerned with the whereabouts and doings of the son of a barren woman.

Rāmānuja, however, deserves full credit for making his doctrine popular and easily comprehensible to the people at large. Steeped in the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* as he was, he surely brings philosophy from heaven to earth, so as to be within the reach of women, Vaiśyas, Śūdras etc. as the *Bhagavadgītā* puts it. Mokṣa or salvation can be achieved — may be even after several rebirths — by the simple method of doing one's duty as prescribed by the Śāstras, without any desire for the fruit.

All this may be palatable to the people at large but it is hardly philosophy. Rāmānuja tries his best to show that he can reconcile the conflicting Śruti-passages successfully by having recourse to the 'Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa-bhāva' and 'Ātma-Śarīra-bhāva', and taking 'Nirguṇa' in the sense 'without any heya-guṇas,' and 'Nirviśeṣa' as 'without only some viśeṣas.'

Similarly he points out that 'Kriyārtha' cannot restrict itself to 'kṛti' or the 'kṛtikarma' or 'kṛtyuddeśa' or 'kṛti-śeṣa-śeṣitva' or 'Niyoga', but must refer to the ultimate 'sukha' which is 'Iṣṭatama' and is 'Icchāviṣaya.'

Here one may as well consider the question why all the Bhāṣya-kāras seem to be obsessed by the idea of proving that the doctrines they preach are based upon the Śruti-texts and are capable of harmonising them. One may legitimately ask—what matters it, if some Śruti-texts go against your view or not? Why should not one stand by his own doctrine independently? A lot of confusion could undoubtedly be removed if the discussions in the Bhāṣyas about the interpretation of the Śruti-texts were weeded out and only the philo-

sophical portion was put forth in a plain straightforward manner. The answer of course would be that the Indian philosophers wanted a firm foundation for their doctrines and the Śruti-texts commanding universal respect could not be ignored.[1]

Rāmānuja's explanation of 'Kriyārtha' (आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्।), must also be pronounced to be unsatisfactory. Apparently, 'Kriyārtha' may be explained as (1) 'for the sake of a direct action' and (2) 'for the sake of something which involves some kind of action in the long run.' That is why the first meaning referring to direct immediate action is ruled out of order (because it cannot endorse Rāmānuja's view — that 'upāsanā' is the teaching of the Āmnāya). Rāmānuja, therefore, has to take 'Artha' to mean the purpose, aim or the main thing or directed goal etc. Thus, 'Kriyārtha' means the ultimate purpose, for which some 'Kriyā' is necessary, and the ultimate aim is 'Sukha'. and 'Upāsanā' also involves some 'Kriyā.' That is why the non-sacrificial passages are not to be discarded as unnecessary, even though they preach the 'pariniṣpanna Brahman.'

It would be seen that the above elaborate reasoning does not achieve its purpose. Śaṅkarācārya, dealing with this topic in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I-1-4, contents himself with emphasizing the fact that a 'Siddha' thing can never be 'Sādhya' or an object of 'Kriyā' even though it might be a 'mānasī kriyā'; and that no injunction is possible in a 'parīniṣpanna' thing and no modification or change therein either. Compared to this explanation, Rāmānuja's elaborate special pleading carries no conviction.

V. CRITICISM OF RĀMĀNUJA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SŪTRAS AND ŚRUTI-SMṚTI-TEXTS

Being bent upon finding support for his theory, Rāmānuja is forced to give fantastic interpretations of various passages — both Śruti and Smṛti,—to suit his purpose. Thus in interpreting the passage 'य एतस्मिन्नन्तरे उदरं कुरुते...' Rāmānuja explains 'उदरम्' as the 'slightest cessation' and the meaning of the passage is — 'one in whose contemplation of Viṣṇu occurs even the slightest break, such a person would be subject to fear'. Now this appears to be not only unnecessary, but has not even the saving grace of being ingenious. In

1. The present writer has dealt with this topic at some length in his Presidential Address (Philosophy and Religion Section) of the All India Oriental Conference held at Annamalai University, December 1955.

interpreting the passages from the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, Rāmānuja gives an elaborate exposition of the three forms of Viṣṇu and finds in the passages a reference to what he calls a 'Śubhāśraya' for contemplation of Viṣṇu ! The interpretations of 'Nirguṇa' and 'Nirviśeṣa' have already been referred to. Wherever possible, Rāmānuja takes the help of passages from the Purāṇas to corroborate his view. There is no objection *per se* to this procedure. But it is doubtful whether it is reasonable to reject the obvious meaning in the case of the Śruti-passages, in order to interpret them in the light of what is stated in the Purāṇas.

Rāmānuja's attempt to find whole-hearted support for the idea of Bhakti or Upāsanā in the Śrutis cannot be described as wholly successful. It is true that the doctrine of Bhakti can be traced even to the Ṛgvedic hymns, and it does get occasional support from the literature following, till it became full-fledged in the Purāṇa-literature. But a categorical statement to that effect appears to be not justified. Even the *Bhagavadgītā* and several passages in the *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* itself do not give up the basic position, viz. salvation comes from Jñāna.

As regards the interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*, Rāmānuja appears to have interpreted the Sūtras more correctly than Śaṅkara. Thus, in the interpretation of Sūtras like 'ज्ञोऽत एव ।' 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात् ।' etc. and others where words like अन्य, इतर etc are used, pointing out to the difference between the Jīva and the Paramātman, Rāmānuja is on firm ground, *if we take into consideration only the wording of the Sūtras.* But, if we grant that the main purpose of the Sūtras is to show the 'samanvaya' of the Śruti-passages and that their main basis is वेदान्तार्थग्रथन (cf. 'वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते ।' शांकरभाष्य १-१-४), one is not so sure of Rāmānuja's interpretation being the correct one. In this respect, the procedure adopted by Śaṅkara is more satisfactory. Śaṅkara firmly believes that the *Brahmasūtras* could not possibly be preaching a philosophy different from that in the Upaniṣads. The *Brahmasūtras* therefore have got to be looked at, only in the light of the exposition in the Śruti. That is why Śaṅkara in the case of about a dozen Sūtras, first gives what may appear to be a natural interpretation and then offers his supplementary remarks.[1] This may appear to be audacious on the part of Śaṅkara, but it was quite necessary to give a complete picture of philosophical thought indicated by the 'Samanvaya' of the earlier philosophical works as a whole.

1. See : R. D. Karmarkar, 'Comparison of the Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Keśavakāśmīrin and Vallabha on some crucial Sūtras', ABORI, Vols. I and II.

It might, therefore, be stated that Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Sūtras, though technically correct, is perhaps incomplete and one-sided.

Rāmānuja is a 'Satkhyātivādin'; that is, he thinks that everything that is perceived is real. Thus, silver that is perceived in the conch-shell is not unreal, but it actually exists and has existed in the conch-shell for all time. Whether it can be actually perceived or not, depends upon the perceiver and the power of his sense of sight. Rāmānuja takes his stand upon the Śruti-text that the 'Parā Devatā' became threefold, thus showing that everything produced by the deity contains all the three (or, according to some five) elements in itself. The object however, is named in a particular way in conformity with the preponderance of some particular element.[1] The things seen in a dream are equally real. When a person in a dream goes to a far-off land, Rāmānuja says that this is possible, because the soul goes there with another body that is actually created in a dream, and so forth. This theory of Rāmānuja has not found favour with other philosophers. It is generally agreed that things seen in dreams etc. are just illusion and nothing else.

Rāmānuja's idea about Mokṣa seems to be based upon the views of the writers of the Purāṇas and similar later literature. The liberated soul enjoys the Highest bliss in the company of the Lord in the special world of his, and he is quite content with waiting upon the Lord in devotion and in the spirit of self-surrender. This almost appears to be just carrying the ideas of happiness on the earth to the heavens, where the Lord like an emperor on the earth is given his tribute by his servants and followers. This no doubt makes a strong appeal to the popular mind, but can in no way be regarded as reasonable. One thing here may be noted, that in spite of these popular notions, the Bhakti-school all over India that has been flourishing for over six hundred years, has never lost sight of the basic Advaita-idea underlying all these notions. It is amazing to find that even the most illiterate devotees are conscious of this Advaita — one God existing everywhere, all powerful etc.

Nowhere again, has Rāmānuja attempted to controvert the impossibility of any 'Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva' (cause and effect relation) really existing. Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara propounded their theories of Ajātivāda and Māyāvāda, convinced that there could be no basis for the relation of cause and effect. Believing in a personal God, Rāmānuja had no option left but to take the Kāryakāraṇabhāva as granted, and to meet the popular notions as far as possible. Rāmānuja is out to invite comparison with Śaṅkara, on various points, but he cannot be said to be as 'Tarka-karkaśa' as Śaṅkara was.

---

1. Cf. 'प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति'.

|| श्रीः ||

रामानुजाचार्यविरचितं

श्रीभाष्यम्

[1] अखिलभुवनजन्मस्थेमभङ्गादिलीले
विनतविविधभूतव्रातरक्षैकदीक्षे ।
श्रुतिशिरसि विदीप्ते ब्रह्मणि श्रीनिवासे
भवतु मम परस्मिन् शेमुषी भक्तिरूपा ॥ १ ॥

पाराशर्यवचःसुधामुपनिषद्दुग्धाब्धिमध्योद्धृतां
संसाराग्निविदीपनव्यपगतप्राणात्मसंजीवनीम् ।
पूर्वाचार्यसुरक्षितां बहुमतिव्याघातदूरस्थिता-
मानीतां तु निजाक्षरैः सुमनसो भौमाः पिबन्त्वन्वहम् ॥ २ ॥

Śrībhāṣya

(*The Glorious Commentary*)

by Rāmānujācārya

[1] May my ardent longing be manifested as [or, amounting to] devotion to the Highest Brahman, from whom, the creation, sustenance, destruction etc. of the whole universe is [but just] a sport ; who is solely consecrated for the protection of the concourse of various creatures bent down [before him] ; who is blazoned forth in the best portion [lit. head, quintessence] of the Śruti [literature] [and] who is the abode of Lakṣmī. [1]

May the gods on the earth [i. e. Brāhmaṇas] drink daily the speech-nectar of the son of Parāśara [Vyāsa], taken out of the midst of the milky ocean of the Upaniṣads ; which is the reviving means of the souls with vitality gone away owing to the powerful scorching up of the fire of worldly existence ; which is well (*su*) preserved by Predecessor-teachers, [which was] kept at a distance [i. e. not sufficiently intelligible] owing to the conflict of many ideas [of various schools of thought] but [now] brought within the reach [of all] in our words. [2]

[2] भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः संचिक्षिपुः। तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते—

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

अत्रायमथशब्दः, आनन्तर्ये भवति। अतःशब्दो वृत्तस्य हेतुभावे। अधीतसाङ्गसशिरस्कवेदस्य, अधिगताल्पास्थिरफलकेवलकर्मज्ञानतया संजातमोक्षाभिलाषस्य, अनन्तस्थिरफलब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ह्यनन्तरभाविनी। ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'। 'ब्रह्मणः' इति कर्मणि षष्ठी,

'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति' (पा. सू. २।३।६५)

इति विशेषविधानात्। यद्यपि संबन्धसामान्यपरिग्रहेऽपि जिज्ञासायाः कर्मापेक्षत्वेन कर्मार्थत्वसिद्धिः, तथापि, आक्षेपतः प्राप्तादाभिधानिकस्यैव ग्राह्यत्वात्कर्मणि षष्ठी गृह्यते।

न च प्रतिपदविधाना षष्ठी न समस्यते, इति कर्मणि षष्ठ्याः समासनिषेधः शङ्कनीयः, 'कृद्योगा षष्ठी समस्यते' इति प्रतिप्रसवसद्भावात्। ब्रह्मशब्देन स्वभावतो निरस्तनिखिल-

---

[2] The Predecessor-teachers abridged the voluminous exposition of the "*Brahmasūtras*" made by His Reverence Baudhāyana; [and] in accordance with their views, the words of the "*Sūtras*" would be commented upon [by us] —

Now, after, the desire to know Brahman, ॥ 1 ॥

Here, the word *atha* is for [showing] immediate succession; the word *ataḥ* is for the nature of cause of something that has happened. In the case of one who has studied the Vedas along with the [six] limbs [i. e. *Vedāṅgas*] and with the best portion [i. e. *Upaniṣads*], in whom the ardent longing for salvation has arisen owing to his having understood the nature of the knowledge of mere *Karma* [*-kāṇḍa*] having insignificant and impermanent fruit, the desire for the knowledge of Brahman, with endless and permanent fruit is, to be sure, to come immediately after. *Brahmajijñāsā* is [to be explained as] *brahmaṇaḥ* [of Brahman] *jijñāsā* [desire to know]. In the case of *brahmaṇaḥ* there is [the use of] the genitive for [showing] the object owing to the special rule, viz.—

'The genitive of a word with a kṛt affix is used to show agent or object.' (Pāṇ. Sūtra 2·3·65)

Even if [the genitive] is taken in the sense of a general relationship, there is the establishment of the nature of the sense 'object' owing to the 'desire to know' being dependent upon an 'object'; still, on account of a word directly denoting something being more acceptable than the one arising out of implication, the use of the genitive in the sense of an 'object' is accepted.

Nor should it be objected to, that there should be a prohibition of a compound in the case of the genitive showing the object, since the genitive, prescribed to refer to each word (*Pratipadavidhānā Saṣṭhī*) cannot be compounded,—on account of the existence of a counter exception, namely —

'The genitive associated with a "kṛt" affix is compounded.'

दोषोऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणः पुरुषोत्तमोऽभिधीयते। सर्वत्र बृहत्त्वगुणयोगेन ब्रह्मशब्दः। बृहत्त्वं च स्वरूपेण गुणैश्च, यत्रानवधिकातिशयं सोऽस्य मुख्योऽर्थः। स च सर्वेश्वर एव। अतो ब्रह्मशब्दस्तत्रैव मुख्यवृत्तः। तस्मादन्यत्र तद्गुणलेशयोगादौपचारिकः, अनेकार्थकल्पनायोगाद्भगवच्छब्दवत्। तापत्रयातुरैरमृतत्वाय स एव जिज्ञास्यः। अतः सर्वेश्वरो जिज्ञासाकर्मभूतं ब्रह्म। ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा। इच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधीयते।

[3] मीमांसापूर्वभागज्ञातस्य कर्मणोऽल्पास्थिरफलत्वात्, उपरितनभागावसेयस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यानन्ताक्षयफलत्वाच्च पूर्ववृत्तात्कर्मज्ञानादनन्तरमत एव हेतोर्ब्रह्म ज्ञातव्यमित्युक्तं भवति। तदाह वृत्तिकारः—

'वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्मविविदिषा'

इति। वक्ष्यति च कर्मब्रह्ममीमांसयोरैकशास्त्र्यम्,

By the word *brahman* is denoted the Highest Puruṣa, in whom all the blemishes are by nature expelled, [and who is] possessed of a host of auspicious qualities, unlimited, unsurpassed and innumerable. Everywhere the word *brahman* [is understood] as being associated with the quality of magnitude. Where there is unlimited excess in respect of nature as well as qualities—that is its primary sense. That, further, is definitely the 'Lord of all.' Therefore the word *brahman* has its primary sense in respect of that alone. Elsewhere than that, it [the word *brahman*] is metaphorical owing to the association with its qualities in a small measure, on account of the impropriety of imagining more than one meaning as [in the case of] the word *Bhagavat.* He [the Lord] alone is fit to be desired to be known for [the acquisition of] immortality by those [that are] afflicted by the triad of torments. Hence the 'Lord of all' [is] the Brahman, the object of the desire to know. '*Jijñāsā*' is the desire to know. As 'desire' is mainly concerned with something to be wished for, the knowledge that is wished for is enjoined here.

[3] On account of the Karman known from the first part of the 'Mīmāṁsā' [being associated] with [some] insignificant and impermanent fruit, and on account of the knowledge of Brahman, which is to be concluded from the succeeding part [of that viz. the 'Uttaramīmāṁsā'] being [associated] with endless and indestructible fruit, after the knowledge of Karman that has taken place before—for this very reason Brahman is to be known.—This is what is intended to be said. To the same effect has said the Vṛttikāra [the author of the Vṛtti, Baudhāyana]—

'The desire to know Brahman is after the acquisition of Karman which has taken place before.'

And he would be saying [further on] that the 'Karmamīmāṁsā' and the 'Brahmamīmāṁsā' have the nature of one Śāstra in—

'संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिः'

इति। अतः प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थभेदेन षट्कभेदवत्, अध्यायभेदवच्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोर्भेदः। मीमांसाशास्त्रम्

'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' (जै. सू. १।१।१)

इत्यारभ्य,

'अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात्।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।२२)

इत्येवमन्तं संगतिविशेषेण विशिष्टक्रमम्। तथाहि—प्रथमं तावत् 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्यध्ययनेनैव स्वाध्यायशब्दवाच्यवेदाख्याक्षरराशेर्ग्रहणं विधीयते। तच्चाध्ययनं किंरूपं कथं च कर्तव्यमित्यपेक्षायाम्,

'अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत, तमध्यापयीत'

इत्यनेन,

'श्रावण्यां प्रौष्ठपद्यां वा उपाकृत्य यथाविधि।
युक्तश्छन्दांस्यधीयीत मासान्विप्रोऽर्धपञ्चमान्॥' (मनु. ४।९५)

इत्यादिव्रतनियमविशेषोपदेशैश्चापेक्षितानि विधीयन्ते।

'This Sāstra dealing with the embodied [soul] has been welded together by the treatise of Jaimini in sixteen chapters—and so is proved the oneness of the [two] Sāstras.'

Hence, owing to the difference in the subject-matter intended to be propounded, there is a difference between the 'Pūrvamīmāṁsā' and the 'Uttaramīmāṁsā', like the division into the groups of six Adhyāyas [of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā] as also like the division into the chapters [of the Uttaramīmāṁsā].

The science of Mīmāṁsā does follow a particular order owing to a distinct co-ordination [as shown in], beginning with—

'And now, therefore, the desire to know Dharma'. (J. S. I·1·1).

and ending with—

'Non-return on account of the Word. Non-return on account of the Word'. (Br. Sū. IV. 4·22).

To explain the same : to begin with, for the matter of that, there is enjoined the comprehension of the heap of syllables known as the 'Vedas', denoted by the word '*Svādhyāya*', by the study itself in accordance with [the injunction]—

'One's own Vedic portion (Svādhyāya) ought to be studied'.

And regarding the expectancy as to, in what form and how that study is to be carried on, there are enjoined the requirements by means of instructions in particular vows and regulations such as—

'One should perform the thread-ceremony for an eight-year old Brāhmaṇa, [and] should teach him.'.

Having performed the 'Upākarman' ceremony according to the injunction, 'on the full-moon day of the month of Śrāvaṇa, or the full-moon day of the month of Prauṣṭhapada [Bhādrapada], a Brāhmaṇa should devotedly study the Vedas for four and a half months.' (Manu 4·95).

[4] एवं सत्संतानप्रसूतसदाचारनिष्ठात्मगुणोपेतवेदविदाचार्योपनीतस्य व्रतनियमविशेषयुक्तस्याचार्योच्चारणानूच्चारणमक्षरराशिग्रहणफलमध्ययनमित्यवगम्यते। अध्ययनं च स्वाध्यायसंस्कारः, 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इति स्वाध्यायस्य कर्मत्वावगमात्। संस्कारो हि नाम कार्यान्तरयोग्यताकरणम्। संस्कार्यत्वं च स्वाध्यायस्य युक्तम्, धर्मार्थकाममोक्षरूपपुरुषार्थचतुष्टयतत्साधनावबोधित्वात्, जपादिना स्वरूपेणापि तत्साधनत्वाच्च। एवम्, अध्ययनविधिर्मन्त्रवन्नियमवदक्षरराशिग्रहणमात्रे पर्यवस्यति। अध्ययनगृहीतस्य स्वाध्यायस्य स्वभावत एव प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधित्वदर्शनात्, गृहीतात्स्वाध्यायादवगम्यमानान्प्रयोजनवतोऽर्थानापाततो दृष्ट्वा, तत्स्वरूपप्रकारविशेषनिर्णयफलवद्वाक्यविचाररूपमीमांसाश्रवणेऽधीतवेदः पुरुषः स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते।

[5] तत्र कर्मविधिस्वरूपे निरूपिते, कर्मणामल्पास्थिरफलत्वं दृष्ट्वा, अध्ययनगृहीतस्वाध्यायैकदेशोपनिषद्वाक्येषु चामृतस्वरूपानन्तास्थिरफलापातप्रतीतेस्तन्निर्णयफल-

---

[4] Thus in the case of one who has been brought near the Ācārya [for studying under him] born of a noble family, devoted to good conduct, endowed with spiritual qualities, conversant with the Vedas, [and] who has observed particular vows and regulations, the repeating after the teacher has uttered it, having for its fruit the comprehension of the heap of syllables—this is known to be 'the study.' And 'study' is [but] working upon one's own Vedic portion on account of the apprehension of 'Svādhyāya' as being the object in [the expression]—

'*Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ*'.

'Working upon' again, to be sure, is effecting the fitness to serve another purpose. And the fitness for being worked upon is quite befitting the 'Vedic section for study' on account of its being possessed of the nature of the enlightening [of one] about the fourfold human purpose in life, in the form of Dharma, Artha [wealth], Kāma [desire], Mokṣa [salvation], [and] the means thereof as also muttering etc. being in their own form, its means. In this way, the study-injunction culminates in the mere grasp of the heap of syllables like the Mantras [and] like the restriction-passages. Finding out that one's own Vedic-section taken up for study, by its very nature enlightens [one] about the meaning along with its purpose and having superficially grasped the meanings along with the purpose which are being known from the study-section, a man who has studied the Veda, of his own accord starts on hearing the discussion of the Vedic sentences in the form of its nature, variety, particularity, decision and fruit.

[5] There, when the nature of the injunctions regarding [sacrificial] rites has been well-scrutinised, having seen the insignificant and impermanent fruit of [sacrificial] rites and through the comprehension at first sight of the nature of the Immortal in the passages from the Upaniṣadas [forming] a part of the Vedic study-section, taken up for study, the person becomes fit for the

वदान्तवाक्यविचाररूपशारीरकमीमांसायामधिकरोति। तथा च वेदान्तवाक्यानि केवलकर्मफलस्य क्षयित्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य चाक्षयफलत्वं दर्शयन्ति—

'तद्यथेव कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते।' (छा. ८।१।६)

'अन्तवदेवास्य तद्भवति।' (बृ. ३।८।१०)

'न ह्यध्रुवैः प्राप्यते ध्रुवं कर्मभिः।' (का. २।१०)

'प्लवा ह्येतेऽदृढा यज्ञरूपाः।' (मु. २।७)

'परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायात् नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन।
तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्॥'
'तस्मै स विद्वानुपसन्नाय सम्यक्प्रशान्तचित्ताय शमान्विताय।
येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्॥' (मु. १।२।१२–१३)

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्।' (तै. २।१।१)

'न पुनर्मृत्यवे तदेकं पश्यति। न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति।' (छा. ७।१६।२)

'स स्वराड्भवति।' (छा. ७।२५।२)

---

consideration of the science of the Embodied [soul], of the nature of the discussion of the Vedic passages resulting in the ascertainment of that [Amṛtasvarūpa].

And further, the Vedānta passages point out to the perishability of the fruit of mere Karman and the imperishability of the fruit in the case of the knowledge of Brahman—

'Just as here the world secured [lit. gathered] by Karman comes to naught, so hereafter, the world secured by merit comes to naught.' (Chā. 8·1·6)

'That becomes for him having an end'. (Bṛ. 3·8·10)

'Not, indeed, is secured the permanent by the impermanent Karmans'. (Kā. 2·10)

'These ferries in the form of sacrifices [are], indeed, not firm'. (Mu. 2·7)

'Having examined the worlds secured by Karman, a Brahman-Knower should become disgusted; there is no 'unmade' [immortality] by the 'made' [Karmans]. In order to know this, he should approach with the sacrificial fuel in the hand [as a persent] the teacher alone well-versed in the three Vedas [and] fully devoted to Brahman'.

'That wise one explained to him who has come near [as a student] with his mind extremely well-pacified, endowed with tranquillity—the Reality [Existent] by which he knows the indestructible Puruṣa—that knowledge of Brahman in its reality'. (Mu. 1·2·12-13)

'The Brahman-Knower acquires the Highest'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'Not for death again, [he] who sees that [to be] one; not the seer [who realises Brahman] sees death'. (Chā. 7·16·2)

'He becomes the self-ruler'. (Chā. 7·25·2)

'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति।' (नृ. पू. १।६)
'तमेवं विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते।' (श्वेता. ३।८)
'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति।' (श्वेता. १।६)

इत्यादीनि।

[6] ननु च साङ्गवेदाध्ययनादेव कर्मणां स्वर्गादिफलत्वं स्वर्गादिनां च क्षयित्वं ब्रह्मोपासनस्यामृतफलत्वं च ज्ञायत एव। अनन्तरं मुमुक्षुर्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामेव प्रवर्तताम्। किमर्था धर्मविचारापेक्षा?

एवं तर्हि शारीरकमीमांसायामपि न प्रवर्तताम्, साङ्गवेदाध्ययनादेव कृत्स्नस्य ज्ञातत्वात्।

सत्यम्। आपाततः प्रतीतिर्विद्यत एव, तथापि न्यायानुगृहीतस्य वाक्यस्यार्थनिश्चायकत्वादापातप्रतीतोऽप्यर्थः संशयविपर्ययौ नातिवर्तते। अतस्तन्निर्णयाय वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः कर्तव्यः — इति चेत्,

तथैव धर्मविचारोऽपि कर्तव्य इति पश्यतु भवान्।

'*Knowing him thus, he becomes immortal*'. (Nṛ. Pū. 1·6)

'*Having known him thus, he passes over death; there is no other path for salvation* [*ayanāya*]'. (Śvet. 3·8)

'*Having thought the Ātman and the Impeller* [*the Paramātman*] *as separate, satisfied, thereafter by that he attains to immortality*'. (Śvet. 1·6)

and so forth.

[**6**] I say [says the objector]—The Karmans [sacrificial], having heaven etc. as their fruit and the perishability of heaven and others and further the worship of Brahman having immortality as the fruit—all this is already known from the study itself of the Veda with the subsidiaries. Afterwards the release-seeker may proceed for the desire to know Brahman itself. What purpose then of the expectancy for the consideration of Dharma?

—In that case, then, let him not proceed on the consideration of the science of the Embodied [soul] either, on account of everything being known from the study itself of the Veda with the limbs [subsidiaries].

—True, there is certainly the prima-facie apprehension, still on account of a sentence favoured by logical reasoning leading on to a definite ascertainment of the sense, a sense although apprehended at first sight does not transcend doubt and wrong apprehension—therefore the consideration of the Vedāntic texts be undertaken for determining the same—if it be objected to thus—

[We say] then may your honourable self see that the consideration of Dharma also has got to be undertaken exactly in the same way.

[7] ननु च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा यदेव नियमेनापेक्षते तदेव पूर्ववृत्तं वक्तव्यम्। न धर्मविचारापेक्षा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः, अधीतवेदान्तस्यानधिगतकर्मणोऽपि वेदान्तवाक्यार्थ-विचारोपपत्तेः।

कर्माङ्गाश्रयाण्युद्गीथाद्युपासनान्यत्रैव चिन्त्यन्ते, तदनधिगतकर्मणो न शक्यं कर्तुम्—इति चेत्,

अनभिज्ञो हि भवान् शारीरकशास्त्रविज्ञानस्य। अस्मिन्शास्त्रे, अनाद्यविद्याकृत-विविधभेददर्शननिमित्तजन्मजरामरणादिसांसारिकदुःखसागरनिमग्नस्य निखिलदुःखमूल-भूतमिथ्याज्ञाननिबर्हणाय, आत्मैकत्वविज्ञानं प्रतिपिपादयिषितम्। अस्य हि भेदावलम्बि कर्मज्ञानं क्वोपयुज्यते? प्रत्युत विरुद्धमेव। उद्गीथादिविचारस्तु कर्मशेषभूत एव ज्ञान-स्वरूपत्वाविशेषादिहैव क्रियते। स तु न साक्षात्संगतः। अतो यत्प्रधानं शास्त्रं तदपेक्षितमेव पूर्ववृत्तं किमपि वक्तव्यम्।

बाढम्। तदपेक्षितं च कर्मविज्ञानमेव कर्मसमुच्चिताज्ज्ञानादपवर्गश्रुतेः। वक्ष्यति च—

---

[7] Further, I say [says the objector]—Whatever the 'desire to know Brahman' necessarily requires that same antecedent state of things has to be stated. For the 'desire to know Brahman', [there is] no necessity of consideration of Dharma on account of the possibility of the consideration of the sense of Vedāntic passages [arising in the case] of one who has studied the Vedānta, although he has not apprehended the Karma[-kāṇḍa].

If it be objected to—Udgītha and other modes of worship having a part of ritual for the resort are taken into consideration even here [and] that is not possible to be done in the case of one who has not apprehended the Karma [-kāṇḍa]—

[Our reply is]—Your honourable self is surely [quite] ignorant of the Knowledge in all its implications (*Vijñāna*) of the science of the Embodied [self]. In this Śāstra [of the Embodied self] there is intended to be propounded the special knowledge of the oneness of Ātman for the sake of rooting out the false knowledge which is the root of all misery in the case of one plunged into the ocean of misery due to worldly existence such as birth, old age, death consequent upon the perception of difference of various kinds caused by the beginningless 'Avidyā' [ne-science]; where again is [such a] knowledge of Karman depending on difference to be made use of? On the contrary, [that is] definitely opposed [to the knowledge of Brahman]. The consideration of the [modes of worship] Udgītha etc., however, being positively subordinate to the Karman [rite] [and] being not different from the characteristics of knowledge is, to be sure, [fit to be] made here. But that [consideration] is not directly relevant. Therefore, whatsoever antecedent requisite is definitely regarded as necessary by that which is dealt with prominently in a science, has got to be stated.

[That is] right, and the same regarded as necessary [requisite] is the special knowledge of the ritual alone, on account of the Sruti passage dealing with salvation from knowledge combined with ritual. And [the Sūtrakāra] would be stating [as under]—

'*सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्*' (ब्र. सू. ३।४।२६)

इति। अपेक्षिते कर्मण्यज्ञाते केन समुच्चयः केन नेति विभागो न शक्यते ज्ञातुम्। अतस्तदेव पूर्ववृत्तम्।

[8] नैतद्युक्तम्, सकलविशेषप्रत्यनीकचिन्मात्रब्रह्मविज्ञानादेवाविद्यानिवृत्तेः। अविद्यानिवृत्तिरेव हि मोक्षः। वर्णाश्रमविशेषसाध्यसाधनेतिकर्तव्यताद्यनन्तविकल्पास्पदं कर्म सकलभेददर्शननिवृत्तिरूपाज्ञाननिवृत्तेः कथमिव साधनं भवेत्? श्रुतयश्च कर्मणामनित्यफलत्वेन मोक्षविरोधित्वं ज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षसाधनत्वं च दर्शयन्ति—

'*अन्तवदेवास्य तद्भवति।*' (बृ. ३।८।१०)

'*तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते।*' (छा. ८।१।६)

'*ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्।*' (तै. २।१।१)

'*ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति।*' (मु. ३।२।९)

'*तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति।*' (श्वेता. ३।८)

इत्याद्याः।

[9] यद्यपि चेदमुक्तं यज्ञादिकर्मापेक्षा विद्येति, तद्वस्तुविरोधाच्छ्रुत्यक्षरपर्या-

---

'*Expectancy for all, from the Śruti dealing with sacrifice etc., like the horse.*' (Br. Sū. 3·4·26)

If the requisite Karman is not known, it would not be possible to know the division—with what the combination [is to be] and with what not. Therefore, that same is the antecedent requisite.

[8] —This [view] is not proper, on account of the cessation of 'Avidyā' from the special knowledge of Brahman alone which is constituted of mere Cit, [sentiency, consciousness] the opposite (*pratyanīka*) of all [kinds of] distinctions, and the cessation of 'Avidyā' itself is salvation. [Now] how possibly would Karman the resort of endless alternatives, such as the goal to be reached, the means and the detailed procedure associated with particular castes and stages of life, for the matter of that, be the means for the cessation of '*Ajñāna*' [ignorance] of the form of the cessation of the perception of all difference? And the Śruti passages point out to the antagonism to salvation of ritualistic deeds owing to [their] fruit being impermanent, and the knowledge alone being the means of salvation—

'*That becomes for him having an end.*' (Bṛ. 3·8·10)

'*Just as here the world secured [lit. gathered] by Karman comes to nought, so hereafter, the world secured by merit comes to nought.*' (Chā. 8·1·6)

'*The Brahman-knower secures the Highest*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman itself*'. (Mu. 3·2·9)

'*Having known Him alone, he passes over death*'. (Śvet. 3·8)

and such others.

[9] As to what this further has been said—

लोचनया चान्तःकरणनैर्मल्यद्वारेण विविदिषोत्पत्तावुपयुज्यते, न फलोत्पत्तौ, 'विविदिषन्ति' इति श्रवणात्। विविदिषायां जातायां ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ शमादीनामेवान्तरङ्गोपायतां श्रुतिरेवाह—

'शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः
समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्।' (बृ. ४।४।२३)

इति।

तदेवं जन्मान्तरशतानुष्ठितानभिसंहितफलविशेषकर्ममृदितकषायस्य विविदिषोत्पत्तौ सत्यां—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्।' (छा. ६।२।१)
'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म।' (तै. २।१।१)
'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्।' (श्वेता. ६।१९)
'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म।' (बृ. २।५।१९)
'तत्त्वमसि।' (छा. ६।८।७)

इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानादेवाविद्या निवर्तते।

[10] वाक्यार्थज्ञानोपयोगीनि च श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनानि। श्रवणं नाम वेदान्तवाक्यान्यात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपादकानीति तत्त्वदर्शिन आचार्यान्न्याययुक्तार्थग्रहणम्।

Knowledge is dependent upon ritual sacrifices and others, that on account of its being contrary to the nature of things is to be taken as producing a desire to know through the purity of the mind, and by a careful scrutiny of the Śruti words, and not as producing the fruit on account of [the expression] 'Vividiṣanti ' [they desire to know]. After the desire to know has been produced, the Śruti itself declares tranquillity, restraint and others alone as the internal means for the production of knowledge.

'Having become tranquil, restrained, resigned, patient and absorbed in meditation, he should see the Ātman within the Ātman alone'. (Bṛ. 4·4·23)

Thereafter, when there is thus the production of 'desire to know' [in the case] of one whose impurities are smashed down by Karman performed in hundreds of lives without any idea of the particular fruit, there turns away 'Avidyā' from the knowledge itself produced from the Śruti passages like—

'Existence, alone, my dear (Somya) was all this in the beginning, one alone without a second'. (Chā. 6·2·1)
'Existent, knowledge, infinite [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 2·1·1)
'Partless, actionless, tranquil, blameless, blotless'. (Śvet. 6·19)
'This Ātman [is] Brahman'. (Bṛ. 2·5·19)
'That thou art'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

[10] Further, 'hearing', 'thinking' [meditating], 'contemplating', are conducive to the knowledge of the meaning of the [Śruti] passages. 'Hearing' means (*nāma*) comprehension of the sense fortified by reasoning through the preceptor who sees the nature of things, because (*iti*) the Vedānta passages propound the knowledge of the oneness of the self.

एवमाचार्योपदिष्टार्थस्य स्वात्मनि 'एवमेव युक्तम्' इति हेतुतः प्रतिष्ठापनं मननम्। एतद्विरोध्यनादिभेदवासनानिरसनायास्यार्थस्यानवरतभावना निदिध्यासनम्। एवं श्रवणादिभिर्निरस्तसमस्तभेदवासनस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानमविद्यां निवर्तयति- इत्येवंरूपस्य श्रवणस्यावश्यापेक्षितमेव पूर्ववृत्तं वक्तव्यम्। तच्च—नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, इहामुत्रफलोपभोगविरागः, मुमुक्षुत्वं च- इत्येतत्साधनचतुष्टयम्। अनेन विना जिज्ञासानुपपत्तेरर्थस्वभावादेवेदमेव पूर्ववृत्तमिति ज्ञायते।

एतदुक्तं भवति—

[11] ब्रह्मस्वरूपाच्छादिकाविद्यामूलमपारमार्थिकं भेददर्शनमेव बन्धमूलम्। बन्धश्चापारमार्थिकः। स च समूलोऽपारमार्थिकत्वादेव ज्ञानेनैव निवर्त्यते। निवर्तकं च ज्ञानं *'तत्त्वमसि'* (छा. ६।८।७) आदिवाक्यजन्यम्। तस्यैतस्य वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य स्वरूपे तदुत्पत्तौ कार्ये वा कर्मणो नोपयोगः।

विविदिषायामेव तु कर्मणामुपयोगः। स च पापमूलरजस्तमोनिबर्हणद्वारेण सत्त्ववृद्ध्या भवतीति, इममुपयोगमभिप्रेत्य,

---

In a similar way 'thinking' is the firm establishment within oneself of the sense instructed by the preceptor through reasoning in the form (*iti*) 'This is proper'. 'Contemplation' is the ceaseless mental revolving of this sense in order to expel the mental impression (*Vāsanā*) of the beginningless difference which is opposed to this [oneness of the self]. And so has to be stated the antecedent requisite necessarily expected in the case of 'hearing' of this form, because (*iti*) the knowledge of the sense of the [Śruti] passages [in the case] of a person whose '*Vāsanā*' about difference in toto is expelled by 'hearing' etc. in this way, turns away '*Avidyā*'. And that—discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, the wealth of accessories such as tranquillity, restraint, aversion to the enjoyment of fruit here and hereafter, [and] being desirous of salvation—is the fourfold means. On account of the 'desire to know' not being feasible without this, in this way alone, it is known that this is the necessary pre-requisite due to the very nature of the sense.

This is [what is intended to be] said—

[11] The perception of difference which is not real and is rooted in 'Avidyā' that screens the nature of Brahman, is alone the root of bondage and bondage is unreal and that is turned away root and branch by knowledge alone, owing to its being unreal itself. And the remover-knowledge is to be produced by the [Sruti] passages like—

'That thou art'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

In [the matter of] the nature, its production and effect of this aforesaid knowledge to be produced from [Śruti] passages, there is no use [at all] of Karman.

There is, however, use of Karmans definitely in the matter of the 'desire to know', and that [use] takes place by the increase of the quality

'ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति ।'　　　　(बृ. ४।४।२२)

इत्युक्तम् इति ।

अतो कर्मणो ज्ञानस्यानुपयोगादुक्तमेव साधनचतुष्टयं पूर्ववृत्तमिति वक्तव्यम् ।

[12] अत्रोच्यते—

यदुक्तं अविद्यानिवृत्तिरेव मोक्षः, सा च ब्रह्मविज्ञानादेव भवति— इति तदभ्युपगम्यते। अविद्यानिवृत्तये हि वेदान्तवाक्यैर्विधित्सितं ज्ञानं किंरूपमिति विवेचनीयम् । किं वाक्याद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रम्, उत तन्मूलमुपासनात्मकं ज्ञानमिति। न तावद्वाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानम्, तस्य विधानमन्तरेणापि वाक्यादेव सिद्धेः, तावन्मात्रेणाविद्यानिवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेश्च ।

न च वाच्यम्- भेदवासनायामनिरस्तायां वाक्यमविद्यानिवर्तकं ज्ञानं न जनयति । ज्ञाने जातेऽपि सर्वस्य सहसैव भेदज्ञानानिवृत्तिर्न दोषाय। चन्द्रैकत्वे ज्ञातेऽपि द्विचन्द्रज्ञानानिवृत्तिवत्, अनिवृत्तमपि छिन्नमूलत्वेन न बन्धाय भवति- इति, सत्यां सामग्र्यां ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः, सत्यामपि विपरीतवासनायामाप्तोपदेशलिङ्गादिभिर्बाधकज्ञानोत्पत्ति-

---

Goodness (*sattva*), through the rooting out of qualities of Activity (*rajas*) and Ignorance [*tamas*] which are the root-causes of sin; and bearing in mind, this use, it has been stated [in the passage]—

'The Brāhmaṇas desire to know'.　　　　(Bṛ. 4·4·22)

Hence, knowledge having no use of Karman, the fourfold means already stated should be spoken of as the pre-requisite.

[12] —To this [objection raised above] it is stated [in reply]—

What has been stated [by you] that the cessation of 'Avidyā' alone [is] salvation and that [cessation of 'Avidyā'] too results from the special knowledge of Brahman alone—is accepted [by us]. Now, it has to be carefully looked into, of what form that knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedānta passages for the removal of 'Avidyā'—Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of the passages from the passage or the knowledge in the form of worship based upon that? It [can-] not [be], for the matter of that, knowledge to be produced from the passage, on account of its being [actually] secured from the sentence itself even without there being any injunction about it, and owing to the securing of the cessation of 'Avidyā' by that much alone.

Nor again should it be objected to —With the 'Vāsanā' of difference not having been removed, the passage would not produce knowledge turning away 'Avidyā'. Even when the knowledge is produced, the non-cessation of the knowledge of difference all of a sudden in the case of all cannot be [regarded as] wrong. Like the non-cessation of the perception (*jñāna*) of two moons, even when the oneness of the Moon is known, knowledge [of the 'Bhedavāsanā'] although ceased is not conducive to bondage on account of its roots being cut, on account of the impossibility of the non-production of knowledge with the set of means of production [at hand]. Because even when there is the contrary 'Vāsanā', the production of the falsifying [stultifying] knowledge is seen by the means such as instruction

दर्शनात्। सत्यपि वाक्यार्थज्ञानेऽनादिवासनया भेदज्ञानमनुवर्तत इति भवता न शक्यते वक्तुम्, भेदज्ञानसामग्र्या अपि वासनाया मिथ्यारूपत्वेन ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यैव निवृत्तत्वात्। ज्ञानोत्पत्तावपि मिथ्यारूपायास्तस्या अनिवृत्तौ निवर्तकान्तराभावात्कदाचिदपि नास्या वासनाया निवृत्तिः। वासनाकार्यं भेदज्ञानं छिन्नमूलम्, अथ चानुवर्तते, इति बालिशभाषितम्।

द्विचन्द्रज्ञानादौ तु, बाधकसंनिधावपि मिथ्याज्ञानहेतोः परमार्थतिमिरादिदोषस्य ज्ञानबाध्यत्वाभावेनाविनष्टत्वात्, मिथ्याज्ञानानुवृत्तिरविरुद्धा। प्रबलप्रमाणबाधितत्वेन भयादिकार्यं तु निवर्तते। अपि च भेदवासनानिरसनद्वारेण ज्ञानोत्पत्तिमभ्युपगच्छतां कदाचिदपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्न सेत्स्यति, भेदवासनाया अनादिकालोपचितत्वेन, अपरिमितत्वात्तद्विरोधिभावनायाश्चाल्पत्वादनया तन्निरसनानुपपत्तेः। अतो वाक्यार्थज्ञानादन्यदेव ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं ज्ञानं वेदान्तवाक्यैर्विधित्सितम्। तथा च श्रुतयः—

'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत।' (बृ. ४।४।२१)

---

from the authority [the preceptor] and logical reasoning. It is not possible for you to argue that the knowledge of the difference persists on account of the beginningless 'Vāsanā', even when there is the knowledge of the sense of the [Śruti] passages, because the Vāsanā which is also the aggregate of the means of the perception of difference is turned by the production of the knowledge itself, as it is of a false nature. If that ['Vāsanā'] with a false nature is not removed even by the production of knowledge, there would not be at any time, the cessation of this 'Vāsanā' on account of the absence of any other removing agency. That the result of the perception of difference—the effect of 'Vāsanā' has its roots cut off, and that it still persists—is a puerile statement [a childish prattle].

In the case of the perception of two moons, however, the persistence of the false perception [*jñāna*] is not incompatible, on account of the real disorders like Timira [partial blindness], the cause of wrong perception, not being completely destroyed, even in the presence of a stultifying agency, owing to their unstultified nature, by knowledge. As for the effect such as fear etc. [due to the serpent on the rope], however, [we say]—It turns away owing to being opposed by stronger means of proof. Moreover, in the case of those admitting the production of knowledge through the removal of the 'Vāsanā' about difference, there would, indeed, never be the production of knowledge. On account of the 'Vāsanā' of difference being collected together from times immemorial, [and thus] being immeasurable, and the revolving thought opposed to it being small, it is impossible for this ['bhāvanā'] to expel it [the 'bhedavāsanā']. Therefore, quite another knowledge, than the knowledge of the sense of the passages denoted by the words like '*Upāsanā*' etc. is intended to be '*dhyāna*' enjoined by the Vedānta passages. And to the same effect [are] the [following] Śruti [passages]—

'Having particularly known [Him], one should practise wisdom.' (Bṛ. 4·4·21)

'*अनुविद्य विजानाति।*' (छा. ८।७।१)
'*ओमित्येवात्मानं ध्यायत।*' (मु. २।२।६)
'*निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते।*' (का. ३।१५)
'*आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत।*' (बृ. १।४।१५)
'*आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः।*' (बृ. २।४।५)
'*सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः। स विजिज्ञासितव्यः।*' (छा. ८।७।१)

इत्येवमाद्याः।

[13] अत्र 'निदिध्यासितव्यः' इत्यादिनैकार्थ्यात्, 'अनुविद्य विजानाति' 'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' इत्येवमादिभिर्वाक्यार्थज्ञानं ध्यानोपकारकत्वात् 'अनुविद्य' 'विज्ञाय' इत्यनूद्य 'प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' 'विजानाति' इति ध्यानं विधीयते।

'श्रोतव्यः' इति चानुवादः, स्वाध्यायस्यार्थपरत्वेनाधीतवेदः पुरुषः प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधित्वदर्शनात्तन्निर्णयाय स्वयमेव श्रवणे प्रवर्तत इति श्रवणस्य प्राप्तत्वात्। श्रवणप्रतिष्ठा-

---

'*Having known [Him] afterwards, he knows*'. (Chā. 8·7·1)
'*You should meditate upon Self as 'Oṁ' itself.*' (Mu. 2·2·6)
'*Having ascertained It, he is freed from the jaws of death*'. (Kā. 3·15)
'*One should worship the world as the Ātman himself*'. (Bṛ. 1·4·15)
'*Ātman, O [Maitreyi], to be sure, should be seen, heard, thought of and contemplated upon*'. (Bṛ. 2·4·5)
'*He should be searched for; he should be specially desired to be known*'. (Chā. 8·7·1)

and the like.

[13] Here, because of the knowledge of the sense of the passages as from [passages like]—

'Having known [Him] afterwards he knows'.

'Having particularly known [Him] one should practise wisdom'.

being possessed of the same sense as [the passage]—

'He is fit to be meditated upon'.

and because it helps the contemplation, so, in accordance with (*anūdya*)

'Having known [Him] afterwards',

[and]

'Having particularly known [Him]',

contemplation is enjoined in [the passages]—

'One should practise wisdom', 'He knows'.

'To be heard' is just a repetition on account of the fact that 'Śravaṇa' [hearing] perforce comes in [as a matter of course], because a person who has studied the Vedas, on account of the perception of the apprehension of the sense with a purpose due to the study of one's own Vedic portion leading on to some sense, starts upon 'hearing' of his own accord in order to ascertain the

र्थत्वान्मननस्य 'मन्तव्यः' इति चानुवादः। तस्माद्ध्यानमेव विधीयते। वक्ष्यति च—

'आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्' (ब्र. सू. ४।१।१)

इति।

तदिदमपवर्गोपायतया विधित्सितं वेदनमुपासनमित्यवगम्यते, विद्युपास्त्योरव्यतिरेकेणोपक्रमोपसंहारदर्शनात्—

'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत।' (छा ३।१८।१)

इत्यत्र

'भाति च तपति च कीर्त्या, यशसा ब्रह्मवर्चसेन य एवं वेद।' (छा. ३।१८।३)

'न स वेद। अकृत्स्नो ह्येषः।.........आत्मेत्येवोपासीत।' (बृ. १।४।७)

'यस्तद्वेद यत्स वेद स मयैतदुक्तः।' (छा. ४।१।४)

इत्यत्र

'अनु म एतां भगवो देवतां शाधि यां देवतामुपास्से।' (छा. ४।२।२)

इति।

[14] ध्यानं च तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसंतानरूपम्—

---

same. And 'to be thought of' is also a repetition on account of 'Manana' being intended for the stability of 'hearing'. Therefore, 'contemplation' alone is enjoined. And [the Sūtrakāra] would be saying [below]—

'*Repetition owing to the instruction, more than once.*' (Br. Sū. 4·1·1)

And this 'knowing' intended to be enjoined as the means of salvation is understood as 'Upāsanā' [worship], the roots 'Vid' [to know] and 'Upās' [to worship] being seen used without any distinction in the beginning and in the conclusion [as follows]—

'*One should worship as Brahman*'. (Chā. 3·18·1)

Here in this passage—

'*He shines and blazons forth through reputation, glory and Brahmanical lustre, who knows thus*' (Chā. 3·18·3)

[and] in these passages—

'*He does not know. This one is not entire...........He should worship Him as Ātman alone.*' (Br. 1·4·7)

'*He who knows that he [Raikva] knows this is [likewise] one [appropriating the good deeds of people] spoken of by me thus.*' (Chā. 4·1·4)

Here in this passage—

'*Teach me, Revered Sir, that deity which deity you worship.*' (Chā. 4·2·2)

[14] And contemplation is of the nature of the uninterrupted continuity of remembrance like the stream of oil, [and] it is intensified remembrance on account of the Śruti [passage] stating the intensified remembrance as the means of salvation in the passage—

'ध्रुवा स्मृतिः । स्मृतिलम्भे सर्वग्रन्थीनां विप्रमोक्षः ।' (छा. ७।२६।२)

इति ध्रुवायाः स्मृतेरपवर्गोपायत्वश्रवणात् । सा च स्मृतिर्दर्शनसमानाकारा—

'भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥' (मु. २।२।८)

इत्यनेनैकार्थ्यात् । एवं च सति—

'आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. २।४।५)

इत्यनेन निदिध्यासनस्य दर्शनरूपता विधीयते । भवति च स्मृतेर्भावनाप्रकर्षाद्दर्शनरूपता । वाक्यकारेणैतत्सर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् ।—

'वेदनमुपासनं स्यात्तद्विषये श्रवणात् ।'

इति सर्वासूपनिषत्सु मोक्षसाधनतया विहितं वेदनमुपासनमित्युक्तम् ।

'सकृत्प्रत्ययं कुर्याच्छब्दार्थस्य कृतत्वात्प्रयाजादिवत्'

इति पूर्वपक्षं कृत्वा

'सिद्धं तूपासनशब्दात्' ।

इति वेदनमसकृदावृत्तं मोक्षसाधनमिति निर्णीतम् ।

'उपासनं स्याद्ध्रुवानुस्मृतिर्दर्शनान्निर्वचनाच्च ।'

'Intensified remembrance. On the acquisition of this memory, there is a complete loosening of all knots'. (Chā. 7·26·2)

That remembrance, further, has a similar form [status] as realisation, on account of its having the same sense with [the passage]

'The heart-knot breaks away; all doubts are cut off; and his acts come to nought when that Highest [the High-low] is seen.' (Mu. 2·2·8)

And this being so, there is declared contemplation having the nature of realisation by [the passage]—

'Ātman [O, Maitreyi], to be sure, [is] to be seen.' (Br. 2·4·5)

And there does take place the nature of realisation for remembrance on account of the intensity of 'bhāvanā'. All this has been propounded by the Vākyakāra in the passage (*iti*)—

'Vedana [knowledge] would be Upāsanā [worship] on account of its being mentioned in the Śruti in that topic.'

'Vedana' [knowledge] enjoined as the means of salvation in all Upaniṣads is spoken of as worship. Having represented as the prima-facie view viz.—

'One should do the contemplation once, the meaning of the words [of the Scriptures] being carried out [by so doing] like the Prayāja and others [sacrificial offerings]'

it has been decided [by the Vākyakāra] that 'Vedana' [knowledge] which is repeated more than once is the means of salvation, in [the passage]—

'It, however, has been established by the word 'Upāsana.'

And in the passage—

'Permanent-post-remembrance—knowledge would be worship on account of observation and definite statement—'

इति तस्यैव वेदनस्योपासनरूपस्यासकृदावृत्तस्य ध्रुवानुस्मृतित्वमुपवर्णितम् ।

[15] सेयं स्मृतिर्दर्शनरूपा प्रतिपादिता। दर्शनरूपता च प्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः। एवं प्रत्यक्षतापन्नामपवर्गसाधनभूतां स्मृतिं विशिनष्टि—

'नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ॥' (का. २।२३)

इति। अनेन केवलश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनानामात्मप्राप्त्यनुपायत्वमुक्त्वा *'यमेवैष आत्मा वृणुते तेन लभ्यः'* इत्युक्तम्। प्रियतम एव हि वरणीयो भवति। यस्यायं निरतिशयप्रियः स एवास्य प्रियतमो भवति। यथायं प्रियतम आत्मानं प्राप्नोति तथा स्वयमेव भगवान्प्रयतत इति भगवतैवोक्तम्—

'तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥' (गीता १०।१०)

इति।

'प्रियो हि ज्ञानिनोऽत्यर्थमहं स च मम प्रियः।' (गीता ७।१७)

इति च।

---

that same 'Vedana' [knowledge] having the nature of worship, repeated more than once has been described as of the nature of permanent-post-remembrance knowledge.

[15] And that same remembrance is described as having the form of realisation. And 'having the form of realisation' amounts to the attainment of the nature of direct perception. In this way he particularises the remembrance which is the means for salvation as amounting to direct perception.

'This Ātman is not to be secured by exposition, nor by intelligence, nor by much learning. That one whom this [Ātman] chooses, by him [the Ātman] is to be secured; and for him this Ātman lays bare his own form'. (Kā. 2·23)

—By this [passage] having spoken of mere [unaided] hearing, thinking, contemplating as not being the means of securing Ātman, it has been declared—

'That one whom this [Ātman] chooses, by him [the Ātman] is to be secured.'

For, the dearest one only is fit to be chosen. For whom alone this one is exceedingly dear, that alone is dearest to him. The Lord himself strives hard (*pra*) so that this dearest one secures the Ātman— this has been said by the Lord himself [in the passage]—

'For those constantly devoted [to Me], [and] clinging affectionately [to Me] I vouchsafe that 'Buddhiyoga' by which they come unto me.' (Gītā 10·10)

And further in the passage—

'Exceedingly dear, indeed, am I to the wise one, and he, too, is dear to me.' (Gītā 7·17)

अतः साक्षात्काररूपा स्मृतिः स्मर्यमाणात्यर्थप्रियत्वेन स्वयमत्यर्थप्रिया यस्य स एव परेणात्मना वरणीयो भवति, इति तेनैव लभ्यते पर आत्मेत्युक्तं भवति। एवंरूपा ध्रुवानुस्मृतिरेव भक्तिशब्देनाभिधीयते, उपासनपर्यायत्वाद्भक्तिशब्दस्य। अत एव श्रुतिस्मृतिभिरेवमभिधीयते—

'तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति।' (श्वेता. ३।८)
'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति।' 'नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते॥' (नृ. पू. १।६)
'नाहं वेदैर्न तपसा न दानेन न चेज्यया।' (गीता ११।५३)
'भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन॥
ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप॥' (गीता ११।५४)
'पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया॥' (गीता ८।२२)

इति।

[16] एवंरूपाया ध्रुवानुस्मृतेः साधनानि यज्ञादीनि कर्माणीति

'यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्'। (ब्र. सू. ३।४।२६)

इत्यभिधास्यते। यद्यपि विविदिषन्तीति यज्ञादयो विविदिषोत्पत्तौ विनियुज्यन्ते तथापि तस्यैव वेदनस्य ध्यानरूपस्य, अहरहरनुष्ठीयमानस्य, अभ्यासाधेयातिशयस्य, आप्रायणादनु-

---

Hence, this is [intended] to be said—For whom the remembrance in the form of realisation which is exceedingly dear itself, owing to the object of remembrance being exceedingly dear, that same is fit to be chosen by the Highest Ātman,—and so by him alone is secured the Highest Ātman. The permanentpost-remembrance-knowledge alone of this form is denoted by the word 'bhakti' [devotion] on account of the word 'bhakti' being a synonym of 'Upāsanā'. For this same reason, it has been stated by the Śruti and Smṛti [passages]—

'Having known Him alone, he passes over death.' (Śve. 3·8)

'Having known Him thus, he becomes here immortal; there is no other path for salvation.' (Nṛ. Pū. 1·6)

'Not by Vedas, not by penance, not by charity [gifts], not by sacrifice, too, am I to be [seen].' (Gītā 11·53)

'However, I of this form am fit to be known and seen and to be entered into in reality by undivided devotion, [O Arjuna] Tormenter of enemy.' (Gītā 11·54)

'That Highest Puruṣa, [O] son of Pṛthā, is to be secured, however, by undivided devotion.' (Gītā 8·22)

[16] And of the permanent-post-remembrance-knowledge of this form, the means are acts like sacrifice etc.—this would be declared [in the Sūtra]

'From the Śruti, "sacrifice etc." like a horse.' (Br. Sū. 3·4·26)

Although sacrifice and others are made use of, for the production of the 'desire to know' because of [the expression] 'They desire to know' [*vividiṣanti*], even then, because of that same 'Vedana' [knowledge] having the nature of contemplation being performed day after day, with the intensity to be secured

वर्तमानस्य ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनत्वात्तदुत्पत्तये सर्वाण्याश्रमकर्माणि यावज्जीवमनुष्ठेयानि। वक्ष्यति च

'आ प्रायणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम्।' (ब्र. सू. ४।१।१२)

'अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्।' (ब्र. सू. ४।१।१६)

'सहकारित्वेन च।' (ब्र. सू. ३।४।३३)

इत्यादिषु।

वाक्यकारश्च ध्रुवानुस्मृतेर्विवेकादिभ्य एव निष्पत्तिमाह—

'तल्लब्धिर्विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः संभवान्निर्वचनाच्च।

इति। विवेकादीनां स्वरूपं चाह—

'जात्याश्रयनिमित्तादुष्टादन्नात्कायशुद्धिर्विवेकः।'

इति। अत्र निर्वचनम्—

'आहारशुद्धौ सत्त्वशुद्धिः, सत्त्वशुद्धौ ध्रुवा स्मृतिः।' (छा. ७।२६।२)

'विमोकः कामानभिष्वङ्गः।' इति।

'शान्त उपासीत' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति निर्वचनम्।

---

through repetition and being followed right upto the passing away [i. e. death] is the means for securing Brahman, all the acts in the various stages of life have got to be practised so long as one lives, for its (*vedanasya*) production. And [the Sūtrakāra] would be saying,

'Upto the passing away, for that is seen even there.' (Br. Sū. 4·1·12)

'Agnihotra etc. however, for producing the same on account of that being seen.' (Br. Sū. 4·1·16)

'And on account of [these] being the accessories.' (Br. Sū. 3·4·33)

in Sūtras like these.

The Vākyakāra also speaks of the rise and of permanent-post-remembrance-knowledge from discrimination etc. Its acquisition is from (1) discrimination, (2) non-attachment, (3) practice, (4) rite [sacrificial], (5) auspiciousness, (6) non-depression [and] (7) non-elation, on account of [such] possibility and on account of definite [scriptural] statements. He also speaks of the nature of discrimination and others.—

(1) '*Viveka*' Discrimination [is] the purity of the body from [the use of] non-impure food, consequent upon caste and resort—

And here [is] the definite statement [*nirvacana*]—

'With the purity of diet [arises] the purity of the mind; with the purity of the mind arises the permanent remembrance'. (Chā. 7·26·2)

(2) '*Vimoka*' [is] non-attachment to desire.

'Tranquil [in mind] he should worship'. (Chā. 3·14·1)

—This [is] the definite statement.

'आरम्भणसंशीलनं पुनः पुनरभ्यासः '

इति। निर्वचनं च स्मार्तमुदाहृतं भाष्यकारेण

'सदा तद्भावभावितः' (गीता ८।६)

इति।

'पञ्चमहायज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानं शक्तितः क्रिया।'

इति। निर्वचनम्—

'क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः।' (मु. ३।१।४)

'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा
विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन।' (बृ. ४।४।२२)

इति च।

'सत्यार्जवदयादानाहिंसानभिध्याः कल्याणानि।'

इति। निर्वचनम्—

'सत्येन लभ्यस्तेषामेवैष विरजो ब्रह्मलोकः।' (प्र. १।१६)

इत्यादि।

'देशकालवैषम्याच्छोकवस्त्वाद्यनुस्मृतेश्च तज्जन्यं दैन्यमभास्वरत्वं मनसोऽवसादः।'

इति। 'विपर्ययोऽनवसादः।' निर्वचनम्—

'नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यः।' (मु. ३।२।४)

इति।

---

(3) '*Abhyāsa*' [is] harping upon the thing begun, again and again.

[As for] the definite statement, [it] has been quoted from a Smṛti-work by the Bhāṣyakāra—

'*Engrossed in his form always*'. (Gītā 8·6)

(4) *Kriyā* [is] the performance of five great sacrifices etc. according to one's abilities.

The definite statement [is]—

'*This one doing the sacrificial rite is pre-eminent among the Brahman-knowers*'. (Mu. 3·1·4)

as also the following—

'*Him, this one, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by means of the recitation of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by charity, by imperishable penance*'. (Bṛ. 4·4·22)

(5) *Kalyāṇāni* [are] truth, uprightness, mercy, gifts, non-killing, absence of greed.

The definite statement [*is*]—

'*For them alone* [*is*] *this Rajasless Brahmaloka, to be secured by truth*'. (Pra. 1·16)

(6) *Avasāda* [is] non-brilliance and poverty of the mind arising from non-suitability of time and place and from the recollection of objects of grief etc.; *Anavasāda* [is] the opposite of that.

The definite statement is—

'*Not* [*indeed is*] *this Ātman to be secured by an impotent person*'. (Mu. 3·2·4)

'तद्विपर्ययजा तुष्टिरुद्धर्षः । तद्विपर्ययोऽनुद्धर्षः ।'
इति । अतिसंतोषश्च विरोधीत्यर्थः । निर्वचनमपि—

'शान्तो दान्तः ।' (बृ. ४।४।२३)

इति ।

[17] एवं नियमयुक्तस्याश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानेनैव विद्यानिष्पत्तिरित्युक्तं भवति । तथा च श्रुत्यन्तरम्—

'विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥' (ईशा. ११)

इति ।

अत्र अविद्याशब्दाभिहितं वर्णाश्रमविहितं कर्म । अविद्यया कर्मणा; मृत्युं ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधि प्राचीनं कर्म; तीर्त्वा, अपोह्य; विद्यया ज्ञानेन, अमृतं ब्रह्म, अश्नुते प्राप्नोति, इत्यर्थः । मृत्युतरणोपायतया प्रतीताविद्या विद्येतरद्विहितं कर्मैव । यथोक्तम्—

'इयाज सोऽपि सुबहून्यज्ञान् ज्ञानव्यपाश्रयः ।
ब्रह्मविद्यामधिष्ठाय तर्तुं मृत्युमविद्यया ॥' (वि. पु. ६।६।१२)

इति ।

ज्ञानविरोधि च कर्म पुण्यपापरूपम् । ब्रह्मज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधित्वेनानिष्टफलतयो-

---

[7] *Uddharṣa* [is] the elation arising from its [of *Avasāda*] opposite, [and] *Anuddharṣa* is its opposite,—extreme satisfaction [is] its opposite—this [is] the sense.

The definite statement also [is]—

'*Tranquil* [*in mind*], *restrained*'. (Bṛ. 4·4·23)

[17] Thus this amounts to saying that there is the production of knowledge for one faithfully observing regulations by the performance of acts enjoined for the [particular] stage of life. To the same effect [is] another Śruti [passage]—

'*One who knows both—Vidyā and Avidyā* (*Karman*) *together, he, having crossed over death by Avidyā secures the immortal by Vidyā*'. (Īśa. 11)

Here, what is denoted by the word 'Avidyā' is the Karman enjoined for the [particular] castes and stages of life. 'Avidyayā' [means] by Karman; 'Mṛtyum' [means] previous Karman counteracting the production of knowledge; 'Tīrtvā' [means] having set aside; 'Vidyayā' [means] by knowledge; 'Amṛtam' [means] Brahman, [and] 'Aśnute' [means] secures, —this is the sense. 'Avidyā' apprehended as being the means of crossing over death [is] the prescribed 'Karman' itself other than 'Vidyā'.
As has been said—

'*He also performed many sacrifices, with knowledge as his resort, having taken to the knowledge of Brahman in order to cross over death by* '*Avidyā*'. (V. P. 6·6·12)

And 'Karman' counteracting knowledge is constituted of [both] merit and demerit. Owing to [their] counteracting the production of the

भयोरपि पापशब्दाभिधेयत्वम् । अस्य च ज्ञानविरोधित्वं ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुभूतशुद्धसत्त्वविरोधि-रजस्तमोविवृद्धिद्वारेण । पापस्य च ज्ञानोदयविरोधित्वं

'एष एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषति ।' (कौ. ३।८)

इति श्रुत्यावगम्यते । रजस्तमसोर्यथार्थज्ञानावरणत्वं सत्त्वस्य च यथार्थज्ञानहेतुत्वं भगवतैव प्रतिपादितम्—

'सत्त्वात्संजायते ज्ञानम् ।' (गीता १४।१७)

इत्यादिना । अतश्च ज्ञानोत्पत्तये पापं कर्म निरसनीयम् । तन्निरसनं चानभिसंहितफलेनानुष्ठितेन धर्मेण । तथा च श्रुतिः—

'धर्मेण पापमपनुदन्ति ।' (म. ना. २२।१)

इति । तदेवं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधनभूतं ज्ञानं सर्वाश्रमधर्मापेक्षम् । अतोऽपेक्षितं कर्मस्वरूपज्ञानं केवलकर्मणामल्पास्थिरफलत्वज्ञानं च कर्ममीमांसावसेयमिति, सैवापेक्षिता ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः पूर्ववृत्ता वक्तव्या ।

[18] अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयश्च मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते,

---

knowledge of Brahman, [there] is the denotation of both of them as 'Pāpa' [sin] owing to their having undesirable fruit. And of this, is the counteracting of knowledge through the augmentation of the qualities of Rajas [energy] and Tamas [ignorance] opposed to the unalloyed [pure] quality of Sattva [goodness] which is the cause of the production of knowledge. Further, the counteracting of the rise of knowledge by demerit is known from the Śruti-passage—

'This one, verily, makes him do an evil deed, whom he desires to bring down'. (Kau. 3·8)

That the [qualities of] Rajas and Tamas are possessed of the nature of concealing the right knowledge, and that the [quality of] Sattva, is the cause of right knowledge— has been propounded by the Lord himself [in the passage].

'Knowledge is well produced from Sattva'. (Gītā 14·17)

and in other [passages].

And, therefore, a sinful act has got to be banished forth for the production of knowledge. And that banishing forth [is to be achieved] by the performance of religious acts with the fruit not being hankered after. To the same effect is the following Sruti [passage]—

'They drive away sin by Dharma'. (M. N. 22·1)

Thus the knowledge which is the means of securing Brahman has expectancy for the duties of all the stages of life. So, the desired knowledge of the nature of 'Karman*' and the knowledge that the mere [sacrificial] acts lead on to meagre and impermanent fruit, have been the conclusion arrived at in the consideration of 'Karman', and so that [Karmamīmāṁsā] alone, which is expected, should be declared as being prior to the desire to know Brahman.

[18] And further, the discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal objects etc. would not again result without the study [lit. hearing] of the Mīmāṁsā, on account of the difficulty of comprehension of the nature of

फलसाधनेतिकर्तव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादृते कर्मस्वरूपतत्फलतत्स्थिरत्वास्थिरत्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरवबोधत्वात्। एषां साधनत्वं च विनियोगादवसेयम्। विनियोगश्च श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभ्यः। स च तार्त्तीयः। उद्गीथाद्युपासनानि कर्मसमृद्ध्यर्थान्यपि ब्रह्मदृष्टिरूपाणीति ब्रह्मज्ञानापेक्षाणीतीहैव चिन्तनीयानि। तान्यपि कर्माण्यनभिसंहितफलानि ब्रह्मविद्योत्पादनानीति तत्साद्गुण्यापादनान्येतानि सुतरामिहैव संगतानि। तेषां च कर्मस्वरूपाधिगमापेक्षा सर्वसंमता।

यदप्याहुः —

अशेषविशेषप्रत्यनीकचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः, तदतिरेकि नानाविधज्ञातृज्ञेयतत्कृतज्ञानभेदादि सर्वं तस्मिन्नेव परिकल्पितं मिथ्याभूतम्—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्।' (छा. ६।२।१)

'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते।
यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम्। नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं,
सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः॥ (मु. १।१।५-६)

'Karman', its fruit, its permanency or impermanency, the eternal nature of the Ātman etc., without the definite ascertainment of the fruit, the means, the detailed procedure and the particular qualified person; and their being the means is to be concluded from their application, [viniyoga]—and the application is [to be ascertained from] the śruti passages [and] the characteristic mark etc.;— and this belongs to [i. e. occurs in] the third chapter [of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā]. The worship of 'Udgītha' and others although for the purpose of the perfection of 'Karman', are fit to be considered just here [in the '*Brahmasūtravicāra*'] on account of their being of the form of meditation [dṛṣṭi] upon Brahman, and because they stand in need of the knowledge of Brahman. And those Karmans also with their fruits not being hankered after, are productive of the knowledge — and so these, bringing about the excellence of [the knowledge of Brahman], are all the more befitting here alone, and their dependence upon the understanding of the nature of karman is agreed to by all.

As to what others [the Pūrvapakṣins say]—

Brahman alone which is 'Cit', opposed to all particularity without exception, is the highest Reality, [and] all the difference such as different kinds of knowers, objects of knowledge, different knowledge occasioned by them, beyond that [Brahman], is false being imagined in respect of that itself.

'Existence alone was all this, my dear, this was Existence [Sat] alone, one only without a second.' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'And now the higher [Vidyā], by which the imperishable is cognized. [And] what that not fit to be seen, not fit to be grasped, without a family [source], without colour, without eyes and ears, that without hands and feet; eternal, all-pervading, all-encompassing, extremely subtile, that immutable, which [is] the source of beings —see all round the wise ones'. (Mu. 1·1·5–6)

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम् ।' (श्वेता. ६।१९)

'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।
अविज्ञातं विजानतो विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥' (के. ११)

'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येर्न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथाः ।' (बृ. ३।४।२)

'आनन्दो ब्रह्म ।' (तै. ३।६।१)

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ।' (बृ. २।४।५)

'नेह नानास्ति किंचन । मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' (बृ. ४।४।१९)

'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति...यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत् केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कं विजानीयात् ।' (बृ. २।४।१४)

'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।' (छा. ६।१।४)

'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते, अथ तस्य भयं भवति ।' (तै. २।७।१)

'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ।' (ब्र. सू. ३।२।११)

'मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ।' (ब्र. सू. ३।२।३)

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite Brahman*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*Partless, actionless, tranquil, blameless, blotless*'. (Śve. 6·19)

'*By whom it is not thought of, by him it is thought of; by whom it is thought of, he knows it not. [It is] unknown for the knowers, [it is] known for the non-knowers*'. (Kena. 11)

'*Thou shalt not see the Seer of the seeing,—thou shalt not think the Thinker of the thinking*'. (Bṛ. 3·4·2)

'*Bliss [is] Brahman*'. (Tait. 3·6·1)

'*All this what [exists] [is] this Ātman*'. (Bṛ. 2·4·5)

'*Not here, is there multiplicity whatsoever. From death, he, to death, passes on, who, here sees as though multiplicity*'. (Bṛ. 4·4·16)

'*For, where there is, as it were, duality, then another sees another. But where everything has become only Ātman in the case of one, then by what, whom would one see? Then by what, whom would one know?*' (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

'*The modification being dependent on [mere] words, a name [only], the clay alone being the reality*'. (Chā. 6·1·4)

'*When again, indeed, this one makes even the slightest difference [Ātman], then there arises fear for him*'. (Tait. 2·7·1)

'*Not even from the [point of view of] place, the Highest [can be said] to be possessed of both characteristics; for everywhere*'. (Br. Sū. 3·2·11)

'*But [that creation is] but illusion on account of its nature not being manifest in its entirety*'. (Br. Sū. 3·2·3)

'प्रत्यस्तमितभेदं यत्सत्तामात्रमगोचरम् ।
वचसामात्मसंवेद्यं तज्ज्ञानं ब्रह्मसंज्ञितम् ॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।५३)

'ज्ञानस्वरूपमत्यन्तनिर्मलं परमार्थतः ।
तदेवार्थस्वरूपेण भ्रान्तिदर्शनतः स्थितम् ॥' (वि. पु. १।२।६)

'परमार्थस्त्वमेवैको नान्योऽस्ति जगतः पते ।' (वि. पु. १।४।३८)

'यदेतद्दृश्यते मूर्तमेतज्ज्ञानात्मनस्तव ।
भ्रान्तिज्ञानेन पश्यन्ति जगद्रूपमयोगिनः ॥
ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलं जगदेतदबुद्धयः ।
अर्थस्वरूपं पश्यन्तो भ्राम्यन्ते मोहसंप्लवे ॥
ये तु ज्ञानविदः शुद्धचेतसस्तेऽखिलं जगत् ।
ज्ञानात्मकं प्रपश्यन्ति त्वद्रूपं परमेश्वर ॥' (वि. पु. १।४।३९,४०,४१)

'तस्यात्मपरदेहेषु सतोऽप्येकमयं हि यत् ।
विज्ञानं परमार्थो यत् द्वैतिनोऽतथ्यदर्शिनः ॥' (वि. पु. २।१४।३१)

'यद्यन्योऽस्ति परः कोऽपि मत्तः पार्थिवसत्तम ।
तदैषोऽहमयं चान्यो वक्तुमेवमपीष्यते ॥' (वि. पु. २।१३।८५)

'That knowledge in which distinctions have gone to set; [which is] mere Existence, not within the ken of speech [which is] self-knowable,—is named 'Brahman'. (V. P. 6·7·53)

'The nature of cognition extremely blotless in the nature of things, and the same has remained in the form of material objects on account of perception of illusion'. (V. P. 1·2·6)

'You alone are the Highest Reality; no one else [is], [O] world-Lord'. (V. P. 1·4·38)

'What is seen, this material form of you constituted of Jñāna, [that] world-form, non-Yogins [common men] perceive owing to the knowledge due to illusion'.

'This entire world constituted of Jñāna, the non-intelligent perceiving as constituted of material objects, are whirled about in the high flood of delusion'.

'But those who know [the world to be constituted of] Jñāna, [who are] pure-minded, definitely perceive the entire world as constituted of Jñāna, [O you] the Highest Lord'. (V. P. 1·4·39–41)

'What that special knowledge of Him, which is uniform although existing in His own body and the bodies of others, is the Highest Reality. Dualists have [but] the apprehension of a false nature'. (V. P. 2·14·31)

'[O] best of kings, if there can be anyone else beyond me, then this one [is] I and this one is another—it would be desirable [possible] to say thus'. (V. P. 2·13·85)

'वेणुरन्ध्रविभेदेन भेदः षड्जादिसंज्ञितः ।
अभेदव्यापिनो वायोस्तथासौ परमात्मनः ॥' (वि. पु. २।१४।३२)
'सोऽहं स च त्वं स च सर्वमेतदात्मस्वरूपं त्यज भेदमोहम् ।
इतीरितस्तेन स राजवर्यस्तत्याज भेदं परमार्थदृष्टिः ॥' (वि. पु. २।१६।२४)
'विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते ।
आत्मनो ब्रह्मणो भेदमसन्तं कः करिष्यति ॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।९४)
'अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ।' (गीता १०।२०)
'क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।' (गीता १३।२)
'न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यान्मया भूतं चराचरम् ।' (गीता १०।३९)

इत्यादिभिर्वस्तुस्वरूपोपदेशपरैः शास्त्रैर्निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव सत्यम्, अन्यत्सर्वं मिथ्येत्यभिधानात्। मिथ्यात्वं नाम प्रतीयमानत्वपूर्वकयथावस्थितवस्तुज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम्, यथा रज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठानकसर्पादेः। दोषवशाद्धि तत्र तत्कल्पनम्। एवं चिन्मात्रवपुषि परे ब्रह्मणि दोषपरिकल्पितमिदं देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरादिभेदं सर्वं जगद्यथावस्थितब्रह्मस्वरूपाव-

---

'*Owing to the distinct difference in respect of the holes of a flute, the difference [in the notes] is named as Ṣaḍja etc. of the wind pervading without any distinction,—in the same way there is this [difference] in respect of the 'Paramātman'.*' (V. P. 2·14·32)

'*He [is] I, and He [is] you, and He [is] all this nature of Ātman;—give up this infatuation due to difference—thus impelled [instructed] by him, that pre-eminent king perceiving the Highest Reality, gave up the [notion of] difference*'. (V. P. 2·16·24)

'*When Ajñāna, the producer of distinct differences has completely come to naught, who would make the non-existing difference between Ātman and Brahman?*' (V. P. 6·7·94)

'*I [am] the self, [O] Guḍākeśa, stationed in the heart of all beings*'. (Gītā 10·20)

'*Know me [to be] the Kṣetrajña as well in all the Kṣetras, [O] descendant of Bharata*'. (Gītā 13·2)

'*There does not exist that being, movable or immovable, which can exist without me*'. (Gītā 10·39)

—On account of the declaration—that distinctionless and mere Cit Brahman alone is real, [and] everything else is unreal—by these [passages from the] Śāstras concerned with instruction about the nature of things. Falsehood, for the matter of that [*nāma*], [is] the capability of being turned away by the knowledge of things as they are, preceded by what is being apprehended, like that of the serpent and others having rope and others as their basis. For, there is the assumption of that [serpent etc.] there [in the rope] by virtue of [some] defect. Thus, this entire world with the distinction of gods, birds [moving across the sky], men and immovable things etc. imagined all round through some defect, in respect of the Highest Brahman

बोधबाध्यं मिथ्यारूपम्। दोषश्च स्वरूपतिरोधानविविधविचित्रविक्षेपकरी सदसदनिर्वचनीया, अनाद्यविद्या।

'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः।' (छा. ८।३।२)
'तेषां सत्यानां सतामनृतमपिधानम्।' (छा. ८।३।१)
'नासदासीत् नो सदासीत्तदानीम्।' (तै. ब्रा. २।८।९)
'तम आसीत्तमसा गूढमग्रे प्रकेतम्।' (तै. ब्रा. २।८।९)
'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्।' (श्वेता. ४।१०)
'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते।' (बृ. २।५।१९)
'मम माया दुरत्यया।' (गीता ७।१४)
'अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते।' (गौडपाद १।१६)

इत्यादिभिर्निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैवानाद्यविद्यया सदसदनिर्वाच्यया तिरोहितस्वरूपं स्वगतनानात्वं पश्यतीत्यवगम्यते। यथोक्तम्—

'ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसावशेषमूर्तिर्न तु वस्तुभूतः।
ततो हि शैलाब्धिधरादिभेदाञ्जानीहि विज्ञानविजृम्भितानि॥

---

having the form of mere 'Cit' is of a false nature, being stultified by the proper knowledge of Brahman as it is. And the 'defect' [is] the beginningless 'Avidyā' causing concealment of the nature [of Brahman] [and] causing various variegated projections, [and] which cannot be described as existing or non-existing.

'*By falsehood, indeed, are they drawn away* [*from Brahman*]'. (Chā. 8·3·2)

'*Falsehood* [*is*] *the veil of them* [*viz. the desires*] *existing* [*and regarded as*] *true*'. (Chā. 8·3·1)

'*There was neither non-Existent, nor Existent at that time*'. (Tait. Br. 2 8·9)

'*Darkness was concealed by darkness in the beginning*'. (Tait. Br. 2·8·9)

'*One should know then Nature* [*Prakṛti*] *as the 'Māyā'* [*and*] *the Highest Lord as Māyā-wielder*'. (Śve. 4·10)

'*Indra moves on, possessed of various forms by his wonderful powers*'. (Bṛ. 2·5·19)

'*My 'Māyā' is difficult to transcend*'. (Gītā. 7·14)

'*When the individual Soul, asleep, owing to the beginningless Māyā, is awakened*'. (Gauḍ. 1·16)

—It is known by these and other passages, that Brahman alone, distinctionless and mere 'Cit' with its nature screened by the beginning-less 'Avidyā' difficult to be described either as existing or as non-existing, perceives multiplicity belonging to itself. As has been stated—

'*Inasmuch as the Lord is of the nature of Jñāna, possessed of all forms, but not of a real* [*material*] *form, know, therefore, the distinctions such as mountain, ocean, earth etc. to be indeed the all-out displays of Vijñāna*'.

यदा तु शुद्धं निजरूपि सर्वकर्मक्षये ज्ञानमपास्तदोषम् ।
तदा हि संकल्पतरोः फलानि भवन्ति नो वस्तुषु वस्तुभेदाः ॥'
(वि. पु. २।१२।३९,४०)

'तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृतेऽस्ति किञ्चित्क्वचित्कदाचिद्द्विज वस्तुजातम् ।
विज्ञानमेकं निजकर्मभेदविभिन्नचित्तैर्बहुधाभ्युपेतम् ॥
ज्ञानं विशुद्धं विमलं विशोकमशेषलोभादिनिरस्तसङ्गम् ।
एकं सदैकं परमः परेशः स वासुदेवो न यतोऽन्यदस्ति ॥
सद्भाव एवं भवतो मयोक्तो ज्ञानं यथा सत्यमसत्यमन्यत् ।
एतत्तु यत्संव्यवहारभूतं तत्रापि चोक्तं भुवनाश्रितं ते ॥'
(वि. पु. २।१२।४३,४४,४५)

इति ।

अस्याश्चाविद्यायाः निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेन निवृत्तिं वदन्ति—
'न पुनर्मृत्यवे तदेकं पश्यति । न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति ।'　(छा. ७।२६।२)
'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते । अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति ।'　(तै. २।७।१)

'But when on the destruction of all Karman, there is Jñāna, pure [and] in its own [unalloyed] form [and] with all blemishes cast away; then again cease to exist the fruits of the tree of superimposition, the distinctions of things in the things'.
(V. P. 2·12·39, 40)

'Therefore, without Vijñāna there is no group of things whatsoever, anywhere [and] at any time, [O] twice-born one. The Vijñāna alone is known to be manifold by those whose minds are distracted by the difference [in respect] of their own 'Karmans'.'

'Jñāna [is] extremely pure, blotless, griefless with [all] attachment removed from greed etc. completely, the one Existent [and] always [remaining] the Supreme, the One Highest Lord,—He [is] Vāsudeva, beyond whom nothing exists'.

'In this way, the nature of the Sat has been spoken to you by me,—how Jñāna [alone is] the reality, [and] [everything] else is false. This, however, which has become [useful] for mutual practical dealings, and there also [it] is resorted to by the worlds—all this has been spoken to you'.　(V. P. 2·12·43, 44, 45)

And the following Sruti passages and others speak of the turning away of the 'Avidyā' by the Vijñāna of the oneness of the Ātman and Brahman [which is] distinctionless [and] mere 'Cit'.

'Not for death again [he] who sees that [to be] One; not the Seer [who realises Brahman] sees death'.　(Chā. 7·26·2)

'When, indeed, this one alone secures stability and freedom from fear in this invisible, incorporal, undefinable, resortless, then he goes to freedom from fear'.　(Tait. 2·7·1)

'*भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।*
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥' (मु. २।२।८)
'*ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ।*' (मु. ३।२।९)
'*तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति ।*
नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥' (श्वे. ३।८)

इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः । अत्र मृत्युशब्देनाविद्याभिधीयते । यथा सनत्सुजातवचनम्—

'*मोहो वै मृत्युः संमतो यः कवीनामिति ।*
प्रमादं वै मृत्युमहं ब्रवीमि ।
सदाप्रमादममृतत्वं ब्रवीमि ।' (स. १।४)

इति ।

'*सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।*' (तै. २।१।१)
'*विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म ।*' (बृ. ३।९।२८)

इत्यादिशोधकवाक्यावसेयनिर्विशेषचिन्मात्रस्वरूपब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं च,

'*अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्ते, अन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति, न स वेद ।*'
(बृ. १।४।१०)
'*आत्मेत्येवोपासीत ।*' (बृ. १।४।७)
'*तत्त्वमसि*' (छा. ६।८।७)

'*The heart-knot is broken; [there are] cut off all doubts; and there come to naught his acts when is seen that Highest [the High-low]*'. (Mu. 2·2·8)

'*He knows Brahman, [and] he becomes Brahman itself*'. (Mu. 3·2·9)

'*Having known Him alone, he passes over death; there is no other path for salvation*'. (Śve. 3·8)

Here 'Avidyā' is denoted by the word 'Mṛtyu'. To the same effect [is] the passage from the *Sanatsujāta*—

'*Infatuation, verily, [is] Death,—[this] is agreed to by the wise; and I speak of delusion as death indeed, [and] I always speak of non-delusion as deathlessness*'. (San. 1·4)

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite [is] Brahman*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*Vijñāna, Bliss [is] Brahman*'. (Bṛ. 3·9·28)

And the Vijñāna, of the Oneness of the Ātman and Brahman, [which is] distinctionless, of mere 'Cit' nature, which is to be concluded from the [above] decisive passages and others, becomes established by passages like—

'*But he who worships another deity with the idea (iti) 'That [deity] is another, another am I; he does not know*'. (Bṛ. 1·4·10)

'*He should worship as Ātman alone*'. (Bṛ. 1·4·7)

'*That thou art*'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

'त्वं वाहमस्मि भगवो देवते, अहं वै
त्वमसि भगवो देवते ।' (जाबालोपनिषत्)
'तद्योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहम् ।' (ऐतरेय. २।४।३)

इत्यादिवाक्यसिद्धम् । वक्ष्यति चैतदेव—

'आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।१।३)

इति । तथा चाह वाक्यकारः—

'आत्मेत्येव तु गृह्णीयात्सर्वस्य तन्निष्पत्तेः ।'

इति । अनेन च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेन मिथ्यारूपस्य सकारणस्य बन्धस्य निवृत्तिरुक्ता ।

[19] ननु च सकलभेदनिवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धा, कथमिव शास्त्रार्थजन्यविज्ञानेन क्रियते ?

कथं वा रज्जुरेषा न सर्प इति ज्ञानेन प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धा सर्पनिवृत्तिः क्रियते ?

तत्र द्वयोः प्रत्यक्षयोर्विरोधः, इह तु प्रत्यक्षमूलस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य च— इति चेत्—

तुल्ययोर्विरोधे कथं बाध्यबाधकभावः ?

'And I, verily, am you, [O] Revered Deity, [and] You are I, [O] Revered Deity'. (Jābāla)

'So what am I, that he is; who is that, that am I'. (Ait. 2·4·3)

and [the Sūtrakāra] would be saying as well—

'But they worship as Ātman, and make others grasp'. (Br. Sū. 4·1·3)

To the same effect says the Vākyakāra—

'One should grasp as Ātman himself, on account of everything arising out of him'.

And by this Vijñāna of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, has been declared the turning away of bondage along with its cause which is of a false nature.

[**19**] I say [says the objector]—The turning away of all difference is contrary to direct perception, [and so] how possibly can it be effected by Vijñāna arising from the purport of the Sāstra ?

How again can the turning away of the serpent, which is contrary to direct perception be effected by the knowledge that this [is] a rope [and] not a serpent ?

If it be objected— In the instance referred to [*tatra*], there is contradiction between two direct perceptions; in this [in the present case], however [there is] contradiction between the Sāstra based upon direct perception and direct perception—

[We ask]—How [could there be] the relationship of the stultifiable and the stultifier, when there is a contradiction between two equals.?

पूर्वोत्तरयोर्दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वतदभावाभ्याम्--

इति चेत्—

शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोरपि समानमेतत्।

एतदुक्तं भवति—

बाध्यबाधकभावे तुल्यत्वसापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वादि न कारणम्, ज्वालाभेदानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षोपमर्दायोगात्। तत्र हि ज्वालैक्यं प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते। एवं सति, द्वयोः प्रमाणयोर्विरोधे यत्संभाव्यमानान्यथासिद्धि तद्बाध्यम्, अनन्यथासिद्धमनवकाशमितरत्, बाधकम्—इति सर्वत्र बाध्यबाधकत्वभावानिर्णय इति।

तस्मात्, अनादिनिधनाविच्छिन्नसंप्रदायासंभाव्यमानदोषगन्धानवकाशशास्त्रजन्य-निर्विशेषनित्यशुद्धमुक्तबुद्धस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रब्रह्मात्मभावावबोधेन संभाव्यमानदोषसावकाशप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धविविधविकल्परूपबन्धनिवृत्तिर्युक्तैव। संभाव्यते च विविधविकल्पभेद-प्रपञ्चग्राहिप्रत्यक्षस्यानादिभेदवासनादिरूपाविद्याख्यो दोषः।

If it be contended [by the objector] that [the '*Bādhyabādhakabhāva*'] between the prior and the posterior [states of things] is possible on account of its being produced by a defective cause, and the absence thereof [respectively]—

[We reply] — The same thing [obtains] in the case of Sāstra and direct perception.

This is what is intended to be stated—

In [the matter of] the relation of the stultifiable and the stultifier, equality being dependent on something, [or] not being dependent upon something etc. are not the producing agency, owing to the impossibility of brushing aside direct perception by [relying upon] the inference about the flame having different parts. For, there the oneness of the flame is apprehended by direct perception. Thus, this being the case, in the case of the contradiction between two means of proof, whatever has its establishment possible otherwise, that [is] the stultifiable; and the other one not established otherwise, not having scope elsewhere, is the stultifier—thus is the conclusion about the relation between stultifiable and stultifier everywhere.

Therefore, it is but quite proper [that there should be] the turning away of bondage of the form of different alternative assumptions established by direct perception and other [means of proof] having possible defects and having scope [elsewhere], by the comprehension of the nature of Brahman being the Ātman, produced by the Śāstra, which has no beginning or end, which has unbroken tradition with no possibility of even the semblance [*gandha*] of a blemish, having no scope [elsewhere], — [Brahman] distinctionless, eternal, pure, free, awakened, self-illumining [and] mere 'Cit'. And there [certainly] is the possibility in the case of direct perception which grasps the paraphernalia with [its] varied assumptions and differences, of the defect called 'Avidyā' having the form of beginningless Vāsanā about difference etc.

[20] ननु-अनादिनिधनाविच्छिन्नसंप्रदायतया निर्दोषस्यापि शास्त्रस्य 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्येवमादेर्भेदावलम्बिनो बाध्यत्वं प्रसज्येत।

सत्यम्, पूर्वापरापच्छेदे पूर्वशास्त्रवन्मोक्षशास्त्रस्य निरवकाशत्वात्तेन बाध्यत एव। वेदान्तवाक्येष्वपि सगुणब्रह्मोपासनपराणां शास्त्राणामयमेव न्यायः, निर्गुणत्वात्परस्य ब्रह्मणः।

ननु च—

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९)

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते
स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च।' (श्वे. ६।८)

'सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः।' (छा. ८।१।५)

इत्यादि ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपराणां कथं बाध्यत्वम्?

—निर्गुणवाक्यसामर्थ्यादिति ब्रूमः।

एतदुक्तं भवति—

'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम्।' (बृ. ३।८।८)

[**20**] I say [says the objector],—That there would be the undesirable contingency of the Śāstra being stultifiable which depends upon the difference [or duality] such as in 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice', although without any defect on account of beginningless and endless unbroken tradition.

We reply:—True [to a certain extent the objection is], like the prior 'Śāstra', when there is the disconnection between the prior and the posterior. [The prior Śāstra] is certainly stultified by the Śāstra dealing with salvation on account of its having no scope otherwise. The same maxim applies in the case of passages in the 'Śāstra' dealing with the worship of the qualified Brahman even in the case of the Vedānta passages, on account of the Highest Brahman being free from qualities.

I say [says the objector] further,—How [can there be] stultifiability of [passages] concerned with propounding the nature of 'Brahman', such as—

'Who omniscient, all-knower'. (Mu. 1·1·9)

'His supreme power is described in the Śruti [passages] as definitely being varied, natural and as being knowledge, strength and action'. (Śve. 6·8)

'Whose desires are fulfilled and whose thoughts are fulfilled [lit. true]'. (Chā. 8·1·5)

We reply—[this 'Bādhyatva' is possible] on account of the power of the passages dealing with qualitiless [Brahman].

This is what is meant to be said—

'Not gross, not atomic, not short'. (Bṛ. 3·8·8)

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'निर्गुणम् ।' (चू. ७।२) (आत्मोपनिषत्)

'निरञ्जनम् ।' (श्वे. ६।१९)

इत्यादिवाक्यानि निरस्तसमस्तविशेषकूटस्थनित्यचैतन्यं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादयन्ति। इतराणि च सगुणम्। उभयविधवाक्यानां विरोधे तेनैवापच्छेदन्यायेन निर्गुणवाक्यानां गुणापेक्षत्वेन परत्वाद्बलीयस्त्वमिति न किञ्चिदवहीनम्।

[21] ननु च

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यत्र सत्यज्ञानादयो गुणाः प्रतीयन्ते।

नेत्युच्यते, सामानाधिकरण्येनैकार्थत्वप्रतीतेः।

अनेकगुणविशिष्टाभिधानेऽप्येकार्थत्वमविरुद्धम्—इति चेत्—

अनभिधानज्ञो हि देवानां प्रियः। एकार्थत्वं नाम सर्वपदानामर्थैक्यम्। विशिष्टपदार्थाभिधाने विशेषणभेदेन पदानामर्थभेदोऽवर्जनीयः। ततश्चैकत्वं न सिध्यति।

एवं तर्हि सर्वपदानां पर्यायता स्यात्, अविशिष्टार्थाभिधायित्वात्।

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'Qualitiless'. (Cū. 7·2) (Atmopaniṣad)

'Blot-less'. (Śve. 6·19)

—These and such other passages propound Brahman as consciousness, ['Caitanya'] with all distinctions banished away, immutable, eternal. Others propound the qualified [Brahman]. When there is conflict between the two types of passages, by that same 'Dis-connection' maxim—there is the greater strength of passages dealing with the qualitiless Brahman owing to their being posterior, being dependent upon the [passages dealing with] the qualities—and so there is nothing wanting [or wrong here].

[21] Further I say [says the objector]—

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

—in this passage, the qualities, Existence, Knowledge etc. are understood.

We reply—No, on account of the apprehension of one entity owing to [their being put] in case-co-ordination,

If it be contended that being [the idea of] one entity is not opposed even if there is the denotation of something particularised by more than one quality.

[Our reply is]—You are ignorant of the nature of denotation, a big fool that you are [lit. beloved of the Gods]. 'Being one entity' means the oneness of the sense of all the words. When there is the denotation of a particularised entity, the difference in the meaning of the words becomes unavoidable, owing to the difference in qualifying attributes, and hence the oneness cannot be [taken to be] established.

If this be admitted, then all the words would be synonyms, owing to their denoting the non-particularised entity.—[says the objector].

एकार्थाभिधायित्वेऽप्यपर्यायत्वमवहितमनाः शृणु। एकत्वतात्पर्यनिश्चयादेकस्यैवार्थस्य तत्तत्पदार्थविरोधिप्रत्यनीकपरत्वेन सर्वपदानामर्थवत्त्वमेकार्थत्वमपर्यायता च। एतदुक्तं भवति—

लक्षणतः प्रतिपत्तव्यं ब्रह्म सकलेतरपदार्थविरोधिरूपम्। तद्विरोधिरूपं सर्वमनेन पदत्रयेण फलतो व्युदस्यते। तत्र 'सत्य' पदं विकारास्पदत्वेनासत्याद्वस्तुनो व्यावृत्तपरम्। 'ज्ञान' पदं चान्याधीनप्रकाशाज्जडरूपाद्वस्तुनो व्यावृत्तपरम्। 'अनन्त' पदं च देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्च परिच्छिन्नाद्व्यावृत्तपरम्। न च व्यावृत्तिर्भावरूपोऽभावरूपो वा धर्मः, अपि तु सकलेतरविरोधि ब्रह्मैव। यथा शौक्ल्यादेः काष्ण्यादिव्यावृत्तिस्तत्तत्पदार्थस्वरूपमेव, न धर्मान्तरम्। एवमेकस्यैव वस्तुनः सकलेतरविरोध्याकारतामवगमयदर्थवत्तरमेकार्थमपर्यायं च पदत्रयम्—इति। तस्मादेकमेव ब्रह्म स्वयंज्योतिर्निर्धूतनिखिलविशेषमित्युक्तं भवति।

एवं वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादने सत्येव

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

Listen, with an attentive mind, how, though there is denotation of one entity, there cannot be synonymous nature [as you are pleased to think]. On account of the ascertainment of the purport about oneness, there is significance, pointing out to one entity and non-synonymous nature of all words, owing to one and the same entity pointing out to the opposite of what is opposed to the sense of the particular word concerned.

This is what is [meant to be] said :—

Brahman, which is to be understood from its [peculiar] characteristics, has the nature opposed to all other objects [than itself], and all that contradictory nature is being driven away in effect by this triad of words; there the word 'Satya' points out to what is excluded from the 'non-satya' thing, owing to its being amenable to modification. And the word 'Jñāna' points out to what is excluded from the non-sentient thing with its illumination being dependent upon another. And the word 'Ananta' points out to what is excluded from [something] circumscribed by space, time and by material [nature]. Not, again, is exclusion a positive or a negative quality, but definitely Brahman itself opposed to every thing other than itself. Just as in the case of whiteness and others, the exclusion from blackness and others, is the very nature of the particular object, and not another quality; in the same way, the triad of words making one apprehend in the case of one and the same object the nature of being opposed to anything else other than [itself] is [certainly] more significant, denoting only one entity, and not synonymous. Therefore, this amounts to saying that one and the same Brahman is self-luminous, with all distinctions shaken off.

When only the meaning of the sentence is thus declared, there would be the oneness of the sense as [conveyed] by passages like

'In the beginning, my dear, this was Existence alone, one only without a second'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

इत्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यम् ।

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ।' (तै. ३।१।१)

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।' (छा. ६।२।१)

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् ।' (ऐ. १।१)

इत्यादिभिर्जगत्कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपमिदमुच्यते

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इति । तत्र सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायेन कारणवाक्येषु सर्वेषु सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्तमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मावगतम् । जगत्कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयस्य प्रतिपिपादयिषितं स्वरूपं तदविरोधेन वक्तव्यम् । अद्वितीयत्वश्रुतिर्गुणतोऽपि सद्वितीयतां न सहते । अन्यथा 'निरञ्जनं' 'निर्गुणम्' इत्यादिभिश्च विरोधः । अतश्चैतल्लक्षणवाक्यमखण्डैकरसमेव प्रतिपादयति ।

[22] ननु च सत्यज्ञानादिपदानां स्वार्थप्रहाणेन स्वार्थविरोधिव्यावृत्तवस्तुस्वरूपोपस्थापनपरत्वेन लक्षणा स्यात् ।

The nature of Brahman characterised as being the cause of the world [as described] by such and other passages :—

'From whom, again, these beings are produced'. (Tait. 3·1·1)

'In the beginning, my dear, this was Existence alone'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

'Ātman, verily, was [all] this, one alone at the beginning'. (Ait. 1·1)

is declared as :—

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

There, in all the passages dealing with the cause [of the world], Brahman, without a second, excluded from [all] homogeneous and heterogeneous [elements] becomes known in accordance with the maxim about the 'faith [in the authority] of all recensions.' And the nature of [that] Brahman without a second [and] characterised as being the cause of the world, [nature] which is intended to be propounded, has got to be declared not in conflict with that [advitīya] [given above]. The Śruti [passage speaking, of Brahman as being] 'without a second' cannot tolerate being with a second, even from the point of quality [possessed by it]. Otherwise [there would be] conflict with [the expressions] 'blotless', 'qualitiless' and others. And therefore this defining passage propounds undivided uniformity alone.

[22] Further, I say [says the objector]—In the case of the words 'Satya' 'Jñāna' and others, there would [have to] be [a resort to] 'Indication' owing to their abandonment of their own [primary] sense and pointing out to the establishment of nature of the object excluded from what is opposed to its own [primary] sense.—

नैष दोषः, अभिधानवृत्तेरपि तात्पर्यवृत्तेर्बलीयस्त्वात्। सामानाधिकरण्यस्य ह्यैक्य एव तात्पर्यमिति सर्वसंमतम्।

ननु च सर्वपदानां लक्षणा न दृष्टचरी।

ततः किम्? वाक्यतात्पर्याविरोधे सत्येकस्यापि न दृष्टा! समभिव्याहृतपदसमुदायस्यैतत्तात्पर्यमिति निश्चिते सति, द्वयोस्त्रयाणां सर्वेषां वा तदविरोधायैकस्येव लक्षणा न दोषाय। तथा च शास्त्रज्ञैरभ्युपगम्यते। कार्यवाक्यार्थवादिभिर्लौकिकवाक्येषु सर्वेषां पदानां लक्षणा समाश्रीयते। अपूर्वकार्य एव लिङादेर्मुख्यवृत्तत्वाल्लिङादिभिः क्रियाकार्यं लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते। कार्यान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायिनां चेतरेषां पदानामपूर्वकार्यान्वित एव मुख्योऽर्थः, इति क्रियाकार्यान्वितप्रतिपादनं लाक्षणिकमेव। अतो वाक्यतात्पर्याविरोधाय सर्वपदानां लक्षणापि न दोषः। अत इदमेवार्थजातं प्रतिपादयन्तो वेदान्ताः प्रमाणम्।

[23] प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधे च शास्त्रस्य बलीयस्त्वमुक्तम्। सति च विरोधे बलीयस्त्वं वक्तव्यम्। विरोध एव न दृश्यते, निर्विशेषसन्मात्रग्राहित्वात्प्रत्यक्षस्य।

—This [is] not a defect, because the purportive power is stronger than even the denotative power. In the case of case-co-ordination, the overall idea points out to oneness alone—this is agreed to, by all.

But I say, [says the objector],—never has been seen before, 'Indication' [resorted to] in the case of all words [in a passage].

What then? When there is no conflict with the gist of the passage even as regards the meaning of one word, ['indication'] is not seen. When it has been definitely ascertained that this is a particular gist of a collection of words pronounced together, [resort to] 'indication' of two or three or all [*padas*] as in the case of one [*pada*] does not bargain for a fault to ensure non-conflict with that [gist]. To the same effect is admitted by those well-versed in the Sāstra. 'Indication' of all words is resorted to in the case of non-Vedic passages, by those, who talk of action as being the sense of a sentence. Because [injunctive expressions in] the potential mood etc. have their primary power to denote the action viz. the '*Apūrva*' [which gives the fruit of the sacrifice], by means of these potential mood and others is pointed out by indication the action and the work to be done. And in view of the fact [*iti*] that in the case of other words denoting their own senses as associated with something to be done, the primary sense is associated with the 'Apūrva' thing alone, the pointing out to something associated with action and the thing to be done is but metaphorical. Hence, even 'Indication' in the case of all the words to ensure non-conflict with the gist of the passage is no defect. And so, the Vedānta passages propounding this very sense-aggregate [*Arthajāta*] are an authority.

[23] And it has been stated [before] that the Sāstra is more powerful when there is its conflict with direct perception and other [means of proof]. If there be any conflict, then [surely what is the] stronger nature has got to be declared, but there is not to be seen any conflict for matter of that, on account of direct perception, being habituated to grasp the distinctionless Existent alone.

ननु च 'घटोऽस्ति' 'पटोऽस्ति' इति नानाकारवस्तुविषयं प्रत्यक्षं कथमिव सन्मात्रग्राहीत्युच्यते? विलक्षणग्रहणाभावे सति सर्वेषां ज्ञानानाम्, एकविषयत्वेन धारावाहिकविज्ञानवदेकव्यवहारहेतुतैव स्यात्।

सत्यम्, तथैवात्र विविच्यते।

कथम्?

'घटोऽस्ति' इत्यत्रास्तित्वं तद्भेदश्च व्यवह्रियते। न च द्वयोरपि व्यवहारयोः प्रत्यक्षमूलत्वं संभवति, तयोर्भिन्नकालज्ञानफलत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्यैकक्षणवर्तित्वात्। तत्र स्वरूपं भेदो वा प्रत्यक्षस्य विषय इति विवेचनीयम्। भेदग्रहणस्य स्वरूपग्रहणतत्प्रतियोगिस्मरणसव्यपेक्षत्वादेव स्वरूपविषयत्वमवश्याश्रयणीयमिति न भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते। अतो भ्रान्तिमूल एव भेदव्यवहारः। किं च भेदो नाम कश्चित्पदार्थो न्यायविद्भिर्निरूपयितुं न शक्यते। भेदस्तावन्न वस्तुनः स्वरूपम्, वस्तुस्वरूपे गृहीते स्वरूपव्यवहारवत्सर्वस्माद्भेदव्यवहारप्रसक्तेः। न च वाच्यम्—स्वरूपे गृहीतेऽपि भिन्न इति व्यवहारस्य प्रतियोगि-

---

Further, I say [says the objector]—How, possibly, can it be said that direct perception, having for its province objects possessed of different forms as [seen] in 'The jar is', 'The cloth is', grasps the Existent alone? In the absence of the grasping of different characteristics, all cognitions would be the cause of the same practical dealing, like the specific cognition [uninterrupted] flowing in a stream, owing to their referring to one and the same [object].

True [to a certain extent what you say]; [and] in the same way [it] is being analysed here.

How?

In 'The jar is' the existence [of the jar] and its difference [from non-jars] are dealt with. But it is not possible for both these practical dealings to be based on direct perception, on account of their being the result of perceptions at different times, because the knowledge from direct perception exists only for a moment. There it is to be particularly analysed—whether nature [of an object] or its difference [from other objects] is the province of direct perception. That the perception of difference, having for its province the nature [of a thing], has got to be necessarilly admitted on account of its being dependent upon the grasping of the nature and the remembrance of its counter-entity,—this being so [*iti*], the difference is not grasped by direct perception. Therefore, the practical dealing in respect of difference is based on mistaken knowledge. And further, it is not possible for logicians to expound [specify] some object or other called 'difference'. 'Difference' for the matter of that, is not the nature of the object, for [otherwise], there would be the undesirable result of the practical dealing of difference from everything, like the practical dealing in respect of the nature [of the object], when the nature of the object is once grasped. Nor should it be contended

सव्यपेक्षत्वात्तत्स्मरणाभावेन तदानीमेव न भेदव्यवहारः—इति। स्वरूपमात्रभेदवादिनो हि प्रतियोगिसव्यपेक्षा च नोत्प्रेक्षितुं क्षमा, स्वरूपभेदयोः स्वरूपत्वाविशेषात्। यथा स्वरूपव्यवहारः न प्रतियोग्यपेक्षः, भेदव्यवहारोऽपि तथैव स्यात्। 'हस्तः करः' 'घटो भिन्नः' इतिवत् पर्यायत्वं च स्यात्। नापि धर्मः। धर्मत्वे सति तस्य स्वरूपाद्भेदोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः, अन्यथा स्वरूपमेव स्यात्। भेदे च तस्यापि भेदस्तद्धर्मस्तस्यापि, इत्यनवस्था। किं च जात्यादिधर्मविशिष्टवस्तुग्रहणे सति भेदग्रहणम्। भेदग्रहणे सति जात्यादिधर्मविशिष्टवस्तुग्रहणमित्यन्योन्याश्रयणम्। अतो भेदस्यापि दुर्निरूपत्वात् सन्मात्रस्यैव प्रकाशकं प्रत्यक्षम्।

[24] किं च 'घटोऽस्ति' 'पटोऽस्ति' 'घटोऽनुभूयते' 'पटोऽनुभूयते' इति सर्वे पदार्थाः सत्तानुभूतिघटिता एव दृश्यन्ते। अत्र सन्मात्रं सर्वासु प्रतिपत्तिष्वनुवर्तमानं दृश्यते, इति तदेव परमार्थः। विशेषास्तु व्यावर्तमानतया, अपरमार्थाः, रज्जुसर्पादिवत्। यथा

---

that even when the nature of the object is grasped, the practical usage '[one thing] is different', being dependent upon the counter-entity, there cannot be any practical dealing in respect of difference at that very time, owing to the absence of the remembrance of that. In the case of one who holds the view that there is difference as being mere nature [of the object], the dependence upon a counter-entity, for the matter of that, is not fit even for being imagined, on account of the fact that there is no difference as regards the nature of the object in the case of its own form and the difference. Just as the practical dealing in respect of the nature of the object is not dependent upon a counter-entity, in the same way there would be the practical dealing in respect of difference. And there would be synonymity regarding a 'jar', 'difference' like 'Hasta' [and] 'Kara' etc. Nor, again, can it [*Bheda*] be the 'characteristic quality' [of a thing]. In case it is possessed of the nature of 'Dharma', its difference from its nature has got to be necessarily admitted; otherwise, it would be just its nature. If there were a difference, there would be difference for that too, and there would be [a separate *Dharma*] for that too—thus there would be the fault of endlessness. Moreover, when there is the apprehension of an object particularised by attributes like generality etc., there would be the apprehension of the difference; [and] when there is the apprehension of the difference, there would be the apprehension of the object particularised by attributes like generality etc.—Thus, there would be the mutual interdependence. Therefore, owing to the 'difference' also being difficult to be specified, direct perception [is] the illuminator of the mere 'sat'.

[24] Furthermore, 'The jar is', 'The cloth is', 'The jar is experienced', 'The cloth is experienced'—thus all objects are seen to be compounded of existence and 'anubhūti'. Here, mere 'sat' is seen persevering in all apprehensions; therefore, that alone is the Reality. Particularities, on the other hand [*tu*], owing to their turning away [exclusion] are unreal, like the serpent etc. on the rope. Just as the rope persisting on account of its being the basis,

रज्जुरधिष्ठानतयानुवर्तमाना सती परमार्था, व्यावर्तमानाः सर्पभूदलनाम्बुधारादयोऽपरमार्थाः।

ननु च रज्जुसर्पादौ 'रज्जुरियं न सर्पः' इत्यादिरज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठानयाथार्थ्यज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात्सर्पादेरपारमार्थ्यम्, न व्यावर्तमानत्वात्। रज्ज्वादेरपि पारमार्थ्यं नानुवर्तमानतया, किंत्वबाधितत्वात्। अत्र त्वबाधितानां घटादीनां कथमपारमार्थ्यम्?

उच्यते। घटादौ दृष्टा व्यावृत्तिः, सा किंरूपेति विवेचनीयम्। किं घटोऽस्तीत्यत्र पटाभावः? सिद्धं तर्हि 'घटोऽस्ति'इत्यनेन पटादीनां बाधितत्वम्। अतो बाधफलभूता विषयनिवृत्तिर्व्यावृत्तिः। सा व्यावर्तमानानामपारमार्थ्यं साधयति। रज्जुवत्सन्मात्रमबाधितमनुवर्तते। तस्मात्सन्मात्रातिरेकि सर्वमपरमार्थम्। प्रयोगश्च भवति—

१ सत् परमार्थम्।
अनुवर्तमानत्वात्।
रज्जुसर्पादौ रज्ज्वादिवत्।

२ घटादयोऽपरमार्थाः।
व्यावर्तमानत्वात्।
रज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठानसर्पादिवत्।

इति।

---

is the reality; the serpent, the cracking of the earth, the line of water etc. that turn away [no longer continuing there] are [all] unreal.

Further, I say [says the objector]—There is the non-real nature of the serpent etc. owing to its being stultified by the knowledge of the basis, rope etc. as it is, in the form 'this is the rope, not the serpent' and not owing to its turning away. The real nature of the rope etc. as well, is not on account of its persisting, but on account of its not being stultified. Here again, how could there be the unreal nature of the jar and others that are not stultified?

[This] is said [in reply] – The exclusion seen in the case of jar and others— of what nature is it [the exclusion] has to be analysed. Is there the absence of cloth when it is said 'the jar is'? Then it is proved that there is the stultification of cloth and others by the statement [*iti*] 'the jar is'. Therefore, 'exclusion' is the turning away from the object, resulting in the stultification. [And] that proves the unreal nature of those turning away. Like rope, the mere 'sat' persists on, [being] unstultified. Therefore, everything beyond mere 'sat' is unreal. And there is the [argument in] the syllogistic form [as follows]—

[1] 'Sat' [is] Reality
On account of its persisting,
Like the rope etc., on the rope and the serpent etc.

[2] Jar and others are unreal
On account of their turning away
Like the serpent and others with the rope and others as their basis.

एवं सत्यनुवर्तमानानुभूतिरेव परमार्था । सैव सती ।

[25] ननु च सन्मात्रमनुभूतेर्विषयतया ततो भिन्नम् ।

नैवम् । भेदो हि प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वाद्दुर्निरूपत्वाच्च पुरस्तादेव निरस्तः । अत एव सतोऽनुभूतिविषयभावोऽपि न प्रमाणपदवीमनुसरति । तस्मात्सदनुभूतिरेव । सा च स्वतः- सिद्धा, अनुभूतित्वात् । अन्यतः सिद्धौ घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । किं चानुभवान्तरापेक्षा चानुभूतेर्न शक्या कल्पयितुम्; स्वसत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वात् । न ह्यनुभूतिर्वर्तमाना घटादि- वदप्रकाशा दृश्यते, येन परायत्तप्रकाशाभ्युपगम्येत ।

अथैवं मनुषे—

उत्पन्नायामप्यनुभूतौ विषयमात्रमवभासते 'घटोऽनुभूयते'इति । न हि कश्चित् 'घटोऽयम्' इति जानंस्तदानीमेवाविषयभूतामनिदंभावामनुभूतिमप्यनुभवति । तस्मा- द्घटादिप्रकाशनिष्पत्तौ चक्षुरादिकरणसंनिकर्षवदनुभूतेः सद्भाव एव हेतुः । तदनन्तर- मर्थगतकादाचित्कप्रकाशातिशयलिङ्गेनानुभूतिरनुमीयते ।

एवं तर्ह्यनुभूतेरजडाया अर्थवज्जडत्वमापद्येत — इति चेत्—

Such being the case, the persisting experience [*anuthūti*] alone is the reality, and that alone exists.

[25] Further, I say [says the objector]— Mere 'sat' being the object of experience is different from it [*anubhūti*].

Not so; for difference, not being the object of direct perception and being difficult to be pointed out has been already ruled out. For the same reason, the 'sat' having the nature of the object of 'anubhūti' also, cannot come within the jurisdiction of the means of proof. Therefore, the 'sat' is 'anubhūti' itself. And that is self-proved, being possessed of the nature of 'Anubhūti.' If it were to be proved by some other means, there would be the undesirable result of its being 'non-anubhūti', like jar and others. Besides, the dependence of 'anubhūti' upon another experience cannot possibly be imagined, on account of its illumining by its own existence itself. Not indeed, is seen 'anubhūti' while existing, as not illumining like jar and others, so that it could be admitted as having its illumination dependent upon others.

Now if you think—

Even in the case of produced 'anubhūti,' there is only the object flashing forth [in the form] 'the jar is experienced',— Not indeed, one knowing 'this is a jar' experiences at the same time itself, 'anubhūti' not being the object and having the form 'not this'. Therefore, the existence of 'anubhūti' is the cause of the production of the illumining of jar and others, like the close contact of the sense-organs like eye and others. After that, 'anubhūti' is inferred by the logical mark viz. the transitory intense illumination pertaining to the object.

If it be contended— Then in so admitting, there would take place the non-sentient nature in the case of the sentient 'Anubhūti' like a material object.

किमिदमजडत्वं नाम ? न तावत्स्वसत्तायाः प्रकाशाव्यभिचारः, सुखादिष्वप्येतत्संभवात् । न हि कदाचिदपि सुखादयः सन्तो नोपलभ्यन्ते । अतोऽनुभूतिः स्वयमेव नानुभूयते । अर्थान्तरं स्पृशतोऽप्यङ्गुल्यग्रस्य स्वात्मस्पर्शवदशक्यत्वात्— इति ।

[26] तदिदम्, अनाकलितानुभवविभवस्य स्वमतिविजृम्भितम्, अनुभूतिव्यतिरेकिणो विषयधर्मस्य प्रकाशस्य रूपादिवदनुपलब्धेः, उभयाभ्युपेतानुभूत्यैवाशेषव्यवहारोपपत्तौ प्रकाशाख्यार्थधर्मकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च । अतो नानुभूतिरनुमीयते । नापि ज्ञानान्तरसिद्धा । अपि तु सर्वं साधयन्त्यनुभूतिः स्वयमेव सिध्यति । प्रयोगश्च—

अनुभूतिरनन्याधीनस्वधर्मव्यवहारा ।
स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुत्वात् ।
यः स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुः
स तयोः स्वस्मिन्ननन्याधीनो दृष्टः ।
यथा रूपादिश्चाक्षुषत्वादौ ।

रूपादिर्हि पृथिव्यादौ स्वसंबन्धाच्चाक्षुषत्वादि जनयन्स्वस्मिन्न रूपादिसंबन्धाधीनश्चाक्षुषत्वादौ । अतोऽनुभूतिरात्मनः प्रकाशमानत्वे 'प्रकाशते' इति व्यवहारे च स्वयमेव हेतुः ।

[We ask] what indeed, is this sentient nature? It cannot possibly be the non-association with illumination of its own existence, because this would be possible even in the case of pleasure etc. For never, surely, pleasure and others while existing, are not experienced. Therefore, 'anubhūti' is not experienced merely by itself, because of the impossibility like touching itself by the tip of the finger, although touching some other object.

[**26**] Now [all] this [is] the display of intelligence of one who has not grasped the [wonderful] glory of 'experience', because the characteristic of the object over and above 'anubhūti' cannot be found like colour etc. of light. And because when the entire practical dealing is possible by the 'anubhūti' [as] admitted by both of us, the supposition of the characteristic of the object called 'light' cannot be justified. Therefore, the 'anubhūti' cannot be inferred. Nor is it proved by another cognition. On the other hand, 'anubhūti' proving everything, becomes proved just by itself. And [there is the following] syllogistic [reasoning].

Anubhūti has practical dealing about its own attributes not dependent upon others.

On account of its being the cause of practical dealing in respect of attributes of other objects through its own connection.

Whosoever is the cause of practical dealing in respect of his attributes with another object through his connection—he is seen as not being dependent out of the two, in respect of himself.

Like colour and others [in respect of being perceptible] by the eye and others.

For, colour and others producing [capability of] perceptibility of the eye etc. in respect of earth etc. through their connection, are not dependent upon the relation of colour etc. in respect of themselves for the purpose of the perceptibility etc. Therefore, 'anubhūti' by itself is the cause of the self-

सेयं स्वयंप्रकाशानुभूतिर्नित्या च, प्रागभावाद्यभावात् । तदभावश्च स्वतःसिद्धत्वादेव । न ह्यनुभूतेः स्वतःसिद्धायाः प्रागभावः स्वतोऽन्यतो वावगन्तुं शक्यते । अनुभूतिः स्वाभावमवगमयन्ती सती तावन्नावगमयति । तस्याः सत्त्वे विरोधादेव तदभावो नास्तीति, कथं स्वाभावमवगमयति ? एवमसत्यपि नावगमयति । अनुभूतिः स्वयमसती कथं स्वाभावे प्रमाणं भवेत् ? नाप्यन्यतोऽवगन्तुं शक्यते, अनुभूतेरनन्यगोचरत्वात् । अस्याः प्रागभावं साधयत्प्रमाणम् ' अनुभूतिरियम् ' इति विषयीकृत्य तदभावं साधयेत् । स्वतःसिद्धत्वेन ' इयम् ' इति विषयीकारानर्हत्वात्तत्प्रागभावो नान्यतः शक्यावगमः । अतोऽस्याः प्रागभावाद्यभावादुत्पत्तिर्न शक्यते वक्तुम्, इति ।

[27] उत्पत्तिप्रतिबद्धाश्चान्येऽपि भावविकारास्तस्या न सन्ति । अनुत्पन्नेयमनुभूतिरात्मनि नानात्वमपि न सहते, व्यापकविरुद्धोपलब्धेः । न ह्यनुत्पन्नं नानाभूतं दृष्टम् । भेदादीनामनुभाव्यत्वेन च रूपादेरिवानुभूतिधर्मत्वं न संभवति । अतोऽनुभूतेरनुभवस्वरूपत्वादेवान्योऽपि कश्चिदनुभाव्यो नास्या धर्मः । यतो निर्धूतनिखिलभेदा संविद्, अत एव

---

illumining and practical usage viz. 'It illumines'. And this same self-illumining 'anubhūti' is eternal, on account of the absence of antecedent negation etc. and the absence of that [*prāgabhāva*] is due to its self-proved nature itself. For, it is not possible to comprehend the antecedent negation of the self-proved 'anubhūti' either from itself or from another [source]. 'Anubhūti' making one comprehend its own negation, would not, for the matter of that, make one comprehend [the same]. When that ['anubhuti], is in existence, there does not exist its negation owing to the very contradiction —so how can it make one comprehend its own negation ? Similarly, the non-existent [*anubhūti*] as well would not make one comprehend ! How could 'anubhūti', not existing itself, be an authority for its own negation ? Nor could it possibly be understood by means of anything else, on account of 'anubhūti' not coming within the ken of anything else. The means of proof proving the antecedent negation of this ['anubhūti'] would prove its negation after having made out 'this [is] anubhūti' as the object of knowledge. On account of its being self-proved, because it [*anubhūti*] does not deserve to be made the object of knowledge in the form 'this is anubhūti' [its] antecedent negation cannot possibly be known from anything else. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of its origination, owing to the absence of antecedent negation and others.

[27] Further, even the other changes in the object associated with origination are not possible in it [*anubhūti*]. This non-originated 'anubhūti' cannot tolerate multiplicity even in itself on account of the presence of the contradictory of the more extensive. Not, indeed, what is not originated is seen to be manifold. And in the case of difference and others, there is no possibility of their being the attribute of 'anubhūti' owing to the fact of their being fit to be experienced, like colour and others. Therefore, because 'anubhūti' has the nature of experience alone, there is no other attribute belonging to it that is fit to be experienced. Because consciousness (*saṁvit*) is completely void of

नास्याः स्वरूपातिरिक्त आश्रयो ज्ञाता नाम कश्चिदस्ति, इति स्वप्रकाशरूपा सैवात्मा, अजडत्वाच्च। अनात्मत्वव्याप्तं जडत्वं संविदि व्यावर्तमानमनात्मत्वमपि हि संविदो व्यावर्तयति।

ननु च 'अहं जानामि' इति ज्ञातृता प्रतीतिसिद्धा।

नैवम्। सा भ्रान्तिसिद्धा, रजततेव शुक्तिशकलस्य, अनुभूतेः स्वात्मनि कर्तृत्वायोगात्। अतो मनुष्योऽहमित्यत्यन्तबहिर्भूतमनुष्यत्वादिविशिष्टपिण्डात्माभिमानवज्ज्ञातृत्वमप्यध्यस्तम्। ज्ञातृत्वं हि ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वम्। तच्च विक्रियात्मकं जडं विकारिद्रव्याहंकारग्रन्थिस्थमविक्रिये साक्षिणि चिन्मात्रात्मनि कथमिव संभवति? दृश्यधीनसिद्धित्वादेव रूपादेरिव कर्तृत्वादेर्नात्मधर्मत्वम्। सुषुप्तिमूर्च्छादावहंप्रत्ययाभावेऽप्यात्मानुभवदर्शनेन नात्मनोऽहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वम्। कर्तृत्वेऽहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वे चात्मनोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने देहस्येव जडत्वपराक्त्वानात्मत्वादिप्रसङ्गो दुष्परिहरः। अहंप्रत्ययगोचरात्कर्तृतया प्रसिद्धाद्देहात्क्रियाफलस्य स्वर्गादेर्भोक्तुरात्मनोऽन्यत्वं प्रामाणिकानां प्रसिद्धमेव।

---

difference,—for this very reason there is no resort for it other than its own nature, called 'knower' and so it [consciousness] alone, of self-luminous nature is the Ātman, and because of its being sentient. Non-sentiency invariably associated with non-Ātman nature turning away from 'saṁvit' turns away the non-Ātman nature also of the 'saṁvit'.

Further, I say [says the objector]—The nature of the knower in the form 'I know' is proved by [actual] apprehension.

Not so. That [apprehension] is established by wrong knowledge like the silver-ness in respect of the conch-piece, on account of there being the impossibility of 'anubhūti' acting as a doer in respect of itself. Therefore, 'the nature of the knower' is also superimposed like the strong notion about the self in the form 'I am a man' in respect of an object characterised by the genus 'man' that is entirely residing outside. The nature of a knower, indeed, is the nature of the agent of the action of knowledge. And how possibly can that [*Jñātṛtvam*] which is essentially subject to modification, non-sentient, stationed in the knot of 'I-ness' [*Ahaṁkāra*] which is a substance undergoing modification, arise in the Changeless, and Witness Ātman who is mere 'cit'? The nature of an agent etc. cannot be the attribute of Ātman owing to their establishment being absolutely dependent upon perception, like colour and others. On account of the apprehension of the 'anubhūti' about the self, even in the absence of the apprehension 'I' in deep sleep, swoon etc. there is no coming of the Ātman within the province of the 'I-apprehension'. And if the nature of agent which is within the province of 'I-apprepension' is admitted in the case of the Ātman, the undesirable result viz. non-sentiency, being outward and non-Ātman nature etc. as in the case of the body, is difficult to avoid. That the Ātman, the enjoyer of heaven etc. the fruit of the [sacrificial] rites, is different from the body which comes within the province of 'I-apprehension' [and] well-known as being the 'doer' is, verily, well-known to [all] those expert in [the use of] the means of proof. Likewise, it should be admitted

तथाहमर्थाज्ज्ञातुरपि विलक्षणः साक्षी प्रत्यगात्मेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। एवमविक्रियानुभवस्वरूपस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जको जडोऽप्यहंकारः स्वाश्रयतया तमभिव्यनक्ति। आत्मस्थतयाभिव्यङ्ग्याभिव्यञ्जनमभिव्यञ्जकानां स्वभावः। दर्पणजलखण्डादिर्हि मुखचन्द्रबिम्बगोत्वादिकमात्मस्थतयाभिव्यनक्ति। तत्कुतोऽयं जानाम्यहमिति भ्रमः ?

स्वप्रकाशाया अनुभूतेः कथमिव तदभिव्यङ्ग्यजडरूपाहंकारेणाभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वम् ?—इति मा वोचः, रविकरनिकराभिव्यङ्ग्यकरतलस्य तदभिव्यञ्जकत्वोपदर्शनात्। जालकरन्ध्रनिष्क्रान्तद्युमणिकिरणानां तदभिव्यङ्ग्येनापि करतलेन स्फुटतरप्रकाशो हि दृष्टचरः। यतः 'अहं जानामि' इति ज्ञातायमहमर्थश्चिन्मात्रात्मनो न पारमार्थिको धर्मोऽत एव सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योर्नान्वेति। तत्र ह्यहमुल्लेखविगमेन स्वाभाविकानुभवमात्ररूपेणात्मावभासते। अत एव सुप्तोत्थितः कदाचिन्मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवानिति परामृशति। तस्मात्परमार्थतो निरस्तसमस्तभेदविकल्पनिर्विशेषचिन्मात्रैकरसकूटस्थनित्यसंविदेव भ्रान्त्या ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानरूपविविधविचित्रभेदा विवर्तत इति तन्मूलभूताविद्यानिबर्हणाय नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते, इति।

---

that there is the in-most Ātman, the Witness different even from the knower conveyed by 'I'. Thus, the 'Ahaṁkāra', the manifester of the nature of experience itself, incapable of modification, although non-sentient, manifests it as being its resort. Manifesting as residing in themselves of things to be manifested is the nature of the manifesters. For, mirror, water etc. manifest, as being within themselves, the face, the orb of the moon, bullness etc. In that case, whence can there be the wrong knowledge in the form 'I know'?

How possibly can there be the fitness for being manifested in the case of the self-illumining 'anubhūti' by the non-sentient 'ahaṁkāra' which is fit to be manifested by it?—Do not talk like this. Because the palm of the hand fit to be manifested by a mass of the rays of the Sun is seen to be the manifester of that [the mass of the rays of the Sun]. For, a more distinct light of the rays of the Sun passing through the latticed holes, by the palm of the hand although fit to be manifested by them, has been seen before. Because this I-entity, the knower, as [is known from] the form 'I know' is not the real attribute of the Ātman who is mere 'cit' and for this very reason does not follow in deep-sleep-state and Release. For, there the Ātman shines forth merely in the form of natural experience owing to the absence of the reference to 'I'. For this very reason, one who has got up from sleep sometimes reflects 'I did not know even myself.' Therefore, because 'Saṁvit' alone, which is in fact, with all difference and alternatives banished away, distinctionless, uniform in mere 'cit', immutable [and] eternal—undergoes various forms through wrong knowledge, with various variegated differences in the form—knower, object of knowledge, and knowledge,—all Vedānta texts are to be taken up [for study] for the rooting out of 'Avidyā' the basis of that [wrong knowledge] [and] for the acquisition of the 'Vidyā', of the oneness of Atman and Brahman, with its nature eternal, pure, awakened [and] free, [from bondage].

[28] तदिदम्, औपनिषदपरमपुरुषवरणीयताहेतुगुणविशेषविरहिणाम्, अनादि-पापवासनादूषिताशेषशेमुषीकाणाम्, अनधिगतपदवाक्यस्वरूपतदर्थयाथात्म्यप्रत्यक्षादि-सकलप्रमाणवृत्ततत्तदितिकर्तव्यतारूपसमीचीनन्यायमार्गाणां विकल्पासहविविधकुतर्क-कल्ककल्पितम्, इति न्यायानुगृहीतवाक्यप्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रमाणवृत्तयाथात्म्यविद्भिरना-दरणीयम् । तथाहि—

निर्विशेषवस्तुवादिभिर्निर्विशेषे वस्तुनि 'इदं प्रमाणम्' इति न शक्यते वक्तुम्, सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वात्सर्वप्रमाणानाम् । यस्तु स्वानुभवसिद्धमिति स्वगोष्ठीनिष्ठः समयः सोऽप्यात्मसाक्षिकसविशेषानुभवादेव निरस्तः, 'इदमहमदर्शम्' इति केनचिद्विशेषेण विशिष्टविषयत्वात्सर्वेषामनुभवानाम् । सविशेषोऽप्यनुभूयमानोऽनुभवः केनचिद्युक्त्याभासेन निर्विशेष इति निष्कृष्यमाणः सत्तातिरेकिभिः स्वासाधारणैः स्वभावविशेषैः निष्कृष्टव्य इति निष्कर्षहेतुभूतैः सत्तातिरेकिभिः स्वासाधारणैः स्वभावविशेषैः सविशेष एवावतिष्ठते । अतः कैश्चिद्विशेषैर्विशिष्टस्यैव वस्तुनोऽन्ये विशेषा निरस्यन्ते, इति न क्वचिन्निर्विशेषवस्तु-

---

[28] [*Mahāsiddhānta*]—Now [all] this, because it is fancied out by the filth of various fallacious reasoning explained alternatively by those who are void of the special quality—the cause of being fit to be chosen by the Highest Puruṣa described in the Upaniṣadas, whose intelligence is completely contaminated by beginningless sinful 'Vāsanā', who have not understood the ways of right logical reasoning consisting of the nature of words and sentences, their right meaning, the functionning of all means of proof like Direct Perception etc. and the various particular modes of procedure [regarding ritual],— should be treated with disrespect by those who know the rightful nature of sentences in conformity with logic, [and] of the functions of all means of proof like Direct Perception and others. To explain the same in detail.—

It is not possible for those who contend that a distinctionless object exists, to talk of, 'This [is] the means of proof' in respect of a distinctionless object, on account of all means of proof having for their object, things having distinctive attributes. As for the convention again, accepted in their own school [*Goṣṭhī*] viz. [the 'Nirviśeṣa Vastu'] is proved by its experience,—that also is ruled out by the experience itself of the distinctive attributes with Ātman as the Witness; because all the experiences have for their object something particularised by some qualifying attribute in the form 'This I saw'. The experience [which is] being experienced although particularised, which is being concluded to be distinctionless by some psudo-reasoning or other, does remain particularised on account of the natural distinctive attributes peculiar to itself, over and above [the attribute] existence, [and] which are the causes of the conclusion, because that [*anubhava*] has got to be concluded by means of natural distinctive attributes, peculiar to itself [and] over and above [the attribute] existence. Therefore, because in the case of an object definitely particularised by some distinctive attribute or other, other distinctive attributes are ruled out, there cannot be the establishment of

सिद्धिः । धियो हि धीत्वं स्वयंप्रकाशता च, ज्ञातुर्विषयप्रकाशनस्वभावतयोपलब्धेः । स्वापमदमूर्च्छासु च सविशेष एवानुभव इति स्वावसरे निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः ।

स्वाभ्युपगताश्च नित्यत्वादयो ह्यनेकविशेषाः सन्त्येव, ते च न वस्तुमात्रमिति शक्योपपादनाः, वस्तुमात्राभ्युपगमे सत्यपि विधाभेदविवाददर्शनात्, स्वाभिमततद्विधाभेदैश्च स्वमतोपपादनात् । अतः प्रामाणिकविशेषैर्विशिष्टमेव वस्त्विति वक्तव्यम् ।

शब्दस्य तु विशेषेण सविशेष एव वस्तुन्यभिधानसामर्थ्यम्, पदवाक्यरूपेण प्रवृत्तेः । प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोगेन हि पदत्वम् । प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोरर्थभेदेन पदस्यैव विशिष्टार्थप्रतिपादनमवर्जनीयम् । पदभेदश्चार्थभेदनिबन्धनः । पदसंघातरूपस्य वाक्यास्यानेकपदार्थसंसर्गविशेषाभिधायित्वेन निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनासामर्थ्यान्न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि शब्दः प्रमाणम् ।

---

a distinctionless object anywhere. For, in the case of consciousness [*samvit*] there is the nature of consciousness and self-illumining nature on account of the knower being apprehended as having the nature of illumining the object. And in the case of the deep-sleep-state, intoxication and swoon, the experience is definitely a particularised one—this we shall expound in a very convincing manner at the proper occasion.

And there are certainly many distinctive attributes, eternality and others accepted by you. And it is not possible to expound them as mere [distinctionless] object [and nothing else], because there is seen a conflict of views regarding the mode and the difference—and there is the expounding of their own view by means of the modes and the differences pertaining to it accepted by them, even if there is the admittance of a mere [distinctionless] object. Therefore it ought to be stated as the proper view, that a thing is a definitely particularised one by distinctive attributes proved by means of proof.

Particularly in the case of [the means of proof] Word, again, there is the denotative power for a particularised thing alone, on account of its activity in the form of word and sentence. For, there is the nature of the word due to conjunction of the root-form and the affix. On account of the difference in meaning of the root-form and the affix, the propounding of a particularised meaning by a word itself cannot be avoided. And the difference of word is dependent upon the difference in meaning. Because in the case of a sentence which is of the form of a group of words, there cannot be the power to expound the distinctionless object, owing to its denotative power in respect of the particular contact with the meaning of more than one word; Word cannot be the authority for [proving] a distinctionless object.

[29] प्रत्यक्षस्य निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदभिन्नस्य न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि प्रमाणभावः। सविकल्पकं जात्याद्यनेकपदार्थविशिष्टविषयत्वादेव सविशेषविषयम् एव। निर्विकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव, सविकल्पके स्वस्मिन्ननुभूतपदार्थविशिष्टप्रतिसंधानहेतुत्वात्। निर्विकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषेण वियुक्तस्य ग्रहणं न सर्वविशेषरहितस्य, तथाभूतस्य कदाचिदपि ग्रहणादर्शनात्, अनुपपत्तेश्च। केनचिद्विशेषेण 'इदमित्थम्' इति सर्वा प्रतीतिरुपजायते, त्रिकोणसास्नादिसंस्थानविशेषेण विना कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्य ग्रहणायोगात्। अतो निर्विकल्पकमेकजातीयद्रव्येषु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम्। द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणं सविकल्पकमित्युच्यते। तत्र प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गोत्वादेरनुवृत्ताकारता न प्रतीयते। द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणेष्वेवानुवृत्तिप्रतीतिः। प्रथमप्रतीत्यनुसंहितवस्तुसंस्थानरूपगोत्वादेरनुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टत्वं द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणावसेयमिति द्वितीयादिग्रहणस्य सविकल्पकत्वम्। सास्नादिवस्तुसंस्थानरूपगोत्वादेरनुवृत्तिर्न प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणे गृह्यत इति प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणस्य

---

[29] There cannot be the nature of the means of proof in respect of a distinctionless object in the case of Direct perception, which is differentiated by the division into Indeterminate [and] Determinate [knowledge]. The Determinate is concerned with an object having distinctive attributes on account of its having definitely for its province, something particularised by more than one object such as generality and others. The Indeterminate also is definitely concerned with an object with distinctive attributes, on account of its being the cause of the continuity of the particularised impression about objects experienced in itself, in the matter of the determinate [direct perception]. The Indeterminate means the apprehension of an object bereft of some particular attribute, and not of a thing bereft of all particular attributes, for never indeed, is seen the apprehension of a thing of that nature, and on account of its not being reasonable either. All apprehension is, indeed' produced in the form 'This [is] thus' on account of the impossibility of apprehending anything whatsoever, without the specific configuration such as the triangular form, dew-lap etc; therefore the Indeterminate [direct perception] is the first apprehension of a body among homogeneous objects; the second and subsequent apprehensions of the object are called the Determinate [direct perception]. There [at the time of] the first apprehension of the [individual] body, the continuing nature of the generality bullness etc. is not apprehended. There is the apprehension of the continuity [in respect of] the second and subsequent apprehensions alone of the [individual] object. Because being particularised by the continuity-attribute of bullness and others, having the form of the configuration of the object bound up with the first apprehension, has its upshot in the second etc. apprehension of the object; the second and subsequent apprehension, is the Determinate. [And] because the continuity of bullness etc, constituted of the form of the configuration of the individual dew-lap etc. is not apprehended at the first apprehension of the object, the first apprehension of the object is Indeterminate, and

निर्विकल्पकत्वम्, न पुनः संस्थानरूपजात्यादेरग्रहणात्, संस्थानरूपजात्यादेरप्यैन्द्रियकत्वाविशेषात्। संस्थानेन विना संस्थानिनः प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेश्च प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणेऽपि ससंस्थानमेव वस्तु 'इत्थम्' इति गृह्यते। अतो द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणेषु गोत्वादेरनुवृत्तिधर्मविशिष्टता संस्थानिवत्संस्थानवच्च सर्वदैव गृह्यत इति तेषु सविकल्पकत्वमेव। अतः प्रत्यक्षस्य कदाचिदपि न निर्विशेषविषयत्वम्।

अत एव सर्वत्र भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमपि निरस्तम्। 'इदमित्थम्' इति प्रतीतौ 'इदम्, इत्थम्' भावयोरैक्यं कथमिव प्रत्येतुं शक्यते? अत्रेत्थंभावः सास्नादिसंस्थानविशेषस्तद्विशेष्यं द्रव्यमिदमंश इत्यनयोरैक्यं प्रतीतिपराहतमेव। तथाहि—

प्रथममेव वस्तु प्रतीयमानं सकलेतरव्यावृत्तमेव प्रतीयते। व्यावृत्तिश्च गोत्वादिसंस्थानविशेषविशिष्टतया 'इदमित्थम्' इति प्रतीतेः। सर्वत्र विशेषणविशेष्यभावप्रतिपत्तौ तयोरत्यन्तभेदः प्रतीत्यैव सुव्यक्तः। तत्र दण्डकुण्डलादयः पृथक्संस्थानसंस्थिताः स्वनिष्ठाश्च कदाचित्क्वचिद्द्रव्यान्तरविशेषणतयावतिष्ठन्ते। गोत्वादयस्तु द्रव्यसंस्थानतयैव पदार्थभूताः

---

not on account of the non-apprehension of the form of configuration; even in the case of bullness etc., of the form of configuration, the nature of being apprehended by the sense-organs is not different. Further, on account of the impossibility of apprehension of the configurated object without the configuration, is apprehended the thing along with the configuration itself as being 'thus' even at the [time of] the first apprehension of an object. Therefore, because at the second and subsequent apprehension of the body, the particularised continuity-attribute of bullness is always [without exception] apprehended like the configuration and the configurated object, there is definitely the Determinate nature in them. Therefore, Direct perception can never have for its object a distinctionless thing.

And for the same reason, is also ruled out difference and non-difference everywhere. When there is the apprehension in the form 'This [is] thus', how again is it possible to apprehend the oneness of the two states [viz.] 'this' [and] 'thus'?—Here (1) the state of 'thus'—is a particular configura tion like dew-lap etc. [and] (2) that qualified thing is the 'this' portion—thus the oneness of the two is completely swept off by [actual] apprehension. To explain the same in detail:—

An object being apprehended for the very first time, is apprehended as definitely excluded from everything else,—and the exclusion is on account of the apprehension in the form 'This [is] thus' owing to its being particularised by the particular configuration, bullness etc. Everywhere in the apprehension of the relation of the qualifying and the qualified, the most complete difference between the two is all too patent by the apprehension itself. There the staff, the ear-rings etc. standing out separately in the configuration and existing by themeselves remain as qualifying another entity, sometimes or in some cases. But bullness and others, getting the status of an object on account of the very configuration of the entity, stand

सन्तो द्रव्यविशेषणतयावस्थिताः। उभयत्र विशेषणविशेष्यभावः समानः। अत एव तयोर्भेदप्रतिपत्तिश्च। इयांस्तु विशेषः — पृथक्स्थितिप्रतिपत्तियोग्या दण्डादयः, गोत्वादयस्तु नियमेन तदनर्हा इति। अतो वस्तुविरोधः प्रतीतिपराहत इति प्रतीतिप्रकारनिह्नवादेवोच्यते। प्रतीतिप्रकारो हि 'इदमित्थम्' इत्येव सर्वसंमतः। तदेतत्सूत्रकारेण —

'नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्' (ब्र. सू. २।२।३१)

इत्यत्र सुव्यक्तमुपपादितम्। अतः प्रत्यक्षस्य सविशेषविषयत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादिदृष्टसंबन्धविशिष्टविषयत्वात्, अनुमानमपि सविशेषविषयमेव। प्रमाणसंख्याविवादेऽपि सर्वाभ्युपगतप्रमाणानामयमेव विषय इति न केनापि प्रमाणेन निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः। वस्तुगतस्वभावविशेषैस्तदेव वस्तु निर्विशेषमिति वदन् जननीवन्ध्यात्वप्रतिज्ञावत्स्ववाग्विरोधित्वमपि न जानाति।

[30] यत्तु — प्रत्यक्षं सन्मात्रग्राहित्वेन न भेदविषयः, भेदश्च विकल्पासहत्वाद्दुर्नि-

---

out as qualifying the entity. The relation of the qualifying and the qualified is the same in [the case of] both. And for this very reason, there is the apprehension of the difference between the two. This, however, is the special feature.—The staff and others are fit for being apprehended as having a separate location; bullness and others, on the other hand, are, as a rule, unsuited for that. Therefore, that the contradiction between things is swept off by the apprehension, is spoken of owing to itself ignoring the mode of apprehension. As for the mode of apprehension 'This [is] thus'—this is met with the approval of all. And [all] this has been very clearly argued out by the *Sūtrakāra* [in the sūtra],

Not, on account of the impossibility [of the contradictory qualities existing] in one and the same [object]. [Br. Sū. 2-2·31]

Therefore, Inference also has for its province qualified things on account of its referring to a qualified [thing] due to its relation seen by Direct perception etc., owing to the Direct perception having for its object a qualified thing. Even though there is a conflict of views about the number of means of proof, this [qualified thing] itself is the province of all means of proof admitted by all, [and] so there cannot be the establishment of a distinctionless thing by any means of proof whatsoever. A person declaring the same thing characterised by natural distinctive attributes belonging to the object as 'distinctionless' does not know even the contradiction [involved] in his own words as in the solemn assertion [made by somebody] about the barrenness of [his] mother.

[30] As regards what has been stated [already] viz. Direct perception cannot concern itself with difference on account of its grasping the mere 'Sat' [and] the difference is difficult to point out owing to its not admitting any alternative,—that too is flung far away, because an object, only when

रूपः—इत्युक्तम्। तदपि जात्यादिविशिष्टस्यैव वस्तुनः प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्, जात्यादेरेव प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया वस्तुनः स्वस्य च भेदव्यवहारहेतुत्वाच्च दूरोत्सारितम्। संवेदनवद्रूपादिवच्च परत्र व्यवहारविशेषहेतोः स्वस्मिन्नपि तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वं युष्माभिरभ्युपेतं भेदस्यापि संभवत्येव। अत एव नानवस्थान्योन्याश्रयणं च। एकक्षणवर्तित्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे वस्तुभेदरूपतत्संस्थानगोत्वादेर्गृहीतत्वात्क्षणान्तरग्राह्यं न किञ्चिदिह तिष्ठति।

अपि च सन्मात्रग्राहित्वे 'घटोऽस्ति' 'पटोऽस्ति' इति विशिष्टविषया प्रतिपत्तिर्विरुध्यते। यदि च सन्मात्रातिरेकिवस्तुसंस्थानरूपजात्यादिलक्षणो भेदः प्रत्यक्षेण न गृहीतः, किमित्यश्वार्थी महिषदर्शने निवर्तते? सर्वासु प्रतिपत्तिषु सन्मात्रमेव विषयश्चेत्, तत्प्रतिपत्तिविषयसहचारिणः सर्वे शब्दा एकैकप्रतिपत्तिषु किमिति न स्मर्यन्ते? किं चाश्वे हस्तिनि च संवेदनयोरेकविषयत्वेनोपरितनस्य गृहीतग्राहित्वाद्विशेषाभावाच्च स्मृतिवैलक्षण्यं न स्यात्। प्रतिसंवेदनं विशेषाभ्युपगमे प्रत्यक्षस्य विशिष्टार्थविषयत्वमेवाभ्युपगतं भवति। सर्वेषां संवेदनानामेकविषयतायामेकेनैव संवेदनेनाशेषग्रहणादन्धबधिराद्यभावश्च प्रसज्येत।

---

particularised by generality and others, is the object of Direct perception, [and] because generality and others, themselves are the cause of practical dealing in respect of difference between themselves and the thing owing to their dependence upon the counter-entity. And that being the cause of practical dealing admitted by you in respect of itself which is the cause of practical dealing does not become possible elsewhere, in the case of difference for the sake of a particular practical usage in itself or elsewhere, like the consciousness and colour and others and, for this very reason, there is no [fault of] endlessness and mutual interdependence [logical see-saw]. Even though Direct perception exists only for a moment, there does not remain anything to be grasped at the next moment on account of the difference, colour etc. of the object, its configuration, bullness and others.

And, further, [if Direct perception were taken] to grasp Existent (*Sat*) alone, the particularised apprehension about an object in the form 'The jar is' 'The cloth is'; would be in contradiction [with it]. And if the difference characterised by the nature of configuration of the object, colour over and above mere 'Sat', is not grasped by Direct perception, why, indeed, does a person desiring a horse, turn away at the sight of a buffalo? In all apprehensions if mere Sat alone be the object [of perception], why indeed are not remembered all the words associated with the objects of various apprehensions in each and every individual apprehension? And further, on account of the two cognitions about the horse and the elephant referring to one and the same object and owing to the absence of particularity due to the subsequent apprehension of what has been apprehended, there would be no difference regarding remembrance. If there be admitted a distinctive nature in respect of each cognition, this would be tantamount to admitting that Direct perception has too for its province a particularised object. If all the cognitions refer to only one object, on account of everything being apprehended by just one cognition, there would be the strange result viz. the absence of the blind and the deaf etc.

न च चक्षुषा सन्मात्रं गृह्यते, तस्य रूपरूपिरूपैकार्थसमवेतपदार्थग्राहित्वात्। नापि त्वचा, स्पर्शवद्वस्तुविषयत्वात्। श्रोत्रादीन्यपि न सन्मात्रविषयाणि, किन्तु शब्दरसगन्धलक्षणविशेषविषयाण्येव। अतः सन्मात्रस्य ग्राहकं न किञ्चिदिह दृश्यते। निर्विशेषसन्मात्रस्य च प्रत्यक्षेणैव ग्रहणे तद्विषयागमस्य प्राप्तविषयत्वेनानुवादकत्वमेव स्यात्। सन्मात्रब्रह्मणः प्रमेयभावश्च ततो जडत्वनाशित्वादयस्त्वयैवोक्ताः। अतो वस्तुसंस्थानरूपजात्यादिलक्षणभेदविशिष्टविषयमेव प्रत्यक्षम्। संस्थानातिरेकिणोऽनेकेष्वेकाकारबुद्धिबोध्यस्यादर्शनात्, तावतैव गोत्वादिजातिव्यवहारोपपत्तेः, अतिरेकवादेऽपि संस्थानस्य संप्रतिपन्नत्वाच्च संस्थानमेव जातिः। संस्थानं नाम स्वासाधारणरूपम्, इति यथावस्तुसंस्थानमनुसंधेयम्। जातिग्रहणेनैव 'भिन्नः' इति व्यवहारसंभवात्, पदार्थान्तरादर्शनात्, अर्थान्तरवादिनाप्यभ्युपगतत्वाच्च गोत्वादिरेव भेदः।

[31] ननु च जात्यादिरेव भेदश्चेत्, तस्मिन्गृहीते तद्व्यवहारवद्भेदव्यवहारोऽपि स्यात्।

Nor again is the mere Sat apprehended by the eye on account of its grasping colour, coloured object and things in intimate relation with the one thing 'colour'. Nor by the sense of touch, on account of its dealing with things having touch. The ear and others also have not for their sphere mere Sat, but [they] definitely concern themselves with characteristics such as sound, taste and smell. Therefore, nothing apprehending mere Sat is to be seen here. If the distinctionless mere Sat is apprehended by Direct perception itself, the Scriptures relating to that would be merely repeating what has been said before on account of their subject matter being already established [by Direct perception]. And Brahman which is mere Sat would have the nature of an object of knowledge, so, as a result there would be non-sentiency, perishability etc. which have already been spoken of by you. So, Direct perception has, for its province, only what is characterised by different properties like the configuration, colour, generality and others, of the object. Because there is not to be seen something to be cognised by the cognition having only one form in the case of many, over and above the configuration, there can be the accounting for the practical dealing about the generality, bullness and others merely by that [cognition] and owing to the configuration being admitted even in the doctrine—configuration being regarded as a separate distinctive property—configuration itself is the generality. Configuration means a form peculiar to oneself, so configuration as it stands should be understood to be persevering.

By the mere grasping of the generality on account of the absence of the perception of another object [and], of its being admitted even by those who advocate [the existence of] another object, there is the difference, bullness etc. itself, on account of the possibility of practical usage, in the form '[this is] different'.

[31] Further, I say [says the objector], if generality and others are themselves the difference, when that is grasped, there would be practical dealing in respect of difference as well, like the practical usage in respect of that [and others].

सत्यम्। भेदश्च व्यवह्रियत एव गोत्वादिव्यवहारात्। गोत्वादिरेव सकलेतरस्य व्यावृत्तिः, गोत्वादौ गृहीते सकलेतरसजातीयबुद्धिव्यवहारयोर्निवृत्तेः। भेदग्रहणेनैव ह्यभेदनिवृत्तिः। 'अयमस्माद्भिन्नः' इति तु व्यवहारे प्रतियोगिनिर्देशस्य तदपेक्षत्वात्प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया 'भिन्नः' इति व्यवहार इत्युक्तम्।

यत्पुनः, घटादीनां विशेषाणां व्यावर्तमानत्वेनापारमार्थ्यमुक्तम्—

तत्, अनालोचितबाध्यबाधकभावव्यावृत्त्यनुवृत्तिविशेषस्य भ्रान्तिप्रकल्पितम्। द्वयोर्ज्ञानयोर्हि विरोधे बाध्यबाधकभावः, बाधितस्यैव व्यावृत्तिः। अत्र घटपटादिषु देशकालभेदेन विरोध एव नास्ति। यस्मिन्देशे यस्मिन्काले यस्य सद्भावः प्रतिपन्नः, तस्मिन्देशे तस्मिन्काले तस्याभावः प्रतिपन्नश्चेत्, तत्र विरोधाद्बलवतो बाधकत्वम्, बाधितस्य च निवृत्तिः। देशान्तरकालान्तरसंबन्धितयानुभूतस्यान्यदेशकालयोरभावप्रतीतौ न विरोध इति, कथमत्र बाध्यबाधकभावः? अन्यत्र निवृत्तस्यान्यत्र निवृत्तिर्वा कथमुच्यते? रज्जुसर्पादिषु

True, [to a certain extent] the difference also is surely dealt with on account of the practical dealing in respect of bullness etc. Bullness etc. is itself exclusion of everything else, since when bullness and others are grasped there is the turning away of the cognition and practical dealing in respect of all other homogeneous objects. And there is the turning away of the non-difference by the grasping of the difference alone. But as regards the practical usage 'this one is different from this one', the reference to the counter-entity being necessarily dependent upon that—it has been said that the practical dealing viz. 'This is different' is there on account of the expectancy for a counter-entity.

As to what again has been said [viz.] [there is the unreal nature of the distinctions, jar and others, on account of their turning away],

—that is [but] a bold fancy due to wrong knowledge by one who has not scrutinised the peculiar nature of the stultified and the stultifying, exclusion and continuity. For, when there is a contradiction between two cognitions [there is] the relation of stultified and the stultifying, [and there is] the exclusion of the stultified alone. Here, in the case of jar, cloth etc. there is no contradiction at all owing to the difference regarding space and time. If there is cognised the absence of that, whose presence, at which time, at which place is cognised, there is owing to contradiction the nature of stultifying, being the stronger, [then] there is the turning away of the stultified. In the case of something experienced, being connected with another space and another time where there is the apprehension of the absence in another space and time, there is no contradiction—[and] so, how could there be, here, the relation of the stultified and stultifying ? Again, how can it be said that there is the turning away elsewhere of something which has turned away elsewhere ? In the case of rope and serpent etc., however, on account of the apprehension of negation

तु तद्देशकालसंबन्धितयैवाभावप्रतीतेर्विरोधो बाधकत्वं व्यावृत्तिश्च, इति देशकालान्तर-दृष्टस्य देशकालान्तरव्यावर्तमानत्वं मिथ्यात्वव्याप्तं न दृष्टम्, इति न व्यावर्तमानत्वमात्रम् अपारमार्थ्ये हेतुः ।

यत्तु—अनुवर्तमानत्वात्सत्परमार्थः—इति—

तत्सिद्धमेवेति न साधनमर्हति । अतो न सन्मात्रमेव वस्तु । अनुभूतिसद्विशेषयोश्च विषयविषयिभावेन भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्, अबाधितत्वाच्च, अनुभूतिरेव सती, इति, एतदपि निरस्तम् ।

[32] यत्तु—अनुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमुक्तम्, तद्विषयप्रकाशनवेलायां ज्ञातुरात्मनस्तथैव, न तु सर्वेषां सर्वदा तथैवेति नियमोऽस्ति, परानुभवस्य हानोपादानादिलिङ्गकानुमानज्ञानविषयत्वात्, स्वानुभवस्याप्यतीतस्य 'अज्ञासिषम्' इति ज्ञानविषयत्वदर्शनाच्च । अतोऽनुभूतिश्चेत्, स्वतःसिद्धा, इति वक्तुं न शक्यते ।

अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वेन, अननुभूतित्वम्—इत्यपि दुरुक्तम्, स्वगतातीतानुभवानां परगतानुभवानां चानुभाव्यत्वेनाननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गात् । परानुभवानुमानानभ्युपगमे च

---

being connected with the same space and time, there is contradiction, stultifying nature and turning away,—and so in the case of something seen in another time the turning away from another space and time is not seen as being invariably associated with false nature—hence the mere nature of turning away is not the cause of unreality.

As to [the statement] that Sat is the reality owing to its persisting nature,

—it is already established [and thus] does not stand in need of any proof. So mere Sat alone is not the thing [to be apprehended]. And on account of there being the relation of the subject and object between 'Anubhūti' and a particular Sat, the difference being established by Direct perception and is not contradicted—and so the. statement 'Anubhūti alone is existence'—this also is ruled out.

[32] As to what has been said—that 'anubhūti' is self-illuminating, it is just like that in the case of the Knower—Ātman at the time of the illumination of the objects, but there is no rule that it is like that at all times for all; because the experience of another is the object of Inferential knowledge with the logical marks like abandonment and acceptance etc., and because there is the perception of one's own past experience as being the object of knowledge in the form 'I have known'. So if there be 'anubhūti', it cannot be said to be self-established.

That the 'anubhūti', would be non-experience in the case of its being fit to be experienced—is also a stupid statement, on account of there being the undesirable result viz. the losing of its nature by 'anubhūti' in the case of past experiences belonging to oneself and experiences belonging to others as they are [certainly] experienced and would be non-anubhūti on account of the things fit for being expeiienced. And if the inferential knowledge :from the experiences of others is not admitted, there would be the undesirable result viz., the whole practical usage in respect of

शब्दार्थसंबन्धग्रहणाभावेन समस्तशब्दव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। आचार्यस्य ज्ञानवत्त्वमनुमाय तदुपसत्तिश्च क्रियते, सा च नोपपद्यते। न चान्यविषयत्वेऽननुभूतित्वम्। अनुभूतित्वं नाम वर्तमानतादशायां स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयं प्रति प्रकाशमानत्वम्, स्वसत्तयैव स्वविषयसाधनत्वं वा। ते चानुभवान्तरानुभाव्यत्वेऽपि स्वानुभवसिद्धे नापगच्छत इति नानुभूतित्वमपगच्छति। घटादेस्त्वननुभूतित्वमेव, तत्स्वभावविरहात्, न, अनुभाव्यत्वात्। तथा, अनुभूतेरननुभाव्यत्वेऽप्यननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारः, गगनकुसुमादेरननुभाव्यस्याननुभूतित्वात्।

गगनकुसुमादेरननुभूतित्वमसत्त्वप्रयुक्तम्, नाननुभाव्यत्वप्रयुक्तम्—इति चेत्,

—एवं तर्हि, घटादेरप्यननुभूतित्वानिबन्धनमज्ञानाविरोधित्वमेव नानुभाव्यत्वम्, इत्यास्थीयताम्।

अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वेऽज्ञानाविरोधित्वमपि तस्या घटादेरिव प्रसज्यते—इति चेत्—

अननुभाव्यत्वेऽपि गगनकुसुमादेरिवाज्ञानाविरोधित्वमपि प्रसज्यत एव। अतोऽनुभाव्यत्वेऽननुभूतित्वमित्युपहास्यम्।

---

words would be rooted out [of existence] on account of the absence of apprehension of the relation between words and their senses. Further, approaching the preceptor after having inferred (*anumāya*) the learned nature of the preceptor accepted—all that world be impossible. Nor again can there be the nature of non-anubhūti owing to its being the object of another. The nature of 'anubhūti' means the illumining nature in respect of its own resort by its very existence in the present state, or being the means of proving its object, by its very existence. And those two, although fit to be experienced by another experience, do not fall away, being established by one's own experience—and so the nature of 'anubhūti' does not cease to exist. In the case of jar and others, however, there is only the nature of non-anubhūti on account of their being bereft of that nature, [and] not on account of their being fit for being experienced. In the same way, even although 'anubhūti' is unfit for not being experienced, the undesirable result of its being non-anubhūti is difficult to avoid; because the flower in the sky, and others being not fit for being experienced have the nature of non-anubhūti.

If it be contended—In the case of the non-experienced nature of the flower in the sky etc. it is prompted by non-existence [and] not prompted by its being unfit for being experienced,

—well then, being wedded to (*nibandhana*) 'anubhūti' in the case even of jar and others is not just contrary to the absence of knowledge and not to its nature of being fit to be experienced—let this be accepted.

If it be contended—If experience is possessed of the nature of being fit to be experienced, the non-contradiction with the absence of knowledge would be the undesirable result in its case as in the case of jar and others—

[We reply]—Even if the experience is not possessed of the nature of being fit to be experienced, there would, indeed, be the undesirable result of not being in contradiction with the absence of knowledge as in the case of flower in the sky etc. So that, there is the nature of non-experience when something is fit to be experienced—this is simply a ridiculous statement.

[33] यत्तु—संविदः स्वतःसिद्धायाः प्रागभावाद्यभावादुत्पत्तिर्निरस्यते तदन्धस्य जात्यन्धेन यष्टिः प्रदीयते। प्रागभावस्य ग्राहकाभावादभावो न शक्यते वक्तुम्, अनुभूत्यैव ग्राहणात्।

कथमनुभूतिः सती तदानीमेव स्वाभावं विरुद्धमवगमयति? इति चेत्,

न ह्यनुभूतिः स्वसमानकालवर्तिनमेव विषयीकरोति, इत्यस्ति नियमः, अतीतानागतयोरविषयत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

अथ मन्यसे—अनुभूतिप्रागभावादेः सिध्यतस्तत्समकालभावनियमोऽस्ति—इति,

किं त्वया क्वचिदेवं दृष्टं येन नियमं ब्रवीषि? हन्त, तर्हि तत एव दर्शनात्प्रागभावादिः सिद्धः, इति न तदभावनिह्नवः। तत्प्रागभावं च तत्समकालवर्तिनं, अनुन्मत्तः को ब्रवीति? इन्द्रियजन्मनः प्रत्यक्षस्य ह्येष स्वभावनियमो यत्स्वसमानकालवर्तिनः पदार्थस्य ग्राहकत्वम्, न सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां प्रमाणानां च, स्मरणानुमानागमयोगिप्रत्यक्षादिषु कालान्तरवर्तिनोऽपि ग्रहणदर्शनात्। अत एवं च प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयाविनाभावः। न हि प्रमाणस्य स्व-

---

[33] As to the statement that the origination of self-established 'saṁvit' is ruled out on account of the absence of antecedent negation etc,. that is [tantamount to] a staff being given to a blind person by one born-blind. It is not possible to speak of the absence of antecedent negation owing to the absence of an apprehender, for 'anubhūti', itself can make us apprehend.

If it be contended—How could being in existence make one understand its own absence which is opposed to it at the same time?

The answer is—Not indeed is there any rule that experience has for its province something existing contemporaneously with itself; [otherwise] there would be the undesirable contingency of past and future things being not the objects [of experience].

If you think that—there is the rule about its contemporaneity, while the antecedent negation of experience is being established, [we ask you]—

Have you ever seen somewhere something like this that you speak of as a rule? [If you say 'Yes' then] O goodness, in that case from that very observation, the antecedent negation etc. becomes established—and hence there is no denial of the negation of antecedent non-existence. And what unintoxicated person would speak [in the same breath] of the antecedent negation of that [anubhūti] and its being contemporaneous with that? For, [in the case] of Direct perception arising out of the sense-organs, this is the rule regarding its nature, that there is the capacity to apprehend an object existing contemporaneously; and not of all cognitions and all means of proof. In the case of remembrance, Inferential knowledge, Scriptural testimony [and] the Direct perception of a yogin etc., there is seen the apprehension of something existing even at some other time. And for this very reason there is the invariable concomittance of the means of proof with the object of knowledge. Not indeed is the connection with the object, the invariable

कालवर्तिनाविनाभावोऽर्थसंबन्धः, अपि तु यद्देशकालादिसंबन्धितया योऽर्थोऽवभासते तस्य तथाविधाकारमिथ्यात्वप्रत्यनीकता। अत इदमपि निरस्तम्, स्मृतिर्न बाह्यविषया, नष्टेऽप्यर्थे स्मृतिदर्शनात्-इति।

[34] अथोच्येत—न तावत्संवित्प्रागभावः प्रत्यक्षावसेयः, अवर्तमानत्वात्। न च प्रमाणान्तरावसेयः, लिङ्गाद्यभावात्। न हि संवित्प्रागभावव्याप्तमिह लिङ्गमुपलभ्यते। न, अनुपलब्धिरपि कस्यचिद्दृश्यते। न चागमस्तद्विषयो दृष्टचरः, अतस्तत्प्रागभावः प्रमाणाभावादेव न सेत्स्यति-इति।

यद्येवम्, स्वतःसिद्धत्वविभवं परित्यज्य प्रमाणाभावेऽवरूढः, चेत्, योग्यानुपलब्ध्यैवाभावः समर्थित इत्युपशाम्यतु भवान्।

किं च प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं स्वविषयं घटादिकं स्वसत्ताकाले सन्तं साधयत्, तस्य न सर्वदा सत्तामवगमयत् दृश्यते, इति घटादेः पूर्वोत्तरकालसत्ता न प्रतीयते। तदप्रतीतिश्च संवेदनस्य कालपरिच्छिन्नतया प्रतीतेः। घटादिविषयमेव संवेदनं स्वयं कालानवच्छिन्नं प्रतीतं चेत्, तत्संवेदनविषयो घटादिरपि कालानवच्छिन्नः प्रतीयते, इति नित्यः स्यात्।

concomittance of the means of proof with something contemporaneous with it, but [it] is the nature of being opposed to false nature of that kind of form in which an object shines in connection with particular space, time etc. Therefore, this also is ruled out viz. remembrance is not concerned with on external object, because remembrance is noticed even when the [actual] object is destroyed.

[34] If it be said— Not, for the matter of that, the antecedent negation of consciousness ['Saṁvit'] is to be concluded from [the means of proof] Direct perception, on account of its non-existing; nor is that to be concluded from another means of proof on account of the absence of logical mark etc. For, there is not found a logical mark invariably concomittant with the antecedent negation of 'Saṁvit'; nor is seen 'Anupalabdhi' [Non-perception] means of proof by any one here; nor is Scriptural testimony seen before as pertaining to that, and so the antecedent negation of that [Saṁvit] cannot be established owing to the very absence of the means of proof—

If that is so, you, having given up the boasting of self-establishment [for consciousness 'Saṁvit'] have descended down to [the argument about] the absence of means of proof; then may your honour rest unruffled in that the negation is justified by the right kind of *Anupalabdhi* [Non-perception].

And, further, because the knowledge from Direct perception proving its object, jar and others existing at the time of its own existence, is not seen to make one apprehend the existence [of the jar and others] at all times, the existence pertaining to the prior and posterior time of jar and others is not apprehended, and that non-apprehension is on occount of the apprehension of the cognition circumscribed by time. If cognition referring to the very object jar and others, were itself apprehended as not circumscribed by time, the object of that cognition [viz.] jar and others would also be apprehended as not circumscribed by time and so [the object, jar and others] would be eternal. If the self-established cognition were eternal,

नित्यं चेत्संवेदनं स्वतःसिद्धं नित्यमित्येव प्रतीयेत, न च तथा प्रतीयते। एवमनुमानादिसंविदोऽपि कालानवच्छिन्नाः प्रतीताश्चेत्, स्वविषयानपि कालानवच्छिन्नान्प्रकाशयन्ति, इति ते सर्वे कालानवच्छिन्ना नित्याः स्युः, संविदनुरूपस्वरूपत्वाद्विषयाणाम्। न च निर्विषया संवित्काचिदस्ति, अनुपलब्धेः। विषयप्रकाशनस्वभावतयैवोपलब्धेरेव हि संविदः स्वयंप्रकाशता समर्थिता। संविदो विषयप्रकाशनसत्तास्वभावविरहे सति स्वयंप्रकाशत्वासिद्धेः, अनुभूतेरनुभवान्तराननुभाव्यत्वाच्च संविदस्तुच्छतैव स्यात्।

न च स्वापमदमूर्च्छादिषु सर्वविषयशून्या केवलैव संवित्परिस्फुरति, इति, वाच्यम्, योग्यानुपलब्धिपराकृतत्वात्।

तास्वपि दशास्वनुभूतिरनुभूता चेत्, तस्याः प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसंधानं स्यात्, न च तदस्ति।

[35] नन्वनुभूतस्य पदार्थस्य स्मरणनियमो न दृष्टचरः। अतः स्मरणाभावः कथमनुभवाभावं साधयेत्?

उच्यते। निखिलसंस्कारतिरस्कृतिकरदेहविगमादिप्रबलहेतुविरहेऽपि, अस्मरणनियमोऽनुभवाभावमेव साधयति। न केवलमस्मरणनियमादनुभवाभावः। सुप्तोत्थितस्य

---

it would be apprehended as eternal itself, but it is not apprehended as such. In this way, if the cognitions from inference and others were apprehended as not circumscribed by time, all of them would be eternal and not circumscribed by time because they would, illumine their objects also as not circumscribed by time on account of the objects having their nature conformable to the 'Saṁvit' [thereof]. There cannot be for the matter of that, any 'saṁvit' not referring to any object, on account of [its] non-perception; for, the self-illumination of the 'saṁvit' has been justified by Perception itself [and] owing to its having the nature of illumining the object itself. If 'saṁvit' is bereft of the nature of existence, and of the possession [of the power] illumining the object, 'saṁvit' would be absolutely unsubstantial on account of the non-establishment of the nature of self-illumining and on account of 'anubhūti' not being fit for being experienced by another experience.

Nor again should it be said that in deep sleep, intoxication, swoon and others, only consciousness ['saṁvit'] throbs forth, void of all objects on account of this being countermanded by valid Non-perception.

If [you say that] 'experience' is to be experienced even in those states, there would be its continuity at the time of awakening, but that exists not.

[35] Further, I say [says the objector]—in the case of an object experienced there is not anywhere seen before, remembrance as a rule; so how could the absence of remembrance prove the absence of experience?

We reply—Even in the absence of stronger causes like the extinction of the body, which sets at naught all impressions, the absence of remembrance as a rule establishes definitely the absence of experience; there cannot be the absence of experience merely on account of the absence of remembrance as a rule on account of its establishment being done by the reflection itself in the

'इयन्तं कालं न किञ्चिदहमज्ञासिषम्' इति प्रत्यवमर्शेनैव सिद्धेः। न च सत्यप्यनुभवे तद्स्मरणनियमो विषयावच्छेदविरहादहंकारविगमाद्वेति शक्यते वक्तुम्, अर्थान्तरानुभवस्यार्थान्तराभावस्य चामुभूतार्थान्तरास्मरणहेतुत्वाभावात्। तास्वपि दशास्वहमर्थोऽनुवर्तते, इति च वक्ष्यते।

ननु स्वापादिदशास्वपि सविशेषोऽनुभवोऽस्ति, इति पूर्वमुक्तम्।

सत्यमुक्तम्। स त्वात्मानुभवः, स च सविशेष एव इति स्थापयिष्यते। इह तु सकलविषयविरहिणी निराश्रया च संविन्निषिध्यते।

केवलैव संविदात्मानुभवः— इति चेत्,—

न, सा च साश्रयेति ह्युपपादयिष्यते। अतोऽनुभूतिः सती स्वयं स्वप्रागभावं न साधयति, इति प्रागभावासिद्धिर्न शक्यते वक्तुम्। अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वसंभवोपपादनेन, अन्यतोऽप्यसिद्धिर्निरस्ता। तस्मान्न प्रागभावाद्यसिद्ध्या संविदोऽनुत्पत्तिरुपपत्तिमती।

यदपि—अस्या अनुत्पत्त्या विकारान्तरतिरसनम्—तदप्यनुपपन्नं प्रागभावे व्यभिचारात्। तस्य हि जन्माभावेऽपि विनाशो दृश्यते। भावेषु इति विशेषणे तर्ककुशलता,

---

form 'I did not know anything during this time' in the case of one risen from sleep. —And further it is not possible to argue that the non-remembrance as a rule, even when the experience is there, is due either to being bereft of the association with the object or due to the extinction of the 'ahaṁkāra', because in the case of the experience of another object and the absence of another object, there is the absence of being the cause of non-remembrance of another object experienced. And even in those states the 'I'-entity persists,— this would be stated later on.

I say [says the objector] it has been stated before that even in the states of deep sleep etc. there is a particularised experience.

[Quite] true, it has been [so] stated. But that is the experience of the Ātman and that too is definitely a particularised one— this would be established [by us] later. At the present stage (*iha*), however, is denied the 'Saṁvit' bereft of all objects and resortless.

If it be contended— Mere 'Saṁvit' alone is experience of the Ātman,—

[We reply]—'No', for it would be argued out,—that 'Saṁvit' again is with a resort; so, it is not possible to argue that there is the non-establishment of antecedent negation on the ground that the 'anubhūti' being in existence could not prove its own antecedent negation. And the non-establishment of the antecedent negation by some [other cause] is ruled out on account of argumentation about the possibility of 'anubhūti' being fit to be experienced. Therefore, the non-origination of 'Saṁvit' by the non-establishment of the antecedent negation etc. is not in conformity with reasoning.

Again, as to the argument about the rebutting of other modifications on account of the non-origination of this ['anubhūti'], that also is unreasonable because this involves violation (*vyabhicāra*) in respect of antecedent negation; for, even in the absence of origination, there is seen to be its destruction. By

आविष्कृता भवति। तथा च, भवदभिमताविद्या, अनुत्पन्नैव, विविधविकारास्पदं तत्त्वज्ञानोदयादन्तवती च, इति तस्यामनैकान्त्यम् ।

तद्विकाराः सर्वे मिथ्याभूताः, इति चेत्—

किं भवतः परमार्थभूतोऽप्यस्ति विकारः येनैतद्विशेषणमर्थवद्भवति ? न ह्यसावभ्युपगम्यते ।

यदपि—अनुभूतिरजत्वात्स्वस्मिन्विभागं न सहते—इति,

तदपि नोपपद्यते, अजस्यैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभक्तत्वात्, अनादित्वेन चाभ्युपगताया अविद्याया आत्मनो व्यतिरेकस्यावश्याश्रयणीयत्वात् ।

स विभाग मिथ्यारूपः-इति चेत्—जन्मप्रतिबद्धः परमार्थविभागः किं क्वचिद्दृष्टस्त्वया? अविद्याया आत्मनः परमार्थतः विभागाभावे हि वस्तुतो ह्यविद्यैव स्यादात्मा। अबाधितप्रतिपत्तिसिद्धदृश्यभेदसमर्थनेन दर्शनभेदोऽपि समर्थित एव, छेद्यभेदाच्छेदनभेदवत् ।

[36] यदपि—नास्या दृशेर्दृशिस्वरूपायाः दृश्यः कश्चिदपि धर्मोऽस्ति, दृश्यत्वादेव तेषां न दृशिधर्मत्वमिति च—

---

putting up the qualifying attribute 'in the case of positive objects' [your] proficiency in syllogistic reasoning becomes displayed, [that is all]. And likewise, because the 'Avidyā' so much esteemed by you being non-originated itself, the home of various modifications reaches destruction through the rise of right knowledge,— the reasoning is of an inconclusive nature in respect of that ['Avidyā']

If it be contended, all the modifications [caused] by it ['Avidyā'] are false— [we ask]—

Is there any real modification for your honour ? So that such a qualifying expression becomes significant, for such a one is not admitted.

As regards the statement that 'anubhūti' on account of its being un-originated cannot endure any division within itself,—

That, too, cannot stand to reason, because the Ātman being un-originated himself is different from body, sense-organs etc. and because it has got to be necessarily accepted that 'Avidyā' admitted as beginningless is different from the Ātman.

If it be contended, that division is of a false nature—[we ask] Is such a real division associated with origination seen by you anywhere ? For, in the case of the absence of real division in the case of Avidyā from Ātman in reality, Avidyā' would itself be Ātman. By the justification of the difference of things apprehended, established by uncontradicted apprehension, the difference of apprehension also is certainly justified like the difference in the cutting on account of the difference in the thing cut.

[36] And further, as to the [statement] that in the case of this (*dṛśi*) having the nature of consciousness there is no characteristic fit to be the object of consciousness, and that they [Dharmas] have not the characteristic of consciousness on account of their being just the objects of consciousness—

तदपि स्वाभ्युपगतैः प्रमाणसिद्धैर्नित्यत्वस्वयंप्रकाशत्वादिधर्मैरुभयमनैकान्तिकम् । न च ते संवेदनमात्रम्, स्वरूपभेदात् । स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयं प्रति कस्यचिद्विषयस्य प्रकाशनं हि 'संवेदनम्'। 'स्वयंप्रकाशता' तु स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयाय प्रकाशमानता । 'प्रकाशः' च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणं व्यवहारानुगुण्यम् । सर्वकालवर्तमानत्वं हि 'नित्यत्वम्'। 'एकत्वम्' एकसंख्यावच्छेदः, इति तेषां जडत्वाद्यभावरूपतायामपि तथाभूतैरपि तैश्चैतन्यधर्मभूतैरप्यनैकान्त्यमपरिहार्यम् । संविदि तु स्वरूपातिरेकेण जडत्वादिप्रत्यनीकत्वम्, इत्यभावरूपो भावरूपो वा धर्मो नाभ्युपेतः, चेत्, तन्निषेधोक्त्या किमपि नोक्तं भवेत् ?

अपि च संवित्सिध्यति वा न वा, सिध्यति चेत्सधर्मता स्यात्, नो चेत्तुच्छता, गगनकुसुमादिवत् । सिद्धिरेव संविदिति चेत्—कस्य कं प्रतीति वक्तव्यम् ? यदि न कस्यचित्कञ्चित्प्रति, सा तर्हि न सिद्धिः । सिद्धिर्हि पुत्रत्वमिव कस्यचित्कञ्चित्प्रति भवति । आत्मन इति चेत्, कोऽयमात्मा ?

ननु संविदेवेत्युक्तम्—

सत्यमुक्तम्, दुरुक्तं तु तत् । तथाहि—

Both [of these are] inconclusive on account of [the possession of] the attributes like eternality, self-illumining nature, which are proved by means of proof, admitted by you. Nor are they mere cognitions because of the difference in nature. For, 'saṁvedana' is the illumining of some object in respect of its resort, by its mere existence. 'Svayaṁprakāśatā', again is the state of illumining in respect of its resort by its own existence. And 'Prakāśa' is the susceptibility to practical usage common to all objects without exception— 'cit' and 'acit', sentient and non-sentient. And 'nityatvam' is existence at all times. 'Ekatvam', is limitation by number one and so though they are possessed of the nature of the absence of non-sentiency the inconclusive nature is unavoidable, even by them of that nature, and even though they have the attributes of sentiency. If there were not admitted an attribute whether of a positive or a negative nature viz. 'being the opposite of non-sentiency' and others over and above its own nature in the case of 'Saṁvit', what, indeed, could not be said by the denial-statement about that ?

And further, is [this] 'Saṁvit' established or not ? If it be established, there would be the nature of possession of attributes by it; if not, there would be unsubstantial nature, like the sky-flower etc. If it be said, establishment itself is consciousness you ought to tell us whose [is that establishment] and for whom [this establishment exists]. If it is not of anybody or for anybody, then it is no establishment [at all], for establishment is associated with somebody in respect of some one, like being possessed of a son. If [your reply is, that the establishment is] of the Ātman, [we ask] who [is] this Ātman ?

I say, [says the objector], that the Ātman is Consciousness has been said before [by us].

True, [you] have said, but that is badly said. To explain the same in detail—

कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य किञ्चिदर्थजातं प्रति सिद्धिरूपतया तत्संबन्धिनी सा संवित् स्वयं कथमिवात्मभावमनुभवेत् ? एतदुक्तं भवति—

अनुभूतिरिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति स्वसद्भावेनैव कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादन-स्वभावो ज्ञानावगतिसंविदाद्यपरनामा सकर्मकोऽनुभवितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषो 'घटमहं जानामि' 'इममर्थमवगच्छामि' 'घटमहं संवेद्मि' इति सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिकः प्रसिद्धः। एतत्स्वभावतया हि तस्याः स्वयंप्रकाशता भवताप्युपपादिता। अस्य सकर्मकस्य कर्तृधर्म-विशेषस्य कर्मत्ववत्कर्तृत्वमपि दुर्घटम्, इति।

[37] तथाहि—अस्य कर्तुः स्थिरत्वं कर्तृधर्मस्य 'संवेदन' आख्यस्य सुखदुःखा-देरिवोत्पत्तिस्थितिनिरोधाश्च प्रत्यक्षमीक्षन्ते। कर्तृस्थैर्यं तावत्—'स एवायमर्थः पूर्वं मयानुभूतः' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञासिद्धम्। 'अहं जानामि' 'अहमज्ञासिषम्' 'ज्ञातुरेव ममेदानीं ज्ञानं नष्टम्' इति च संविदुत्पत्त्यादयः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा इति, कुतस्तदैक्यम्? एवं क्षणभङ्गिन्याः संविद आत्मत्वाभ्युपगमे 'पूर्वेद्युर्दृष्टमिदम्, अपरेद्युरिदमहमदर्शम्' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा च न घटते। अन्येनानुभूतस्य न ह्यन्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञानसंभवः। किं चानुभूतेरात्मत्वाभ्युपगमे तस्या

That 'Saṁvit' related by its nature of establishment with reference to some group of objects with some person or other—how possibly can that 'Saṃvit' experience its own nature of its own accord? This is what is meant to be said;—

'Anubhūti' is well known to all as a special attribute of the Ātman, the experiencer, having the nature of conducing favourableness for practical usage with respect to its resort of something by its very existence, having other names such as 'Jñāna', 'Avagati', and 'Saṁvit'; relating to an object and having Ātman as the Witness in the form 'I know the jar', 'I comprehend this object', 'I am conscious of the jar'. The self-illumining nature has been propounded by yourself, it [experience] being possessed of this very nature; in the case of this special attribute of the agent relating to an object, even the nature of an agent is difficult to accomplish like the nature of being an object.

[37] To explain the same in detail—The permanency of this agent known as 'Consciousness' and the origination, sustenance and destruction of the attribute of the agent called 'saṁvedana' [cognition] are actually perceived, as in the case of pleasure, pain etc. As to the permanency of the agent, it is proved by recognition in the form 'that same, this object was experienced by me before', 'I know', 'I have known' and 'the knowledge of me—who am, verily, the Knower has now disappeared'—such this, and others which originate 'Saṁvit' are proved by Direct perception, and so whence can there be the identity [with the Ātman] ? And in this way, in the case of 'Saṁvit' disappearing in a moment being admitted as having the nature of Ātman, recognition also in the form 'what was seen by me the day before', 'this I saw the other day', will not stand. For, there is no possibility of recognition by somebody of something experienced by another,

नित्यत्वेऽपि प्रतिसंधानासंभवस्तदवस्थः । 'प्रतिसंधानं' हि पूर्वापरकालस्थायिनमनुभवितारमुपस्थापयति, नानुभूतिमात्रम् । 'अहमेवेदं पूर्वमप्यन्वभूवम्' इति भवतोऽनुभूतेर्न ह्यनुभवितृत्वमिष्टम् । अनुभूतिरनुभूतिमात्रमेव । संविन्नाम काचिन्निराश्रया निर्विषया वा, अत्यन्तानुपलब्धेर्न संभवति, इत्युक्तम् । उभयाभ्युपगता संविदेवात्मा, इत्युपलब्धिपराहतम् । अनुभूतिमात्रमेव परमार्थः, इति निष्कर्षहेत्वाभासाश्च निराकृताः ।

ननु च 'अहं जानामि' इत्यस्मत्प्रत्यये योऽनिदमंशः प्रकाशैकरसश्चित्पदार्थः, स आत्मा । तस्मिंस्तद्बलनिर्भासिततया युष्मदर्थलक्षणो 'अहं जानामि' इति सिध्यन्नहमर्थश्चिन्मात्रातिरेकी युष्मदर्थ एव ।

नैतदेवम्, 'अहं जानामि' इति धर्मधर्मितया प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिविरोधादेव । किं च—

अहमर्थो न चेदात्मा प्रत्यक्त्वं नात्मनो भवेत् ।
अहंबुद्ध्या परागर्थात्प्रत्यगर्थो हि भिद्यते ॥ १ ॥
निरस्ताखिलदुःखोऽहमनन्तानन्दभाक् स्वराट् ।
भवेयमिति मोक्षार्थी श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते ॥ २ ॥

And further, admitting the nature of Ātman, the impossibility of its continuity even though possessed of an eternal nature, stands in the same position. For 'continuity' establishes an experiencer staying both in the prior and the posterior time, and not merely 'anubhūti'. In the case of your [i. e. admitted by you] 'anubhūti', the nature of an experiencer, in the form 'I myself have experienced this even before' is not desirable. 'Anubhūti' is but just [pure and simple] 'Anubhūti' [and nothing else]. It has been stated that there does not exist something resortless and objectless called 'Saṁvit', on account of its absolute non-perception. That 'Saṁvit', admitted by us both is Ātman himself is ruled out by [actual] perception. The fallacious reasonings pointing out to the extracted conclusion viz. 'anubhūti alone is the highest reality', have [already] been refuted.

[Says the objector] I say, what non-this portion in the 'I'-apprehension in the form 'I know' having a uniformly illumining nature, sentient object—that [is] Ātman. In that apprehension the I-entity having the characteristics of the idea of 'You' owing to its being illumined by its strength, establishing [the apprehension] 'I know' is but the idea 'You', [the objective element] beyond and above mere 'cit'.

This is not so, on account of the contradiction itself of the apprehension by Direct perception involving the relation of an attribute and the possessor of an attribute in the form 'I know.' And further—

(1) If the I-entity is not the Ātman, there would not be the inmost nature of the Ātman, for the inmost thing is distinct from the outward object on account of the apprehension of 'I'.

(2) One desirous of securing salvation proceeds on 'hearing' [about the Ātman] etc, with the idea 'I shall be having all miseries driven out, enjoying infinite bliss [and] self-ruled.'

अहमर्थविनाशश्चेन्मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्यति ।
अपसर्पेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावगन्धतः ॥ ३ ॥
मयि नष्टेऽपि मत्तोऽन्या काचिज्ज्ञप्तिरवस्थिता ।
इति तत्प्राप्तये यत्नः कस्यापि न भविष्यति ॥ ४ ॥
स्वसंबन्धितया ह्यस्याः सत्ताविज्ञप्तितादि च ।
स्वसंबन्धवियोगे तु ज्ञप्तिरेव न सिध्यति ॥ ५ ॥
छेत्तुश्छेद्यस्य चाभावे छेदनादेरसिद्धिवत् ।
अतोऽहमर्थो ज्ञातैव प्रत्यगात्मेति निश्चितम् ॥ ६ ॥
'विज्ञातारमरे केन जानात्ये'वेति च श्रुतिः ।
'एतद्यो वेत्ति तं प्राहुः क्षेत्रज्ञः' इति च स्मृतिः ॥ ७ ॥
'नात्मा श्रुतेः' इत्यारभ्य सूत्रकारोऽपि वक्ष्यति ।
'ज्ञोऽत एव' इत्यतो नात्मा ज्ञप्तिमात्रमिति स्थितम् ॥ ८ ॥

अहंप्रत्ययसिद्धो ह्यस्मदर्थः । युष्मत्प्रत्ययविषयो युष्मदर्थः । तत्र 'अहं जानामि' इति सिद्धो ज्ञाता युष्मदर्थः, इति वचनं 'जननी मे वन्ध्या' इतिवद्व्याहतार्थं च । न चासौ ज्ञाता, अहमर्थोऽन्याधीनप्रकाशः, स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् ।

---

(3) If he would come to the conclusion that salvation is the destruction of the 'I'-entity, he would be keeping himself away even from the semblance of [association with] reference to any talk about salvation.

(4) Even when I am dead and gone, there would be remaining some consciousness other than myself— in view of this (*iti*)— there would be no effort to secure that on the part of anybody.

(5) For, the existence and the nature of being the special cognition etc. of this [consciousness] is on account of its relation to itself, but when the connection is dissolved, Saṁvit itself would not be established—

(6) like the non-Jñapti of cutting etc. in the absence of the cutter and the thing to be cut. So the 'I'-entity, the Knower himself is ascertained to be the inmost Ātman.

(7) 'By what does one know, dear one (*are*), the Knower'?—this, verily, again is the Śruti [passage]; 'Him, who knows this—they call the Kṣetraknower'—this is the Smṛti passage—

(8) 'Not [originated is] the Ātman,' on account of the Sruti passage—beginning [with] this [Sūtra] the Sūtrakāra also would be saying [the same thing] and [with the Sūtra] 'the Knower for the same reason', it has been established that Ātman is not merely Jñapti'.

The 'I'-entity, indeed, becomes established by the 'I'-apprehension, and the 'you'-entity has the 'you'-apprehension for its object. There [in the circumstances] the Knower established in the form 'I know' is the 'you'-object—this statement has its sense nullified like [the statement], 'My mother is barren'. Nor again has that 'I'-entity—the Knower—its illumination dependent upon others, on account of its self-illumining nature,

[38] चैतन्यस्वभावता हि 'स्वयंप्रकाशता'। [यः प्रकाशस्वभावः सोऽनन्याधीनप्रकाशो दीपवत्]। न हि दीपादेः स्वप्रभाबलनिर्भासितत्वेन प्रकाशित्वम्, अन्याधीनप्रकाशत्वं च।

किं तर्हि ?

दीपः प्रकाशस्वभावः स्वयमेव प्रकाशते, अन्यानपि प्रकाशयति प्रभया।--यथैकमेव तेजोद्रव्यं प्रभाप्रभावद्रूपेणावतिष्ठते।

एतदुक्तं भवति—यद्यपि प्रभा प्रभावद्द्रव्यगुणभूता तथापि तेजोद्रव्यमेव, न शौक्ल्यादिवद्गुणः, स्वाश्रयादन्यत्रापि वर्तमानत्वात्। रूपवत्त्वाच्च शौक्ल्यादिधर्मवैधर्म्यात्। प्रकाशवत्त्वाच्च तेजोद्रव्यमेव, नार्थान्तरम्। प्रकाशवत्त्वं च स्वस्वरूपस्यान्येषां च प्रकाशकत्वात्। अस्यास्तु गुणत्वव्यवहारो नित्यतदाश्रयत्वतच्छेषत्वनिबन्धनः। न चाश्रयावयवा एव विशीर्णाः प्रचरन्तः 'प्रभा' इत्युच्यन्ते, मणिद्युमणिप्रभृतीनां विनाशप्रसङ्गात्। दीपेऽप्यवयवविप्रतिपत्तिः कदाचिदपि न स्यात्। न हि विशरणस्वभावावयवा दीपाश्चतुरङ्गुलमात्रनियमेन पिण्डीभूता ऊर्ध्वमुद्गम्य ततः पश्चाद्युगपदेव तिर्यगूर्ध्वमधश्चैकरूपा विशीर्णाः प्रचरन्ति, इति वक्तुं शक्यते। अतः सप्रभाका एव दीपाः प्रतिक्षणमुत्पन्ना

---

[38] 'Self-illumining nature' is, indeed, the nature of possessing sentiency. [Whosoever is possessed of an illumining nature has his illumining not dependent upon others, like a lamp.] Not, indeed, in the case of the lamp and others there is a capacity to illumine owing to being illumined by the strength of its own lustre [and] the illumining nature depending upon others.

What then ?

The lamp possessing an illumining nature, itself shines of its own accord, and illumines others as well by [its] lustre. Just as one and the same lustrous substance stands in the form of lustre and one possessed of lustre

This is what is meant to be said. Although the lustre is the quality of the lustrous substance, still it is but the lustrous substance, not a quality like whitness etc. on account of its existing elsewhere also, other than its resort, and on account of its being possessed of dissimilarity from the other attributes whiteness and others, as it is possessed of [the quality] colour. And it is a lustrous substance itself owing to its being possessed of an illumining quality, and not another object. And being possessed of illumining nature is due to illumining its own nature and others. The practical usage, however, of it as quality is based upon its having that permanent resort and being subordinate to it [the lustrous object]. Not surely are the parts of the resort themselves moving about helterskelter, called 'Lustre'; otherwise there would be the undesirable result viz. the disappearance of the jewel and the jewel in the sky [the Sun] etc. And there would never be the apprehension of parts even in the case of a lamp. For, it is not possible to say that [many] lamp-flames with their parts possessing the nature of being scattered away, welded into a mass limited only to the measure of fingers, having [first] gone up, then afterwards proceed on, scattered about just simultaneously and uniformly

विनश्यन्ति, इति पुष्कलकारणक्रमोपनिपातात्तद्विनाशे विनाशाच्चावगम्यते। प्रभायाः स्वाश्रयसमीपे प्रकाशाधिक्यमौष्ण्याधिक्यमित्याद्युपलब्धिव्यवस्थाप्यम्, अग्न्यादीनामौष्ण्यादिवत्। एवमात्मा चिद्रूप एव चैतन्यगुणः, इति। ‘चिद्रूपता’ हि स्वयंप्रकाशता।

तथा हि श्रुतयः—

‘स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एव। एवं वा अरे, अयमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव।’ (बृ. ४।५।१३)

‘विज्ञानघन एव।’ (बृ. २।४।१२)

‘अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति।’ (बृ. ४।३।९)

‘न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते।’ (बृ. ४।३।३०)

‘अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा।’ (छा. ८।१२।४)

‘कतम आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः।’ (बृ. ४।३।७)

‘एष हि द्रष्टा श्रोता रसयिता घ्राता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः।’ (प्र. ४।९)

---

slantingly up and down. Therefore, the [flames of] lamps, along with the lustre, themselves coming into existence every moment, disappear— this is understood on account of the falling together in order, of many causes and on account of the disappearance [of the lamp-flames] on the disappearance of them [i. e. of the causes]. The increase of light [and] the increase of heat of the lustre in the vicinity of its resort is to be established by perception, like the heat etc. of fire etc. In this way the Ātman being of the nature of ‘cit’ itself has sentiency as his quality. Being possessed of the nature of ‘cit’ is, indeed, the self-illumining nature.

To the same effect [are the following] Śruti passages and others.

[That is illustrated as follows]—‘As a mass of salt without inside, [and] without outside, is altogether a mass of taste, even so, O [Maitreyī], this Ātman without inside, without outside, altogether a mass of knowledge’. (Bṛ. 4·5·13)

‘[He is] just a mass of Vijñāna’. (Bṛ. 2·4·12)

‘Here this Man becomes self-light’. (Bṛ. 4·3·9)

‘There is not the complete extinction of the cognition of the Knower’. (Bṛ. 4·3·30)

‘Now who knows ‘I smell this’ is the Atman’. (Chā. 8·12·4)

‘Which is the Ātman ?—this one who is the Puruṣa constituted of Vijñāna among the Prāṇas, and light within the heart’. (Bṛ. 4·3·7)

‘This one, verily, is the Puruṣa, seer, hearer, taster, smeller, thinker, knower, doer [and] constituted of Vijñāna’. (Pra. 4·9)

'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ।' (बृ. २।४।१४)
'जानात्येवायं पुरुषः । न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम् ।' (छा. ७।२६।२)
'स उत्तमः पुरुषः । ...... नोपजनं स्मरन्निदं शरीरम् ।' (छा. ८।१२।३)
'एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाः षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति ।' (प्र. ६।५)
'तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः ।' (तै. २।४।१)

इत्याद्याः ।

वक्ष्यति च

'ज्ञोऽत एव'— (ब्र. सू. २।३।१९)

अतः स्वयंप्रकाशोऽयमात्मा ज्ञातैव, न प्रकाशमात्रम् । प्रकाशत्वादेव कस्यचिदेव भवेत्प्रकाशः, प्रदीपादिप्रकाशवत् । तस्मान्नात्मा भवितुमर्हति संवित् । 'संवित्' 'अनुभूति' 'ज्ञान,' आदिशब्दाः संबन्धिशब्दा इति च शब्दार्थविदः । न हि लोकवेदयोर्जानात्यादेरकर्मकस्याकर्तृकस्य च प्रयोगो दृष्टचरः ।

[39] यच्चोक्तम्—अजडत्वात्संविदेवात्मा, इति-तत्रेदं प्रष्टव्यम्-'अजडत्वम्' इति किमभिप्रेतम् ?

'*By what would, O [Maitreyī], one know the Knower ?*" (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

'*This Puruṣa certainly knows; the Seer sees not death, nor disease, nor again the state of grief*'. (Chā. 7·26·2)

'*This is the Highest Puruṣa ...... not remembering this body generated*'. (Chā. 8·12·3)

'*In the same way, this—sixteen parts of this all-Seer, depending upon the Puruṣa, having reached the Puruṣa, go to set*'. (Pra. 6·5)

'*From that, verily, from this constituted of mind [described above] [there is] another Self within constituted of Vijñāna*'. (Tait. 2·4·1)

[The Sūtrakāra] also would be stating

'*The Knower, for this very reason*'. (Br. Sū. 2·3·19)

—Therefore this self-illumining Ātman is the Knower himself and not merely illumination [Consciousness]. On account of the very nature of illumination, there would be illumination for someone alone, like the light of a big lamp etc. Therefore, Ātman does not deserve to be 'Saṁvit'. So also those well-versed in [the science of] word and sense state that the words 'Saṁvit', 'Anubhūti' and 'Jñāna' are relative words. Neither has been seen before in the popular usage [and] the Vedas the use of [expressions like] Knower' etc. as being without any object or being without any agent.

[39] As to what has been said,—'Saṁvit' itself is Ātman on account of its sentient nature—referring to it, this is the query [to you]—what is intended [by you] with [the use of the expression] 'Ajaḍatva' [sentient nature] ?

'स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वम्'—इति चेत्—

तथा सति दीपादिष्वनैकान्त्यम्, संविदतिरिक्तप्रकाशधर्मानभ्युपगमेनासिद्धिरिति विरोधश्च। अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकत्वमपि सुखादिषु व्यभिचारान्निरस्तम्।

यद्युच्येत—सुखादिरव्यभिचरितप्रकाशोऽप्यन्यस्मै प्रकाशमानतया घटादिरिव जडत्वेन नात्मा—इति—

ज्ञानं किं स्वस्मै प्रकाशते? तदपि ह्यन्यस्यैवाहमर्थस्य ज्ञातुरवभासते 'अहं सुखी' इतिवत् 'जानाम्यहम्' इति। अतः स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वमेवंरूपमजडत्वं संविद्यसिद्धम्। तस्मात्स्वात्मानं प्रति स्वसत्तयैव सिध्यन्नजडोऽहमर्थ एवात्मा। ज्ञानस्यापि प्रकाशता तत्संबन्धायत्ता। तत्कृतमेव हि ज्ञानस्य सुखादेरिव स्वाश्रयचेतनं प्रति प्रकटत्वम्, इतरं प्रत्यप्रकटत्वं च। अतो न ज्ञप्तिमात्रमात्मा, अपि तु ज्ञातैवाहमर्थः।

अथ यदुक्तम्—अनुभूतिः परमार्थतो निर्विषया निराश्रया च सती भ्रान्त्या ज्ञातृतयावभासते, रजततयेव शुक्तिः, निरधिष्ठानभ्रमानुपपत्तेः—इति—

तदयुक्तम्। तथा सति, अनुभवसामानाधिकरण्येनानुभविताहमर्थः प्रतीयेत—

If it be intended to mean 'Having its illumining nature prompted by its existence',

—in that case it would be an inconclusive statement [*hetvābhāsa*] [because it would be extending] in respect of lamps and others, and there would further be the contradiction [fallacy] on account of its non-establishment by not admitting the property of illumination over and above 'Saṁvit'. 'The state of illumination and existence being invariably associated' is also ruled out owing to the violation in the case of pleasure and others.

If it were argued that pleasure and others, although having their illumination not violated are not Ātman, on account of their being non-sentient like jar and others, owing to their shining forth for the sake of others—

[We ask you]—Does knowledge shine forth for itself? That also shines forth, verily, for another—the 'I'-entity, the Knower in the form 'I know' like 'I am happy'. Thus sentiency of such nature viz. shining forth for oneself is not proved in the case of 'Saṁvit'. Therefore, sentient 'I'-entity itself being established in respect of itself by its very existence is the Ātman. The shining forth of Jñāna also is dependent upon relationship with it. For, being evident to its own sentient resort and being not evident to others in respect of cognition, is just due to that [relationship] as in the case of pleasure and others. So, Ātman is not mere 'Jñapti', but 'verily' the Knower, the 'I'-entity.

Now further as to what has been said— 'Anubhūti', being in reality objectless and resortless shines forth as being possessed of the nature of the Knower through wrong knowledge, like the conch-shell by being possessed of the nature of silver, on account of the impossibility of there being error without any basis.

—That is improper. In that case the experiencer 'I-'entity owing to its having the same abode as 'Anubhūti' would be apprehended as

'अनुभूतिरहम्' इति, पुरोवस्थितभास्वरद्रव्याद्याकारतया रजतादिरिव। अत्र तु पृथगवभासमानैवेयमनुभूतिरर्थान्तरमहमर्थं विशिनष्टि, दण्ड इव देवदत्तम्।

तथाहि—'अनुभवाम्यहम्' इति प्रतीतिः। तदेवमस्मदर्थमनुभूतिविशिष्टं प्रकाशयन् 'अनुभवाम्यहम्' इति प्रत्ययो दण्डमात्रे 'दण्डी देवदत्तः' इति प्रत्ययवत्, विशेषणभूतानुभूतिमात्रावलम्बनः कथमिव प्रतिज्ञायेत?

[40] यदप्युक्तम्—'स्थूलोऽहम्' इत्यादिदेहात्माभिमानवत एव ज्ञातृत्वप्रतिभासनाज्ज्ञातृत्वमपि मिथ्या इति—तदयुक्तम्। आत्मतयाभिमताया अनुभूतेरपि मिथ्यात्वं स्यात्, तद्वत एव प्रतीतेः। सकलेतरोपमर्दितत्त्वज्ञानाबाधितत्त्वेनानुभूतेर्न मिथ्यात्वम्-इति चेत्—हन्त, एवं सति तदबाधादेव ज्ञातृत्वमपि न मिथ्या।

यदप्युक्तम्—अविक्रियस्यात्मनो ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वरूपं ज्ञातृत्वं न संभवति। अतो

'I am Anubhūti' like silver and others on account of being possessed of the form f shining substances and others stationed in front. Here, however, this 'Anubhūti' which verily shines forth separately particularises another object, the 'I'-entity, like the staff, Devadatta.

To explain the same thing in detail —There is the apprehension 'I experience'. Therefore, how possibly can the apprehension 'I experience' illumining the 'I'-entity particularised by 'Anubhūti', as being entirely dependent upon mere particularised Anubhūti like the apprehension in the form 'Daṇḍī Devadattaḥ [Devadatta possessing a staff]' in respect of mere 'Daṇḍa' [staff] be solemnly stated forth as being entirely dependent upon mere particularised 'anubhūti' like the apprehension in the form 'Devadatta is possessed of a staff' in respect of mere 'staff'.

[40] Again, as to what has been said—That the nature of Knower [of Ātman] is also false, on account of the nature of the Knower being apparent only in one who takes the Ātman to be body etc. as evidenced by 'I am gross'—that is improper, for [in that case] there would be the false nature of 'Anubhūti' also admitted as having the nature of Ātman, on account of the apprehension as being possessed of that. If it were argued that there is no falsity about experience on account of its being contradicted by the knowledge of reality that brushes aside everything else,—O goodness, in that case the state of the Knower also cannot be false on account of its very non-contradiction.

As to what has been stated viz.—In the case of the Ātman admitting of no modifications, the state of being the Knower of the form of being the agent of the action of Jñāna is not possible; therefore, the state of being the Knower

ज्ञातृत्वं विक्रियात्मकं जडं विकारास्पदाव्यक्तपरिणामाहंकारग्रन्थिस्थम्, इति न ज्ञातृत्वमात्मनः, अपि त्वन्तःकरणरूपस्याहंकारस्य। कर्तृत्वादिर्हि रूपादिवद्दृश्यधर्मः। कर्तृत्वे चाहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वे चात्मनोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने देहस्येवानात्मत्वपराक्त्वजडत्वादिप्रसङ्गश्च—

इति—

नैतदुपपद्यते, देहस्येवाचेतनत्वप्रकृतिपरिणामित्वदृश्यत्वपराक्त्वपरार्थत्वादियोगादन्तःकरणरूपस्याहंकारस्य, चेतनासाधारणस्वभावत्वाच्च ज्ञातृत्वस्य। एतदुक्तं भवति—

यथा देहादिर्दृश्यत्वपराक्त्वादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्प्रत्यनीकद्रष्टृत्वप्रत्यक्त्वादेर्विविच्यते, एवमन्तःकरणरूपाहंकारोऽपि तद्दृश्यत्वादेव तैरेव हेतुभिस्तस्माद्विविच्यते, इति। अतो विरोधादेव न ज्ञातृत्वमहंकारस्य, दृशित्ववत्। यथा दृशित्वं तत्कर्मणोऽहंकारस्य नाभ्युपगम्यते, तथा ज्ञातृत्वमपि न तत्कर्मणोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। न च ज्ञातृत्वं विक्रियात्मकम्। ज्ञातृत्वं हि ज्ञानगुणाश्रयत्वम्। ज्ञानं चास्य नित्यस्य स्वाभाविकधर्मत्वेन नित्यम्। नित्यत्वं चात्मनो

---

constituted [i. e. involving] of modifications, non-sentient, stationed in the knot of the 'ahaṁkāra'— the manifestation of the unmanifest [and] the abode of modifications— therefore the state of being the Knower [does] not belong to the Ātman, but definitely to the 'Ahaṁkāra' of the nature of the inner sense-organ. The state of being the doer etc. again is the attribute of the object of perception like colour etc. If the state of being the agent and at the same time being within the province of the 'I'-apprehension, be admitted in the case of the Ātman, there would be, in addition, the undersirable result, viz. there being [in the Ātman], as in the body, the state of not being Ātman, being outward, being non-sentient etc.

This is not reasonable on account of the ego having the form of the inner sense-organ being associated like the body, with the non-sentiency, the modification of the Prakṛti, the state of being the object of perception, being outward, being meant for others, and on account of the state of being the Knower sharing the nature of the sentient. What is meant to be said is :—

Just as the body etc. is singled out [distinguished], by the causes like the nature of being the object of perception, the nature of being outward etc. from the nature of being the Seer and of being inward etc. opposed to them, in the same way the 'Ahaṁkāra' also, which is of the nature of the inner sense-organ is singled out by the same causes, from that on account of its verily being the object of perception. Therefore, being the Knower does not belong to the 'ahaṁkāra' owing to the contradiction itsel [between them] like the nature of 'dṛśi'. Just as the nature of 'dṛśi' is not admitted in the case of 'ahaṁkāra'—which is the object of that, in the same way being the Knower also must not be admitted in the case of its object. Further, 'being the Knower' does not involve modification, for 'being the Knower' is being the resort of the quality of knowledge. And the knowledge of this [Ātman] which is eternal, owing to its being the natural attribute

'नात्मा श्रुतेः' (ब्र. सू. २।३।१८)

इत्यादिषु वक्ष्यति ।

'ज्ञोऽत एव' (ब्र. सू. २।३।१९)

इत्यत्र 'ज्ञ' इति व्यपदेशेन ज्ञानगुणाश्रयत्वं च स्वाभाविकम्, इति वक्ष्यति । अस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव मणिप्रभृतीनां प्रभाश्रयत्वमिव ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमप्यविरुद्धम् इत्युक्तम् । स्वयमपरिच्छिन्नमेव ज्ञानं संकोचविकासार्हम्, इत्युपपादयिष्यामः । अतः क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां कर्मणा संकुचितस्वरूपं तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणतरतमभावेन वर्तते । तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण व्यवस्थितम् । इममिन्द्रियद्वारा ज्ञानप्रसरमपेक्ष्योदयास्तमयव्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते । ज्ञानप्रसरे तु कर्तृत्वमस्त्येव । तच्च न स्वाभाविकम्, अपि तु कर्मकृतमित्यविक्रियस्वरूप एवात्मा । एवंरूपाविक्रियात्मकं ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मन एवेति न कदाचिदपि जडस्याहंकारस्य ज्ञातृत्वसंभवः ।

[41] जडस्वभावस्याहंकारस्य चित्संनिधानेन तच्छायापत्त्या तत्संभवः— इति चेत्—

---

is eternal. [The Sūtrakāra] would speak of [later] the eternal nature of the Ātman [in the Sūtra]—

'*Not the Ātman, on account of the Śruti*'. (Br. Sū. 2·3 18)

and others, and would be speaking of [in the Sūtra]

'*The Knower, for this very reason*' (Br. Sū. 2·3·19)

as being the resort of the quality of knowledge as natural by reference to the Ātman as [the Knower]. It has [already] been stated that being the resort of knowledge also in the case of this Ātman constituted of knowledge only is not contradicted like being the resort of lustre in the case of jewel etc. We shall reason out [later on] that knowledge although unlimited in itself is capable of contraction and expansion. Therefore, in the state of a Kṣetra-knower, there is the contracted nature owing to the Karman, having comparative and superlative nature in conformity with the various kinds of Karmans, and that is well-established through the means of the sense-organs. And the reference 'rise' and 'set' proceeds, taking into account the knowledge by means of the sense-organs. And there surely does exist the nature of the doer in the flow of knowledge. That, however, is not natural; but on the other hand is affected by Karman and so Ātman has a nature incapable of modification. The nature of Knower, involving non-modification in this way belongs to the Ātman alone, having the nature of cognition—Jñāna—and so there would never be the possibility of the state of being the Knower in respect of the non-sentient 'ahaṁkara'.

[41] If it be contended— There is that possibility in the case of 'ahaṁkāra' having non-sentient nature on account of its being overcast with the shadow of the 'cit' as a result of its proximity—

केयं चिच्छायापत्तिः ? किम् अहंकारच्छायापत्तिः संविदः, उत संविच्छायापत्तिरहंकारस्य ? न तावत्संविदः, संविदि ज्ञातृत्वानभ्युपगमात् । नाप्यहंकारस्य, तस्य जडस्योक्तरीत्या ज्ञातृत्वायोगात्, द्वयोरप्यचाक्षुषत्वाच्च । न ह्यचाक्षुषाणां छाया दृष्टा ।

अथ अग्निसंपर्कादयः पिण्डौष्ण्यवच्चित्संपर्काज्ज्ञातृत्वोपलब्धिः – इति—

नैतत् । संविदि वास्तवज्ञातृत्वानभ्युपगमादेव न तत्संपर्कादहंकारे ज्ञातृत्वं तदुपलब्धिर्वा । अहंकारस्य त्वचेतनस्य ज्ञातृत्वासंभवादेव सुतरां न तत्संपर्कात्संविदि ज्ञातृत्वं तदुपलब्धिर्वा ।

यदप्युक्तम्—उभयत्र वस्तुनो न ज्ञातृत्वमस्ति । अहंकारस्त्वनुभूतेरभिव्यञ्जकः स्वात्मस्थामेवानुभूतिमभिव्यनक्त्यादर्शादिवत्—इति—

तदयुक्तम्, आत्मनः स्वयंज्योतिषो जडरूपाहंकाराभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वायोगात् । तदुक्तम्—

शान्ताङ्गार इवादित्यमहंकारो जडात्मकः ।
स्वयंज्योतिषमात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न युक्तिमत् ॥ (आ. सि. पृ. २७)

[We ask]—What is this being overcast with the shadow of 'cit'? Is it being overcast with the shadow of 'ahaṁkāra' in respect of the 'saṁvit' or is it being overcast with the shadow of 'saṁvit' in respect of 'ahaṁkāra'? Not, for the matter of that in respect of 'saṁvit,' on account of the non-admission of being the Knower in the case of 'saṁvit.' Nor again, in the case of 'ahaṁkāra,' on account of the absence of connection with being the Knower in the case of that non-sentient ['ahaṁkāra'] in the manner stated [above], and owing to both of them being imperceptible to the eye. Surely, there is not seen a shadow of a thing not perceptible to the eye.

Now [if you say that] there would be the perception of being the Knower owing to the contact with the 'cit', like the heat in the iron-ball through the contact with fire—

It is not so, on account of the non-admission itself of a real state of being the Knower in 'saṁvit' there cannot be either the state of the Knower in the 'ahaṁkāra' or its perception on account of its contact with that [cit]. On account of the very impossibility itself, however, of the state of being the Knower in the case of the non-sentient 'ahaṁkāra,' there cannot be, by and large, the nature of Knower or its perception in 'saṁvit' through its contact with that [cit].

As to what has been said— viz. really there is no nature of Knower in both— The 'ahaṁkāra,' however, the manifester of 'anubhūti,' manifests like the mirror and others, the 'anubhūti' residing within itself—

That is improper, on account of the impossibility of the self-luminous Ātman, being fit to be manifested by the 'ahaṁkāra' having a non-sentient nature. As has been stated—

'That the ahaṁkāra of non-sentient nature manifests the self-luminous Ātman, like extinguished hot coal, the Sun, is not reasonable'.
(Ā. Si. Page 27)

स्वयंप्रकाशानुभवाधीनसिद्धयो हि सर्वे पदार्थाः। तत्र तदायत्तप्रकाशोऽचिदहंकारोऽनुदितानस्तमितस्वरूपप्रकाशमशेषार्थसिद्धिहेतुभूतमनुभवमभिव्यनक्ति, इत्यात्मविदः परिहसन्ति। किं चाहंकारानुभवयोः स्वभावविरोधादनुभूतेरननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गाच्च न व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्याभवः। तथोक्तम्—

व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यत्वमन्योन्यं न च स्यात्प्रातिकूल्यतः।
व्यङ्ग्यत्वेऽननुभूतित्वमात्मनि स्याद्यथा घटे॥ (आ. सि. पृ. २७)

न च रविकरनिकराणां स्वाभिव्यङ्ग्यकरतलाभिव्यङ्ग्यत्ववत्संविदभिव्यङ्ग्याहंकाराभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वं संविदः साधीयः, तत्रापि रविकरनिकराणां करतलाभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वाभावात्। करतलप्रतिहतगतयो हि रश्मयो बहुलाः स्वयमेव स्फुटतरमुपलभ्यन्ते, इति तद्बाहुल्यमात्रः हेतुत्वात्करतलस्य नाभिव्यञ्जकत्वम्। किं चास्य संविद्रूपस्यात्मनोऽहंकारनिर्वर्त्याभिव्यक्तिः किंरूपा? न तावदुत्पत्तिः, स्वतःसिद्धतयानन्योत्पाद्यताभ्युपगमात्। नापि तत्प्रकाशनम्,

---

For, all objects have their establishment dependent upon self-luminous experience. That being the case, the Ātman-Knowers ridicule unsparingly [the idea] that the non-sentient 'ahaṁkāra' with its illumination dependent on it [saṁvit] manifests 'anubhūti,' with its nature and illumination neither risen nor set, [and] which is the cause of the establishment of all objects without exception. And further, on account of the contradiction in natures of 'ahaṁkāra' and 'anubhūti' and on account of the undesirable result viz. 'anubhūti' would be non-anubhūti, there cannot be the nature of manifester and the, manifested [between the two]. To the same effect has been said—

"*There cannot be the mutual state of being the manifester and the manifested owing to the opposing natures; if (the Ātman) were capable of being manifested, that would be the nature of non-anubhūti in the Ātman as in the case of a jar*'. (Ā. Si. Page 27)

Like being fit to be manifested in the case of the masses of the Sun's rays, by the palm of the hand capable of being manifested by themselves, is not at all reasonable, the capability of being manifested of 'saṁvit' by 'ahaṁkāra' capable of being manifested by 'saṁvit,' on account of the absence even of the capability of being manifest by the plam of the hand in the case of the masses of the rays of the Sun. For, the rays with their course obstructed by the palm of the hand, [being] in large quantities are found out more distinctly of their own accord— and therefore there cannot be the state of being the manifester in the case of the palm of the hand on account of its being the cause merely of [manifesting] their large quantity. Furthermore, what nature the manifestation being affected by 'ahaṁkāra' in the case of the Ātman constituted of 'saṁvit'? It cannot be the origination, for the matter of that, on account of the admission of being fit to be originated by no one else owing to its being self-established. Nor again, could it be its illumination, on account

तस्या अनुभवान्तराननुभाव्यत्वात् । तत एव च न तदनुभवसाधनानुग्रहः । स हि द्विधा—ज्ञेयस्येन्द्रियसंबन्धहेतुत्वेन वा, यथा जातिनिजमुखादिग्रहणे व्यक्तिदर्पणादीनां नयनादीन्द्रियसंबन्धहेतुत्वेन; बोद्धृगतकल्मषापनयनेन वा, यथा परतत्त्वावबोधसाधनस्य शास्त्रस्य शमदमादिना । यथोक्तम्—

करणानामभूमित्वान्न तत्संबन्धहेतुता । (आ॰ सि॰ पृ॰ २८)

इति ।

[42] किं चानुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्यहमर्थेन न तदनुभवसाधनानुग्रहः सुवचः । स ह्यनुभाव्यानुभवोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकनिरसनेन भवेत्, यथा रूपादिग्रहणोत्पत्तिविरोधिसंतमसनिरसनेन चक्षुषो दीपादिना । न चेह तथाविधं निरसनीयं संभाव्यते । न तावत्संविदात्मगतं तज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधि किंचिदप्यहंकारापनेयमस्ति ।

अस्ति ह्यज्ञानम्-इति चेत्—न, अज्ञानस्याहंकारापनोद्यत्वानभ्युपगमात् । ज्ञानमेव ह्यज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम् । न च संविदाश्रयत्वमज्ञानस्य संभवति, ज्ञानसमानाश्रयत्वात्, तत्समानविषयत्वाच्च । ज्ञातृभावविषयभावविरहिते ज्ञानमात्रे साक्षिणि नाज्ञानं संभवितु-

of its being not capable of being experienced by another experience. And for that very reason, there is no [question of] taking hold of the means in respect of that, for that is two-fold, (1) either by being the cause of the contact of the object, for instance, of knowledge with the sense-organs as by being the cause of the contact with sense-organs, eye and others of the individual, the miror etc. in the apprehension of generality, face etc. (2) or, by the removal of impurity [wrong notions] belonging to the knower, as in the case of Sāstra which is the means of comprehension of the highest Truth by tranquillity, self-restraint etc. As has been stated—

'The sense-organs cannot be the cause of the contact with them, on account of their being unfit for the same'. (Ā. Si. Page 28)

[42] And further, even if it were admitted that 'Anubhūti' is possessed of the nature of being fit to be experienced, it is not a fair statement that there is the taking hold of the means for the 'Anubhūti' by the 'I'-entity ; and that indeed, may be by the removal of the obstructing agencies, for the origination of the 'anubhūti' of the things to be experienced, as by the removal in the case of the pitchy darkness opposing the rise of apprehension of colour and others by means of the lamp etc. But in this case nothing of that nature fit to be removed is possible. Not for the matter of that, is there anything whatsoever fit to be removed by 'ahaṁkāra' belonging to 'saṁvit' itself opposed to the origination of its knowledge.

If it were argued,— There is [such a thing viz.] Ajñāna, [we say]—'No', on account of the non-admission of the Ajñāna, fit to be removed by Ahaṁkāra; for Jñāna alone is the dispeller of Ajñāna. And further, it is not possible for Ajñāna to have 'saṁvit' as its resort on account of its having the same resort as Jñāna and having the same sphere as that of knowledge. And Ajñāna does not

मर्हति। यथा ज्ञानाश्रयत्वप्रसक्तिशून्यत्वेन घटादेर्नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वम्, तथा ज्ञानमात्रेऽपि ज्ञानाश्रयत्वाभावेन नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वं स्यात्। संविदोऽज्ञानाश्रयत्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्यात्मतयाभ्युपेतायास्तस्या ज्ञानविषयत्वाभावेन ज्ञानेन न तद्गताज्ञाननिवृत्तिः। ज्ञानं हि स्वविषय एवाज्ञानं निवर्तयति, यथा रज्ज्वादौ। अतो न केनापि कदाचित्संविदाश्रयमज्ञानमुच्छिद्येत। अस्य च सदसदनिर्वचनीयस्याज्ञानस्य स्वरूपमेव दुर्निरूपम्, इत्युपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यते। ज्ञानप्रागभावरूपस्य चाज्ञानस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधित्वाभावेन न तन्निरसनेन तज्ज्ञानसाधनानुग्रहः। अतो न केनापि प्रकारेणाहंकारेणानुभूतेरभिव्यक्तिः।

न च स्वाश्रयतयाभिव्यङ्ग्याभिव्यञ्जनमभिव्यञ्जकानां स्वभावः, प्रदीपादिष्वदर्शनात्, यथावस्थितपदार्थप्रतीत्यनुगुणस्वाभाव्याच्च ज्ञानतत्साधनयोरनुग्राहकस्य च। तच्च स्वतःप्रामाण्यं न्यायसिद्धम्। न च दर्पणादिर्मुखादेरभिव्यञ्जकः, अपि तु चाक्षुषतेजःप्रतिफलनरूपदोषहेतुः। तद्दोषकृतश्च तत्रान्यथावभासः। अभिव्यञ्जकस्त्वालोकादिरेव। न चेह

---

deserve to exist in the mere Jñāna, the Witness bereft of the nature of the Knower and the nature of being the object of knowledge. Just as jar and others cannot be the resort of Ajñāna on account of their being void of the possibility of being the resort of knowledge; in the same way, there would not be the nature of having Ajñāna as the resort on account of there being the absence of being the abode even in the case of mere Jñāna alone. Even if 'saṁvit' is admitted to be the resort of Ajñāna, on account of the absence of its being the object of knowledge, in the case of it (*saṁvit*) admitted to have the nature of Ātman, there would not be the removal of Ajñāna belonging to it by Jñāna. For, Jñāna removes Ajñāna in the case of its own object alone as in the case of rope and others. Hence Ajñāna with consciousness ['Saṁvit'] for its abode, could never be rooted out by anybody. It would be stated down below that it is very difficult to point out the very nature of Ajñāna that cannot be described as either existing or non-existing. And, in the case of Ajñāna, of the nature of the antecedent negation of Jñāna, there cannot be the taking hold of the means of Jñāna by its [of Ajñāna] removal, owing to the absence of opposition to the origination of Jñāna. Therefore, there cannot be the manifestation by 'Ahaṁkāra' of 'Anubhūti' by any method whatsoever.

Neither is it the nature of manifesters to manifest the things fit to be manifested as being their resort, on account of this not being seen in the case of a big lamp and others; and on account of Jñāna, its means, and favourable accessories having the nature compatible with the apprehension of objects as they are. And that self-authoritative nature is logically proved. Nor is mirror etc. the manifester of face etc.; but on the other hand, it is the cause of the blemish in the form of refraction of the lustre associated with the eye. And there is an impression otherwise due to that blemish. The manifester, however,

तथाहंकारेण संविदि स्वप्रकाशायां तादृशदोषापादनं संभवति। व्यक्तेस्तु जातिराकार इति तदाश्रयतया प्रतीतिः, न तु व्यक्तिव्यङ्ग्यत्वात्। अतोऽन्तःकरणभूताहंकारस्थतया संविदुपलब्धेर्वस्तुतो दोषतो वा न किञ्चिदिह कारणमिति नाहंकारस्य ज्ञातृत्वम्, तथोपलब्धिर्वा। तस्मात्स्वत एव ज्ञातृतया सिध्यन्नहमर्थ एव प्रत्यगात्मा, न ज्ञप्तिमात्रम्। अहंभावविगमे तु ज्ञप्तेरपि न प्रत्यक्त्वसिद्धिरित्युक्तम्। तमोगुणाभिभवात्पराגर्थानुभवाभावाच्चाहमर्थस्य विविक्तस्फुटप्रतिभासाभावेऽप्याप्रबोधादहमित्येकाकारेणात्मनः स्फुरणात्सुषुप्तावपि नाहंभावविगमः। भवदभिमताया अनुभूतेरपि तथैव प्रथेति वक्तव्यम्। न हि सुप्तोत्थितः कश्चित् अहंभाववियुक्तार्थान्तरप्रत्यनीकाकारा ज्ञप्तिः 'अहमज्ञानसाक्षितयावतिष्ठे' इत्येवंविधां स्वापसमकालामनुभूतिं परामृशति। एवं हि सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शः 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति। अनेन प्रत्यवमर्शेन तदानीमप्यहमर्थस्यैवात्मनः सुखित्वं ज्ञातृत्वं च ज्ञायते।

[43] न च वाच्यम्—'यथेदानीं सुखं भवति तथा तदानीमस्वाप्सम्' इत्येषा प्रतिपत्तिः—इति। अतद्रूपत्वात्प्रतिपत्तेः।

---

is the light etc. alone. Here, there is not possible that kind of production of blemish in the case of self-luminous 'saṁvit' by Ahaṁkāra in that way. In the case of the individual, however, there is the apprehension as the resort of the generality because it is just its form, but not on account of its being fit to be manifested by the individual. And therefore, because there is no cause either in reality or through some blemish of the perception of 'saṁvit' on account of its being stationed within 'ahaṁkāra' which is the inner sense-organ, there cannot be the nature of the Knower or his perception likewise in the case of Ahaṁkāra. Therefore, the 'I-entity' alone being established of its own accord as the Knower is the inner-self, and not merely Jñapti. It has already been stated that in the absence of the 'I-nature' there cannot be the establishment of even Jñapti as being within. Even in the absence of a distinct clear shining forth of the 'I-entity' on account of the overpowering by the quality of ignorance (*Tamas*) and on account of the absence of the experience of outside objects, there cannot be even in the deep-sleep-state the disappearance of the 'I-nature' owing to the clear apprehension, [throbbing] of the Ātman in the one form 'I' upto the time of waking. And it may be stated that the same thing obtains in the case of your pet 'Anubhūti' also. For surely, any one risen from sleep does not refer to 'Anubhūti' contemporaneous with the deep-sleep-state in the form viz., 'I am Jñapti possessing the form opposed to another object bereft of 'I nature' and 'I stay with Ajñāna as the witness'. And likewise there is the reference of one risen from sleep in the form 'I have slept happily'. By this reflection is known even at that time the state of being happy and the nature of the Knower in the case of the Ātman— the 'I-entity' itself.

[43] It should not be argued,—'As now there is happiness, so also at the time I slept' is the apprehension, on account of the apprehension not being in that form.

न चाहमर्थस्यात्मनोऽस्थिरत्वेन तदानीमहमर्थस्य सुखित्वानुसंधानानुपपत्तिः। यतः सुषुप्ति-दशायाः प्रागनुभूतं वस्तु सुप्तोत्थितो 'मयेदं कृतम्' 'मयेदमनुभूतम्' 'अहमेवेदमवोचम्' इति परामृशति।

'एतावन्तं कालं न किंचिदहमज्ञासिषम्' इति च परामृशति—इति चेत्,

ततः किम्?

'न किंचित्' इति कृत्स्नप्रतिषेधः इति चेत्—

न, 'अहमवेदिषम्' इति वेदितुरहमर्थस्यानुवृत्तेः। वेद्यविषयो हि स प्रतिषेधः। 'न किंचित्' इति निषेधस्य कृत्स्नविषयत्वे भवदभिमतानुभूतिरपि प्रतिषिद्धा स्यात्। सुषुप्तिसमयेऽप्यनुसंधीयमानमहमर्थमात्मानं ज्ञातारं 'अहं' इति परामृश्य 'न किंचिदवेदिषम्' इति वेदने, तस्य प्रतिषिध्यमाने तस्मिन्काले प्रतिषिध्यमानाया वित्तेः सिद्धिमनुवर्तमानस्य ज्ञातुरहमर्थस्य चासिद्धिमनेनैव 'न किंचिदहमवेदिषम्' इति परामर्शेन साधयंस्तमिममर्थं देवानामेव प्रियः साधयतु।

'मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान्' इति, अहमर्थस्यापि तदानीमननुसंधानं प्रतीयते—इति चेत्—

स्वानुभवस्ववचनयोर्विरोधमपि न जानन्ति भवन्तः।

And further, on account of the nature of Ātman—the 'I-entity' being non-permanent, there would be the impossibility of the continuing impression about being happy at that time for the 'I-entity'. For, the person risen from sleep reviews the thing experienced prior to the state of deep sleep in the form 'By me was done this', 'By me was this experienced', 'I myself spoke thus'.

If it were argued—He also reviews about it, 'I did not know anything during all this time',

[we ask]—What then?

If it be argued that there is the denial of all [to be understood] in the term 'Not anything',

We reply—'No', on account of the continuity of the 'I-entity'—the Knower, because of the form 'I knew'. That denial, indeed, has for its province the thing to be known. If the denial in the form 'Not anything' refers to all, your pet 'Anubhūti' would also be denied. If the apprehension in the form 'I did not know anything' were to be denied in the case of him, on having referred as 'I' to the 'I-entity', the Ātman, the Knower persisting even at the time of deep sleep, one proving by this very reference 'I did not know anything' the existence of the knowledge which is being denied at that time and the non-existence of the persisting 'I-entity', the Knower—let him [the idiot] the beloved of Gods alone establish such a sense [if he cares to do so] !

If it were argued—At that time is apprehended the non-continuity even of the 'I-entity' in the form 'I did not know even myself',

your honour does not know even the contradiction between your own experience and your statements !

'अहं मां न ज्ञातवान्' इति ह्यनुभववचने 'मां' इति किं निषिध्यते ?—इति चेत्—

साधु पृष्टं भवता । तदुच्यते—अहमर्थस्य ज्ञातुरनुवृत्तेर्न स्वरूपं निषिध्यते, अपि तु प्रबोधसमयेऽनुसंधीयमानस्याहमर्थस्य वर्णाश्रमादिविशिष्टता । 'अहं मां न ज्ञातवान्' इत्युक्तेर्विषयो विवेचनीयः । जागरितावस्थानुसंहितजात्यादिविशिष्टोऽस्मदर्थो 'माम्' इत्यंशस्य विषयः । स्वापावस्था प्रसिद्धोऽविशदस्वानुभवैकतानश्चाहमर्थे 'अहम्' इत्यंशस्य विषयः । अत्र 'सुप्तोऽहम्' 'ईदृशोऽहम्' इति च 'मामपि न ज्ञातवानहम्' इत्येव खल्वनुभवप्रकारः ।

किं च, सुषुप्तावात्मा, अज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनास्ते, इति हि भवदीया प्रक्रिया । साक्षित्वं च साक्षाज्ज्ञातृत्वमेव । न ह्यजानतः साक्षित्वम् । ज्ञातैव लोकवेदयोः साक्षी, इति व्यपदिश्यते, न ज्ञानमात्रम् । स्मरति च भगवान्पाणिनिः —

'साक्षाद्द्रष्टरि संज्ञायाम्' (पा. सू. ५।२।९१)

इति । साक्षाज्ज्ञातर्येव 'साक्षि'शब्दम् । स चायं साक्षी 'जानामि' इति प्रतीयमानोऽस्मदर्थ एव, इति कुतस्तदानीमहमर्थो न प्रतीयेत ? आत्मने स्वयमवभासमानः 'अहम्' इत्येवावभासते, इति स्वापाद्यवस्थास्वप्यात्मा प्रकाशमानो 'अहम्' इत्येवावभासत इति सिद्धम् ।

If it were asked,—In the statement about the experience in the form 'I did not know myself', what is denied by the expression 'myself' (*mām*)?

[We say]—A very pertinent question put by you! This is our reply—what is denied is not the nature of the continuity of the 'I-entity'—the Knower, but the particularity about caste, stage of life etc. of the 'I-entity' being continued at the time of awakening; the thing referred to in the statement 'I did not know myself' has got to be analysed—The object of the portion viz. 'myself' is the 'I' particularised by caste etc. continued in the state of waking and the object of the portion 'I' [of the statement] is the 'I-entity' well-known in the deep-sleep state associated uniformly with one's self-experience which is indistinct. Here, 'Asleep was I' and this also 'Such am I', 'Myself too I did not know',—these are indeed the varieties of experience.

And further, this is the theory of your honour, that the Ātman stands in the state of a Witness to 'Ajñāna' in deep sleep. And the state of a witness is surely the state of a direct knower. Not surely can there be the nature of witness in one who does not know. The Knower alone is referred to as witness both in the Vedas and in the world [and] not mere Jñāna. Says the revered Pāṇini—

'In [regard to] direct beholder, as appellation'.

(Pāṇ. Sūtra 5·2·91)

Thus the word 'witness' is in [regard to] the direct Knower. And that same, this witness, [is] the entity itself referred to by the First Person, being apprehended in the form 'I know'—and so how [indeed] could not the 'I-entity' be apprehended at that time? It is proved that the Ātman illumining even in the states of deep sleep etc., shines forth only in the form 'I', because he illumining in respect of himself does shine forth as 'I' alone.

[44] यत्तु—' मोक्षदशायामहमर्थो नानुवर्तते ' इति—तदपेशलम् । तथा सति, आत्मनाश एवापवर्गः प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात् । न चाहमर्थो धर्ममात्रम्, येन तन्निगमेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्ताविव स्वरूपमवतिष्ठेत, प्रत्युत स्वरूपमेवाहमर्थ आत्मनः । ज्ञानं तु तस्य धर्मः, ' अहं जानामि ' ' ज्ञानं मे जातम् ' इति चाहमर्थधर्मतया ज्ञानप्रतीतेरेव । अपि च यः परमार्थतो भ्रान्त्या वा, आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखैर्दुःखितयात्मानमनुसंधत्ते ' अहं दुःखी ' इति ' सर्वमेतद्दुःखजातम्, अपुनर्भवमपोह्य कथमहमनाकुलः स्वस्थो भवेयम् ' इत्युत्पन्नमोक्षरागः स एव तत्साधने प्रवर्तते । स साधनानुष्ठानेन यदि ' अहमेव न भविष्यामि ' इत्यवगच्छेत्, अपसर्पेदेवासौ मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावात् । ततश्चाधिकारिविरहादेव सर्वं मोक्षशास्त्रमप्रमाणं स्यात् ।

अहमुपलक्षितं प्रकाशमात्रमपवर्गे, अवतिष्ठते—इति चेत्—

किमनेन ? ' मयि विनष्टेऽपि किमपि प्रकाशमात्रमवतिष्ठते, ' इति मत्वा न हि कश्चिद्बुद्धिपूर्वमधिकारी प्रयतते । अतोऽहमर्थस्यैव ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यतः प्रत्यगात्मत्वम् । स च प्रत्यगात्मा मुक्तावपि ' अहम् ' इत्येव प्रकाशते, स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात् ।

---

[44] As to [what has been stated]—The 'I-entity' does not follow up in the state of salvation—that is not a plausible [statement]. In that case, that 'Salvation [is] nothing but self-destruction' would just be declared [though] in a different form. Nor again is the 'I-entity' a mere attribute, so that even in its disappearance, its nature would be still existing as in the case of the turning away of 'Avidyā'; on the other hand, the 'I-entity' is the very nature of the Ātman. And knowledge is its attribute, on account of the apprehension itself of knowledge as being the attribute of the 'I-entity' in the form 'I know', 'knowledge is produced in me'. And further, he alone who refers to the Ātman as 'I am unhappy' on account of his being unhappy by miseries pertaining to the body etc. in reality or through wrong knowledge, [and] who has a passion for salvation produced in him with the thought (*iti*) 'I am unhappy, how can I unaffected be at ease barring all this aggregate of miseries [leading to] the absence of rebirth?'—proceeds on for [securing] the means thereof. If he were to come to know 'I myself would be no more', by utilising the means, he would certainly move away from [even] the introductory talk about salvation. And thus the entire salvation—Śāstra would be [deemed to be] unauthoritative owing to the absence itself of qualified persons [to profit by its tenets].

If it were argued—Mere illumination pointed out by 'I' does exist in salvation, [our reply is]—

[what do you want to prove] by this? 'Even when I am dead and gone, something [in the form of] mere illumination does exist'—no qualified person indeed having pondered all this, would be striving on deliberately. Therefore, the nature of the inmost Ātman belongs to the 'I-entity' itself, being established as being the Knower. And that inmost Ātman shines forth as 'I' himself even in Salvation, on account of his illumining in respect of himself.

यो यः स्वस्मै प्रकाशते स सर्वोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते
यथा तथावभासमानत्वेनोभयवादिसंमतः संसार्यात्मा ।
यः पुनरहमिति न चकास्ति नासौ स्वस्मै प्रकाशते यथा घटादिः ।
स्वस्मै प्रकाशते चायं मुक्तात्मा ।
स तस्मादहमित्येव प्रकाशते ।
न च 'अहम्' इति प्रकाशमानत्वेन तस्याज्ञत्वसंसारित्वादिप्रसङ्गः, मोक्षविरोधादज्ञत्वाद्यहेतुत्वाच्चाहंप्रत्ययस्य ।

[45] अज्ञानं नाम स्वरूपाज्ञानम्, अन्यथाज्ञानं विपरीतज्ञानं वा । 'अहम्' इत्येवात्मनः स्वरूपम्, इति स्वरूपज्ञानरूपोऽहंप्रत्ययो नाज्ञत्वमापादयति, कुतः संसारित्वम् ? अपि तु तद्विरोधित्वान्नाशयत्येव ? ब्रह्मात्मभावापरोक्षनिर्धूतनिरवशेषाविद्यानामपि वामदेवादीनां 'अहम्' इत्येवात्मानुभवदर्शनाच्च । श्रूयते हि—

'तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति ।' (बृ. १।४।१०)
'अहमेव च संवर्तामि भविष्यामि ।' (छा. ६।३।२, (?))

इत्यादि । सकलेतराज्ञानविरोधिनः सच्छब्दप्रत्ययमात्रभाजः परस्य ब्रह्मणो व्यवहारोऽप्येवमेव ।

Whosoever illumines in respect of himself, the whole lot [of them] shines forth in the form 'I' itself, as [for instance] the worldly individual Soul admitted by both the disputants on account of his shining forth in that manner.

He again who does not shine forth as 'I',—he does not illumine in respect of himself, as for instance, the jar and others.

And this released Self shines forth in respect of himself.

Therefore, he shines forth as 'I' alone.

Nor further, would there be the undesirable result of the Ātman being ignorant and worldly owing to his illumining as 'I' owing to the 'I-apprehension' being opposed to salvation and not being the cause of ignorance etc.

[45] 'Ajñāna' means ignorance about the nature, knowledge otherwise or contrary knowledge. The 'I-apprehension' constituted of Jñāna of the nature [of the Ātman], because the nature of Ātman is 'I' itself, would not be bringing forth ignorance; whence then the worldly form? But on the contrary, it definitely destroys the same ['saṁsāritvam'] on account of its being contrary to that, [and] on account of the declaration about the self-experience in the form 'I' itself in the case of Vāmadeva and others, with their Avidyā completely brushed aside by the direct experience of the Brahman as having the nature of Ātman. For, there is the Sruti passage to [this effect]—

'That this, verily, seeing, Seer Vāmadeva, came to understand and in the form 'I have become Manu and Sūrya. (Bṛ. 1·4·10)
'I alone move about, I alone would be existing' etc. (Chā. 6·3·3, (?))

There is this very use in practice in respect of the highest Brahman opposed to the ignorance of everything else, and sharing just the apprehension of the word 'sat'—

'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवताः ।' (छा. ६।३।२)
'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय ।' (छा. ६।२।३)
'स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै ।' (ऐ. १।१)

इति । तथा

'यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥' (गीता १५।१८)
'अहमात्मा गुडाकेश' (गीता १०।२०)
'न त्वेवाहं जातु नासम्' (गीता २।१२)
'अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ।' (गीता ७।६)
'अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवो मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते ।' (गीता १०।८)
'तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।' (गीता १२।७)
'अहं बीजप्रदः पिता ।' (गीता १४।४)
'वेदाहं समतीतानि ।' (गीता ७।२६)

इत्यादिषु ।

यद्यहमित्येवात्मनः स्वरूपम्, कथं तर्ह्यहंकारस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावो भगवतैवोपदिश्यते—
'महाभूतान्यहंकारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च ।' (गीता १३।५)

इति ?

'*Good!* [*having entered into*] *these three divinities*'. (Chā. 6·3·2)
'*Let me be many, let me procreate*'. (Chā. 6·2·3)
'*He reflected—let me, indeed, create the world*'. (Ait. 1·1)

Similarly in the following passages—

'*Whereas I had transcended the perishable and am even more pre-eminent than the Imperishable; therefore in the world and in the Veda, I am well-known as the* '*Puruṣottama*'. (Gītā 15·18)
'*I am the Ātman,* [*O*] *Guḍākeśa*'. (Gītā 10·20)
'*It is not however that, verily, I had not been* [*before*]'. (Gītā 2·12)
'*I* [*am*] *the source of the entire world* [*and the cause of*] *the dissolution as well*'. (Gītā 7·6)
'*I* [*am*] *the source of everything; all proceeds from me*'. (Gītā 10·8)
'*I am their uplifter from the ocean of worldly existence* [*and*] *death*'. (Gītā 12·7)
'*I am the father, the seed-disseminator*'. (Gītā 14·4)
'*I knew the* [*births*] *gone away*'. (Gītā 7·26)

If, asks the objector, 'I' itself is the nature of the Ātman, how is it that the inclusion under 'Kṣetra,' of 'Ahaṁkāra' has been declared by the Lord himself in [the passage]—

'*The great Five elements, ego, intellect and the unmanifest itself*'? (Gītā 13·5)

उच्यते। स्वरूपोपदेशेषु सर्वेष्वहमित्येवोपदेशात्, तथैवात्मस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तेश्च, अहम्-इत्येव प्रत्यगात्मनः स्वरूपम्। अव्यक्तपरिणामभेदस्याहंकारस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावो भगवतोपदिश्यते, स त्वनात्मनि देहेऽहंभावकरणहेतुत्वेनाहंकार इत्युच्यते। अस्य तु 'अहंकार'शब्दस्याभूततद्भावेऽर्थे च्विप्रत्ययमुत्पाद्य व्युत्पत्तिर्द्रष्टव्या। अयमेव त्वहंकार उत्कृष्टजनावमानहेतुः 'गर्व'अपरनामा शास्त्रेषु बहुशो हेयतया प्रतिपाद्यते। तस्माद्बाधकापेताहंबुद्धिः साक्षादात्मगोचरैव। शरीरगोचरा त्वहंबुद्धिरविद्यैव। यथोक्तं भगवता पराशरेण—

श्रूयतां चाप्यविद्याया स्वरूपं कुलनन्दन।
अनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिर्या— (वि. पु. ७।१०।११)

इति।

यदि ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवात्मा, तदानात्मन्यात्माभिमाने शरीरे ज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रतिभासः स्यात्, न ज्ञातृत्वप्रतिभासः। तस्माज्ज्ञाताहमर्थ एवात्मा। तथोक्तम्—

'अतः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादुक्तन्यायागमान्वयात्।
अविद्यायोगतश्चात्मा ज्ञाताहमिति भासते॥' (आ. सि. पृ. ३२)

इति। तथा च

We reply—On account of the instruction in the form 'I' in all instructions about the nature, and on account of the apprehension of the nature of Ātman in that very manner, 'I' itself is the nature of the inmost Ātman. The inclusion in the 'Kṣetra' of the 'Ahaṁkāra' which is a special modification of the unmanifest, [and] which is preached by the Lord, that, however, is spoken of as 'Ahaṁkāra' on account of its being the cause effecting the egoity in the non-Ātman body. And of this word 'Ahaṁkāra' the following derivation has to be understood [seen], after having made out the use of the 'Cvi' termination in the sense of possessing the nature which is not there before. This same 'Ahaṁkāra', the cause of treating with contempt excellent people, having 'Garva' [pride] as its another appellation is often propounded as fit for being abandoned in the Śāstras. Therefore, the 'I-consciousness' being away from the stultifier, is definitely directly within the ken of Ātman; but the 'I-consciousness' within the ken of the body is, verily, Avidyā. As has been said by the Revered Parāśara—

'Listen, as well, to the nature of Avidyā, [O] Delighter of the family! which is the Ātman-consciousness [super-imposed] on the non-Ātman'. (V. P. 7·10·11)

If mere Jñapti alone were the Ātman, then there would be presentation of mere Jñapti in the non-Ātman body looking upon Ātman as itself, and not the presentation of the state of the Knower. Therefore, the knower 'I-entity' itself [is] the Ātman. To the same effect has been said—

'Therefore, owing to his being established by Direct perception, on account of the co-ordination of logic, Scriptures as spoken of before, the Ātman shines forth as 'I am the knower' also on account of the association with Avidyā'. (Ā. Si. Page 32)

and likewise—

देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणधीभ्योऽन्योऽनन्यसाधनः ।
नित्यो व्यापी प्रतिक्षेत्रमात्मा भिन्नः स्वतः सुखी ॥ (आ. सि. पृ. ६)

इति। 'अनन्यसाधनः' स्वप्रकाशः। 'व्यापी' अतिसूक्ष्मतया सर्वाचेतनान्तःप्रवेशस्वभावः।

[46] यदुक्तम्—दोषमूलत्वेनान्यथासिद्धिसंभावनया सकलभेदावलम्बिप्रत्यक्षस्य शास्त्रबाध्यत्वम्-इति—

'कोऽयं दोषः' इति वक्तव्यम्, यन्मूलतया प्रत्यक्षस्यान्यथासिद्धिः ?

अनादिभेदवासनैव हि दोषः—इति चेत्—

भेदवासनायास्तिमिरादिवद्यथावस्थितवस्तुविपरीतज्ञानहेतुत्वं किमन्यत्र ज्ञातपूर्वम् ?

अनेनैव शास्त्रविरोधेन ज्ञास्यते—इति चेत्—

न, अन्योन्याश्रयणात्—शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेषवस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चये सति, भेदवासनाया दोषत्वनिश्चयः, भेदवासनाया दोषत्वनिश्चये सति, शास्त्रस्य निरस्तनिखिलविशेषवस्तुबोधित्वनिश्चयः, इति । किं च, यदि भेदनासनामूलत्वेन प्रत्यक्षस्य विपरीतार्थत्वम्,

---

'Other than body, sense-organ, mind, vital air [and] intellect, depending upon no other means [for its illumination], eternal, [all-] pervading, different for each Kṣetra, Ātman himself [is] blissful'.
(Ā. Si. Page 6)

'Ananyasādhanaḥ'—self-illuminating, 'Vyāpī'—having the nature of entering into all inanimates on account of his being extremely subtle.

[**46**] As to what has been said, viz.—In the case of Direct perception depending upon difference all round, there is the nature of being stultified by the Sāstra on account of the possibility of its being established otherwise owing to its being based upon some blemish,—

[We query]—'What is this blemish'—this ought to be made clear by you—being based on which there is the establishment otherwise of Direct perception ?

If it is argued—The beginningless 'Vāsanā' about difference is itself the blemish—

[We ask]—Has it ever been known before [by you] anywhere that being the cause of contrary knowledge of a thing different from what it is, in the case of the 'Vāsanā' about difference as in the case of cataract etc. ?

If [it were argued that,] it would be known by this very contradiction with the 'Śāstra', [we reply]—

'No', on account of the [logical fault of] mutual interdependence—When there is the ascertainment of the Śāstra as having the enlightening nature of the object from which all distinctions have been brushed aside, there is the ascertainment of blemish in respect of the 'Vāsanā' about difference; when there is the ascertainment of the blemish in respect of the 'Vāsanā' about difference, there is the ascertainment of the enlightening nature of the Śāstra—of the object from which all distinctions have been brushed aside. And further, if Direct perception leads on to contrary knowledge on account of its being rooted in the 'Vāsanā' about difference,

शास्त्रमपि तन्मूलत्वेन तथैव स्यात् ।

अथोच्येत--दोषमूलत्वेऽपि शास्त्रस्य प्रत्यक्षावगतसकलभेदनिरसनज्ञानहेतुत्वेन परत्वात्, तत् प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकम्—इति ।—

तन्न । दोषमूलत्वे ज्ञाते सति परत्वमकिञ्चित्करम्, रज्जुसर्पज्ञाननिमित्तभये सति भ्रान्तोऽयम् ' इति परिज्ञातेन केनचित् ' नायं सर्पो मा भैषीः ' इत्युक्तेऽपि भयानिवृत्ति-दर्शनात् । शास्त्रस्य च दोषमूलत्वं श्रवणवेलायामेव ज्ञातम्, श्रवणावगतनिखिलभेदोपमर्दि-ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाभ्यासरूपत्वान्मननादेः । अपि च—इदं शास्त्रमसंभाव्यमानदोषम्, प्रत्यक्षं तु संभाव्यमानदोषम्—इति केनावगतं त्वया ? न तावत्स्वतःसिद्धा निर्धूतनिखिलविशेषानु-भूतिरिममर्थमवगमयति, तस्याः सर्वविषयविरक्तत्वात्, शास्त्रपक्षपातविरहाच्च । नाप्यैन्द्रियकं प्रत्यक्षम्, दोषमूलत्वेन विपरीतार्थत्वात् । तन्मूलत्वादेव नान्यान्यपि प्रमाणानि । अतः स्वपक्षसाधनप्रमाणानभ्युपगमान्न स्वाभिमतार्थसिद्धिः ।

ननु व्यावहारिकप्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारोऽस्माकमप्यस्त्येव ।

---

the Śāstra also being rooted in that, would exactly be of the same nature.

If it were contended—Even though the Śāstra is rooted in a blemish, it is the stultifier of Direct perception on account of its being superior, it being the cause of the knowledge brushing aside difference all round—apprehended by Direct perception.

[We say]—' Not so '. When something is known to be rooted in blemish, its being superior is of no moment, because, when there is the fear caused by the knowledge of the serpent on the rope, even though it is spoken by someone who has known ' This one is wool-gathering ', ' this is not a serpent. Do not be afraid '—there is not seen the turning away of fear [from the ' Bhrānta ' person]. And the nature of Śāstra being rooted in blemish is already known at the time of the recitation [of the Śāstra], on account of the thinking and others having the nature of the repetition of the special knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman setting at naught difference all round apprehended from the hearing. And further, this Śāstra has no possible blemish, while Direct perception on the other hand, has possible blemish—By what means is this apprehended by you ? Not, for the matter of that, does the self-established ' Anubhūti ' with all the distinctions brushed away, make one comprehend this idea, on account of its being unattached to all objects and on account of the absence of partiality towards Śāstra. Nor too Direct perception due to the sense-organs, on account of its producing contrary knowledge, being rooted in blemish. Nor do also other means of proof, on account of their being verily rooted in that. Therefore, there cannot be the establishment of your cherished object on account of the non-admission of means of proof proving your view.

I say, [says the objector], the use of proof and the object of knowledge associate with practical dealings exists in our case too.

कोऽयं 'व्यावहारिको' नाम ?

आपातप्रतीतिसिद्धो युक्तिभिर्निरूपितो न तथावस्थितः—इति चेत्—

किं तेन प्रयोजनम् ? प्रमाणतया प्रतिपन्नेऽपि यौक्तिकबाधादेव प्रमाणकार्याभावात्।

अथोच्येत—शास्त्रप्रत्यक्षयोर्द्वयोरप्यविद्यामूलत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षविषयस्य शास्त्रेण बाधो दृश्यते। शास्त्रविषयस्य सदद्वितीयस्य ब्रह्मणः पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनेन निर्विशेषानुभूतिमात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः, इति—

तदयुक्तम्, अबाधितस्यापि दोषमूलस्यापारमार्थ्यनिश्चयात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—

यथा सकलेतरकाचादिदोषरहितपुरुषान्तरागोचरगिरिगुहासु वसतस्तैमिरिकजनस्य, अज्ञातस्वतिमिरस्य सर्वस्य तिमिरदोषाविशेषेण द्विचन्द्रज्ञानमविशिष्टं जायते। तत्र न बाधकप्रत्ययोऽस्तीति न तन्मिथ्या न भवति, इति तद्विषयभूतं चन्द्रद्वित्वमपि मिथ्यैव। दोषो ह्ययथार्थज्ञानहेतुः। तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानमविद्यामूलत्वेन बाधकज्ञानरहितमपि स्वविषयेण ब्रह्मणा सह मिथ्यैव—इति। भवन्ति चात्र प्रयोगाः—

We ask—What, indeed, [is] this 'being associated with practical dealings?'

If it were argued—It is established by the prima-facie apprehension [and] pointed out by logical reasoning, but not actually being in that state—

[We reply]—What is the purpose served by that? Because there would be the absence of the result of the means of proof owing to the stultification caused by logical reasoning, even though it is apprehended as having the nature of the means of proof.

Now, if it were argued—There is seen the stultification of Direct perception, although, even both Śāstra and Direct perception are rooted in Avidyā, [and] Brahman alone, that is mere distinctionless 'Anubhūti' is the highest reality on account of the absence of subsequent stultification of Brahman, the subject-matter of Śāstra [and] which is existent without a second.

[We reply]—That is improper, on account of the ascertainment about the non-reality of something rooted in blemish although un-stultified. This is what is meant to be said ;—

Just as there is produced without any distinction [the same] knowledge of two moons on account of the sameness of the defect—the cataract in the case of all cataract-affected people unaware of their defect—the cataract,—residing in the mountain caverns inaccessible to other people free from all other [eye] defects 'Kāca' and others. There is no stultifying apprehension, because it is not that it is not false, [and so] the duality of the moons also, which is the object of that is certainly false. For, a defect is the cause of knowledge of the object as it is not. Likewise, the knowledge of Brahman although bereft of the stultifying knowledge along with its object Brahman, is definitely false, being rooted in Avidyā. And there are in this connection the [following] syllogisms :—

(१) विवादाध्यासितं ब्रह्म मिथ्या।
अविद्यावदुत्पन्नज्ञानविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवत्।

(२) ब्रह्म मिथ्या।
मिथ्याज्ञानविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवत्।

(३) ब्रह्म मिथ्या।
असत्यहेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवदेव।

[47] न च वाच्यम्—स्वाप्नस्य हस्त्यादिज्ञानस्यासत्यस्य परमार्थशुभाशुभप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभाववदविद्यामूलत्वेनासत्यस्यापि शास्त्रस्य परमार्थभूतब्रह्मविषयप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभावो न विरुद्धः—इति, स्वाप्नज्ञानस्यासत्यत्वाभावात्। तत्र हि विषयाणामेव मिथ्यात्वम्। तेषामेव हि बाधो दृश्यते, न ज्ञानस्य। न हि 'मया स्वप्नवेलायामनुभूतं ज्ञानमिह न विद्यते' इति कस्यचिदपि प्रत्ययो जायते। दर्शनं तु विद्यते। अर्था न सन्ति, इति बाधकप्रत्ययः। मायाविनो मन्त्रौषधिप्रभवं मायामयं ज्ञानं सत्यमेव, प्रीतेर्भयस्य च हेतुः, तत्रापि ज्ञानस्याबा-

---

[1] Brahman, the subject-matter of dispute is false
On account of its being the object of produced knowledge associated with Avidyā.
Like the worldly existence.

[2] Brahman is false
On account of its being the object of false knowledge;
Like worldly existence.

[3] Brahman is false
On account of its being produced by false causes.
Like the same worldly existence.

[47] Nor should it be said viz.—Like the false knowledge of elephant and others in dream, having the nature of the cause of true apprehension—auspicious or inauspicious, the nature of being the cause of apprehension of the object viz. Brahman which is the Highest reality is not contradictory in the case of Śāstra although false, being rooted in Avidyā, because of the absence of falsehood in the case of dream-knowledge. For, there, the false nature belongs to the objects themselves. There is seen, verily, the stultification of them alone [and] not of the knowledge. For, there does not arise in the case of any one the apprehension 'the knowledge experienced by me at the time of the dream, does not exist here'. But the perception of them is certainly there [but] 'the objects are not there'—and so, there is the stultifying apprehension. The illusive knowledge of the enchanter, proceeding from spells, [medicinal] herbs, is certainly true [and, is] the cause of love and fear, on account of the knowledge being not stultified even there. The specific

धितत्वात्। विषयेन्द्रियादिदोषजन्यं रज्ज्वादौ सर्पादिविज्ञानं सत्यमेव, भयादिहेतुः। सत्यैवादष्टेऽपि स्वात्मनि सर्पसंनिधानाद्दष्टबुद्धिः। सत्यैव शङ्काविषबुद्धिर्मरणहेतुभूता। वस्तुभूत एव जलादौ मुखादिप्रतिभासो वस्तुभूतमुखगतविशेषनिश्चयहेतुः। एतेषां संवेदनानामुत्पत्तिमत्त्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वमवसीयते।

हस्त्यादीनामभावे कथं तद्बुद्धयः सत्या भवन्ति ? इति चेत्—

न, एतद्बुद्धीनां सालम्बनत्वमात्रनियमात्। अर्थस्य प्रतिभासमानत्वमेव ह्यालम्बनत्वेऽपेक्षितम्। प्रतिभासमानता चास्त्येव दोषवशात्। स तु बाधितोऽसत्यः, इत्यवसीयते। अबाधिता हि बुद्धिः सत्यैव, इत्युक्तम्।

रेखया वर्णप्रतिपत्तावपि नासत्यात्सत्यबुद्धिः, रेखायाः सत्यत्वात्।

ननु वर्णात्मना प्रतिपन्ना रेखा वर्णबुद्धिहेतुः। वर्णात्मता त्वसत्या।

नैवम्, वर्णात्मताया असत्याया उपायत्वायोगात्। असतो निरुपाख्यस्य ह्युपायत्वं न दृष्टमनुपपन्नं च।

---

knowledge, as [that of] serpent and others upon rope and others produced from the defect associated with the object, sense-organs etc., is [certainly] really, the cause of fear and others. The feeling of having been bitten, on account of the vicinity of the serpent even though one is not bitten, is certainly true. Certainly true is the idea of suspicion of being poisoned, which has become the cause of death. The appearance of the face and others in water and others, is certainly in conformity with the object [and so true], being the cause of the ascertainment of the particularities associated with the real face. In the case of these apprehensions, [their] true nature is concluded from their being produced, and from their doing some action serving some purpose.

If it were argued—How in the absence of the elephant and others can their apprehensions be true ?—

[We reply]—No ; on account of the rule—viz. to have merely something to depend upon, in the case of such impressions. For, what is expected in respect of ' having a support ' is the appearance itself of the object. And the nature of the appearance does exist by virtue of the blemish. But that object being stultified, is concluded to be not-true. The ' Buddhi ' however being unstultified is definitely true—This has been stated.

Even in the case of the apprehension of the alphabet by means of [figures made of] lines, there is no apprehension of the true from the untrue, on account of the lines being true.

I say, [says the objector]—The line apprehended in the form of alphabet [is] the cause of the conception of the alphabet ; but being the form of the alphabet is untrue.

[We reply]—Not so, on account of the impropriety of a false [thing] in the form of the alphabet as the means. For, nowhere is to be seen, nor is it reasonable, the nature of the means in the case of a false indefinable thing.

अथ तस्यां वर्णबुद्धेरुपायत्वम्—

एवं तर्ह्यसत्यात्सत्यबुद्धिर्न स्यात्, बुद्धेः सत्यत्वादेव, उपायोपेययोरैक्यप्रसङ्गश्च, उभयोर्वर्णबुद्धित्वाविशेषात्। रेखाया अविद्यमानवर्णात्मनोपायत्वे च, एकस्यामेव रेखायामविद्यमानसर्ववर्णात्मकत्वस्य सुलभत्वात्, एकरेखादर्शनात्सर्ववर्णप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्। अथ—पिण्डविशेषे 'देवदत्तादि'शब्दसंकेतवच्चक्षुर्ग्राह्यरेखाविशेषे श्रोत्रग्राह्यवर्णविशेषसंकेतवशाद्रेखाविशेषो वर्णविशेषबुद्धिहेतुः—इति,—

हन्त, तर्हि सत्यादेव सत्यप्रतिपत्तिः, रेखायाः संकेतस्य च सत्यत्वात्। रेखागवयादपि सत्यगवयबुद्धिः सादृश्यनिबन्धना, सादृश्यं च सत्यमेव। न चैकरूपस्य शब्दस्य नादविशेषेणार्थविशेषभेदबुद्धिहेतुत्वेऽप्यसत्यात्सत्यप्रतिपत्तिः, नानानादाभिव्यक्तस्यैकस्यैव शब्दस्य तत्तन्नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्वरूपेणार्थविशेषैः सह संबन्धग्रहणवशादर्थभेदबुद्ध्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वात्। शब्दस्यैकरूपत्वमपि न साधीयः, गकारादेर्बोधकस्यैव श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वेन शब्दत्वात्। अतोऽसत्याच्छास्त्रात्सत्यब्रह्मविषयप्रतिपत्तिर्दुरुपपादा।

Now, if [you want to argue that] there the conception of the alphabet is the means thereof,

Then in that case there would not be the conception of the true from the untrue on account of the true nature itself of conception. And there would be the undesirable result [of admitting] the oneness of the means and the end, on account of both conceptions being of the alphabet without any distinction. And if there is the nature of the means of the form of non-existing alphabet in the case of the line, there would be the apprehension of all [the letters of] the alphabet, by the sight of [only] one line on account of the nature of the form of all non-existing alphabets at the time being easy to secure in the case of one single line. If it were contended —Like the convention of the word 'Devadatta and others', in respect of particulari-ndividuals [apprehended by the eye] the particular line is the cause of the particular conception of the particular alphabet, on account of the convention of a particular alphabet to be apprehended by the ear, in respect of a particular line to be apprehended by the eye—

O joy !—then there is the apprehension of a true [thing] from the true itself, on account of the true nature of the line as well as of the convention ! The conception of a real 'Gavaya' even from the Gavaya drawn in lines, is closely tied up with similarity, and similarity is certainly real. And there is not the apprehension of the true from the untrue, in the case of the word of one form, even though it be the cause of the conception of the difference of particular senses by different sounds, since one and the same word manifested by different sounds has the nature of the cause of the origination of conception regarding different senses, on account of the apprehension of its relationship with different senses, owing to the nature fit to be manifested by various sounds. The word having only one nature is likewise not proper, because the sound 'Ga' and others, verily, make one understand some sense, and have the nature of word being fit to be apprehended by the ear. Therefore, the apprehension of the subject-matter viz. real Brahman, from the unreal Śāstra is difficult to sustain.

[48] ननु न शास्त्रस्य गगनकुसुमवदसत्यत्वम्, प्रागद्वैतज्ञानात्सद्बुद्धिबोध्यत्वात्। उत्पन्ने तत्त्वज्ञाने ह्यसत्यत्वं शास्त्रस्य। न तदा शास्त्रं निरस्तनिखिलभेदचिन्मात्रब्रह्मज्ञानोपायः। यदोपायः, तदास्त्येव शास्त्रमस्तीति बुद्धिः।

नैवम्,—असति शास्त्रे, अस्ति 'शास्त्रम्' इति बुद्धेर्मिथ्यात्वात्।

ततः किम्?

इदम्—ततो मिथ्याभूतशास्त्रजन्यज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्यापि ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वम्, यथा धूमबुद्ध्या गृहीतबाष्पजन्याग्निज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्याग्नेरपि मिथ्यात्वम्। पश्चात्तनबाधादर्शनं चासिद्धम्, 'शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्' इति वाक्येन तस्यापि बाधदर्शनात्।

तत्तु भ्रान्तिमूलम्—इति चेत्—

एतदपि भ्रान्तिमूलमिति त्वयैवोक्तम्। पाश्चात्यबाधादर्शनं तु तस्यैव, इत्यलमप्रतिष्ठितकुतर्कपरिहसनेन।

यदुक्तम्—वेदान्तवाक्यानि निर्विशेषज्ञानैकरसवस्तुमात्रप्रतिपादनपराणि—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्।' (छा. ६।२।१)

---

[48] [Says the objector] I say, that the unreal nature of the Sāstra is not like [that of] the sky-flower, on account of its having the nature of being understood by the conception of its being real, prior to the knowledge of non-duality. Only when the right knowledge is originated, there is the unreal nature of the Śāstra. At that time the Śāstra cannot be the means of the knowledge of Brahman—mere 'cit'—with all the differences brushed aside, when it is the means, there does exist the conception that the Śāstra is in esse.;

[We reply]—Not so, on account of the false nature of the conception 'The Śāstra is in esse', when the Śāstra does not exist.

What then?—[says the objector].

This—[is what we mean]—therefore, due to the false nature of the knowledge produced from the falsified Śāstra, there is the false nature of even its object—Brahman, as, for instance, owing to the false nature of the knowledge of fire, produced by vapour conceived as smoke, there is the false nature even of the fire—its object. The non-apprehension of its later stultification is not proven, on account of the apprehension of stultification even of that by the assertion 'The reality is just the void'.

If it be contended—That is rooted in wrong knowledge—

[Our reply is]—Even this has been already declared by you to be rooted in wrong knowledge. The non-apprehenison of the later stultification is in respect of that alone— enough of this ridiculing all round of fallacious unfounded reasoning!

As to what has been stated—That the Vedānta passages are intent upon propounding only the thing distinctionless and uniform consciousness—

'Existence alone, my dear, was all in the beginning'.

(Chā. 6·2·1)

इत्येवमादीनि—इति

तदयुक्तम्, 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान'प्रतिज्ञोपपादनमुखेन सच्छब्दवाच्यस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वं जगन्निमित्तत्वं सर्वज्ञता सर्वशक्तियोगः सत्यसंकल्पत्वं सर्वान्तरत्वं सर्वाधारता सर्वनियमनम्, इत्याद्यनेककल्याणगुणविशिष्टतां कृत्स्नस्य जगतस्तदात्मकतां च प्रतिपाद्य, एवंभूतब्रह्मात्मकस्त्वमसि, इति श्वेतकेतुं प्रत्युपदेशाय प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रकरणस्य। प्रपञ्चितश्चायमर्थो वेदार्थसंग्रहे। अत्राप्यारम्भणाधिकरणे निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः।

'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' (मु. १।१।५)

इत्यत्रापि प्राकृतान्हेयगुणान्प्रतिषिध्य नित्यत्वविभुत्वसूक्ष्मत्वसर्वगतत्वाव्ययत्वभूतयोनित्व-सर्वज्ञत्वादिकल्याणगुणगणयोगः परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादितः।

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यत्रापि सामानाधिकरण्यस्यानेकविशेषणविशिष्टैकार्थाभिधानव्युत्पत्त्या न निर्विशेषवस्तु-सिद्धिः। प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदेनैकार्थवृत्तित्वं सामानाधिकरण्यम्। तत्र 'सत्यज्ञाना'दिपद-

---

and others [other Sruti passages]—

—That is improper, because the Section is begun for instructing Svetaketu in the form—' You are constituted of Brahman of this nature', having put forward through the propounding of the assertion of ' knowing everything by the knowledge of one' and the entire world being constituted of that in the case of the Highest being the material cause of the world, being the instrumental cause [of the world], omniscience, association with all powers having all desires coming out true, being the innermost of all, being the support of all, all-controlling nature being particularised by such like many auspicious qualities in the case of the highest Brahman denoted by the word 'Sat'. And this matter has been fully explained [amplified] in the 'Vedārthasangraha'. And here also, we shall deal with the matter very carefully in [discussing] the 'Ārambhaṇa'-topic.

Even here in the passage—

'*And now the higher* (*vidyā*) *by which that Imperishable is cognised*'. (Mu. 1·1·5)

having denied qualities, ordinary [belonging to the Prakṛti] and fit to be discarded, has been propounded [in this passage] in the case of the Highest Brahman the association of the host of auspicious qualities such as eternality, all-pervading nature, subtile nature, omnipresence, non-decaying nature, being the source of all beings, omniscience etc.

Even here in the passage—

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite* [*is*] *Brahman*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

—there is no justification of a distinctionless object on account of the comprehension of the denotation of one object particularised by many qualifying attributes where there is the same case-co-ordination. Being in the same case-co-ordination means residing in the same object by virtue of the difference in the causes of activity [or application]. There with the [different] words pointing to one object only by the qualities, the primary senses of words 'Satya' [existent] etc., or the forms 'Jñāna' [knowledge]

मुख्यार्थैर्गुणैस्तत्तद्गुणविरोध्याकारप्रत्यनीकाकारैर्वा, एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे पदानां प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तभेदोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः। इयांस्तु विशेषः —

एकस्मिन्पक्षे पदानां मुख्यार्थता, अपरस्मिंश्च तेषां लक्षणा। न चाज्ञानादीनां प्रत्यनीकता वस्तुस्वरूपमेव, एकेनैव पदेन स्वरूपं प्रतिपन्नम्, इति पदान्तरप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यात्। तथा सति सामानाधिकरण्यासिद्धिश्च, एकस्मिन्वस्तुनि वर्तमानानां पदानां निमित्तभेदानाश्रयणात्। न चैकस्यैवार्थस्य विशेषणभेदेन विशिष्टताभेदादनेकार्थत्वं पदानां सामानाधिकरण्यविरोधि, एकस्यैव वस्तुनोऽनेकविशेषणविशिष्टताप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्सामानाधिकरण्यस्य। भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यम्, इति शाब्दिकाः।

[49] यदुक्तम् —

'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. ६।२।१)

इत्यत्र, अद्वितीयपदं गुणतोऽपि सद्वितीयतां न सहते। अतः सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायेन कारणवाक्यानामद्वितीयवस्तुप्रतिपादनपरत्वमभ्युपगमनीयम्। कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य तस्याद्वितीयस्य ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमिदमुच्यते —

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

---

having the form opposed to the various qualities, the difference in causes has got to be resorted to. This, again, is the special feature—

In the one [first] alternative, there is the denotative power of the Words, and in the other one, [there is] indication of them. Further, the opposing nature to Ajñāna etc. is not the only nature of the thing, on account of the superfluity of the use of another word, as the nature of [the thing] is [already] known by [the use of] even one word; in that case, there would be further, the non-establishment of the case-co-ordination on account of the non-resort to difference in causes in the case of words referring to one and the same object. And further, the possession of more than one meaning in the case of words is not opposed to the case-co-ordination on account of the difference of being particularised as the result of the difference in the qualifying attribute or one and the same object, because case-co-ordination is closely concerned with propounding the state of being particularised by many qualifying attributes in one and the same object. The grammarians [declare]—'The case-co-ordination is the application to one and the same object of words having causes for their different activities'.

[49] As to what has been stated here in the passage

'One alone without a second'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

the word 'Advitīya' [one without a second] cannot tolerate being with a second even from [the point of view] of the qualities. Therefore, in conformity with the maxim about the belief in the statements made in all recensions in the case of passages dealing with the cause [of the world] has got to be admitted their being intent upon the propounding of the thing without a second.

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite [is] Brahman' (Tait. 2·1·1)

is the definition of that without-a-second Brahman, characterised by being

इति। अतो हि लिलक्षयिषितं ब्रह्म निर्गुणमेव, अन्यथा 'निर्गुणम्' 'निरञ्जनम्' इत्यादिभिर्विरोधश्च। इति—

—तदनुपपन्नम्, जगदुपादानस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वव्यतिरिक्ताधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिवारणेन विचित्रशक्तियोगप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, अद्वितीयपदस्य। तथैव विचित्रशक्तियोगमेवावगमयति

'तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत।' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यादि।

अविशेषेणाद्वितीयम्, इत्युक्ते निमित्तान्तरमात्रनिषेधः कथं ज्ञायते? इति चेत्—सिसृक्षोर्ब्रह्मण उपादानकारणत्वम्—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेव' (छा. ६।२।१)

इति प्रतिपादितम्। कार्योत्पत्तिस्वाभाव्येन बुद्धिस्थं निमित्तान्तरम्, इति तदेव 'अद्वितीय' पदेन निषिध्यते, इत्यवगम्यते। सर्वनिषेधे हि स्वाभ्युपगताः सिषाधयिषिता नित्यत्वादयश्च निषिद्धाः स्युः। सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्यायश्चात्रभवतो विपरीतफलः, सर्वशाखासु कारणान्वयिनां

---

the cause. Therefore, indeed, the Brahman that is intended to be pointed out is certainly qualitiless; otherwise, there would further be conflict with [the expressions like] 'qualitiless', 'blotless' etc.

—[All] that [is] improper; because the word 'Advitīya'—[one without a second] is meant for propounding the association with multiform [wonderful] powers, by the setting aside of a Governor other than itself in the case of Brahman—the material cause of the world. In the same way the Śruti passage—

"*It reflected 'let me be many, let me procreate'; it created fire (or heat)*". (Chā. 6·2·3)

and such like, make one comprehend the association itself of multiform powers.

If it were asked—When it has been stated that [Brahman is] without-a-second, without any qualification, how is the denial of another instrumental cause known?—

[Our reply is]—The nature of Brahman desiring to create, as the material cause [of the world] is propounded by the passage

'*Existence alone, my dear, [all] this was in the beginning, one alone*', (Chā. 6·2·1)

and on account of the state of the nature of origination of the effect, there is another instrumental cause, present to the mind—and so, that itself is denied by the word 'without a second'—this is known [from the passage]. For, if the denial of everything [was intended], [the qualities] eternality and others admitted by you and intended to be established would also remain denied. The maxim about the belief in the authority of the [various] recensions, for the matter of that, yields a contrary result for your honourable self, on account of the qualities omniscience etc. related to the cause [as

सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां गुणानामत्रोपसंहारहेतुत्वात्। अतः कारणवाक्यस्वभावादपि—

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यनेन सविशेषमेव प्रतिपाद्यते, इति विज्ञायते। न च निर्गुणवाक्यविरोधः, प्राकृतहेयगुणविषयत्वात्तेषाम्,

'निर्गुणम्' (चू. ७।२)

'निरञ्जनम्' (श्वे. ६।१९)

'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम्' (श्वे. ६।१९)

इत्यादीनाम्। ज्ञानमात्रस्वरूपवादिन्योऽपि श्रुतयो ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानस्वरूपतामभिदधति। न तावता निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रमेव तत्त्वम्, ज्ञातुरेव ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वात्। ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव तस्य ज्ञानाश्रयत्वं मणिद्युमणिप्रदीपादिवत्, इत्युक्तमेव। ज्ञातृत्वमेव हि सर्वाः श्रुतयो वदन्ति—

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्।' (मु. १।१।९)

'तदैक्षत।' (छा. ६।२।३)

'सेयं देवतैक्षत।' (छा. ६।३।२)

'स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै।' (ऐ. १।१)

इति।

---

mentioned] in all the recensions, being here intended to be brought together. Hence, even from the nature of the passages dealing with the cause [of the world] by this passage,

'*Existence, Knowledge, Infinite* [*is*] *Brahman*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

[Brahman] with distinctive atributes only is propounded—this is known. Neither is [thus] contradiction with the passages [describing Brahman as] qualitiless, on account of their referring to the qualities fit to be discarded as belonging to the Prakṛti, as in the case of the passages

'*Qualitiless*'. (Chū. 7·2)

'*Blotless*'. (Śve. 6·19)

'*Partless, actionless, tranquil*'. (Śve. 6·19)

The Sruti passages speaking about the nature of Brahman as mere Jñāna, also denote Jñāna being the nature of Brahman. Not by this much is the reality [of Brahman] distinctionless and mere consciousness, on account of the Knower himself having the nature of knowledge. It has been [already] pointed out that in the case of him [the Knower] definitely having the nature of knowledge, there is the state of being the resort of knowledge, like a jewel, sky-jewel [the Sun], a lamp etc. All the Śruti passages, indeed, speak of the nature of the Knower [in the case of Brahman] [in]—

'*Who, the omniscient, all-Knower*'. (Mu. 1·1·9)

'*It reflected*'. (Chā. 6·2·3)

'*That this Deity reflected*'. (Chā. 6·3·2)

'*He reflected—May I, indeed, create the worlds*'. (Ait. 1·1)

'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनाना-
मेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।' (श्वे. ६।१३)
'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ ।' (श्वे. १।९)
'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं दैवतानां परमं च दैवतम् ।
पतिं पतीनां परमं परस्ताद्विदाम देवं भुवनेशमीड्यम् ॥
न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते
न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते ।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते
स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥' (श्वे. ६।७-८)
'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽ-
विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः ।' (छा. ८।१।५)

[50] इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः ज्ञातृत्वप्रमुखान्कल्याणगुणाञ्ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव ब्रह्मणः स्वाभाविकान्वदन्ति समस्तहेयगुणरहिततां च। निर्गुणवाक्यानां सगुणवाक्यानां च विषयम् 'अपहतपाप्मा' इत्यादि 'अपिपासः' इत्यन्तेन, हेयगुणान्प्रतिषिध्य 'सत्यकामः सत्य-

---

'The eternal of the eternals, the sentient of the sentients, the one of the many, who grants the desires'. (Śve. 6·13)

'The wise [and] the unwise, the two unborn, the Lord and the non-Lord'. (Śve. 1·19)

'Him, the highest, great Lord of the lords, and him, the highest Deity of deities, the Protector of the protectors, the Highest beyond the highest, the God, the Lord of the world [and] the adorable one'.

'In his case there is no effect [body] and the sense-organs; there is not to be seen any one equal to Him or superior; His supreme power is heard to be definitely multifarious, and knowledge, strength, activity [are all] natural [in Him]'. (Śve. 6·7-8).

'This Ātman with sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst, with desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled'. (Chā. 8·1·5)

[50] These and other Śruti passages speak of the auspicious qualities in the case of Brahman with 'the nature of Knower' being foremost as natural in the case of Brahman having the nature of Jñāna alone, and [speak of] being void of all qualities fit to be abandoned. The Śruti [passage] itself, discriminates regarding spheres of the [passages] dealing with qualitiless Brahman, [and] passages dealing with the qualified Brahman, denying in the passage beginning with, 'with the sins removed' and ending with 'without thirst' the fit-to-be-abandoned qualities [and] ascribing auspicious qualities to Brahman by 'with desires fulfilled' 'with thoughts fulfilled'—and so, on account of the absence of contradiction between the passages dealing with the

संकल्पः ' इति ब्रह्मणः कल्याणगुणान्विदधती, इयं श्रुतिरेव विविनक्ति, इति सगुणनिर्गुणवाक्ययोर्विरोधाभावात्, अन्यतरस्य मिथ्याविषयताश्रयणमपि नाशङ्कनीयम् ।

' भीषास्माद्वातः पवते । ' (तै. २।८।१)

इत्यादिना ब्रह्मगुणानारभ्य,

' ते ये शतम् ' (तै. २।८।१)

इत्यनुक्रमेण क्षेत्रज्ञानन्दातिशयमुक्त्वा,

' यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते, अप्राप्य मनसा सह, आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् '
(तै. २।९।१)

इति ब्रह्मणः कल्याणगुणानन्त्यमत्यादरेण वदतीयं श्रुतिः ।

' सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्त्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता । ' (तै. २।१।१)

इति ब्रह्मवेदनफलमवगमयद्वाक्यं परस्य विपश्चितो ब्रह्मणो गुणानन्त्यं ब्रवीति । विपश्चिता ब्रह्मणा सह सर्वान्कामानश्नुते । काम्यन्त इति 'कामाः' कल्याणगुणाः । ब्रह्मणा सह तद्गुणान्त्सर्वानश्नुते, इत्यर्थः । दहरविद्यायाम्,

' तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम् । ' (छा. ८।१।१)

इतिवद्गुणप्राधान्यं वक्तुं ' सह 'शब्दः । फलोपासनयोः प्रकारैक्यं

---

qualified and the qualitiless Brahman, the accepting either as being the resort of a false object is not to be considered. Having commenced [with naming] the qualities in Brahman in the passage,

' Owing to the fear of him, the wind blows '. (Tait. 2·8·1)

having spoken of the abundance of joy in the Kṣetra-Knower in the passage in a graduated manner,

' Those which [are the] hundred '. (Tait. 2·8·1)

this Ṣruti passage—

' From whom words turn back along with the mind without having reached it. The Knower of the bliss of Brahman '.
(Tait. 2·9·1)

speaks with very great respect of the infinite nature of auspicious qualities of Brahman.

' He enjoys all desires along with the wise Brahman.'
(Tait. 2·1·1)

This passage making one comprehend [thus] the fruit of knowing Brahman, speaks of the infinite nature of the qualities of the highest, wise Brahman. ' Vipaścitā Brahmaṇā saha sarvān kāmān aśnute '—[This is the prose order]. ' Kāmāḥ ' [means] auspicious qualities, because they are longed for, [and] he enjoys all those qualities along with Brahman—this is the sense. The word ' Saha ' [occurring here] is meant to refer to the prominence of the qualities, as in the Dahara-Vidyā [passage] viz.

' What is inside there, that is to be searched after '.
(Chā. 8·1·1)

The oneness of the type of fruit and worship has been established by the Sruti itself—

'यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेतः प्रेत्य भवति ।' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इति श्रुत्यैव सिद्धम् ।

'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं.........अविज्ञातं विजानताम् ।' (के. ११)

इति ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानाविषयत्वमुक्तम्–इति चेत्–

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१।१)

'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु. ३।२।९)

इति ज्ञानान्मोक्षोपदेशो न स्यात् ।

'असन्नेव स भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् ।
अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ॥' (तै. २।६।१)

इति ब्रह्मविषयज्ञानासद्भावसद्भावाभ्यामात्मनाशम्, आत्मसत्तां च वदति । अतो ब्रह्मविषयवेदनमेवापवर्गाय सर्वाः श्रुतयो विदधति । ज्ञानं चोपासनात्मकम् । उपास्यं च ब्रह्म सगुणम्, इत्युक्तम् ।

'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्तेऽप्राप्य मनसा सह ।' (तै. २।४।१)

इति ब्रह्मणोऽनन्तस्यापरिमितगुणस्य वाङ्मनसयोः 'एतावत्' इति परिच्छेदायोग्यत्व-

---

'Whatever thought a person entertains in this world, so he becomes, having departed from here'. (Chā. 3·14·1)

If it be contended—[in the passage]

'By whom not thought of, for him thought ... ... not known for the Knowers'. (Kena. 11)

Brahman is spoken of as not being the object of knowledge—[We reply] —There would not be the instruction in respect of salvation from knowledge in passages

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'Who knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman itself'. (Mu: 3·2·9)

The passage

'If he knows Brahman as non-existent, he becomes non-existent himself; if he knows that Brahman is, then they know him to be existent'. (Tait. 2·6·1)

[This passage] speaks of the self-destruction and self-existence on account of the absence and presence [respectively] of knowledge concerning Brahman. Therefore, all Śruti passages prescribe knowledge concerning Brahman as the means for salvation. And knowledge is of the nature of worship, and it has been [already] stated that the thing to be worshipped is the qualified Brahman.

'From whom words turn back along with the mind, without having reached it'. (Tait. 2·4·1)

—by the declaration in this passage about the unfitness for limitation in the form 'this [is] so much' even in word and in mind in the case of the infinite

श्रवणेन 'ब्रह्मैतावत्' इति ब्रह्मपरिच्छेदज्ञानवतां ब्रह्माविज्ञातममतमित्युक्तम्, अपरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः । अन्यथा

'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं.........विज्ञातमविजानताम्' (के. ११)

इति ब्रह्मणो मतत्वविज्ञातत्ववचनं तत्रैव विरुध्यते ।

यत्तु—

'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं...न मतेर्मन्तारम् ।' (बृ. ३।४।२)

इति श्रुतिर्दृष्टेर्मतेर्व्यतिरिक्तं द्रष्टारं मन्तारं च प्रतिषेधति-इति—

तदागन्तुकचैतन्यगुणयोगितया ज्ञातुरज्ञानस्वरूपतां कुतर्कसिद्धां मत्वा 'न तथात्मानं पश्येर्न मन्वीथाः, अपि तु द्रष्टारं मन्तारमप्यात्मानं दृष्टिमतिरूपमेव पश्येः' इत्यभिदधाति, इति परिहृतम् । अथ वा दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं मतेर्मन्तारं जीवात्मानं प्रतिषिध्य, सर्वभूतान्तरात्मानं परमात्मानमेवोपास्स्व, इति वाक्यार्थः । अन्यथा

'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ।' (बृ. २।४।१४)

इति ज्ञातृत्वश्रुतिविरोधश्च ।

Brahman with unlimited qualities, it has been said that Brahman is unknown, unthought of, by those who have the knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the form 'Brahman [is] so much', owing to the unlimited nature of Brahman. Otherwise, the statement about Brahman being known and being thought of

'For whom it is not thought of, for him it is thought of... [it is] known for the non-knowers'. (Kena. 11)

is contradicted itself.

As to, however, the Sruti passage

'Not him the Seer of the sight...not him the Thinker of the thought'. (Br. 3·4·2)

denies a Seer and a Thinker other than the sight and the thought—

That has been rebutted because the Sruti declares that one should not see, not think of the Ātman in that way, but on the other hand, one should see the Ātman even as Seer and Thinker as possessed of the form itself of sight and thought, on having regarded the knower as having the nature of Ajñāna as established by false reasoning, on account of the association [of the knower] with the adventitious quality of intelligence; or the sense of the passage is—Having denied the individual Soul [as] the Seer of the sight, the Thinker of the thought, take to the worship of the highest Ātman alone—the inmost Ātman of all beings. Otherwise, there would be further the contradiction with the Śruti

'By what, O Dear one, would one know the Knower'. (Br. 2·4·14)

referring to the Ātman being the Knower [in the case of Brahman].

[51] *'आनन्दो ब्रह्म'* (तै. ३।६।१)

इति, आनन्दमात्रमेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपं प्रतीयते-इति यदुक्तम्, तज्ज्ञानाश्रयस्य ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानं स्वरूपम्, इति परिहृतम् । ज्ञानमेव ह्यनुकूलमानन्दः, इत्युच्यते ।

'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' (बृ. ३।९।२८)

इति, आनन्दस्वरूपमेव विज्ञानं ब्रह्म, इत्यर्थः । अत एव भवतामेकरसता । अस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वमपि श्रुतिशतसमधिगतम्, इत्युक्तम् । तद्वदेव—

'स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः ।' (तै. २।८।१)
'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् ।' (तै. २।४।१)

इत्यादिव्यतिरेकानिर्देशाच्च न, आनन्दमात्रं ब्रह्म, अपि, आनन्दि । ज्ञातृत्वमेव हि, आनन्दित्वम् । यदिदमुक्तम्—

'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति' (बृ. २।४।१४)
'नेह नानास्ति किंचन । मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' (बृ. ४।४।१९)
'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत् ।' (बृ. ४।५।१५)

इति भेदनिषेधो बहुधा दृश्यते-इति—

[**51**] As to what has been said, [in the passage]—

'Brahman [is] bliss'. (Tait. 3·6·1)

the nature of Brahman as mere bliss only is apprehended—That is rebutted by [saying] that Jñāna is the nature of Brahman, the resort of Jñāna; for a favourable Jñāna alone is described as 'bliss' [in the passage]

'Special knowledge, bliss is Brahman'. (Br 3·9·28)

and so, special knowledge, Brahman, [has] the nature itself of bliss—this [is] the sense. For this very reason, is the homogeneous [uniform] nature [of Brahman] admitted by your honour. Even the nature of the Knower also of this [Brahman] of the nature of Jñāna itself is well understood in hundreds of Sruti passages—this has been stated. And similarly, on account of the reference to its being different in such passages as—

'That one [is] the bliss of Brahman'. (Tait. 2·8·1)
'The knower of the bliss of Brahman'. (Tait. 2·4·1)

Brahman is not merely bliss but also one possessed of bliss, for the nature of Knower itself is being possessed of bliss. As to this which has been said [in the passages]—

'For where there is, as it were, duality'. (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

'Not here, is there multiplicity whatsoever; from death, he, to death passes, who here sees as though multiplicity'. (Bṛ. 4·4·19)

'But where everything has become Ātman of this one, then by what and whom would one see?' (Bṛ. 4·5·15)

the denial of difference is mostly seen—

तत्-कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यतया तदन्तर्यामिकतया च तदात्मकत्वेनैक्या-त्तत्प्रत्यनीकनानात्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, न पुनः—

'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छा. ६।२।३)

इति बहुभवनसंकल्पपूर्वकं ब्रह्मणो नानात्वं श्रुतिसिद्धं प्रतिषिध्यते—इति परिहृतम् ।

नानात्वनिषेधादियमपरमार्थविषया, इति चेत्—

न, प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रमाणावगतनानात्वं दुरारोहं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्य तदेव बाध्यते, इत्युपहास्यमिदम् ।

'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते,
अथ तस्य भयं भवति ।' (तै० २।७।१)

इति ब्रह्मणि नानात्वं पश्यतो भयप्राप्तिः—इति यदुक्तं, तदसत्,

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म, तज्जलानिति
शान्त उपासीत ।' (छा० ३।१४।१)

इति तन्नानात्वानुसंधानस्य शान्तिहेतुत्वोपदेशात् ।

तथाहि—सर्वस्य जगतस्तदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकर्मतया तदात्मकत्वानुसंधानेनात्र

That is refuted as under—On account of the entire world being the effect of Brahman and on account of that Brahman being the Inner Controller, on account of the oneness [of Brahman and Jagat] owing to its having Brahman as its Ātman, is denied the multiform nature opposed to it [Brahman] and not again is denied the multiform nature of Brahman preceded by the thought of becoming many, established by the Śruti in the passage—

'*Let me be many*; *may I procreate*'. (Chā. 6·2·3)

If it is argued—This [Śruti passage] refers to an unreality on account of the denial of the multiform nature—

[Our reply is]—'No'. Having propounded in respect of Brahman multiform nature known from all means of proof beginning with Direct Perception, which is difficult to pass over—that itself is contradicted [now]. —This is [entirely] ridiculous.

As to what has been said [as established in the passage]—

'*When again this one makes even the slightest difference in this* (*Ātman*), *then there arises fear for him*'. (Tait. 2·7·1)

that there is attainment of fear [on the part of] of one seeing multiform nature in Brahman—[Our reply is]—That can not be, on account of the instruction about the reflection of the multiform nature being the cause of tranquillity in [the passage]—

'*All this indeed* [*is*] *Brahman, that in which origination, absorption and subsistence take place, thus being tranquil one should worship*'. (Chā. 3·14·1)

To explain the same—Here tranquillity is enjoined by the reflection about its [world's] being constituted of that [Brahman], on account of the entire world being subject to origination, sustenance, and dissolution from that

शान्तिर्विधीयते । अतो यथावस्थितदेवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरादिभेदभिन्नं जगद्ब्रह्मात्मकम्, इत्यनुसंधानस्य शान्तिहेतुतया, अभयप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेन न भयहेतुत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

एवं तर्हि

'अथ तस्य भयं भवति' (तै० २।७।१)

इति किमुच्यते ?

'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते ।
अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति'। (तै० २।७।१)

इत्यभयप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेन ब्रह्मणि या प्रतिष्ठाभिहिता तस्या विच्छेदे भयं भवति, इति । यथोक्तं महर्षिभिः—

'यन्मुहूर्तं क्षणं वापि वासुदेवो न चिन्त्यते ।
सा हानिस्तन्महच्छिद्रं सा भ्रान्तिः सा च विक्रिया ॥'

इत्यादि । ब्रह्मणि प्रतिष्ठाया 'अन्तरम्' अवकाशो विच्छेद एव ।

यदुक्तम्—

'न स्थानतोऽपि' (ब्र० सू० ३।२।११)

इति सर्वविशेषरहितं ब्रह्म, इति वक्ष्यति, इति—

Therefore, there is not the undesirable result of [there] being cause for fear, on account of the reflection that the world differentiated by the difference such as gods, lower animals, human beings, inanimate things etc., as they are, is constituted of Brahman, owing to [its] being the cause of the acquisition of fearlessness, owing to its producing tranquillity.

If [it is] so, why is it said ?—

'Now there is fear for him'. (Tait. 2·7·1)

[says the objector]—

[The answer is]—There is fear when there is dissociation from that stability which is spoken of in respect of Brahman as being the cause of the aquisition of fearlessness in the passage—

'When indeed, this one, verily, secures stability [and] fearlessness in this invisible, incorporeal, indefinable, resortless, then he goes to fearlessness'. (Tait. 2·7·1)

As has been said by the great Seers—

'That, Vāsudeva is not meditated upon for a 'muhūrta' [undefined time] or even for a moment, that [is] a loss, that [is] a great weak point, that is wrong knowledge and that [is] distortion'.

and such like. The 'antaram' in respect of the stability [continuity in meditation] of Brahman is certainly the interval, breach itself.

As to what has been said—[The Sūtrakāra] would speak of Brahman as bereft of all distinctive attributes, [in the Sūtra]—

'Not even from the point of view of place'. (Bṛ. Sū. 3·2·11)

तन्न । सविशेषं ब्रह्म, इत्येव हि तत्र वक्ष्यति ।

'मायामात्रं तु'

इति च स्वाप्नानामप्यर्थानां जागरितावस्थानुभूतपदार्थवैधर्म्येण मायामात्रत्वमुच्यते, इति पारमार्थिकत्वमेव वक्ष्यति ।

[52] स्मृतिपुराणयोरपि निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रमेव परमार्थः, अन्यदपारमार्थिकम्— इति प्रतीयते—इति यदभिहितं तदसत् ।

'यो मामजमनादिं च वेत्ति लोकमहेश्वरम् ।' (गीता १०।३)

'मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि न चाहं तेष्ववस्थितः ॥
न च मत्स्थानि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् ।
भूतभृन्न च भूतस्थो ममात्मा भूतभावनः ॥' (गीता ९।४-५)

'अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥
मत्तः परतरं नान्यत्किञ्चिदस्ति धनञ्जय ।
मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोतं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव ॥' (गीता ७।६-७)

'विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेन स्थितो जगत् ॥' (गीता १०।४२)

'उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥

That is not so, for there he [the Sūtrakāra] would be speaking, verily, of Brahman as having distinctive attributes. And [in the Sūtra],

'That is but Māyā'

the nature of being mere Māyā is spoken of [in respect of objects even in dream-state] on account of the difference in characteristics of the objects experienced in the waking state,—thus [the Sūtrakāra] would be speaking of the real nature itself.

[**52**] As to what has been stated even in the Smṛti [literature] and Purāṇas that distinctionless mere consciousness alone is the Highest reality, [everything] else unreal—[Our reply is—] That cannot be—

'Who knows me—the Supreme Lord of the worlds as unborn and beginningless'. (Gītā 10·3)

'All beings are stationed in me, but I am not stationed in them. And still, however, the beings are not stationed in me—Behold this my lordly Yoga. [I am] the supporter of beings but not stationed in beings, myself is the producing cause of beings'. (Gītā 9·4-5)

'I am the source of the entire world as well as of dissolution; there is nothing else at all beyond Me, [O] Dhanañjaya; all this has been woven up in me like a number of pearls in a thread'. (Gītā 7·6-7)

'Having encompassed this entire world by a portion, I stay on'. (Gītā 10·42)

'But another excellent Puruṣa has been mentioned as the Highest Self, who the immutable one, the Lord, supports the three worlds, having entered into them.

यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥' (गीता १५।१७–१८)
'स सर्वभूतप्रकृतिविकारान्गुणादिदोषांश्च मुने व्यतीतः ।
अतीतसर्वावरणोऽखिलात्मा तेनास्तृतं यद्भुवनान्तराले ॥
समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकोऽसौ स्वशक्तिलेशोद्धृतभूतसर्गः ।
इच्छागृहीताभिमतोरुदेहः संसाधिताशेषजगद्धितोऽसौ ॥
तेजोबलैश्वर्यमहावबोधसुवीर्यशक्त्यादिगुणैकराशिः ।
परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति परावरेशे ॥
स ईश्वरो व्यष्टिसमष्टिरूपोऽव्यक्तस्वरूपोऽप्रकटस्वरूपः ।
सर्वेश्वरः सर्वदृक्सर्ववेत्ता समस्तशक्तिः परमेश्वराख्यः ॥
संज्ञायते येन तदस्तदोषं शुद्धं परं निर्मलमेकरूपम् ।
संदृश्यते वाप्यथ गम्यते वा तज्ज्ञानमज्ञानमतोऽन्यदुक्तम् ॥'
(वि. पु. ६।५।८३–८७)

'शुद्धे महाविभूत्याख्ये परे ब्रह्मणि शब्द्यते ।
मैत्रेय भगवच्छब्दः सर्वकारणकारणे ॥

'Whereas I had transcended the Perishable and am even more pre-eminent than the Imperishable; therefore in the world and in the Veda I am well-known as the Puruṣottama'. (Gītā 15·17–18)

'He is gone beyond, [O] sage, the nature of all beings, modifications, and the blemishes like Guṇa and others; He transcending all the veils, the Soul of everything—by Him has been spread over what [exists] in the worlds and the mid-region.

'He is possessed of all auspicious qualities, He who has upheld the created beings by a particle of his power; He who takes at [His] will, any desirable eminent or big body; who has well brought about the welfare of the entire world.

'He is the one store of qualities—lustre, strength, overlordship, great knowledge, great prowess, power etc., the eminent among the eminents, in whom, the Lord of the high and the low, are no afflictions and others whatsoever.

'That Lord [is] constituted of the individual and cosmos, of unmanifest nature, of non-evident nature, all-Lord, all-Seer, all-Knower, possessed of all powers, known as the Highest Lord.

'By which that Highest, with the blemishes gone away, pure, blotless, uniform, is known properly or seen properly, or reached—that is spoken of as Jñāna; other than that [is called] Ajñāna'.
(V. P. 6·5·83–87)

'[O] Maitreya, the word 'Bhagavat' is pronounced in respect of the Highest Brahman, pure, well-known as 'Mahāvibhūti' [Great Manifestation], the cause of all causes.

संभर्तेति तथा भर्ता भकारोऽर्थद्वयान्वितः ।
नेता गमयिता स्रष्टा गकारार्थस्तथा मुने ॥
ऐश्वर्यस्य समग्रस्य वीर्यस्य यशसः श्रियः ।
ज्ञानवैराग्ययोश्चैव षण्णां भग इतीरणा ॥
वसन्ति तत्र भूतानि भूतात्मन्यखिलात्मनि ।
स च भूतेष्वशेषेषु वकारार्थस्ततोऽव्ययः ॥' (वि. पु. ६।५।७२–७५)

'ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यवीर्यतेजांस्यशेषतः ।
भगवच्छब्दवाच्यानि विना हेयैर्गुणादिभिः ॥' (वि. पु. ६।५।७९)

'एवमेष महाशब्दो मैत्रेय भगवानिति ।
परमब्रह्मभूतस्य वासुदेवस्य नान्यगः ॥
तत्र पूज्यपदार्थोक्तिपरिभाषासमन्वितः ।
शब्दोऽयं नोपचारेण, अन्यत्र ह्युपचारतः ॥' (वि. पु. ६।५।७६–७७)

'समस्ताः शक्तयश्चैता नृप यत्र प्रतिष्ठिताः ।
तद्विश्वरूपवैरूप्यं रूपमन्यद्धरेर्महत् ॥
समस्तशक्तिरूपाणि तत्करोति जनेश्वर ।
देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यादिचेष्टावन्ति स्वलीलया ॥

'The 'Bha' sound is associated with two meanings—as the nourisher and also the supporter, [and] [O] Sage, also the sense of the 'Ga' sound is leader, taker [to the goal], creator.

'[The word] 'Bhaga' proclaims the six—the entire overlordship, prowess, fame, glory, and also knowledge and renunciation.

'Beings reside there in the soul of everything, the soul of beings; and He [resides] in all beings,—therefore, the sense of 'Va' sound is 'immutable'. (V. P. 6·5·72–75)

'Knowledge, power, strength, overlordship, prowess, lustre—in their entirety without qualities etc. fit to be abandoned, are to be denoted by the word 'Bhagavat.' (V. P. 6·5·79)

'In this way this great word 'Bhagavān' [Bhagavat], [O] Maitreya, belongs to Vāsudeva, who has become the highest Brahman, not going to [denote] another'.

'There [in respect of Vāsudeva] this word [Bhagavat] associated with the technical statement about adorable objects, is not [used] metaphorically; elsewhere, indeed, [it is] by way of metaphor'. (V. P. 6·5·76–77)

'Where, [O] King, are established all these powers, that is Hari's another great form with multiplicity of a universal nature.

'[O] Lord of people, that [Hari's form] creates in its sport, the forms of all powers endowed with activities of gods, lower animals human beings etc..

जगतामुपकाराय न सा कर्मनिमित्तजा ।
चेष्टा तस्याप्रमेयस्य व्यापिन्यव्याहतात्मिका ॥'
(वि. पु. ६।७।६९–७१)

'एवंप्रकारममलं नित्यं व्यापकमक्षयम् ।
समस्तहेयरहितं विष्ण्वाख्यं परमं पदम् ॥' (वि. पु. १।२२।५१)
'परः पराणां परमः परमात्मात्मसंस्थितः ।
रूपवर्णादिनिर्देशविशेषणविवर्जितः ॥
अपक्षयविनाशाभ्यां परिणामर्द्धिजन्मभिः ।
वर्जितः शक्यते वक्तुं यः सदास्तीति केवलम् ॥
सर्वत्रासौ समस्तं च वसत्यत्रेति वै यतः ।
ततः स वासुदेवेति विद्वद्भिः परिपठ्यते ॥
तद्ब्रह्म परमं नित्यमजमक्षयमव्ययम् ।
एकस्वरूपं च सदा हेयाभावाच्च निर्मलम् ॥
तदेव सर्वमेवैतद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वरूपवत् ।
तथा पुरुषरूपेण कालरूपेण च स्थितम् ॥' (वि० पु० १।२।१०–१४)
'प्रकृतिर्या मयाख्याता व्यक्ताव्यक्तस्वरूपिणी ।
पुरुषश्चाप्युभावेतौ लीयेते परमात्मनि ॥

'The pervading uninterrupted activity of that unknowable one, is for obliging the worlds [and] it is not the outcome [as a result] of Karman'. (V. P. 6·7·69–71)

'Of this nature is the Highest Place called Viṣṇu, blotless, eternal, pervading, non-decaying, bereft of everything fit to be abandoned'. (V. P. 1·22·51)

'The Highest Ātman, the Eminent of the eminent, and Supreme, is well stationed in the Ātman, completely devoid of particularities pointed out by form and colour etc..

'He who is devoid of decrease and destruction [and] of modification, increase, and origination, [and] who can possibly be spoken of as merely always 'is'.

'Whereas He, verily, resides everywhere, and everything [resides] here; therefore, He is proclaimed all over by the wise as Vāsudeva.

'That Highest Brahman [is] eternal, unborn, undecaying, immutable, and of uniform nature and always blotless on account of the absence [of things] fit to be abandoned.

'That same is all this possessing the manifest and the unmanifest nature [and] likewise that stays on in the form of Puruṣa and in the form of Time [or Death]'. (V. P. 1·2·10–14)

'That 'Prakṛti' which has been declared by Me as having the manifest and the unmanifest nature, and the Puruṣa—both these are merged into the Highest Ātman.

परमात्मा च सर्वेषामाधारः परमेश्वरः ।
विष्णुनामा स वेदेषु वेदान्तेषु च गीयते ॥' (वि० पु० ६।४।३८–३९)
'द्वे रूपे ब्रह्मणस्तस्य मूर्तं चामूर्तमेव च ।
क्षराक्षरस्वरूपे ते सर्वभूतेष्ववस्थिते ॥
अक्षरं तत्परं ब्रह्म क्षरं सर्वमिदं जगत् ।
एकदेशस्थितस्याग्नेर्ज्योत्स्ना विस्तारिणी यथा ॥' (वि० पु० १।२२।५४–५५)
'परस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिस्तथेदमखिलं जगत् ॥'
'विष्णुशक्तिः परा प्रोक्ता क्षेत्रज्ञाख्या तथापरा ।
अविद्याकर्मसंज्ञान्या तृतीया शक्तिरिष्यते ॥
यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिः सा वेष्टिता नृप सर्वगा ।
संसारतापानखिलानवाप्नोत्यतिसंततान् ॥
तया तिरोहितत्वाच्च शक्तिः क्षेत्रज्ञसंज्ञिता ।
सर्वभूतेषु भूपाल तारतम्येन वर्तते ॥' (वि० पु० ६।७।६१–६३)
'प्रधानं च पुमांश्चैव सर्वभूतात्मभूतया ।
विष्णुशक्त्या महाबुद्धे वृतौ संश्रयधर्मिणौ ॥
तयोः सैव पृथग्भावकारणं संश्रयस्य च ।' (वि० पु० २।७।२९–३०)

'And the Highest Ātman, the support of all, the Supreme Lord by name Viṣṇu; He is sung in the Vedas and in the Vedāntas [Upaniṣads]'. (V. P. 6·4·38–39)

'Of that Brahman, [there are] two forms—the embodied and the unembodied only,—those two having perishable and imperishable nature [respectively] are stationed in all the beings.

'That Highest Brahman is imperishable, and this entire world [is] perishable, as the illumining lustre of the fire stationed in one place, [is] spreading over,' (V. P. 1·22·54–55)

'In the same way, is this entire world the power of the Highest Brahman'.

'The power of Viṣṇu is spoken of as 'Parā' [the Higher]; likewise there is the 'Aparā' [the lower] called 'Kṣetrajña' and another third power is intended [to be there], called 'Avidyā' [or] 'Karman'.

'By which the all-pervading Kṣetrajña-power, [O King], is enveloped, reaching all round, attains to all the ever-continuing torments of the worldly existence—

[And] the power called Kṣetrajña on account of its being screened by that, remains in all the beings in different measures, [O] Protector of the earth'. (V. P. 6·7·61–63)

'The Pradhāna [the Prakṛti], and the Puruṣa as well, possessing the property of being the resort, [O] one of great intellect, are shrouded by Viṣṇu-power that has become one with all beings, [and] that [power] alone is the cause of separation of them and of the resort', (V. P. 2·7·29–30)

' यथा सक्तो जले वातो बिभर्ति कणिकाशतम् ।
शक्तिः सापि तथा विष्णोः प्रधानपुरुषात्मनः ॥' (वि० पु० २।७।३२)
' तदेतदक्षयं नित्यं जगन्मुनिवराखिलम् ।
आविर्भावतिरोभावजन्मनाशविकल्पवत् ॥' (वि० पु० १।२२।५९)

इत्यादिना परं ब्रह्म स्वभावत एव निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धं समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकं जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारान्तःप्रवेशनियमनादिलीलं प्रतिपाद्य, कृत्स्नस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनः सर्वावस्थावस्थितस्य पारमार्थिकस्यैव परस्य ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया रूपत्वं शरीररूपशक्ति-विभूत्यादिशब्दैस्तत्तच्छब्दसामानाधिकरण्येन चाभिधाय, तद्विभूतिभूतस्य चिद्वस्तुनः स्वरूपेणावस्थितिम्, अचिन्मिश्रतया क्षेत्रज्ञरूपेणावस्थितिं चोक्त्वा, क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां पुण्यपापात्मककर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टितत्वेन स्वाभाविकज्ञानरूपत्वाननुसंधानम्, अचिद्रूपार्थाकारतयानुसंधानं च प्रतिपादितम्, इति परं ब्रह्म सविशेषं तद्विभूतिभूतं जगदपि पारमार्थिकमेवेति ज्ञायते ।

[53] ' प्रत्यस्तमितभेदम् ' इत्यत्र देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषसंसृष्टस्याप्यात्मनः स्वरूपं तद्गतभेदरहितत्वेन तद्भेदवाचिदेवादिशब्दागोचरं, ज्ञानसत्तैकलक्षणं

' As the wind sticking to the water, bears hundreds of tiny drops, in the same way that Viṣṇu's power also [bears] the Ātmans with Pradhāna and Puruṣa—as this body'. (V. P. 2·7·32)

' Therefore, this entire world, [O] best of the sages, undecaying, eternal, is possessed of having alternatives of birth and death [due to] the appearance and the disappearance [of that]. (V. P. 1·22·59)

—Having in these and other passages propounded the Highest Brahman as having by nature itself even the smallest semblance of all blemishes brushed away, as abounding in all auspicious qualities [and as] enjoying the sport of controlling etc. the origination, sustenance, destruction, entrance within etc. of the world; having declared its possessing the form on account of the entire Cit and Acit things having the form as the body, which are definitely real [and] are stationed in all conditions, being the body of the Highest Brahman; and having declared by the case-co-ordination of different words, in words like body, form, power, manifestation etc., and having stated its staying in the form of the 'Cit' entities that have become His manifestation and also staying in the form of the 'Kṣetrajña' on account of its being mixed with the 'Acit'; [and] the non-continuity of the possession of natural Jñāna and form in the state of 'Kṣetrajña' on account of its being enveloped by 'Avidyā' in the form of acts constituted of merit and demerit and its continuity in the form of 'Acit' entities constituted of 'Acit'—and so, it is known that the Highest Brahman is possessed of distinctive attributes, and even the world which has become its manifestation is certainly real.

[53] [As regards what has been stated by you viz.]— In [the passage] 'The knowledge in which distinctions have gone away'— The nature of the Ātman although mixed up all round with the particular modifications of the 'Prakṛti', gods, men etc., not within the province of the words 'God' etc. expressing their differences on account of its being bereft of the difference

स्वसंवेद्यं योगयुङ्मनसो न गोचरम्- इत्युच्यते, इति—

अनेन न प्रपञ्चापलापः ।

कथमिदमवगम्यते—? इति चेत्—तदुच्यते । अस्मिन्प्रकरणे संसारैकभेषजतया योगमभिधाय, योगावयवान्प्रत्याहारपर्यन्तांश्चोक्त्वा, धारणासिद्ध्यर्थं शुभाश्रयं वक्तुं परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः 'शक्ति'शब्दाभिधेयं रूपद्वयं मूर्तामूर्तविभागेन प्रतिपाद्य, तृतीयशक्तिरूपकर्माख्याविद्यावेष्टितमाचिद्विशिष्टं क्षेत्रज्ञं मूर्ताख्यविभागं भावनात्रयान्वयादशुभमित्युक्त्वा, द्वितीयस्य कर्माख्याविद्याविरहिणोऽचिद्वियुक्तस्य ज्ञानैकाकारस्यामूर्ताख्यविभागस्य निष्पन्नयोगिध्येयतया योगयुङ्मनसोऽनालम्बनतया स्वतःशुद्धिविरहाच्च शुभाश्रयत्वं प्रतिषिध्य, (१) परशक्तिरूपमिदममूर्तम् (२) अपरशक्तिरूपं क्षेत्रज्ञाख्यं मूर्तं च (३) परशक्तिरूपस्यात्मनः क्षेत्रज्ञतापत्तिहेतुभूततृतीयशक्त्याख्यकर्मरूपाविद्या च— इत्येतच्छक्तित्रयाश्रयं भगवदसाधारणम्, आदित्यवर्णम्, इत्यादिवेदान्तसिद्धं मूर्तं रूपं शुभाश्रय इत्युक्तम् ।

---

referring to them, having the characteristics of 'Jñāna' and existence alone, capable of self-realization, is not within the sphere of the mind of one devoted to 'Yoga—'

[Our reply is]—By this, there is no denial of the worldly existence.

If it be asked—How is this known?—It is said in reply—In this context, having mentioned Yoga as being the one remedy in the worldly existence, and having spoken of the constituents of 'Yoga' up to 'Pratyāhāra' [complete restraining of the senses], having propounded the two forms as divided into embodied and the unembodied, denoted by the word 'Śakti' [power] of Viṣṇu, the Highest Brahman; in order to mention an auspicious resort for the accomplishment of the 'Dhāraṇā' [contemplation], having spoken of as inauspicious, the division designated unembodied 'Kṣetrajña' particularised by the 'Acit', enveloped by 'Avidyā' known as 'Karman' having the form of the third power on account of the association of the three 'Bhāvanās' [mental impressions]; having denied the nature of being an auspicious resort, in the case of the second division designated the 'unembodied', bereft of 'Avidyā' known as 'Karman', separated from the 'Acit', having the form of 'Jñāna' alone, on account of its being fit for meditation by the perfect 'Yogins', and not being the resort of the mind of one devoted to 'Yoga' and on account of the absence of purity within itself, it has been stated that the auspicious resort is the embodied form established in Vedānta [passages] like '*possessed of the colour of the Sun,*' peculiar to the Lord [and] the resort of these three powers viz. (1) This unembodied, of the form of the higher power—(2) and the embodied designated as the 'Kṣetrajña' of the form of the lower power, and (3) 'Avidyā' of the nature of 'Karman' called the third power, which has become the cause of 'Ātman' of the nature of the higher power, being changed into the nature of 'Kṣetrajña'.

अत्र परिशुद्धात्मस्वरूपस्य शुभाश्रयतानर्हतां वक्तुं—

'प्रत्यस्तमितभेदं यत्' (वि॰ पु॰ ६।७।५३)

इत्याद्युच्यते। तथाहि—

'न तद्योगयुजा शक्यं नृप चिन्तयितुं यतः।
द्वितीयं विष्णुसंज्ञस्य योगिध्येयं परं पदम्॥' (वि॰ पु॰ ६।७।५५)
'समस्ताः शक्तयश्चैता नृप यत्र प्रतिष्ठिताः।
तद्विश्वरूपवैरूप्यं रूपमन्यद्धरेर्महत्॥' (वि॰ पु॰ ६।७।६९)

इति। तथा चतुर्मुखसनकादीनां जगदन्तर्वर्तिनामविद्यावेष्टितत्वेन शुभाश्रयानर्हतामुक्त्वा, बद्धानामेव पश्चाद्योगेनोद्भूतबोधानां स्वस्वरूपमापन्नानां च स्वतःशुद्धिविरहाद्भगवता शौनकेन शुभाश्रयता निषिद्धा।

'आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्ता जगदन्तर्व्यवस्थिताः।
प्राणिनः कर्मजनितसंसारवशवर्तिनः॥
यतस्ततो न ते ध्याने ध्यानिनामुपकारकाः।
अविद्यान्तर्गताः सर्वे ते हि संसारगोचराः॥

In this context, the passage—

'In which distinctions have gone away' (V. P. 6·7·53)

is stated in order to declare the undeserving nature for being an auspicious resort, of the nature of the completely pure 'Ātman'. To the same effect [are the following passages]—

'Inasmuch as, [O] King, that is not possible to meditate upon by one engaged in Yoga; [and] the second [the highest] place belongs to him, who, called Viṣṇu, is fit to be meditated upon by [full-fledged] Yogins'. (V. P. 6·7·55)

'Where, [O] King, are established all these powers,—that is Hari's another great form with multiplicity of a universal nature'. (V. P. 6·7·69)

Thus having spoken of the undeserving nature to be the auspicious resort in the case of the Four-faced [Brahmadeva], Sanaka and others residing within the world, owing to their being enveloped by 'Avidyā', by Revered Śaunaka has been denied the nature of an auspicious resort, on account of the absence of inherent purity, in the case of those [previously] definitely bound down [to Saṁsāra] in whom, afterwards awakening has dawned by the practice of 'Yoga' and thus, who have attained to their own nature.

'Living beings right from Brahman to the dump of grass, well stationed within the world, acting under the influence of worldly existence produced by the Karman—

'Because of this nature, therefore, they are not obliging agencies for those engaged in meditation, in respect of their meditation—all of these, being within the fold of Avidyā, are, indeed, within the sphere of worldly existence—

पश्चादुद्भूतबोधाश्च ध्याने नैवोपकारकाः ।
नैसर्गिको न वै बोधस्तेषामप्यन्यतो यतः ॥
तस्मात्तदमलं ब्रह्म निसर्गादेव बोधवत् ।' (विष्णुधर्म)

इत्यादिना परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः स्वरूपं स्वासाधारणमेव शुभाश्रय इत्युक्तम् । अतोऽत्र न भेदापलापः प्रतीयते ।

[54] 'ज्ञानस्वरूपम्' इत्यत्रापि ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तार्थजातस्य कृत्स्नस्य न मिथ्यात्वं प्रतिपाद्यते, ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मनो देवमनुष्याद्यर्थाकारेणावभासो भ्रान्तिः, इत्येतावन्मात्रवचनात् । न हि शुक्तिकाया रजततयावभासो भ्रान्तिरित्युक्ते, जगति कृत्स्नं रजतजातं मिथ्या भवति ।

जगद्ब्रह्मणोः सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यप्रतीतेर्ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानस्वरूपस्यार्थाकारता भ्रान्तिरित्युक्ते सति, अर्थजातस्य कृत्स्नस्य मिथ्यात्वमुक्तं स्यात्—इति चेत्—

तदसत्, अस्मिञ्छास्त्रे परस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोर्निरस्ताज्ञानादिनिखिलदोषगन्धस्य समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकस्य महाविभूतेः प्रतिपन्नतया तस्य भ्रान्तिदर्शनासंभवात् । सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यप्रतिपादनं च बाधासहम्, अविरुद्धं च, इत्येतदनन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यते । अतोऽयमपि श्लोकः नार्थस्वरूपस्य बाधकः ।

'[*And*] *they with awakening drawing upon them, afterwards are definitely not obliging agencies in respect of meditation*; *in their case there is no natural awakening as it comes from another* [*source*].

'*Therefore, that blotless Brahman is by nature itself possessed of awakening* (*bodha*)' (Viṣṇu Dharma).

It has been stated that the nature of the Highest Brahman Viṣṇu, which is very peculiar to Him is alone the auspicious resort, in the above and such other passages.—
Therefore, here, the denial of difference is not apprehended.

[**54**] Even here in [the passage] '*the nature of cognition etc.*' is not propounded; the false nature of the entire concourse of objects over and above Jñāna, on account of the statement to this extent only—the appearance of the Ātman with Jñāna as the nature, in the form of entities like gods, human beings etc. is [but] delusion. For, surely when it is stated that the appearance of the conch-shell as having the nature of silver is illusion, the entire mass of silver in the world does not become false.

If it be contended that, when it is stated—on account of the apprehension of identity of the world and Brahman, owing to the same case-co-ordination, the possession of the form of objects by Brahman having Jñāna as its nature, is delusion—it would be tantamount to saying that the entire concourse of the objects has a false nature,—

[We reply]—That is not [so], on account of the impossibility in this Sāstra, of regarding as false, on account of the Highest Brahman Viṣṇu being understood as having the semblance of all blemishes like ignorance and others driven away, as constituted of all auspicious qualities, [as] Great manifestation. And the propounding of the identity [of the world and Brahman] by the same case-co-ordination, is incapable of stultification and [is] non-contradictory—

तथाहि—

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ।
येन जातानि जीवन्ति ।
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति ।
तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्म ।' (तै० ३।१।१)

इति जगज्जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म, इत्यवसिते सति,

'इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् ।
बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ॥' (महा० भा० १।१।२७३)

इति शास्त्रेण, अर्थस्येतिहासपुराणाभ्यामुपबृंहणं कार्यम्, इति ज्ञायते । 'उपबृंहणं' नाम विदितसकलवेदतदर्थानां स्वयोगमहिमसाक्षात्कृतवेदतत्त्वार्थानां वाक्यैः स्वावगतवेदवाक्यार्थव्यक्तीकरणम् । सकलशाखानुगतस्य वाक्यार्थस्याल्पभागश्रवणात् दुरवगमत्वेन, तेन विना निश्चयायोगात्, उपबृंहणं हि कार्यमेव । तत्र पुलस्त्यवसिष्ठवरप्रदानलब्धपरदेवतापारमार्थिकज्ञानवतो भगवतः, पराशरात्स्वावगतवेदार्थोपबृंहणमिच्छन्मैत्रेयः परिपप्रच्छ—

---

this would be properly explained immediately below. Therefore, this verse also is not the stultifier of the real nature of entities.

To explain the same—

'From which, verily, these beings are produced, by which, [when] produced, [they] live on, to which [they] go and enter within—Desire to know that definitely, that is Brahman'. (Tait. 3·1·1)

When it is concluded that the Brahman is the cause of origination etc. of the world in [accordance with the passage]—

'One should amplify the Veda by Itihāsa and Purāṇa; the Veda is afraid of one of little learning [fearing], 'This one would be distorting me'. (Mbh. 1·1·273)

by the Sāstra [—passage]—

—is known that the amplification of the sense [of the Vedas] is to be effected by Itihāsa and Purāṇa. 'Upabṛṁhaṇa' means [nāma] the elucidation of the meanings of the Veda passages understood by oneself by the statements of those who have known all the Vedas and their meanings and who by their Yogic power have directly realised the right meaning of the Vedas. And [such] elucidation, indeed, has definitely got to be made on account of the difficulty of understanding the sense of the passages occurring in all the recensions, owing to the hearing [study] of a small portion [and] owing to the impossibility of a definite conclusion without it. There Maitreya asked in detail, desiring amplification of the sense of the Vedas understood by him from the Revered Parāśara, who had the right insight into the real nature of the Highest deity, who had secured from the gift of a boon from Pulastya and Vasiṣṭha, in the following passages and others—

'सोऽहमिच्छामि धर्मज्ञ श्रोतुं त्वत्तो यथा जगत् ।
बभूव भूयश्च यथा महाभाग भविष्यति ॥
यन्मयं च जगद्ब्रह्मन्यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् ।
लीनमासीद्यथा यत्र लयमेष्यति यत्र च ॥' (वि. पु. १।१।८-९)

इत्यादिना। तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेषतद्विभूतिभेदप्रकारतदाराधनस्वरूपफलविशेषाश्च पृष्टाः। ब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेषप्रश्नेषु 'यतश्चैतच्चराचरम्' इति निमित्तोपादानयोः पृष्टत्वात्, 'यन्मयम्' इत्यनेन सृष्टिस्थितिलयकर्मभूतं जगत्किमात्मकमिति पृष्टम्। तस्य चोत्तरं 'जगच्च सः' इति। इदं च तादात्म्यमन्तर्यामिरूपेणात्मतया व्याप्तिकृतम्, न तु व्याप्यव्यापकयोर्वस्त्वैक्यकृतम्, 'यन्मयम्' इति प्रश्नस्योत्तरत्वात् 'जगच्च सः' इति सामानाधिकरण्यस्य। 'यन्मयम्' इति मयण्न विकारार्थः, पृथक्प्रश्नवैयर्थ्यात्। नापि प्राणमयादिवत् स्वार्थिकः, 'जगच्च सः' इत्युत्तरानुपपत्तेः। तदा हि 'विष्णुरेव' इत्युत्तरमभविष्यत्। अतः प्राचुर्यार्थ एव।

'तत्प्रकृतवचने मयट्' (पा. सू. ५।४।२१)

इति मयट्।

'O Dharma-knower, that I desire to hear from you, how the world came to be, and how, O Noble one, would it come into existence again ?

'And constituted of what is this world, [O] Brahman, and from what [comes forth] this movable and immovable [world]; How [and] where it stayed and laid low and where it would undergo dissolution ?' (V. P. 1·1·8-9)

There have been asked particulars about the nature of Brahman, the distinctions and varieties of Its manifestations, the nature, fruit [and] details of the worship thereof. Regarding the queries about the particulars of the nature of Brahman, the instrumental and the material cause are asked by— 'And from what ('*Yatah*') [comes forth] this movable and immovable', by 'Yanmayam' is asked— of what is constituted this world which has become the object of creation, sustenance and dissolution; by the passage 'constituted of what ?'— And the answer to which 'He is the world'.—And this identity is caused by the invariable association on account of its being the Ātman in the form of the inner controller, and not caused by the identity of objects in respect of the less extensive and more extensive. Because they are put in the same case-co-ordination in the form 'He is the world' it is the answer to the question 'Being constituted of what'; the termination 'Mayat' in 'Yanmayam' has not the sense of modification, owing to the uselessness of a separate question. Nor again, is it used to give its own sense as [in the expression] 'Prāṇamaya' etc., on account of the impropriety of the answer 'He is the world'. In that case, certainly, the answer would have been 'Viṣṇu alone'. Therefore, ('Mayaṭ') has the sense of abundance only. The 'Mayaṭ' is used in accordance with the Sūtra.—

'Mayaṭ is used to express the matter in hand.'

(Pāṇ. Sūtra. 5·4·21)

कृत्स्नं च जगच्छरीरतया तत्प्रचुरमेव। तस्मात् 'यन्मयम्' इत्यस्य प्रतिवचनं 'जगच्च सः' इति सामानाधिकरण्यं जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरात्मभावनिबन्धनमिति निश्चीयते। अन्यथा निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनपरे शास्त्रेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वाण्येतानि प्रश्नप्रतिवचनानि न संगच्छन्ते। तद्विवरणरूपं कृत्स्नं च शास्त्रं न संगच्छते। तथा हि सति 'प्रपञ्चभ्रमस्य किमधिष्ठानम्' इत्येवंरूपस्यैकस्य प्रश्नस्य 'निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रम्,' इत्येवंरूपमेवोत्तरं स्यात्। जगद्ब्रह्मणोरेकद्रव्यत्वपरे च सामानाधिकरण्ये सत्यसंकल्पत्वादिकल्याणगुणैकतानता निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकता च बाध्येत। सर्वाशुभास्पदं च ब्रह्म भवेत्। आत्मशरीरभावे, एवेदं सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यवृत्तम्, इति स्थाप्यते। अतः

'विष्णोः सकाशादुद्भूतं जगत्तत्रैव संस्थितम्।
स्थितिसंयमकर्तासौ जगतोऽस्य जगच्च सः॥' (वि. पु. १।१।३५)

इति संग्रहेणोक्तमर्थं 'परः पराणाम्' इत्यारभ्य विस्तरेण वक्तुं परब्रह्मभूतं भगवन्तं विष्णुं स्वेनैव रूपेणावस्थितं 'अविकाराय' इति श्लोकेन प्रथमं प्रणम्य, तमेव हिरण्यगर्भस्वावतारशङ्कररूपत्रिमूर्तिप्रधानकालक्षेत्रज्ञसमष्टिव्यष्टिरूपेणावस्थितं च नमस्करोति। तत्र

And the entire world abounds in Him owing to its being his body. Therefore, it can be ascertained that the case-co-ordination in the form 'He is the world' which is the answer to the question 'Being constituted of what?' is dependent upon the relationship of the body and the soul, between the world and the Brahman. Otherwise, if this Śāstra is admitted to be intent upon propounding distinctionless Entity, all these queries and answers would not harmonise, so also the entire Śāstra in the form of the exposition of the same. For, if it were the case, of the query 'What is the basis of the delusion in the form of the world-existence?' there would have been just this answer in the form—'The distinctionless Jñāna alone'. And if the case-co-ordination were pointing out the world and Brahman as one substance, there would be the stultification of the uniform nature of the auspicious qualities like 'with the thoughts fulfilled' etc. and of the contrary nature to everything fit to be abandoned. And Brahman would be the abode of everything inauspicious. And it is established that this case-co-ordination has its primary sense, only in the case of the relation of the Ātman and body. Therefore, in order to state in detail the summarised sense in the passage,

'The world coming up from Viṣṇu is stationed there alone,
[And] He is the agent of the sustenance and withdrawal of this
world—and He [is] the world'. (V. P. 1·1·35)

beginning with 'the Eminent of the eminents,' the writer having first bowed down to Lord Viṣṇu standing in his own form being the Highest Brahman in the verse 'To the changeless', and makes obeisance to Him alone stationed in the form of the trinity formed of Hiraṇyagarbha [Brahmā], His own incarnation and Śaṁkara [and] stationed in the form of the Pradhāna, Time, the Kṣetrajña, the cosmos and the individual. There this verse viz. 'the nature of Jñāna,'

'ज्ञानस्वरूपम्' इत्ययं श्लोकः क्षेत्रज्ञत्वव्यवस्थात्मनावस्थितस्य परमात्मनः स्वभावमाह। तस्मान्नात्र निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतीतिः।

[55] यदि निर्विशेषज्ञानरूपब्रह्माधिष्ठानभ्रमप्रतिपादनपरं शास्त्रम्, तर्हि—

'निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मनः।
कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते॥' (वि. पु. १।३।१)

इति चोद्यं

'शक्तयः सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः।
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः॥
भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता॥' (वि. पु. १।३।२-३)

इति परिहारश्च न घटते। तथा सति, निर्गुणस्य ब्रह्मणः कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वम्, ब्रह्मणो न पारमार्थिकः सर्गः, अपि तु भ्रान्तिकल्पितः, इति चोद्यपरिहारौ स्याताम्। उत्पत्त्यादिकार्यं सत्त्वादिगुणयुक्तापरिपूर्णकर्मवश्येषु दृष्टम्, इति सत्त्वादिगुणरहितस्य परिपूर्णस्याकर्मवश्यस्य कर्मसंबन्धानर्हस्य कथं सर्गादेः कर्तृत्वमभ्युपगम्यते, इति चोद्यम्। दृष्टसकलविसजातीयस्य ब्रह्मणो यथोदितस्वभावस्यैव, जलादिविसजातीयस्याग्न्यादेरौष्ण्यादिशक्तियोगवत् सर्वशक्तियोगो न विरुध्यते, इति परिहारः।

---

states the nature of the highest Soul residing as Kṣetrajña—the individual Soul. Therefore, there is no apprehension of the distinctionless entity here.

[55] If the Sāstra were intent upon propounding delusion having Brahman distinctionless and of the nature of Jñāna as the basis, then this query viz.

'How is admitted the nature of the agent for the creation etc. in the case of Brahman qualitiless, unknowable, although pure and of a blotless nature?'. (V. P. 1·3·1)

and the refutation as well viz.,

'Because there are powers of all entities which are within the sphere of unthinkable knowledge, therefore, [O] best of ascetics, the powers of entities, creation and others are [found] in the case of Brahman as heat in the case of fire.' (V. P. 1·3·2–3)

would not stand to reason. In that case, there would have been the query and the refutation [respectively] as follows— How [could there be] the nature of the agent for creation etc. in the case of qualitiless Brahman? [and] The creation on the part of Brahman is not real but on the other hand fancied by delusion. The [proper] query should be 'How is admitted the nature of the agent for creation etc. in the case of one who is bereft of qualities like 'Sattva' and others, all-perfect, not subject to Karman, undeserving of any contact with Karman because acts like origination and others are seen in the case of those that are endowed with qualities like Sattva and others, not all-perfect, and subject to Karman?' 'That the association of all powers is not incompatible with the same Brahman heterogeneous with everything seen [and] which, verily, is of the nature as depicted [before] like the association of heat etc. of fire etc. that are heterogeneous in respect of water etc.'— and this the refutation.

'परमार्थस्त्वमेवैकः' इत्याद्यपि न कृत्स्नस्यापारमार्थ्यं वदति, अपि तु कृत्स्नस्य तदात्मकतया तद्व्यतिरेकेणावस्थितस्यापारमार्थ्यम्। तदेवोपपादयति—

तवैष महिमा येन व्याप्तमेतच्चराचरम् । (वि. पु. १।४।३८)

इति। येन त्वयेदं चराचरं व्याप्तमतस्त्वदात्मकमेवेदं सर्वमिति त्वदन्यः कोऽपि नास्ति। अतः सर्वात्मतया त्वमेवैकः परमार्थः। अत इदमुच्यते—तवैष महिमा या सर्वव्याप्तिः, इति। अन्यथा 'तवैषा भ्रान्तिः' इति वक्तव्यम्। 'जगतः पते' 'त्वम्' इत्यादीनां पदानां च लक्षणा स्यात्। लीलया महीमुद्धरतो महावराहस्य स्तुतिप्रकरणविरोधश्च। यतः कृत्स्नं जगज्ज्ञानात्मना त्वयात्मतया व्याप्तत्वेन तव मूर्तम्, तस्मात्, त्वदात्मकत्वानुभवसाधनयोगविरहिण एतत्केवलं देवमनुष्यादिरूपमिति भ्रान्तिज्ञानेन पश्यन्ति, इत्याह 'यदेतद् दृश्यते' इति।

न केवलं वस्तुतस्त्वदात्मकं जगत्, देवमनुष्याद्यात्मकमिति दर्शनमेव भ्रमः। ज्ञानाकाराणामात्मनां देवमनुष्याद्यर्थाकारत्वदर्शनमपि भ्रमः, इत्याह-- 'ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलम्' इति।

'You alone are the highest Reality' does not state the unreality of everything, but, on the other hand, the unreal nature of everything staying distinct from that, owing to its having that for its Ātman. And [the passage]

'*This is your greatness by which is pervaded this movable and immovable.*' (V. P. 1·4·38)

corroborates the same. Because by you [all] this movable and the immovable is pervaded, therefore, all this has you for its Ātman—and so there is no one whosoever other than you. Therefore, you alone are the one Reality on account of your being the Atman of all. Therefore, this is said 'This [is] your greatness viz. what this all-pervasion is'. Otherwise, it ought to have been stated, 'This [is] your delusion', and there would be then the metaphorical use of the words viz. 'Jagataḥ pate' 'tvam' and others. And further, there would be contradiction of the eulogy-chapter of the great Boar lifting up the earth in sport [easily]. Because the entire world is your embodied form on account of its being pervaded as the Ātman by you constituted of Jñāna, therefore, those that are bereft of the association with the means of realisation of your being the Ātman [of that], see by mis-apprehension in the form—this is merely the form of gods and men etc.—[the speaker] states this [in the verse] 'what this is seen' etc.

Not merely is 'the perception' in the form —the world really constituted of you is constituted of gods, men etc. alone, the delusion, [but] even the perception of the Ātmans of the nature of Jñāna as having the form of objects like gods, men etc. is the delusion,— thus he says '[The entire world] constitutes of Jñāna'.

ये पुनर्बुद्धिमन्तो ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मविदः सर्वस्य भगवदात्मकत्वानुभवसाधनयोगयोग्यपरिशुद्धमनसश्च ते देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषशरीररूपमखिलं जगच्छरीरातिरिक्तज्ञानस्वरूपात्मकं त्वच्छरीरं च पश्यन्तीत्याह— 'ये तु ज्ञानविदः' इति। अन्यथा श्लोकानां पौनरुक्त्यं, पदानां लक्षणार्थविरोधः, प्रकरणविरोधः, शास्त्रतात्पर्यविरोधश्च।

[56] 'तस्यात्मपरदेहेषु सतोऽप्येकमयम्' इत्यत्र सर्वेष्वात्मसु ज्ञानैकाकारतया समानेषु सत्सु, देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषरूपपिण्डसंसर्गकृतमात्मसु देवाद्याकारेण द्वैतदर्शनमतथ्यम्— इत्युच्यते। पिण्डगतमात्मगतमपि द्वैतं न प्रतिषिध्यते। देवमनुष्यविविधविचित्रपिण्डेषु वर्तमानं सर्वमात्मवस्तुसमम्, इत्यर्थः। यथोक्तं भगवता—

'शुनि चैव श्वपाके च पण्डिताः समदर्शिनः।' (गीता ५।१८)

'निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म।' (गीता ५।१९)

इत्यादिषु, 'तस्यात्मपरदेहेषु सतोऽपि' इति देहातिरिक्ते वस्तुनि स्वपरविभागस्योक्तत्वात्।

'यद्यन्योऽस्ति परः कोऽपि' इत्यत्रापि नात्मैक्यं प्रतीयते। 'यदि मत्तः परः कोऽप्यन्यः' इत्येकस्मिन्नर्थे 'पर'शब्द—'अन्य'शब्दयोः प्रयोगायोगात्। तत्र 'पर'शब्दः

Those, again, that are endowed with intellect, knowers of Ātman as having the nature of Jñāna, [and] with their minds perfectly pure and fit for association with the means of realisation of everything having the Lord as the Ātman,— they see the entire world having the forms of particular bodies, the modification of Prakṛti, gods, men etc. and your body having consciousness as its soul over and above the body— thus [he] says— 'But [those] who know the Jñāna'; otherwise, there would be the [superfluous] repetition of the verses, contradiction of the indicated sense of the words, contradiction with the context, contradiction with the purport of the Śāstras.

[56] In the passage 'What [that special knowledge] uniform though existing in His own body and the bodies of others' it is stated—All the Ātmans being equal owing to their possessing the one form of Jñāna, the perception of duality in the Ātmans of the form of gods etc. effected by the contact with the body having the form of different modifications of Prakṛti, gods, men etc. is false. But the duality in the individual belonging to oneself and the body as well, is not denied. The entire Ātman-entity is the same existing in the different variegated bodies of gods, men etc.—This is the sense. As has been said by the Lord—

'Wise men look equally upon a dog, so also the Cāṇḍāla [lit. the dog-eater]'. (Gītā 5·18)

'For Brahman free from blemish is the same'. (Gītā 5·19)

—in [passages] like this, on account of the division of oneself and the others being spoken of in the case of a thing over and above the body, though existing in His body and the bodies of others.

Even in the passage—'If there can be any one else beyond me' etc. is not apprehended the oneness of the Ātman, on account of the impropriety of the use of [both] the words—'para', 'anya'—'above' and 'another' in

स्वव्यतिरिक्तात्मवचनः। 'अन्य'शब्दस्तस्यापि ज्ञानैकाकारत्वादन्याकारत्वप्रतिषेधार्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति—यदि मद्व्यतिरिक्तः कोऽप्यात्मा मदाकारभूतज्ञानैकाकारादन्याकारोऽस्ति, तदाहमेवाकारोऽयं चान्यादृशाकार इति शक्यते व्यपदेष्टुम्। न चैवमस्ति, सर्वेषां ज्ञानैकाकारत्वेन समानत्वादेव— इति।

'वेणुरन्ध्रविभेदेन' इत्यत्रापि, आकारवैषम्यमात्मनां न स्वरूपकृतम्, अपि तु देवादिपिण्डप्रवेशकृतमित्युपदिश्यते, नात्मैक्यम्। दृष्टान्ते चानेकरन्ध्रवर्तिनां वाय्वंशानां न स्वरूपैक्यम्, अपि त्वाकारसाम्यमेव तेषाम्। वायुत्वेनैकाकाराणां रन्ध्रभेदनिष्क्रमणकृतो हि षड्जादिसंज्ञाभेदः। एवम्, आत्मनां देवादिसंज्ञाभेदः। तैजसाप्यपार्थिवद्रव्यांशभूतानां पदार्थानां तत्तद्द्रव्यत्वेनैक्यमेव, न स्वरूपैक्यम्। तथा वायवीयानामंशानामपि स्वरूपभेदोऽवर्जनीयः।

[57] 'सोऽहं स च त्वम्', इति सर्वात्मनां पूर्वोक्तं ज्ञानाकारं 'तत्'शब्देन परामृश्य, तत्सामानाधिकरण्येनाहं त्वमित्यादीनामर्थानां ज्ञानमेवाकारः, इत्युपसंहरन्,

---

one and the same sense in the [passage]—'If some one above me, some one other than me'— there the word 'Para' refers to Ātman other than oneself. The word 'Anya' has the sense of denial of its having another form even in the case of that one having the form of Jñāna. This is what is intended to be said—If there were some Ātman over and above Me, possessed of a form different from the one form of Jñāna, that is My form; then [only] would it be possible to refer to me as 'I alone am one form and this one is another form'. But it is not so on account of all entities being definitely equal owing to their having the form of Jñāna alone.

Even here in the passage, 'Owing to the distinct differences in the holes of a lute' is taught that the inequality of the form of the Ātman is not due to nature, but on the other hand, due to the entrance into the bodies of gods and others, and not to the oneness of the Ātman. And in the illustrative instance [given] there is not the oneness of natures of portions of wind moving about in the many holes, but there is similarity of their form alone, in their case. For the difference in names 'ṣaḍja' and others is effected by the passing out through the different holes in the case of them having only one form as they have, as wind. Thus, there is a difference in names viz. gods and others in the case of the Ātmans. In the case of objects that have become the parts of substances constituted of 'Tejas' [Light], 'Āp' [water], 'Pṛthivī' [earth], there is the oneness due to their being possessed of the nature alone of different substances and not the oneness of nature. Similarly the difference in form of the portions of windy substances cannot be avoided.

[57] In [the passage] 'He, I and He, you',—having referred to by the word 'Tat' [that] the form of Jñāna of all Ātmans mentioned before, [and] concluding that Jñāna alone is the form of entities like 'I', 'You'

देवाद्याकारभेदेनात्मसु भेदमोहं परित्यज, इत्याह। अन्यथा, देहाद्यतिरिक्तोपदेश्यस्वरूपे 'अहं त्वं सर्वमेतदात्मस्वरूपम्' इति भेदनिर्देशो न घटते। 'अहं' 'त्वम्—' आदिशब्दाना-मुपलक्ष्येण 'सर्वमेतदात्मस्वरूपम्' इत्यनेन सामानाधिकरण्यादुपलक्षणत्वमपि न संगच्छते। सोऽपि यथोपदेशमकरोत्, इत्याह—

'तत्याज भेदं परमार्थदृष्टिः' (वि. पु. २।१६।२४)

इति।

कुतश्चैष निर्णयः, इति चेत्—देहात्मविवेकविषयत्वादुपदेशस्य। तच्च—

'पिण्डः पृथग्यतः पुंसः शिरःपाण्यादिलक्षणः' (वि. पु. २।१३।८४)

इति प्रक्रमात्।

'विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने' इति च नात्मस्वरूपैक्यपरम्, नापि जीवपरयोः। आत्म-स्वरूपैक्यमुक्तरीत्या निषिद्धम्। जीवपरयोरपि स्वरूपैक्यं देहात्मनोरिव न संभवति। तथा च श्रुतिः—

'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीतीति॥' (मु. ३।१।१)

---

etc. owing to the case-co-ordination with 'that', he says 'Give up the infatuation about difference in the case of the Ātmans owing to the difference of forms of gods etc.'. Otherwise, regarding the nature of the Ātman to be taught as being over and above the body, the pointing out of the difference in the form 'I', 'You', 'all this', 'the nature of Ātman' would not stand to reason. In the case of the words 'I', 'You' etc. their pointing to some characteristic would not go well with the entity to be pointed out, on account of the case-co-ordination in the form 'All this is of the nature of Ātman'. And he also carried out the instruction as given—and so he says—

'He gave up the difference with the knowledge of the Reality'.
(V. P. 2·16·24)

If it be argued—Whence this conclusion ? [Our reply is]—On account of the instruction referring to the discrimination between body and Soul. And that is due to the introduction with [the passage]

'Because the body characterised by the head, hands etc, is different from the Puruṣa' (V. P. 2·13·84)

—and the passage 'Ignorance the producer of distinct difference' is not intent upon the oneness of the nature of Ātman, nor again [the oneness] of the individual Soul and the highest [Ātman]. The oneness of the nature of Ātman is denied in the manner aforesaid. The oneness regarding the nature of the individual Soul and the Highest also is not possible as in the case of the body and the Ātman. To the same effect are the Śruti passages and others—

'Two birds [with good feathers] together, friends, cling to the same tree; one of the two eats the sweet fruit of the Pippala, and not eating, another continues to look on'. (Mu. 3·1·1)

'ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।
छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः ॥' (का. ३।१)
'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानाम् ।' (तै. आ. ३।११)
'सर्वात्मा' (कै. १६)

इत्याद्याः । अस्मिन्नपि शास्त्रे—

'स सर्वभूतप्रकृतिं विकारं गुणादिदोषांश्च मुने व्यतीतः ।
अतीतसर्वावरणोऽखिलात्मा तेनास्तृतं यद्भुवनान्तराले ॥
समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकोऽसौ—' (वि. पु. ६।५।८३, ८४)
'परः पराणां सकला न यत्र क्लेशादयः सन्ति परावरेशे ॥' (वि. पु. ६।५।८५)
'अविद्याकर्मसंज्ञान्या तृतीया शक्तिरिष्यते ।
यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिः सा वेष्टिता नृप सर्वगा ॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।६१)

इति भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

'उभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते' (ब्र. सू. १।२।२१)
'भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः' (ब्र. सू. १।१।२२)
'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्' (ब्र. सू. २।१।२२)

इत्यादिसूत्रेषु च ।

'The two enjoying in the world, the fruit of their good deed, entering the cave in the transcendental, highest Half [and] shadow and light— say the Brahman-knowers, keepers of five fires and those who have kept the Triṇāciketa fire.' (Kā 3·1)

'Entered within, the Controller of the people' (Tait. Ā. 3·11)

'The Self of all' (Kai. 16)

Even in this Śāstra, on account of the reference to the difference [in the aforesaid passages]—

'He, gone beyond the nature of all beings, [O] sage, modifications and the blemishes like 'Guṇa' and others; He transcending all the veils, the Soul of everything, by Him what has been spread over in the worlds and in the mid-region, He is possessed of all auspicious qualities.' (V. P. 6·5·83–84)

'The Eminent of the eminents, in whom the Lord of the high and low are, not all ['Doṣas' like] affliction and others.' (V. P. 6·5·85)

'[And] another third power is intended, called Avidyā or Karman by which the all-pervading Kṣetrajña-power, O King, is enveloped.' (V. P. 6·7·61)

—and also in the following Sūtras—

'For, both also speak of this one as different.' (Br. Sū. 1 2·21)

'And he is different, on account of the reference to difference.' (Br. Sū. 1·1·22)

'But over and above, owing to the reference to the difference.' (Br. Sū. 2·1·22)

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरः। यमात्मा न वेद। यस्यात्मा शरीरम्। य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति।' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः।' (बृ. ४।३।२१)

'प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढः।' (बृ. ४।३।३५)

इत्यादिभिरुभयोरन्योन्यप्रत्यनीकाकारेण स्वरूपनिर्णयात्, नापि साधनानुष्ठाने निर्मुक्ताविद्यस्य परेण स्वरूपैक्यसंभवः, अविद्याश्रयत्वयोगस्य तदनर्हत्वासंभवात्। यथोक्तम्—

'परमात्मात्मनोर्योगः परमार्थ इतीष्यते।
मिथ्यैतदन्यद्द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतां यतः॥' (वि. पु. २।१४।२७)

इति। मुक्तस्य तु तद्धर्मतापत्तिरेवेति भगवद्गीतासूक्तम्—

'इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च॥' (गीता १४।२)

इति। इहापि—

'आत्मभावं नयत्येनं तद्ब्रह्म ध्यायिनं मुने।
विकार्यमात्मनः शक्त्या लोहमाकर्षको यथा॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।३०)

Nor again, is the possibility of oneness of nature with the Highest in the case of one free from Avidyā, by the practice of the means [of salvation], on account of the impossibility of being undeserving for it, in the case of one fit to be a resort of Avidyā and on account of the conclusion about the nature of both in forms mutually opposite in these passages—

'Who residing in the Ātman is different from the Ātman; Whom the Ātman knows not; Whose body is Ātman; Who controls the Ātman inside'. (Bṛ. 3·7·22)

'Completely united with the Intelligent Ātman'. (Bṛ. 4·3·21)

'Over-ridden by the Intelligent Ātman' (Bṛ. 4·3·35)

As has been said—

'The association of the Highest Ātman and Ātman is desired to be the reality. But this is false; for, a substance different from one cannot be possessed of the nature of that substance.' (V. P. 2·14·27)

As for a Released person, the attainment of only the attributes of that [Paramātman] is stated in the Bhagavad-Gītā—

'Having resorted to this knowledge and having attained to the nature of possessing the same attributes as mine, they are not born at [the time of] creation, nor are they afflicted at [the time of] dissolution'. (Gītā 14·2)

Here also,

'That Brahman, [O] Sage, by its own power leads this meditator fit for such a change, to its own nature, as the attracter [magnet] the iron [piece]'. (V. P. 6·7·30)

इति । 'आत्मभावम्' आत्मनः स्वभावम्, न ह्याकर्षकस्वरूपापत्तिराकृष्यमाणस्य । वक्ष्यति च—

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।१७)

'भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।२१)

'मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच्च' (ब्र. सू. १।३।२)

इति । वृत्तिरपि—

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जं समानो ज्योतिषा'

इति । द्रमिडभाष्यकारश्च— 'देवतासायुज्यादशरीरस्यापि देवतावत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिः स्यात्' इत्याह । श्रुतयश्च—

'य इहात्मानमनुविद्य व्रजन्त्येतांश्च सत्यान्कामान् तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति ।' (छा. ८।१।६)

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१।१)

'सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य ।
इमाँल्लोकान्कामान्नी कामरूप्यनुसंचरन् ।' (तै. ३।१०।५)

'स तत्र पर्येति' (छा. ८।१२।३)

'Ātmabhāva'—the nature of Ātman; surely, there is no attainment to the nature of the attracter [magnet] by the object being attracted. [The Sūtrakāra] would also be stating—

'*Barring the dealings with the world, on account of the context and on account of [their] being not near.*' (Br. Sū. 4·4·17)

'*And on account of the characteristic of the enjoyment alone being the same*'. (Br. Sū. 4·4·21)

'*On account of the reference to its being fit for being approached by the released*'. (Br. Sū. 1·3·2)

And the commentary [of Bodhāyana on the Sūtras] also—

'*Barring the dealings with the world, equal to the Light.*'

And the Dramiḍa Bhāṣyakāra [says]— 'On account of the conjoint nature with the deities, there would be the accomplishment of all desired objects, as in the case of deities, [in him] although not having a body'—And to the same effect are the following and other Sruti passages—

'*For those who here, having known the Ātman and having these desires fulfilled, go, there is movement at will of theirs in all the worlds.*' (Chā. 8·1·6)

'*The Brahman-knower secures the Highest.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*He enjoys all desires along with the wise Brahman.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*Having reached over to this Ātman full of bliss, moving about these worlds, enjoying food at will and assuming forms at will*'. (Tait. 3·10·5)

'*He goes there all over.*' (Chā. 8·12·3)

'रसो वै सः । रसꣳ ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति ।' (तै. २।७।१)

'यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥' (मु. ३।२।८)

'तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ।' (मु. ३।१।३)

इत्याद्याः ।

[58] **परविद्यासु सर्वासु सगुणमेव ब्रह्मोपास्यं फलं चैकरूपमेवातो विद्याविकल्पः, इति सूत्रकारेणैव—**

'आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य' (ब्र. सू. ३।३।११)

'विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात्' (ब्र. सू. ३।३।५७)

इत्यादिषूक्तम् । वाक्यकारेण च सगुणस्योपास्यत्वं विद्याविकल्पश्चोक्तः—'युक्तं तद्गुणकोपासनात् ।' इति । भाष्यकृता व्याख्यातं च 'यद्यपि सच्चित्तः' इत्यादिना ।

'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ।' (मु. ३।२।९)

इत्यत्रापि—

'He is the flavour; having secured indeed, the flavour, one becomes blissful'. (Tait. 2·7·1)

'As rivers trickling down disappear into the sea, giving up [their individual] names and forms; so, the wise one, completely freed from name and form, goes unto the shining Puruṣa—Higher than the high'. (Mu. 3·2·8)

'Then the wise one, having shaken off merit and demerit [and thus becoming] blotless, attains to the maximum equality.' (Mu. 3·1·3)

[58] By the Sūtrakāra himself has been stated in the Sūtras,

'Bliss and others, of the Pradhāna.' (Br. Sū. 3·3·11)

'There is option, on account of the non-difference in fruit'. (Br. Sū. 3·3·57)

and others, that in all higher Vidyās, Brahman possessed of qualities alone is to be worshipped and the fruit is uniform and so there is option about the Vidyās. By the Vākyakāra also has been stated that [there is] the nature of being fit for worship in the case of [Brahman] possessed of qualities, and the option regarding the Vidyās, in the statement—'That is proper on account of the worship of one possessing qualities'. By the Bhāṣyakāra [this] has been explained as well in the passage 'Although with the mind on Sat' and others. Even here [in the passage]

'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself'. (Mu. 3·2·9

—there, having the same sense as in the passage—

'नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम्' (मु. ३।२।८)
'निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति' (मु. ३।१।३)
'परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' (छा. ८।३।४)

इत्यादिभिरैकार्थ्यात्प्राकृतनामरूपाभ्यां विनिर्मुक्तस्य निरस्ततत्कृतभेदस्य ज्ञानैकाकारतया ब्रह्मप्रकारतोच्यते। प्रकारैक्ये च तत्त्वव्यवहारो मुख्य एव, यथा 'सोऽयं गौः' इति। अत्रापि—

'विज्ञानं प्रापकं प्राप्ये परे ब्रह्मणि पार्थिव।
प्रापणीयस्तथैवात्मा प्रक्षीणाशेषभावनः॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।९१)

इति परब्रह्मध्यानात्, आत्मा परब्रह्मवत् प्रक्षीणाशेषभावनः कर्मभावना-ब्रह्मभावना, उभयभावना, इति भावनात्रयरहितः प्रापणीयः, इत्यभिधाय,

'क्षेत्रज्ञः करणी ज्ञानं करणं तस्य वै द्विज।
निष्पाद्य मुक्तिकार्यं वै कृतकृत्यं निवर्तयेत्॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।९२)

इति करणस्य परब्रह्मध्यानरूपस्य प्रक्षीणाशेषभावानात्मस्वरूपप्राप्त्या कृतकृत्यत्वेन

'*Freed from name and form, [he] goes unto the shining Puruṣa higher than the high*'. (Mu. 3·2·8)

'*[Becoming] Blotless, [he] attains to the maximum equality*'. (Mu. 3·1·3)

Having gone over to the highest light, he comes out in his own form'. (Chā. 8·3·4)

there is stated, being the mode of Brahman on account of being possessed of the form of Jñāna alone, in the case of one who is completely freed from name and from belonging to the Prakṛti, [and] with the difference made by them brushed away. And in identity of the modes, the practical nature of the essence is the principal [factor]; as for instance—'That one [here] is a bull.' Here also [in the passage]—

'[O] *King, in respect of the Highest Brahman which is to be reached, Vijñāna leads on to it. And in the same way, the one to be secured is the Ātman with the entire 'Bhāvanās' decayed away*'. (V. P. 6·7·91)

—having mentioned that the Ātman with his entire 'Bhāvanās' decayed away as in the case of the Highest Brahman, bereft of the three Bhāvanās viz. 'Karmabhāvanā', 'Brahmabhāvanā', and 'Bhāvanā' of the two combined—is reached through the meditation upon the Highest Brahman.

'*The Kṣetrajñā is the user of the means; knowledge, verily, is his means, O twice-born one; having effected, verily, the purpose viz. release, he should turn off [the knowledge] the purpose of what has been accomplished.*' (V. P. 6·7·92)

—Having said that owing to the statement about the cessation of the means of the form of the meditation on the Highest Brahman, on account of the person having his work accomplished by attaining to the nature of Ātman

निवृत्तिवचनात्, यावत्सिद्ध्यनुष्ठेयमित्युक्त्वा,

*'तद्भावभावमापन्नस्तदासौ परमात्मना ।
भवत्यभेदी भेदश्च तस्याज्ञानकृतो भवेत् ॥'* (वि. पु. ६।७।९३)

इति मुक्तस्य स्वरूपमाह । 'तद्भावः' ब्रह्मणो भावः स्वभावः न स्वरूपैक्यम्, 'तद्भावभावमापन्नः' इति द्वितीय'भाव'शब्दानन्वयात्, पूर्वोक्तार्थविरोधाच्च । यद्ब्रह्मणः प्रक्षीणाशेषभावनत्वम्, तदापत्तिस्तद्भावभावापत्तिः । यदैवमापन्नस्तदायं परमात्मनाभेदी भवति, भेदरहितो भवति । ज्ञानैकाकारतया परमात्मनैकप्रकारस्यास्य तस्माद्भेदो देवादिरूपः । तदन्वयोऽस्य कर्मरूपाज्ञानमूलो, न स्वरूपकृतः । स तु देवादिभेदः परब्रह्मध्यानेन मूलभूताज्ञानरूपे कर्मणि विनष्टे हेत्वभावान्निवर्तते, इत्यभेदी भवति । यथोक्तम्—

*'एकस्वरूपभेदस्तु बाह्यकर्मप्रवृत्तिजः ।
देवादिभेदे विध्वस्ते नास्त्यनावरणो हि सः ॥'* (वि. पु. २।१४।३३)

इति । एतदेव विवृणोति—

---

with the entire 'Bhāvanās' decayed away, that one should carry on till the accomplishment of the purpose—he speaks of the nature of the released [soul] in the passage—

'*Attaining to the nature of possessing His nature, then he becomes non-different from the highest Ātman; and the difference from that would be due to 'Ajñāna'*. (V. P. 6·7·93)

'Tadbhāva—' nature of Brahman [is its] own unique nature, not the identity of one's own nature, on account of the absence of the proper construing with the second 'Bhāva' word in [the expression] 'Tadbhāvabhāvamāpannaḥ', and on account of the contradiction with the sense of what has been mentioned before. That what is the nature of possessing the entire 'Bhāvanās' decayed away belonging to Brahman ; attainment to that [is] the attainment to the nature of being possessed of that nature. When [this one] has thus attained to this [condition], then this one becomes non-different from the 'Paramātman', becomes bereft of difference. Of him who is just one mode of the highest Ātman being possessed of the form of 'Jñāna', there is the difference from Him, in the form of gods etc. That association with that is rooted in 'Ajñāna' in the form of 'Karman', not effected by one's own nature. But that difference, gods etc. when the 'Karman' having the form of ignorance, which has been the root, has completely disappeared, owing to the meditation upon the Highest Brahman, turns away on account of the absence of any cause—thus he becomes non-different [from the Highest Brahman]. As has been stated—

'*But the difference from being one by nature [is] produced by the activity of external Karman; that exists not when the difference gods etc. is completely devastated, for he [is] without any veil*'. (V. P. 2·14·33)

This same he clarifies [thus]—

'विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते ।
आत्मनो ब्रह्मणो भेदमसन्तं कः करिष्यति ॥' (वि. पु. ६।७।९४)

इति । विविधो भेदो 'विभेदः' देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यस्थावरात्मकः । यथोक्तं शौनकेनापि—

'चतुर्विधो विभेदोऽयं मिथ्याज्ञाननिबन्धनः ।'

इति । आत्मनि ज्ञानस्वरूपे देवादिरूपविविधभेदहेतुभूतकर्माख्याज्ञाने परब्रह्मध्यानेनात्यन्तिकं नाशं गते सति, हेत्वभावात्, असन्तं परस्माद्ब्रह्मण आत्मनो देवादिरूपं भेदं कः करिष्यति ?—इत्यर्थः ।

'अविद्याकर्मसंज्ञान्या' (वि. पु. ६।७।६१)

इत्यत्रैवोक्तम् ।

'क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि' (गीता १३।२)

इत्यादिना, अन्तर्यामिरूपेण सर्वस्यात्मतयैक्यविधानम् ।
अन्यथा—

'क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः' (गीता १५।१६)

इत्यादिभिर्विरोधः । अन्तर्यामिरूपेण सर्वेषामात्मत्वं तत्रैव भगवताभिहितम् ।

'When Ajñāna, the producer of distinct differences has completely come to nought, who would make the non-existing difference between Ātman and Brahman?' (V. P. 6·7·94)

Difference of various kinds—'Vibheda' is constituted of gods, lower animals, human beings and inanimate things. As has been stated by Śaunaka also—

'This four-fold distinct difference is tied on to false knowledge'.

Who would do the non-existent difference in the forms of gods etc. from the Highest Brahman, of Ātman, as there is no cause for the same, when 'Ajñāna' called 'Karman' which has become the cause of various differences in the form of gods etc. in respect of the Ātman having the nature of 'Jñāna', has been completely demolished for ever, by the meditation upon the Highest Brahman—this [is] the sense. It has been stated here itself—

'There is another [power of Viṣṇu] named Avidyā and Karman'. (V. P. 6·7·61)

In [the passage],

'Know me to be Kṣetrajña as well' (Gītā 13·2)

there is the declaration of the oneness due to [his] being the Ātman of all in the form of the Inner Controller. Otherwise, there would be contradiction with this and other passages—

'The Kṣara is all the beings, and the Immutable is called the Imperishable [akṣara], while the Highest Puruṣa is another, [different from these]'. (Gītā 15·16)

And there itself has been declared by the Lord the nature of Ātman of all, in the form of an Inner Controller—

'ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।' (गीता १८।६१)

'सर्वस्य चाहं हृदि संनिविष्टः ।' (गीता १५।१५)

इति च ।

'अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ।' (गीता १०।२०)

इति च तदेवोच्यते । 'भूत 'शब्दो ह्यात्मपर्यन्तदेहवचनः । यतः सर्वेषामयमात्मा, तत एव सर्वेषां तच्छरीरतया पृथगवस्थानं प्रतिषिध्यते—

'न तदस्ति विना यत्स्यात् ।' (गीता १०।३९)

इति । भगवद्विभूत्यपसंहारश्चायम्, इति तथैवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तत इदमुच्यते—

'यद्यद्विभूतिमत्सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा ।
तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोंऽशसंभवम् ॥' (गीता १०।४१)

'विष्टभ्याहमिदं कृत्स्नमेकांशेन स्थितो जगत् ।' (गीता १०।४२)

इति । अतः शास्त्रेषु न निर्विशेषवस्तुप्रतिपादनमस्ति, नाप्यर्थजातस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रतिपादनम्, नापि चिदचिदीश्वराणां स्वरूपभेदनिषेधः ।

[59] यदप्युच्यते—निर्विशेषे स्वयंप्रकाशे वस्तुनि दोषपरिकल्पितम्,

---

'The Lord stays, [O] Arjuna, in the heart-region of all beings'. (Gītā 18·61)

'And I am well stationed in the heart of all'. (Gītā 15·15)

And in the passage,

'I am the Self, [O] Guḍākeśa, stationed in the heart of all beings'. (Gītā 10·20)

the same thing has been stated. For the word 'Bhūta' refers to the body extending [right up] to the soul. Inasmuch as this one is the Ātman of all, for that very reason is denied his separate habitat, on account of all being his body in the expression,

'There does not exist that [being] which can exist without [me]' (Gītā 10·39)

This passage being the winding up of the manifestations of the Lord, the same thing is to be understood [as well from this]. So this is said—

'Whatever being is there possessed of distinctive glory, possessed of splendour, [or which is] quite eminent,—know, you, all that to be arising out of the portion of my lustre'. (Gītā 10·41)

'Having encompassed this entire world by a portion, I stay on'. (Gītā 10·42)

Therefore, there is no propounding of a distinctionless thing in the Śāstras, nor again propounding of the concourse of objects being false, nor again the denial of the difference in nature of the sentient 'Cit', non-sentient 'acit' and the Lord.

[59] As to what has been said [by our opponents]—On the distinctionless self-illumining thing [Brahman], is superimposed through

ईश्वरेशितव्याद्यनन्तविकल्पं सर्वं जगत्। दोषश्च स्वरूपतिरोधानविविधविचित्रविक्षेपकरी सदसदनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्या। सा चावश्यमभ्युपगमनीया,

'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः।' (छा. ८।३।२)

इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिः, ब्रह्मणः 'तत्त्वमसि'आदिवाक्यसामानाधिकरण्यावगतजीवैक्यानुपपत्त्या च। सा तु न सती, भ्रान्तिबाधयोरयोगात्। नापि, असती, ख्यातिबाधयोश्चायोगात्। अतः कोटिद्वयविनिर्मुक्तेयमविद्या, इति तत्त्वविदः—इति—

तदयुक्तम्। सा हि किमाश्रित्य भ्रमं जनयति, इति वक्तव्यम्। न तावज्जीवमाश्रित्य, अविद्यापरिकल्पितत्वाज्जीवभावस्य। नापि ब्रह्माश्रित्य, तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानरूपत्वेनाविद्याविरोधित्वात्। सा हि ज्ञानबाध्याभिमता।

'ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म तन्निवर्त्यं मृषात्मकम्।
अज्ञानं चेत्तिरस्कुर्यात्कः प्रभुस्तन्निवर्तने॥
ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति चेज्ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्।
ब्रह्मवत्तत्प्रकाशत्वात्तदपि ह्यनिवर्तकम्॥

---

error, the entire world full of endless varied conceptions like the controller and the controlled etc. and the blemish [is] beginningless 'Avidyā' that cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, [and] which causes the screening of the nature and different variegated projections. And that 'Avidyā' has got to be necessarily admitted [on the strength] of such Śruti passages—

By falsehood, indeed, are they drawn away [from Brahman]'. (Chā. 8·3·2)

and others, and on account of the impropriety of the oneness of the individual soul with Brahman, known from the case-co-ordination in passages like 'That thou art'. That Avidyā, however, is not existent, on account of the non-association with delusion and stultification, nor again is that [Avidyā] non-existent on account of the non-association with knowledge [apprehension] and stultification. Therefore, this Avidyā is free from the above two ends [alternatives]— Thus say the philosophers—

That is improper. Resorting to what does it produce delusion?—This ought to be stated [by you]. Not for the matter of that, by resorting to the individual Soul, on account of the nature of the individual Soul being superimposed by Avidyā. Nor again, resorting to Brahman on account of its being opposed to Avidyā due to its having the form of self-illumining Jñāna. That [Avidyā] indeed is admitted to be stultified by Jñāna—

'The Highest Brahman is of the form of Jñāna; whatever is fit to be turned away by that [Jñāna] is of a false nature. If Ajñāna were to screen [Brahman]— who is competent in respect of driving that away?'

'If the knowledge—that Brahman is Jñāna—is the remover of Ajñāna, that too, indeed, cannot be the remover, like Brahman, on account of its illumining that'.

ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानमस्ति चेत्स्यात्प्रमेयता ।
ब्रह्मणोऽननुभूतित्वं त्वदुक्त्यैव प्रसज्यते ॥ '   (नाथमुनिसूक्तयः)

ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानं तस्या अविद्याया बाधकम्, न स्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानम्— इति चेत्— न, उभयोरपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रकाशत्वे सति, अन्यतरस्य विरोधित्वम्, अन्यतरस्य नेति विशेषानवगमात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—' ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म ' इत्यनेन ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मणि यः स्वभावोऽवगम्यते स ब्रह्मणः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन स्वयमेव प्रकाशते, इत्यविद्याविरोधित्वे न कश्चिद्विशेषः स्वरूपतद्विषयज्ञानयोः — इति ।

किं च, अनुभवरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनुभवान्तराननुभाव्यत्वेन भवतो न तद्विषयं ज्ञानमस्ति । अतो ज्ञानम्, अज्ञानविरोधि चेत्, स्वयमेव विरोधि भवति, इति नास्या ब्रह्माश्रयत्वसंभवः । शुक्त्यादयस्तु स्वयाथात्म्यप्रकाशे स्वयमसमर्थाः स्वाज्ञानाविरोधिनस्तन्निवर्तने ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षन्ते । ब्रह्म तु स्वानुभवसिद्धस्वयाथात्म्यम्, इति स्वाज्ञानविरोध्येव । तत एव च निवर्तकान्तरं नापेक्षते ।

'If 'Jñāna is Brahman' is a 'Vijñāna' [special type of knowledge], then there would be the nature of being the object of knowledge [in respect of Brahman]. By your own statement this Brahman being non-experienced,—this would be the undesirable result'.

(Utterances of Nātha Muni)

If it be contended—The knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of Jñāna is the stultifier of that Avidyā and not the knowledge which is its own nature, [our reply is]—'No'. When there is the nature of illumining the nature of Brahman in the case of both, there cannot be the non-apprehension of the distinction viz. the nature being opposed in the case of one and not in the case of the other. That is what is intended to be said—What nature in [respect of] Brahman is apprehended by this knowledge viz. Brahman has Jñāna as its own nature, that shines forth of its own accord, owing to Brahman being self-illumining and so there is no distinction between the nature and the knowledge regarding it, in the matter of being the opponents of Avidyā.

And further, on account of Brahman of the form of 'experience' being apprehended by another experience, there cannot be any knowledge regarding that for your honoured self. Therefore, if it were argued that knowledge is contradictory to Ajñāna, [the reply is]—That becomes opposed of its own accord and so there is no possibility of its having Brahman as the resort. The conch-shell and others, however, being unable to illumine their real nature of their own accord and not opposed to their own Ajñāna stand in need of another knowledge to turn it away. Brahman, on the other hand, is certainly opposed to its own Ajñāna, because it has its real nature established by its own experience. And for that very reason it does not stand in need of another remover.

[60] अथोच्येत — ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वज्ञानमविरोधि — इति — न। इदं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तमिथ्यात्वज्ञानं किं ब्रह्मयाथात्म्याज्ञानविरोधि, उत प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वरूपाज्ञानविरोधि, इति विवेचनीयम्। न तावत्, ब्रह्मयाथात्म्याज्ञानविरोधि, अतद्विषयत्वात्। ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरेकविषयत्वेन हि विरोधः। प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञानं च तत्सत्यत्वरूपाज्ञानेन विरुध्यते। तेन प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वरूपाज्ञानमेव बाधितम्, इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपाज्ञानं तिष्ठत्येव। ब्रह्मरूपाज्ञानं नाम तस्य सद्वितीयत्वज्ञानमेव। तत्तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वज्ञानेन निवृत्तम्।

स्वरूपं तु स्वानुभवसिद्धम् — इति चेत् — न, ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वं स्वरूपं स्वानुभवसिद्धमिति तद्विरोधि सद्वितीयत्वरूपाज्ञानं तद्बाधश्च न स्याताम्।

अद्वितीयत्वं धर्मः — इति चेत् — न, अनुभवस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनुभाव्यधर्मविरहस्य भवतैवोपपादितत्वात्। अतो ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणो विरोधादेव नाज्ञानाश्रयत्वम्।

[**60**] Now if it be argued— The knowledge about the false nature of things other than Brahman is opposed of Ajñāna', [our reply is]—' No '; this has got to be scrutinised— Is this knowledge about the false nature of things other than Brahman opposed to the Ajñāna regarding the real nature of Brahman? Or else opposed to the Ajñāna of the form of the reality of worldly existence? Not for the matter of that, [it is] opposed to the Ajñāna regarding the real nature of Brahman on account of its being not concerned with it. For, there should be opposition between knowledge and Ajñāna on account of their being concerned with one [and the same] object. And the knowledge regarding the false nature of worldly existence is opposed to the Ajñāna of the form of its having the real nature. So, by that is stultified the Ajñāna itself of the form of worldly existence having the real nature, and so the Ajñāna regarding the nature of Brahman does remain. The Ajñāna regarding the nature of Brahman indeed, is nothing but the knowledge of its being with a second. But that has disappeared owing to the knowledge about the false nature of things other than that [Brahman].

If it were argued— But the nature [of Brahman] is established by its own experience—[our reply is] —' No '; [for in that case] the nature of Brahman as being without a second is proved by self-experience ; hence there cannot be Ajñāna in the form of Brahman being with a second, opposed to it and its stultification.

If it were argued—Being without a second [would be] an attribute— [our reply is]—No, on account of Brahman having experience as its nature being expounded, verily, by your honour, as bereft of the attribute being fit to be experienced. Therefore, there cannot be the nature of being the resort of Ajñāna in respect of Brahman having Jñāna as its nature, on account of the opposition itself.

किं च, अविद्यया प्रकाशैकस्वरूपं ब्रह्म तिरोहितम्, इति वदता स्वरूपनाश एवोक्तः स्यात् । प्रकाशतिरोधानं नाम प्रकाशोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धः, विद्यमानस्य विनाशः, वा । प्रकाशस्यानुत्पाद्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन प्रकाशतिरोधानं प्रकाशनाशं एव ।

अपि च, निर्विषया निराश्रया स्वप्रकाशा, इयमनुभूतिः स्वाश्रयदोषवशादनन्ताश्रयमनन्तविषयमात्मानमनुभवति, इत्यत्र किमयं स्वाश्रयदोषः परमार्थभूतः, उत अपरमार्थभूतः इति विवेचनीयम् । न तावत्परमार्थः, अनभ्युपगमात् । नापि अपरमार्थः । तथा सति द्रष्टृत्वेन वा दृश्यत्वेन वा दृशित्वेन वा, अभ्युपगमनीयः । न तावद्दृशिः, दृशिस्वरूपभेदानभ्युपगमात्, भ्रमाधिष्ठानभूतायास्तु साक्षाद्दृशेर्माध्यमिकपक्षप्रसङ्गेनापारमार्थ्यानभ्युपगमाच्च । द्रष्टृदृश्ययोस्तदवच्छिन्नाया दृशेश्च काल्पनिकत्वेन मूलदोषान्तरापेक्षयानवस्था स्यात् ।

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया, परमार्थसत्यनुभूतिरेव ब्रह्मस्वरूपा दोषः-इति चेत्— ब्रह्मैव चेद्दोषः प्रपञ्चदर्शनस्यैव तन्मूलं स्यात्, किं प्रपञ्चतुल्याविद्यान्तरकल्पनेन ? ब्रह्मणो दोषत्वे सति तस्य नित्यत्वेनानिर्मोक्षश्च स्यात् । अतो यावद्ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तपार-

---

And further, while declaring that Brahman having a uniform illumining nature is screened by Avidyā, would [in effect] be declared the destruction of its own nature itself. The screening of light means an impediment to the origination of light, or the destruction of the existing [light]. Because of the admission of light not capable of being produced, the screening of light is but the destruction of light.

And further, this objectless, resortless and self-illumining 'Anubhūti' experiences through the blemish in its resort, the Ātman of endless resort, [and] endless objects—In respect of this, it has got to be scrutinised—'Is this blemish in one's resort real or unreal ?' Not for the matter of that, real, on account of its non-admission ; nor again, is it unreal, for in that case it has got to be understood as either having the nature of the perceiver, or having the nature of the perceived, or, having the nature of perception. Not for the matter of that, perception; on account of the non-admission of differences in the nature of perception, and on account of the non-admission of the non-real nature of actual perception, that has nevertheless become the basis of illusion, and on account of this [being tantamount to] undesirable result of siding with the Mādhyamikas [Nihilist Buddhists]. In the case of the perceiver and the perceived and the perception limited by them, being imagined, there would be [the fault of] endlessness owing to their standing in need of a blemish other than the basic one.

Now if, with a desire to avoid this blemish, it be argued— The 'Anubhūti' itself having the nature of Brahman, [and] existing in reality is the blemish,— [Our reply is]— If Brahman itself were the blemish, it would be the root [cause] verily, of the perception of worldly existence, what [then] is the use of imagining another Avidyā equal to worldly existence ? If Brahman were to be the blemish, there would be, in addition, absence of salvation,

मार्थिकदोषानभ्युपगमः, तावद्भ्रान्तिरुपपादिता भवति।

अनिर्वचनीयत्वं च किमभिप्रेतम्? सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्—इति चेत्—तथाविधस्य वस्तुनः प्रमाणशून्यत्वेनानिर्वचनीयतैव स्यात्। एतदुक्तं भवति— सर्वं हि वस्तुजातं प्रतीतिव्यवस्थाप्यम्। सर्वा च प्रतीतिः सदसदाकारा। सदसदाकारायाः प्रतीतेः सदसद्विलक्षणं विषय इत्यभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वं सर्वप्रतीतेर्विषयः स्यात्— इति।

[61] अथ स्यात्— वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधानकरम्, आन्तरबाह्यरूपविविधाध्यासोपादानम्, सदसदनिर्वचनीयम्, अविद्या–अज्ञानादिपदवाच्यम्, वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञाननिवर्त्यम्, ज्ञानप्रागभावातिरेकेण भावरूपम् एव किञ्चिद्वस्तु प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां प्रतीयते। तदुपहितब्रह्मोपादानः, च— अविकारे स्वप्रकाशाचिन्मात्रवपुषि, तेनैव तिरोहितस्वरूपे प्रत्यगात्मनि, अहंकारज्ञानज्ञेयविभागरूपोऽध्यासः। तस्यैव, अवस्थाविशेषेणाध्यासरूपे जगति ज्ञानबाध्यसर्परजतादिवस्तुतज्ज्ञानरूपोऽध्यासोऽपि जायते। कृत्स्नस्य मिथ्यारूपस्य तदुपादानत्वं च

---

owing to its being eternal. Therefore, so long as there is non-admission of a real blemish over and above Brahman, delusion would not be well accounted for.

What is intended [by saying] 'being indefinable'? If it were argued—[It is] 'being different from existent or non-existent', [our reply is]—That sort of thing would be indefinable itself owing to its being beyond the ken of means of proof. This is what is intended to be said— The whole concord of objects becomes, indeed, fit to be established in conformity with apprehension, and all apprehensions have the form, existent or non-existent. In admitting the apprehension, having the form, existent or non-existent, has for its province [an object] different from existent or non-existent— everything would be the object of every apprehension.

[**61**] If it were [said]—There is apprehended by Direct Perception and Inference, something having the form of a positive entity over and above the antecedent negation of knowledge, effecting the screening of the nature of an object, the material cause of different superimpositions of outward and inward forms, indefinable either as existent or non-existent, denoted by the word 'Avidyā', 'Ajñāna' etc., fit to be turned away by the knowledge of the object as it is. And there is the superimposition having the form involving division into 'Ahaṁkāra', the knowledge and object of knowledge, with Brahman superimposed by it as the producing cause, on unmodified the inmost Ātman [and] having the nature of its form self-illumining and mere 'Cit' nature screened by itself. In respect of the world made up of superimposition of that same, on account of a particular condition there is also produced the superimposition of that same, of the form of things—the serpent, silver etc. capable of being stultified by the knowledge, and the knowledge thereof: and that [Adhyāsa] being the material cause of all things that are unreal, is comprehended from the syllogistic-logical mark, viz., 'of a thing that is false, the cause also, is, verily, false.' The Direct Perception referring to the root–Ajñāna, for the matter of that, is the flashing forth in the form 'I am

मिथ्याभूतस्यार्थस्य मिथ्याभूतमेव कारणं भवितुमर्हति, इति हेतुबलादवगम्यते। कारणाज्ञानविषयं प्रत्यक्षं तावत् 'अहमज्ञो, मामन्यं च न जानामि' इत्यपरोक्षावभासः। अयं तु न ज्ञानप्रागभावविषयः। स हि षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरः। अयं तु 'अहं सुखी' इतिवदपरोक्षः। अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि, अयमनुभवो नात्मनि ज्ञानाभावविषयः, अनुभववेलायामपि ज्ञानस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, अविद्यमानत्वे ज्ञानाभावप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेश्च।

एतदुक्तं भवति— 'अहमज्ञः' इत्यस्मिन्ननुभवे, 'अहम्' इत्यात्मनोऽभावधर्मितया ज्ञानस्य च प्रतियोगितयावगतिरस्ति वा न वा?। अस्ति चेत्— विरोधादेव न ज्ञानाभावानुभवसंभवः। नो चेत्, धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षो ज्ञानाभावानुभवः सुतरां न संभवति। ज्ञानाभावस्यानुमेयत्वेऽभावाख्यप्रमाणविषयत्वे च, इयमनुपपत्तिः समाना। अस्याज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे, धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानसद्भावेऽपि विरोधाभावात्, अयमनुभवो भावरूपाज्ञानविषय एवाभ्युपगन्तव्यः— इति।

ननु च— भावरूपमज्ञानं वस्तुयाथात्म्यावभासरूपेण साक्षिचैतन्येन विरुध्यते।

---

ignorant', 'I know not myself and another as well.' This, however, has not, for its province the antecedent negation of knowledge, for, that is within the ken of the sixth means of proof [Non-perception]. This, however, is direct like 'I [am] happy'. Even though negation is admitted to have the nature of direct perception, this experience has no reference to the negation of knowledge in the Ātman, on account of the existence of knowledge even at the time of [such] experience, and on account of the impossibility of apprehension of the negation of knowledge, in the case of its not being existent.

This is what is intended to be said— In this experience— 'I am ignorant', is there the apprehension in the form 'I' or not, on account of the Ātman being possessed of the attribute of negation and on account of its being the counter-entity of knowledge? If there is [the apprehension], there is no possibility of the experience of the negation of knowledge, from the contradiction itself; if not, of the experience of the negation of knowledge, standing in need of the knowledge of the counter-entity of the object possessed of attributes, there is certainly no possibility by far. In case the negation of knowledge is regarded as fit to be inferred and as the province of the means of proof named 'Abhāva', this impossibility remains the same. Even if this Ajñāna has the form of a positive entity, this experience, on account of the absence of contradiction even though there is the existence of knowledge, of the counter-entity of the object possessed of attributes, has definitely got to be admitted as the object of 'Ajñāna' possessing the form of a positive entity.

Further, I say [says the objector]— The Ajñāna having the nature of the positive entity is contradicted by the Witness-sentiency having the form of the shining forth of the nature of the object as it is.

मैवम् । साक्षिचैतन्यं न वस्तुयाथात्म्यविषयम्, अपि त्वज्ञानविषयम्, अन्यथा मिथ्यार्थावभासानुपपत्तेः । न ह्यज्ञानविषयेण ज्ञानेनाज्ञानं निवर्त्यते, इति न विरोधः ।

ननु चेदं भावरूपमप्यज्ञानं विषयविशेषव्यावृत्तमेव साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषयो भवति । स विषयः प्रमाणाधीनसिद्धिः, इति कथमिव साक्षिचैतन्येनास्मदर्थव्यावृत्तमज्ञानं विषयीक्रियते ?

नैष दोषः । सर्वमेव वस्तुजातं ज्ञाततयाज्ञाततया वा साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषयभूतम् । तत्र जडत्वेन ज्ञानतया सिध्यत एव प्रमाणव्यवधानापेक्षा । अजडस्य तु प्रत्यग्वस्तुनः स्वयं सिध्यतो न प्रमाणव्यवधानापेक्षा, इति सदैवाज्ञानव्यावर्तकत्वेनावभासो युज्यते । तस्मान्न्यायोपबृंहितेन प्रत्यक्षेण भावरूपमेवाज्ञानं प्रतीयते । तदिदं भावरूपमज्ञानमनुमानेनापि सिध्यति—

विवादाध्यासितं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभाव-
व्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेश-
गतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम् ।
अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्,
अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत्—

इति ।

[The reply is]— No, not so. The Witness-sentiency has not for its province, the nature of the object as it is, but has for its province Ajñāna; otherwise, there would be the impossibility of the shining forth of the false objects. Not indeed, is Ajñāna removed by knowledge that has Ajñāna for its province— And so [there is] no contradiction.

Further, I say,— This Ajñāna although possessed of the nature of a positive entity, becomes the object of the Witness-sentiency, only when divorced from particular objects ; and as that object has its establishment dependent upon the means of proof, how possibly can the Ajñāna divorced from ' I-entity ' be made the object by the ' Witness-sentiency ' ?

[The reply is]— This [is] no fault. The entire concourse of the objects, for the matter of that, is the object of the Witness-sentiency, either as being known or as being unknown. There is the need for an intervening means of proof, owing to the non-sentient nature, for the establishment itself of the object as knowledge. But in the case of the sentient inner thing there is no need of the intervening means of proof—self-established and so the shining forth owing to its nature of turning away Ajñāna always, is proper. Therefore, the Ajñāna having the nature of positive entity alone is apprehended by Direct Perception amplified by logical reasoning. And so, this Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity is established by Inference also as follows—

The knowledge by the means of proof, which is the subject of discussion is preceded by another object distinct from its own antecedent negation, the enveloper of its object, capable of being turned away by itself, and lying within its own region.

On account of its possessing the nature of illumining the objects that are not illumined

Like the light of a lamp rising up for the first time in darkness.

आलोकाभावमात्रं रूपदर्शनाभावमात्रं वा तमो न द्रव्यम्। तत्कथं भावरूपाज्ञानसाधने निदर्शनतयोपन्यस्यते ?— इति चेत्— उच्यते। बहुत्वविरलत्वाद्यवस्थायोगेन रूपवत्तया चोपलब्धेर्द्रव्यान्तरमेव तम इति निरवद्यम्— इति।

[62] अत्रोच्यते— 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामि' इत्यत्रोपपत्तिसहितेन केवलेन च प्रत्यक्षेण न भावरूपमज्ञानं प्रतीयते। यस्तु ज्ञानप्रागभावविषये विरोध उक्तः, स हि भावरूपाज्ञानेऽपि तुल्यः। विषयत्वेनाश्रयत्वेन च, अज्ञानस्य व्यावर्तकतया प्रत्यगर्थः प्रतिपन्नोऽप्रतिपन्नो वा ? प्रतिपन्नश्चेत्— तत्स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यं तदज्ञानं तस्मिन्प्रतिपन्ने कथमिव तिष्ठति ? अप्रतिपन्नश्चेत्, व्यावर्तकाश्रयविषयशून्यमज्ञानं कथमनुभूयेत ?

अथ— विशदस्वरूपावभासोऽज्ञानविरोधी, अविशदस्वरूपं तु प्रतीयते, इति, आश्रयविषयज्ञाने सत्यपि नाज्ञानानुभवविरोधः — इति,

हन्त, तर्हि ज्ञानप्रागभावोऽपि विशदस्वरूपविषयः, आश्रयप्रतियोगिज्ञानं त्वविशद-

---

If it be contended— Darkness which is merely the absence of light [sight] or merely the absence of colour etc., is not [itself] a substance; how can it be then put forward as being an illustration in proving the Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity? [The following] is [to be] stated [as a reply]— It is an unexceptionable [proposition] that darkness is definitely a distinct substance owing to its being found as being associated with conditions— density, thinness etc. and being possessed of colour.

[62] Here it is stated [by way of reply]—In respect of 'I am ignorant', 'I do not know myself and another',— here is not apprehended the Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity, by mere perception backed by reasoning. As to the contradicion stated in the case of the antecedent negation of knowledge, that indeed equally holds good even in [respect of] the Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity. On account of its nature of turning away Ajñāna by being the object and the resort—[the question is], is the inmost entity apprehended or not? If it is apprehended, how possibly can that Ajñāna which is fit to be turned away by the knowledge of the nature of that, remain [unaffected] when that is apprehended? If not apprehended, how can the Ajñāna devoid of a distinguishing resort and object be experienced?

If it be argued that the shining forth of a distinct nature, is opposed to Ajñāna, but [what] is apprehended [is] the indistinct nature and so, even though there be the knowledge of the resort and the object, there would not be contradiction with the experience of Ajñāna, [the reply is]—

O goodness! Then the antecedent negation of knowledge also has a distinct nature for its object, but the knowledge of the counter-entity of the

स्वरूपविषयम्, इति न कश्चिद्विशेषः, अन्यत्राभिनिवेशात्। भावरूपस्याज्ञानस्यापि ह्यज्ञानमिति सिध्यतः प्रागभावसिद्धाविव सापेक्षत्वमस्त्येव। तथाहि— 'अज्ञानम्', इति ज्ञानाभावः, तदन्यः, तद्विरोधि वा। त्रयाणामपि तत्स्वरूपज्ञानापेक्षा, अवश्याश्रयणीया। यद्यपि तमःस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तौ प्रकाशापेक्षा न विद्यते, तथापि प्रकाशविरोधि, इत्यनेनाकारेण प्रतिपत्तौ प्रकाशप्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षास्त्येव। भवदभिमताज्ञानं न कदाचित्स्वरूपेण सिध्यति, अपि त्वज्ञानम्, इत्येव। तथा सति ज्ञानभाववत्तदपेक्षत्वं समानम्। ज्ञानप्रागभावस्तु भवताप्यभ्युपगम्यते प्रतीयते च, इत्युभयाभ्युपेतो ज्ञानप्रागभाव एव 'अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामि' इत्यनुभूयते, इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशचैतन्यैकस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवश्च न संभवति, स्वानुभवस्वरूपत्वात्।

स्वानुभवस्वरूपमपि तिरोहितस्वस्वरूपमज्ञानमनुभवति— इति चेत्— किमिदं 'तिरोहितस्वस्वरूपत्वम्? 'अप्रकाशितस्वरूपत्वम्? इति चेत्,— स्वानुभवस्वरूपस्य कथम् 'अप्रकाशितस्वरूपत्वम्'?

स्वानुभवस्वरूपस्याप्यन्यतोऽप्रकाशितस्वरूपत्वमापद्यते—इति चेत्— एवं तर्हि,

---

resort has an indistinct nature for its object,—and so there is no distinction whatsoever, except your obsession for the other [point of view]. For, in respect of Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity while being established as Ajñāna, there is indeed the expectancy as in the establishment of the antecedent negation. To explain the same—By the [expression] 'Ajñāna' [is meant] negation of knowledge, of [something] other than it, or the contradiction of it. Even in the case of [all] the three [alternatives], the need of the knowledge of its nature has got to be resorted to. Even if there is no need for light in the apprehension of the nature of darkness, still, there does remain the need for the light, in the apprehension in the form 'that is opposed to light'. The Ajñāna [highly] esteemed by your honour can never be established with its nature, but [it can be established] only as Ajñāna. In that case, as in the case of the nature of knowledge, being dependent upon that is the same. The antecedent negation of knowledge, however, is admitted even by your honour and apprehended as well—and so the antecedent negation itself of knowledge admitted by both of us, is experienced as 'I am ignorant', 'I do not know myself and another'—this should be admitted.

And further, in the case of Brahman, eternal, free, self-illumining, having the uniform nature of sentiency, the experience of Ajñāna is not possible, on account of its having the nature of self-experience.

If it be contended— [Brahman] although having the nature of self-experience, with its nature screened, experiences Ajñāna, [we ask]—What is this 'having one's own nature screened?' If it is 'having an unillumined nature,' how can there be 'having an unillumined nature', in the case of one having the nature of self-experience? If it were argued— Even in the case of one having the nature of self-experience, there would be the necessary result of 'having the unillumined nature' from another— Well, then, in that case, it has been

प्रकाशाख्यधर्मानभ्युपगमेन प्रकाशस्यैव स्वरूपत्वात्, अन्यतः स्वरूपनाश एव स्यात्, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम्। किं च, ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरोधानहेतुभूतमेतत्, अज्ञानं स्वयमनुभूतं सत्, ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, तिरस्कृत्य स्वयं तदनुभवविषयो भवति, इत्यन्योन्याश्रयणम्।

अनुभूतमेव तिरस्करोति— इति चेत्— यदि, अतिरोहितस्वरूपमेव ब्रह्म, अज्ञानमनुभवति, इति तिरोधानकल्पना निष्प्रयोजना स्यात्, अज्ञानस्वरूपकल्पना च, ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानदर्शनवदज्ञानकार्यतयाभिमतप्रपञ्च दर्शनस्यैव संभवात्। किं च, ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवः किं स्वतोऽन्यतो वा? स्वतश्चेत् अज्ञानानुभवस्य स्वरूपप्रयुक्तत्वेनानिर्मोक्षः स्यात्, अनुभूतिस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानानुभवस्वरूपत्वेन मिथ्यारजतबाधकज्ञानेन रजतानुभवस्यापि निवृत्तिवत्, निवर्तकज्ञानेनाज्ञानानुभूतिरूपब्रह्मस्वरूपनिवृत्तिर्वा। अन्यतश्चेत्— किं च तदन्यत्? अज्ञानान्तरम्, इति चेत्, अनवस्था स्यात्।

ब्रह्म तिरस्कृत्यैव स्वयमनुभवविषयो भवति—इति चेत्— तथा सति इदमज्ञानं काचादिवत्स्वसत्तया ब्रह्म तिरस्करोति, इति ज्ञानबाध्यत्वम्, अज्ञानस्य न स्यात्।

---

already stated that there would be the destruction of one's own nature from another on account of light itself being the nature, owing to the non-admission of the attribute named 'light'. And further, that this Ajñāna that becomes the cause of screening the nature of Brahman, being itself experienced, screens Brahman, [and] having sceened Brahman, itself becomes the object of its experience,— Thus there is the fault of mutual interdependence.

If it were argued—[Ajñāna] itself, when experienced, screens,—[our reply is]— If Brahman with its nature not definitely screened, experiences the Ajñāna, the idea of screening would be having no purpose, so also the idea about the nature of Ajñāna, on account of the possibility, in the case of Brahman, of the apprehension of worldly existence itself admitted as being the product of Ajñāna, like the apprehension of Ajñāna. And further, is the experience of Ajñāna, by Brahman due to itself or due to another? If due to itself, there would be the absence of Release, on occount of the experience of Ajñāna being prompted by its own [Brahmans'] nature, or there would be the divorce of the nature of Brahman having the form of the experience of Ajñāna, by the removing knowledge, like the turning away also of the experience of silver by the stultifying knowledge of the false silver, of Brahman with Anubhūti as its own nature, by the nature of the experience of Ajñāna. If due to another, what that another [is] ? If it be another Ajñāna, there would be the [fault of] endlessness.

If it were argued—Having, verily, screened Brahman, it itself becomes the object of experience ; in that case, there would not be the nature of being fit to be stultified by knowledge in the case of Ajñāna, as this Ajñāna screens Brahman by its own existence like the Kāca [eye-disease].

अथ, इदमज्ञानं स्वयमनादि ब्रह्मणः स्वसाक्षित्वं ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरस्कृतिं च युगपदेव करोति। अतो नानवस्थादयो दोषाः— इति। नैतत्, स्वानुभवस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूप तिरस्कृतिमन्तरेण साक्षित्वापादनायोगात्।

हेत्वन्तरेण तिरस्कृतम्—इति चेत्— तर्हि, अस्यानादित्वमपास्तम्। अनवस्था च पूर्वोक्ता। अतिरस्कृतस्वरूपस्यैव साक्षित्वापादने ब्रह्मणः स्वानुभवैकतानता च न स्यात्। अपि च, अविद्यया ब्रह्मणि तिरोहिते, तद्ब्रह्म न किंचिदपि प्रकाशते, उत किंचित्प्रकाशते ? पूर्वस्मिन्कल्पे प्रकाशमात्रस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽप्रकाशे तुच्छतापत्तिरसकृदुक्ता। उत्तरस्मिन्कल्पे, सच्चिदानन्दैकरसे ब्रह्मणि कोऽयमंशस्तिरस्क्रियते ? को वा प्रकाशते ? निरंशे निर्विशेषे प्रकाशमात्रे वस्तुनि, आकारद्वयासंभवेन तिरस्कारः प्रकाशश्च युगपन्न संगच्छेते।

[63] अथ—सच्चिदानन्दैकरसं ब्रह्म, अविद्यया तिरोहितस्वरूपमविशदमिवालक्ष्यते—इति—प्रकाशमात्रस्वरूपस्य विशदता, अविशदता वा, किंरूपा ? एतदुक्तं भवति— यः सांशः सविशेषः प्रकाशविषयः, तस्य सकलावभासो विशदावभासः, कतिपयविशेषरहितश्च, अविशदावभासः। तत्र य आकारोऽप्रतिपन्नः, तस्मिन्नंशे प्रकाशाभावादेव

Now, if [you say]— This Ajñāna itself beginning-less, effects simultaneously in the case of Brahman the nature of Witness for itself, and the screening of Brahman's own nature. So, there would not be the blemishes, endlessness and others—[We reply]—Not so, on account of the impossibility of the investing of the nature of Witness without the screening of its own nature in the case of Brahman having the nature of self-experience.

If you say, that it [Brahman] is screened by another cause, then its being beginning-less vanishes away; and [the fault of] endlessness [for the matter of that] has already been spoken of; and there would indeed not be the uniform nature of self-experience in the case of Brahman in investing the nature of Witness in the case of Brahman, with its own unscreened nature itself. Moreover, when Brahman is screened by Avidyā— does that Brahman not shine at all, or does it shine a little ? With regard to the former alternative, the reduction to non-entity has been spoken of more than once as referring to Brahman having for its nature light alone, being non-illumining. According to the latter alternative, in the case of Brahman, a uniform mass of existence, 'Cit' and Bliss, which [of] this portion is screened ?— or which one shines forth ? In the case of an impartite distinctionless thing, which is mere light, the screening and the illumining would not go together simultaneously owing to the impossibility of the two forms.

[63] Now [as to the contention] that Brahman— a uniform mass of Existence, 'Cit' and Bliss,— with its own nature screened by Avidyā appears as though indistinct,—[We ask]—In the case of Brahman, with light as its nature, what form [is] this distinct nature or indistinct nature ? What is intended to be said is this—Whatever is partite, with distinctive attributes, the object of illumination—in its case a complete shining forth is distinct shining forth, and [the shining forth] bereft of a few distinctive attributes is indistinct

प्रकाशवैशद्यं न विद्यते। यश्चांशः प्रतिपन्नः, तस्मिन्नंशे तद्विषयप्रकाशो विशद एव। अतः सर्वत्र प्रकाशांशेऽवैशद्यं न संभवति। विषयेऽपि स्वरूपे प्रतीयमाने तद्गतकतिपयविशेषाप्रतीतिरेव, अवैशद्यम्। तस्मात्, अविषये निर्विशेषे प्रकाशमात्रे ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपे प्रकाशमाने कतिपयविशेषाप्रतिपत्तिरूपावैशद्यं नाम, अज्ञानकार्यं न संभवति, इति। अपि च, इदमविद्याकार्यम्, अवैशद्यं तत्त्वज्ञानोदयान्निवर्तते न वा?

अनिवृत्तौ, अपवर्गाभावः। निवृत्तौ च, वस्तु किंरूपम्, इति विवेचनीयम्। विशदस्वरूपम्, इति चेत्, विशदस्वरूपं प्रागस्ति वा न वा? अस्ति चेत्, अविद्याकार्यम् अवैशद्यं तन्निवृत्तिश्च न स्याताम्। नो चेत्, मोक्षस्य कार्यतयानित्यता स्यात्। अस्याज्ञानस्य, आश्रयानिरूपणादेवासंभवः पूर्वमेवोक्तः। अपि च, अपरमार्थदोषमूलभ्रमवादिना निरधिष्ठानभ्रमासंभवो दुरुपपादः, भ्रमहेतुभूतदोषदोषाश्रयवत्, अधिष्ठानापारमार्थ्येऽपि भ्रमोपपत्तेः। ततश्च सर्वशून्यत्वमेव स्यात्।

यदुक्तम्— अनुमानेनापि भावरूपमज्ञानं सिध्यति— इति— तदयुक्तम्, अनुमानासंभवात्।

ननु, उक्तमनुमानम्। सत्यम्, उक्तम्, दुरुक्तं तु तत्। अज्ञानेऽपि, अनभिमता-

---

shining forth. There, where a [particular] form is not apprehended, in that portion, a distinct nature due to the illumining, does not exist owing to the absence of illumination itself. And regarding that portion apprehended, the illumining referring to that portion it is certainly distinct. Therefore, everywhere in the illumined portion, indistinct nature—the function of Ajñāna is not possible. Even when the nature [of a thing]— is apprehended in the case of a thing, the non-apprehension itself of some distinctive attributes belonging to that, is non-distinctness. Therefore, in the case of objectless, distinctionless Brahman which is mere light, when its nature is being illumined,— the function of Ajñāna, is not possible. And further, this function of Ajñāna, the indistinctness does it turn away or not, through the knowledge of reality ?

In case it does not turn away, [there is] the absence of Salvation. If it turns away, of what form the thing is— [this] has got to be scrutinised. If it has a distinct nature, then does that distinct nature exist before or not ? If it exists, the indistinctness, the effect of Avidyā, and its turning away would not take place. If not, there would be the non-eternal nature of Salvation on account of its being the effect. The non-existence of this Ajñāna on account of the resort not [capable of] being pointed out, has already been spoken of. And further, for a disputant admitting illusion rooted in a non-real blemish, the absence of a baseless delusion is difficult to justify, on account of the possibility of delusion, even though the base has the nature of unreality, like the blemish that becomes the cause of delusion, [and] the resort of [such] blemish. And thus would result the state of everything being void.

As to what has been said— 'Ajñāna' having the nature of a positive entity gets established by Inference also— That is improper, on account of the impossibility of an inference.

I say [says the objector], that an inference has been [actually] stated [already by us]—True, [it has been] stated, but that is a bad [fallacious]

ज्ञानान्तरसाधनेन विरुद्धत्वाद्धेतोः। तत्राज्ञानान्तरासाधने हेतोरनैकान्त्यम्। साधने च तदज्ञानम्, अज्ञानसाक्षित्वं निवारयति। ततश्चाज्ञानकल्पना निष्फला स्यात्। दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः, प्रदीपप्रभाया अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वाभावात्। सर्वत्र हि ज्ञानस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वम्, सत्यपि दीपे विज्ञानेन विना विषयप्रकाशाभावात्। इन्द्रियाणामपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वमेव, न प्रकाशकत्वम्। प्रदीपप्रभायास्तु चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य ज्ञानमुत्पादयतो विरोधितमोनिरसनद्वारेणोपकारकत्वमात्रमेव। प्रकाशकज्ञानोत्पत्तौ व्याप्रियमाणचक्षुरिन्द्रियोपकारकत्वमपेक्ष्य दीपस्य प्रकाशकत्वव्यवहारः।

[64] नास्माभिर्ज्ञानतुल्यप्रकाशकत्वाभ्युपगमेन प्रदीपप्रभा निदर्शिता, अपि तु ज्ञानस्यैव स्वविषयावरणनिरसनपूर्वप्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकृत्य—इति चेत्—न, नहि विरोधिनिरसनमात्रं प्रकाशकत्वम्, अपि त्वर्थपरिच्छेदः, व्यवहारयोग्यतापादनमिति यावत्। तच्च ज्ञानस्यैव। यद्युपकारकाणामप्यप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकृतम्, तर्हि, इन्द्रियाणामुपकारकतमत्वेनाप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमङ्गीकरणीयम्। तथा सति तेषां स्वनिवर्त्यवस्त्वन्तर-

---

statement, on account of the logical mark being contradictory [i. e. there is the 'Viruddha' 'hetvābhāsa'] owing to its proving another Ajñāna not acceptable [to you] even in respect of Ajñāna. There the logical mark is inconclusive in the matter of [its] not proving another Ajñāna. If it were to prove that Ajñāna would ward off the witness for the Ajñāna and then the Ajñāna-concept would be fruitless. And the illustrative instance is impotent to prove [the position] on account of the absence of the nature of illumining objects that are not illumined, in the case of the lustre of a big lamp; for everywhere there is the illumining nature of knowledge alone; for even though the lamp is there, there is the absence of illumination of the object without the particular knowledge. In the case of the sense-organs also, there is certainly the nature of being the cause of the production of knowledge, and not the nature of illumining; but in the case of the lustre of the lamp, there is only the obliging nature through the channel of brushing aside the opposing darkness, of the sense-organ eye, producing knowledge; referring to [this] obliging nature of the sense-organ eye being engaged in the production of the illumining knowledge, is the practical description of the lamp as having an illumining nature.

[64] If it be contended—Not by us has been put forward as an illustration the lustre of a lamp involving the admission of [its] illumining nature equal to that of knowledge, but on the other hand, having accepted the illumining nature of knowledge itself preceded by the brushing aside of the veil of its object—[We reply]—No. Illumining nature is by no means, merely the brushing aside of the opposing thing, but is the defining of the object, that is to say, producing in it the fitness for practical usage. That, however, belongs to knowledge alone. If even in the case of the obliging agents, the nature of illumining objects that are not illumined, is accepted, then on account of the sense-organs being the most eminent obliging agents, the nature of illumining

पूर्वकत्वाभावाद्धेतोरनैकान्त्यम्, इत्यलमनेन।

प्रतिप्रयोगाश्च—

(१) विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रयम्,
अज्ञानत्वात्,
शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्,
ज्ञात्राश्रयं हि तत्।

(२) विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञानावरणम्,
अज्ञानत्वात्,
शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्,
विषयावरणं हि तत्।

(३) विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम्,
ज्ञानविषयानावरणत्वात्,
यज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यमज्ञानम्, तज्ज्ञानविषयावरणम्,
यथा शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानम्।

(४) ब्रह्म नाज्ञानास्पदम्,
ज्ञातृत्वविरहात्,
घटादिवत्।

---

objects not illumined must be admitted [as well] in their case. In that case, on account of the absence of their [of the senses] being preceded by another object fit to be removed by them, there would be the inconclusive nature of the logical mark— enough of this [futile discussion],

And there are the [following] counter-syllogisms.

[1] Ajñāna, the subject of discussion, has not for its resort Brahman which is mere 'Cit' [Jnāna],
On account of its being Ajñāna,
Like Ajñāna about the conch-shell etc.,
For, that has the knower as its resort.

[2] The Ajñāna, the subject of discussion, is not the enveloping agent of knowledge,
On account of its being Ajñāna,
Like Ajñāna about the conch-shell etc.,
For, it is the enveloping agent for the objects.

[3] Ajñāna, the subject of discussion, is not fit to be removed by knowledge,
On account of its not being the enveloping agent for the objects of knowledge,
Whatever Ajñāna is fit to be removed by knowledge, that is the enveloping agent for the objects of knowledge,
Like Ajñāna about the conch-shell etc.

[4] Brahman is not the abode of Ajñāna,
On account of its not being the knower,
Like the jar and others.

(५) ब्रह्म नाज्ञानावरणम्,
ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्,
यदज्ञानावरणम्, तज्ज्ञानविषयभूतम्,
यथा शुक्तिकादि ।

(६) ब्रह्म न ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानम्,
ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्,
यज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानम्, तज्ज्ञानविषयभूतम्,
यथा शुक्तिकादि ।

(७) विवादाध्यासितं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावातिरिक्ताज्ञानपूर्वकं न भवति,
प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात्,
भवदभिमताज्ञानसाधनप्रमाणज्ञानवत् ।

(८) ज्ञानं न वस्तुनो विनाशकम्,
शक्तिविशेषोपबृंहणविरहे सति ज्ञानत्वात् ।
यद्वस्तुनो विनाशकम्, तच्छक्तिविशेषोपबृंहितं ज्ञानमज्ञानं च दृष्टम्,
यथेश्वरयोगिप्रभृतिज्ञानम्, यथा च मुद्गरादि ।

---

[5] Brahman is not the enveloping agent for Ajñāna,
On account of its not being the object of knowledge,
Whatever is the enveloping agent for Ajñāna, that is the object of knowledge,
Like the conch-shell and others.

[6] Brahman is not Ajñāna fit to be removed by knowledge,
On account of its not being the object of knowledge,
Whatever is Ajñāna fit to be removed by knowledge, that becomes the object of knowledge,
Like the conch-shell and others.

[7] The knowledge from the means of proof, the subject of discussion, is not preceded by Ajñāna, that is over and above its own antecedent negation,
On account of its being the knowledge of the means of proof,
Like the knowledge from the means of proof proving your favourite Ajñāna.

[8] Knowledge is not the destroyer of a thing,
On account of its being knowledge, in the absence of amplification by a distinct power,
Whatever is the destroyer of a thing, that is found to be knowledge amplified by a distinct power—knowledge, or Ajñāna—
Like the knowledge of the Supreme Controller, Yogins etc, or
Like the club and others.

(९) भावरूपमज्ञानं न ज्ञानविनाश्यम्,
भावरूपत्वात्,
घटादिवत् ।

इति ।

[65] अथोच्येत—बाधकज्ञानेन पूर्वोत्पन्नानां भयादीनां विनाशो दृश्यते—इति—नैवम् । नहि ज्ञानेन तेषां विनाशः, क्षणिकत्वेन तेषां स्वयमेव विनाशात्, कारणनिवृत्त्या च पश्चादनुत्पत्तेः । क्षणिकत्वं च तेषां ज्ञानवदुत्पत्तिकारणसंनिधान एवोपलब्धेः, अन्यथानुपलब्धेश्चावगम्यते । अक्षणिकत्वे च तेषां भयादीनां भयादिहेतुभूतज्ञानसंततौ, अविशेषेण सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां भयाद्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वेनानेकभयोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गाच्च । स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकमिति व्यर्थविशेषणोपादानेन प्रयोगकुशलता चाविष्कृता । अतो नानुमानेनापि भावरूपाज्ञानसिद्धिः । श्रुतितदर्थापत्तिभ्यामज्ञानासिद्धिरनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यते । मिथ्यार्थस्य मिथ्यैवोपादानं भवितुमर्हति, इत्येतदपि

'*न विलक्षणत्वात्......*' (ब्र. सू. २।१।४)

इति, एतदधिकरणन्यायेन परिहियते । अतः, अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानविषया न काचिदपि

---

[9] Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge,
On account of its being a positive entity.
Like the jar and others.

[65] If it were said— By the stultifying knowledge, is seen the destruction of fear etc. that are produced beforehand—[We reply]— Not so. For, not by knowledge is their destruction [effected], on account of their perishing of their own accord due to their momentariness; and on account of their non-origination later on by the removal of the cause. And their momentariness is apprehended by the perception only in the presence of the cause of their origination, like knowledge, and on account of the non-perception otherwise. And in case of their not being momentary, there would be the undesirable result viz. the perception of many fears, on account of all knowledges without distinction being the cause of the origination of fear etc, when there is the continuity of the knowledge that has become the cause of fear etc. And in putting forth the unnecessary qualifying expressions viz. ' preceded by another object over and above its antecedent negation ' has been disclosed [by you] proficiency (?) in [the matter of] syllogisms. Therefore, even by Inference, there would not be the establishment of Ajñāna having the nature of a positive entity. The non-establishment of Ajñāna by 'Śruti' and '*Arthāpatti*' [presumption] concerning it, would be stated immediately afterwards. That, in the case of the false object, the material cause ought to be definitely false,— This also is refuted by the reasoning in this topic viz.

'*No, on account of being different.*' (Br. Sū. 2·1·4)

Therefore, there is no apprehension whatsoever referring to the undefinable

प्रतीतिरस्ति। प्रतीतिभ्रान्तिबाधैरपि न तथाभ्युपगमनीयम्। प्रतीयमानमेव हि प्रतीतिभ्रान्तिबाधविषयः। आभिः प्रतीतिभिः प्रतीत्यन्तरेण चानुपलब्धम्, आसां विषय इति न युज्यते कल्पयितुम्।

शुक्त्यादिषु रजतादिप्रतीतेः प्रतीतिकालेऽपि तन्नास्ति, इति बाधेन चान्यस्यान्यथावभासायोगाच्च सदसदनिर्वचनीयम्, अपूर्वम्, एवेदं रजतं दोषवशात्प्रतीयते, इति कल्पनीयम्—इति चेत्—न, तत्कल्पनायामपि, अन्यस्यान्यथावभासस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्। अन्यथावभासाभ्युपगमादेव ख्यातिप्रवृत्तिबाधभ्रमत्वानामुपपत्तेः, अत्यन्तापरिदृष्टाकारणकवस्तुकल्पनायोगात्। कल्प्यमानं हि, इदमनिर्वचनीयम्। न च तदानीम्, अनिर्वचनीयमिति प्रतीयते, अपि तु परमार्थरजतमित्येव। अनिर्वचनीयम्, इत्येव प्रतीतं चेत्, भ्रान्तिबाधयोः प्रवृत्तेरप्यसंभवः। अतोऽन्यस्यान्यथावभासविरहे प्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिबाधभ्रमत्वानामनुपपत्तेः, तस्यापरिहार्यत्वाच्च शुक्त्यादिरेव रजताद्याकारेणावभासते, इति भवताभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

ख्यात्यन्तरवादिनां च सुदूरमपि गत्वा, अन्यथावभासोऽवश्याश्रयणीयः, असत्-

---

Ajñāna. Nor should it be taken in that light [as 'anirvacanīya'] even on the score of apprehension, delusion and stultification; for, whatever is being apprehended, that alone is the object of apprehension, delusion and stultification. It is not right to maintain that whatever is not perceived by these apprehensions or by any other apprehension is the object of these [apprehensions].

If it be contended—It should be held that due to [some] blemish there is apprehended this silver, as being, verily, something not seen before, undefinable either as existent or non-existent on account of the stultification in the form 'That is not' even at the time of the apprehension, in the matter of the apprehension of silver and others, in conch-shell and others, and on account of the impossibility of the shining forth otherwise,— [We reply]— 'No', on account of the unavoidable nature of another thing shining forth otherwise even according to that view. It is only on account of our admission of shining forth otherwise, there would be the accounting for the nature of knowledge, activity, stultification and delusion—on account of the impossibility of fancying a cause-less object not seen at all anywhere. If this, indeed, is fancied, it would be indefinable. And it is not apprehended as indefinable at that time, but as real silver alone. If it were apprehended only as indefinable, there would be the impossibility of delusion, and stultification, as also of activity. Therefore, on account of apprehension, activity, stultification and delusion not being accounted for, in the absence of the shining forth of another as otherwise, and on account of its being unavoidable, the conch-shell and others themselves shine forth in the form of silver and others—This ought to be accepted by your honour.

For the Discoursers of other theories of knowledge, 'the shining forth otherwise' has got to be necessarily accepted, although straying away far off [in holding fast to their views]—as having the nature of 'Sat' in the 'Asatkhyāti'

ख्यातिपक्षे सदात्मना; आत्मख्यातिपक्षे चार्थात्मना; अख्यातिपक्षेऽपि, अन्यविशेषणम्, अन्यविशेषणत्वेन, ज्ञानद्वयमेकत्वेन च; विषयासद्भावपक्षेऽपि विद्यमानत्वेन। किं च, अनिर्वचनीयमपूर्वरजतमत्र जातमिति वदता तस्य जन्मकारणं वक्तव्यम्। न तावत्प्रतीतिः, तस्यास्तद्विषयत्वेन तदुत्पत्तेः प्रागात्मलाभायोगात्। निर्विषया जाता, तदुत्पाद्य तदेव विषयीकरोति, इति महतामिदमुपपादनम्।

अथ—इन्द्रियादिगतो दोषः,—तन्न, तस्य पुरुषाश्रयत्वेन, अर्थगतकार्यस्योत्पादकत्वायोगात्। नापि, इन्द्रियाणि, तेषां, ज्ञानकारणत्वात्। नापि दुष्टानीन्द्रियाणि, तेषामपि स्वकार्यभूते ज्ञान एव हि विशेषकरत्वम्। अनादिमिथ्याज्ञानोपादानत्वं तु पूर्वमेव निरस्तम्।

[66] किं च, अपूर्वमनिर्वचनीयमिदं वस्तुजातं रजतादिबुद्धिशब्दाभ्यां कथमिव विषयीक्रियते, न घटादिबुद्धिशब्दाभ्याम्?

रजतादिसादृश्यात्—इति चेत्, तर्हि, तत्सदृशम्, इत्येव प्रतीतिशब्दौ स्याताम्।

रजतत्वादिजातियोगात्—इति चेत्—सा किं परमार्थभूता, उत, अपरमार्थभूता वा? न तावत्परमार्थभूता, तस्या अपरमार्थान्वयायोगात्। नापि, अपरमार्थ-

---

view; as having the nature of the object according to the 'Ātmakhyāti' view; as the qualifying attribute of another, as having the qualifying attributes [and] two knowledges as being one in the 'Akhyāti' view; and as having the nature of existence, even according to the view admitting non-existence of objects. And further, while asserting that an indefinable, [and] unseen-before silver is produced here, you ought to say what the cause of its origination is. Not the apprehension, for the matter of that, [can be the 'Janmakāraṇa'] on account of that [apprehension] referring to that [object], not securing its existence prior to its origination of that [object]. That [apprehension] originated without any object; having produced that [object] makes the same its object—This kind of reasoning becomes [only] great [?] [people like yourself].

If [there be admitted] the defect belonging to the sense-organ [as a cause]—That [is] not so,on account of the impropriety of being the producing cause of the activity associated with the object, because it has an individual as its resort. Nor again, the sense-organs; on account of their being the cause of knowledge; nor again, defective sense-organs; for, even in their case, there is a particular orientation in respect of the knowledge alone, that has become their sphere of activity. As for the beginning-less false knowledge being the material cause also, it has been already refuted.

[66] Furthermore, how possibly is this indefinable [and] unseen-before concourse of objects, made an object [of perception] by idea and words 'silver and others,' and not by idea and words 'jar and others'?

If it were argued—It is due to the resemblance with silver and others, then, there would, verily, be the apprehension and [the use of] words 'similar to that'.

If it were argued—It is due to the association with the generality silverness etc,—[We ask]—Is that [generality] real or unreal? Not for the matter of that, real, on acount of the impossibility of its association with an unreal

भूता, परमार्थान्वयायोगात्, अपरमार्थे परमार्थबुद्धिशब्दयोर्निर्वाहकत्वायोगाच्च—इत्यलमपरिणतकुतर्कनिरसनेन।

अथवा—

यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम्।
श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः सर्वस्य सर्वात्मत्वप्रतीतितः॥
'बहु स्याम्' इति संकल्पपूर्वसृष्ट्याद्युपक्रमे।
'तासां त्रिवृतमेकैकम्' इति श्रुत्यैव चोदितम्॥
त्रिवृत्करणमेवं हि प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते॥
यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तदपामपि।
शुक्लं कृष्णं पृथिव्याश्चेत्यग्नावेव त्रिरूपता॥
श्रुत्यैव दर्शिता तस्मात्सर्वे सर्वत्र संगताः।
पुराणे चैवमेवोक्तं वैष्णवे सृष्ट्युपक्रमे॥
'नानावीर्याः पृथग्भूतास्ततस्ते संहतिं विना।
नाशक्नुवन्प्रजाः स्रष्टुमसमागम्य कृत्स्नशः॥
समेत्यान्योन्यसंयोगं परस्परसमाश्रयाः।
महदाद्या विशेषान्ता ह्यण्डमित्यादिना ततः॥'

---

thing; nor again, is it unreal on account of the impossibility of its connection with the real, and on account of the impossibility on the part of the cognition and words as real, being made use of in respect of an unreal thing— [Let us do] away with this refutation of immature fallacious reasoning.

Or—

'All special knowledge is in conformity with the object as it is— This is the view of the Veda-knowers, on account of the apprehension of everything being constituted of everything, from the Śrutis and Smṛtis.'

'At the beginning of creation etc. preceded by the thought 'May I be many', it has been dogmatised by the Śruti itself viz. 'Of them, every one is tri-partite'. The tri-partite production, indeed, is thus found out by Direct Perception'

'What [is the] colour in the fire [is] the red colour of Tejas, the white colour of Waters as well and the black [colour] of the Earth—Thus the three-coloured nature [is], verily, in Agni.'

'[This] has been pointed out by the Śruti itself, therefore, all get together everywhere. This same thing has been declared in the Purāṇa dedicated to Viṣṇu in [introducing] the description of creation.'

'In the following passages and others, 'Possessed of various powers, remaining separately, thereupon, they were not able to create people in the absence of collaboration, not coming all together.

'[And] having effected union with one another, and resorting to each other [having come together they created] beginning with 'Mahat' [and] ending with 'Viśeṣas'— Thus the Egg.'

सूत्रकारोऽपि भूतानां त्रिरूपत्वं तथावदत् ।
' त्र्यात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वात् ' इति तेनाभिधाभिदा ॥
सोमाभावे च पूतीकग्रहणं श्रुतिचोदितम् ।
सोमावयवसद्भावादिति न्यायविदो विदुः ॥
व्रीह्यभावे च नीवारग्रहणं व्रीहिभावतः ।
तदेव सदृशं तस्य यत्तद्द्रव्यैकदेशभाक् ॥
शुक्त्यादौ रजतादेश्च भावः श्रुत्यैव चोदितः ।
रूप्यशुक्त्यादिनिर्देशे भेदो भूयस्त्वहेतुकः ॥
रूप्यादिसदृशश्चायं शुक्त्यादिरुपलभ्यते ।
अतस्तस्यात्र सद्भावः प्रतीतेरपि निश्चितः ॥
कदाचिच्चक्षुरादेस्तु दोषाच्छुक्त्यंशवर्जितः ।
रजतांशो गृहीतोऽतो रजतार्थी प्रवर्तते ॥
दोषहानौ तु शुक्त्यंशे गृहीते तन्निवर्तते ।
अतो यथार्थं रूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्तिकादिषु ॥

'The [Brahma-] Sūtrakāra as well, declared the three-fold nature of the creatures in the same way as 'being constituted of the three, on account of the preponderance of it'— by [the Sūtra] specially mentioning that.'

'And in the absence of Soma, the use of 'Pūtīka' is enjoined by the Śruti itself; [this is] on account of the existence [in the Pūtīka] of portions of Soma— Thus explain the Nyāya-knowers [Mīmāṁsā interpreters].'

'And in the absence of rice, the use of 'Nīvāra' on account of its possessing the nature of rice. That alone is similar to that which possesses a portion of that substance.'

'And the presence of silver and others in conch-shell and others is declared by the Śruti itself; the different mention of the silver and the conch-shell etc. is due to the preponderance [of the one or the other].'

'This conch-shell etc. is found out to be similar to silver and others. Therefore, the presence of that here is ascertained from the apprehension also.'

'But sometimes on account of the defect in the eye etc. is comprehended the silver-portion divorced from the conch-shell portion. And so proceeds the silver-covetor.'

'But, then on the removal of the defect, with the conch-shell-portion grasped, it turns away as a consequence. Therefore, the 'Vijñāna' of silver and others [to be found] in conch-shell and others is in keeping with the object [i. e. real].'

बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि भूयस्त्वेनोपपद्यते ।
शुक्तिभूयस्त्ववैकल्यसाकल्यग्रहरूपतः ॥
नातो मिथ्यार्थसत्यार्थविषयत्वनिबन्धनः ।
एवं सर्वस्य सर्वत्वे व्यवहारव्यवस्थितिः ॥' (भाष्यकारस्य)

स्वप्ने च प्राणिनां पुण्यपापानुगुणा भगवतैव तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्याः, तत्तत्कालावसानाः, तथाभूताः, च, अर्थाः सृज्यन्ते। तथा हि श्रुतिः स्वप्नविषया—

'न तत्र रथा रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति, अथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते ।
न तत्रानन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्ति, अथानन्दान्मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते ।
न तत्र वेशान्ताः पुष्करिण्यो स्रवन्त्यो भवन्ति । अथ वेशान्तान्पुष्करिण्यः स्रवन्त्यः सृजते । स हि कर्ता ।' (बृ. ४।३।१०)

इति। यद्यपि सकलपुरुषेतरानुभाव्यतया तदानीं न भवन्ति, अथापि तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभाव्यतया तथाविधार्थानीश्वरः सृजति। स हि कर्ता। तस्य सत्यसंकल्पस्याश्चर्यशक्तेस्तथाविधं कर्तृत्वं संभवति, इत्यर्थः।

'य एष सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः ।
तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते ।
तस्मिँल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तदु नात्येति कश्चन ॥' (का. ५।८)

'The relation of the stultified and the stultifying is appropriate owing to the preponderance due to the form of comprehension regarding [its] preponderance, deficiency and entirety in the conch-shell.'

'Therefore, [the relation of the stultified and the stultifying] is not dependent upon having for its object false or real objects.'
'In this way, [there is] proper establishment of the practical usage when everything has the nature of everything'. (Bhāsyakāra)

In Dream also, by the Lord himself are created objects in conformity with the merit and demerit of the creatures, fit to be experienced only by various individuals, lasting for that particular time and assuming the particular forms. To the same effect is the Śruti passage dealing with dream [-state].

'Not there are the chariots, nor chariot-horses, nor roads, but he creates chariots, chariot-horses, roads. Not there are delights, joys, ecstasies, but He creates delights, joys, ecstasies. Not there are tanks, lotus-lakes, rivers, but He creates tanks, lotus-lakes, rivers. He indeed [is] the doer.' (Br. 4·3·10)

Even though those different kinds of objects are not there at that time fit to be experienced by all other individuals, still the Lord creates those same, fit for being experienced by these particular individuals alone. He indeed [is] the doer—That kind of the nature of doer is possible in Him whose thoughts are fulfilled [and who is] possessed of miraculous powers.—This is the sense.

'Who, this Puruṣa, keeps awake while [the individuals are] asleep, creating various desired objects—

That same, the effulgent, that Brahman, that same is called the Immortal; in him rest all the worlds; no one, verily, transcends it.' (Kā. 5·8)

इति। सूत्रकारोऽपि—

'सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराह हि' (ब्र. सू. ३·२·१)
'निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश्च।' (ब्र. सू. ३।२।२)

इति सूत्रद्वयेन स्वाप्नेष्वर्थेषु जीवस्य स्रष्टृत्वमाशङ्क्य—

'मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्' (ब्र. सू. ३।२।३)

इत्यादिना न जीवस्य संकल्पमात्रेण स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्यते, जीवस्य स्वाभाविकसत्यसंकल्पादेः कृत्स्नस्य संसारदशायामनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्। ईश्वरस्यैव तत्तत्पुरुषानुभाव्यतयाश्चर्यभूता सृष्टिरियम्।

[67] *'तस्मिल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तदु नात्येति कश्चन।'* (का. ५।८)

इति परमात्मैव स्रष्टेत्यवगम्यते—इति परिहरति। अपवरकादिषु शयानस्य स्वप्नदृशः स्वदेहेनैव देशान्तरगमनराज्याभिषेकशिरच्छेदादयः पुण्यपापफलभूताः शयानदेहसरूपसंस्थानदेहान्तरसृष्ट्योपपद्यन्ते।

पीतशङ्खादौ तु नयनवर्तिपित्तद्रव्यसंभिन्ना नायनरश्मयः शङ्खादिभिः संयुज्यन्ते।

The [Brahma-] Sūtrakāra, also, having called into question the nature of the creator belonging to the individual soul in respect of objects in dreams, by the couple of Sūtras—

'*For, he speaks creation in dreams*' (Br. Sū. 3·2·1)
'*Some* [*speak of him*] *as creator; and sons and others.*' (Br. Sū. 3·2·2)

refutes the same under the Sūtra—

'*But* [*that creation is but*] *illusion, on account of its nature, not being manifest in its entirety.*' (Br. Sū. 3·2·3)

etc. The nature of the creator merely by this much [reasoning] in the individual Soul is not proper, on account of that nature not being manifest in the state of worldly existence, of the natural [qualities] like 'having thoughts fulfilled' in the case of all the individual souls. This creation which is a wonder belongs to the Lord alone, owing to its being fit to be experienced by particular persons.

[**67**] '*In him rest all the worlds; no one, verily, transcends it.*' (Kā. 5·8)

By this passage it is apprehended that the Paramātman himself is the creator. Thus is the refutation made. In the case of the dream-seer resting in a chamber etc. going on to another country with his own body, coronation, beheading etc., the fruit of merit and demerit, can be accounted for by the creation of another body, having the same form and configuration as those of the resting body.

In the case of the yellow conch-shell etc. however, the rays from the eye come in contact with the conch and others, being inter-mixed with the bile-substance existing in the eye. There the whiteness belonging to the conch

तत्र पित्तद्रव्यगतपीतिमाभिभूतः शङ्खगतशुक्तिमा न गृह्यते। अतः सुवर्णानुलिप्तशङ्खवत्पीतः शङ्खः, इति प्रतीयते। पित्तद्रव्यं तद्गतपीतिमा च, अतिसूक्ष्मतया पार्श्वस्थैर्न गृह्यते, पित्तोपहतेन तु स्वनयननिष्क्रान्ततया, अतिसामीप्यात्सूक्ष्ममपि गृह्यते। तद्ग्रहणजनित-संस्कारसचिवनायनरश्मिभिर्दूरस्थमपि गृह्यते। जपाकुसुमसमीपवर्तिस्फटिकमणिरपि तत्प्रभाभिभूततया रक्तः, इति गृह्यते। जपाकुसुमप्रभा विततापि स्वच्छद्रव्यसंयुक्ता स्फुटतरमुपलभ्यते, इत्युपलब्धिव्यवस्थाप्यमिदम्।

मरीचिकाजलज्ञानेऽपि तेजःपृथिव्योरप्यम्बुनो विद्यमानत्वात्, इन्द्रियदोषेण तेजः-पृथिव्योरग्रहणात्, च, अदृष्टवशात्, च, अम्बुनो ग्रहणाद्यथार्थत्वम्।

अलातचक्रेऽपि, अलातस्य द्रुततरगमनेन सर्वदेशसंयोगात्, अन्तरालाग्रहणात् तथा-प्रतीतिरुपपद्यते। चक्रप्रतीतौ, अपि, अन्तरालाग्रहणपूर्वकं तत्तद्देशसंयुक्ततत्तद्वस्तुग्रहणमेव क्वचिदन्तरालाभावात्, अन्तरालाग्रहणम्, क्वचिच्छैघ्र्यादग्रहणम् — इति विशेषः; अतस्तदपि यथार्थम्।

---

is not apprehended, being overpowered by the yellowness belonging to the bile-substance. Therefore, the apprehension is that the conch is yellow like a conch encased in gold. The bile-substance, and the yellow colour belonging to it are not apprehended by those near about, on account of their being very subtle, but are apprehended though subtle, by one affected by bile, owing to their being extremely near and owing to their coming out of the eyes, [and] are apprehended even though at a distance by the eye-rays guided by the impression caused by their apprehension. The crystal jewel, also, lying near the Japā flower is apprehended as red owing to its being overpowered by its [red] lustre. Even the [red] lustre of the Japā flower although spread about is apprehended quite distinctly, being conjoint with a clear substance—Thus [all] this is properly settled by perception.

Even in the case of cognition of the mirage-water, there is the real nature of water owing to its apprehension on account of water being present even in Tejas and Pṛthivī portions, and on account of the non-apprehension of Tejas and Pṛthivī [portions] owing to the defect in the sense-organs, and through the force of destiny.

In the matter of the fire-brand-circle, also, that kind of apprehension is reasonable, on account of the conjunction of the fire-brand with all quarters, owing to its very rapid movement [and] on account of the non-apprehension of the intervening space. In the matter of the apprehension of [the fire-brand] circle, also, there is the apprehension itself of the different things conjoint with the different quarters, preceded by the non-apprehension of the intervening space; the [only] difference being, sometimes there is the non-apprehension of the intervening space because of the absence of the intervening space and sometimes the non-apprehension is due to rapidity. Therefore, that also is real.

दर्पणादिषु निजमुखादिप्रतीतिरपि यथार्था, दर्पणादिप्रतिहतगतयो हि नायनरश्मयः, दर्पणादिदेशग्रहणपूर्वकं निजमुखादि गृह्णान्ति। तत्रापि, अतिशैघ्र्यादन्तरालाग्रहणात्तथा प्रतीतिः।

दिङ्मोहेऽपि दिगन्तरस्यास्यां दिशि विद्यमानत्वात्, अदृष्टवशेनैतद्दिगंशवियुक्तो दिगन्तरांशो गृह्यते। अतो दिगन्तरप्रतीतिर्यथार्थैव।

द्विचन्द्रज्ञानादौ, अपि, अङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भतिमिरादिभिर्नायनतेजोगतिभेदेन सामग्री-भेदात्सामग्रीद्वयम्, अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षं चन्द्रग्रहणद्वयहेतुर्भवति। तत्रैका सामग्री स्वदेश-विशिष्टं चन्द्रं गृह्णाति। द्वितीया तु किंचिद्वक्रगतिः, चन्द्रसमीपदेशग्रहणपूर्वकं चन्द्रं स्वदेशवियुक्तं गृह्णाति। अतः सामग्रीद्वयेन युगपद्देशद्वयविशिष्टचन्द्रग्रहणेऽपि ग्रहणभेदेन ग्राह्याकारभेदात्, एकत्वग्रहणाभावात्, च 'द्वौ चन्द्रौ' इति भवति प्रतीतिविशेषः। देशान्तरस्य तद्विशेषणत्वं देशान्तरस्य चागृहीतस्वदेशाचन्द्रस्य च निरन्तरग्रहणेन भवति। तत्र सामग्रीद्वित्वं पारमार्थिकम्। तेन देशद्वयविशिष्टचन्द्रग्रहणद्वयं च पारमार्थिकम्। ग्रहणद्वित्वेन चन्द्रस्यैव ग्राह्याकारद्वित्वं च पारमार्थिकम्। तत्र, विशेषणद्वयविशिष्ट-

---

The apprehension also, of one's face etc. in the mirror etc. is real, for the eye-rays with their course obstructed by the mirror etc. grasp one's face etc. preceded by the apprehension of the region of the mirror, and there, too, the apprehension is to that effect on account of the non-apprehension of the intervening space owing to extreme rapidity.

Even in the matter of perplexity about direction, some portion of another direction is apprehended owing to another direction existing in this direction, as divorced from the portion of this direction through the force of (*adṛṣta*) destiny. Therefore, the apprehension of another direction is certainly real.

Even in the matter of knowledge of two moons, two sets of means independent of each other become the cause of the two apprehensions of the moon, on account of the difference in the course of the aura of the eye due to the pressure of the finger, cataract etc. There, one set of means apprehends the moon particularised by its own place. The second, on the other hand, moving slightly at a tangent apprehends the moon divorced from her own region, preceded by the apprehension of the region adjoining the moon. Therefore, in the matter of the apprehension also of the moon characterised by two regions simultaneously by the two sets of means, 'two moons' becomes the particular apprehension on account of the difference in the form to be apprehended, also on account of the absence of the apprehension of oneness owing to the difference in the apprehension. The other region having that particular characteristic is there owing to the uninterrupted apprehension of the other region and of the moon with her region not grasped. There, the two sets of means are real, and so the two apprehensions of the moon particularised by the two regions, are also real. On account of the two apprehensions the two forms to be apprehended of the moon herself are real.

चन्द्रग्रहणद्वयस्य, एक एव चन्द्रो ग्राह्यः, इति ग्रहणे, प्रत्यभिज्ञावत्केवलचक्षुषः सामर्थ्याभावात्, चाक्षुषं ज्ञानं तथैवावतिष्ठते। द्वयोश्चक्षुषोरेकसामग्र्यन्तर्भावेऽपि तिमिरादिदोषभिन्नं चाक्षुषं तेजः सामग्रीद्वयं भवति, इति कार्यकल्प्यम्। अपगते तु दोषे, स्वदेशविशिष्टस्य चन्द्रस्यैकग्रहणवेद्यत्वात्, 'एकश्चन्द्रः' इति भवति प्रत्ययः। दोषकृतं तु सामग्रीद्वित्वम्, तत्कृतं ग्रहणद्वित्वम्, तत्कृतं ग्राह्याकारद्वित्वम्, च—इति निरवद्यम्। अतः सर्वं विज्ञानजातं यथार्थम्, इति सिद्धम्।

[68] ख्यात्यन्तराणां दूषणानि तैस्तैर्वादिभिरेव प्रपञ्चितानि, इति न तत्र यत्नः क्रियते। अथवा, किमनेन बहुनोपपादनप्रकारेण? प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाख्यं प्रमाणजातम्, आगमगम्यं च निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धम्, अनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणगणं सर्वज्ञं सत्यसंकल्पं परं ब्रह्माभ्युपगच्छतां किं न सेत्स्यति, किं नोपपद्यते? भगवता हि परेण ब्रह्मणा क्षेत्रज्ञपुण्यपापानुगुणं तद्भोग्यत्वायाखिलं जगत्सृजता, सुखदुःखोपेक्षाफलानुभवानुभाव्याः पदार्थाः सर्वसाधारणानुभवविषयाः—केचन तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभवविषयाः,तत्त-

---

There, in the apprehension in the form 'only one moon' [is the object] to be apprehended, of the two apprehensions of the moon, particularised by two qualifications, the perception by the eye remains exactly the same, owing to the absence of the [necessary] power in the eye alone, like recollection. Even though the two eyes are to be included in the one set of means, the aura from the eye, differentiated by the defect—the cataract etc.—becomes the [other] set of means—This has got to be assumed from the effect, but when the defect goes away, there arises the apprehension viz., one moon, on account of the moon particularised by her own region being fit to be known by one apprehension. The double nature of the sets of means is, however, due to the defect; the double nature of the apprehension is due to that, the double nature of the forms to be apprehended is due to that ['Grahaṇadvitva']—Thus everything is flawless. Therefore, it is proved that all knowledge is real.

[68] The defects in other views about the [theory] of knowledge, have been explained in detail by various disputants themselves; so no attempt is made in that behalf [by us here],—or, what is the use of the many different ways of explaining? The group of means of proof is Direct Perception, Inference and Word. And in the case of those who have taken to the Highest Brahman with even a semblance of all blemish banished away, possessed of hosts of auspicious qualities of endless excess and numberless, omni-scient, with thoughts fulfilled, as to be known from scriptures—what could not possibly be established, [and] what possibly would not be reasonable? By the Lord, the Highest Brahman, indeed, while creating in conformity with merit and demerit of the Kṣetrajña, the entire world for being enjoyable by him, are created [several] objects fit to be experienced by the experience of fruit viz. happiness, misery, and indifference, the objects of experience common to all and some objects of experience of particular individuals alone, lasting for

त्कालावसानाः, तथातथानुभाव्याः सृज्यन्ते। तत्र बाध्यबाधकभावः सर्वानुभवविषयतया तद्रहिततया च, उपपद्यते, इति सर्वं समञ्जसम्।

यत्पुनः—' सदसदनिर्वचनीयमज्ञानं श्रुतिसिद्धम्। '—इति —तदसत्,

' अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः ' (छा. ८।३।२)

इत्यादिषु, ' अनृत 'शब्दस्यानिर्वचनीयानभिधायित्वात्। ऋतेतरविषयो हि ' अनृत 'शब्दः। ' ऋतम् ' इति कर्मवाचि,

' ऋतं पिबन्तौ ' (का. ३।१)

इति वचनात्। ' ऋतं ' कर्म फलाभिसंधिरहितं परमपुरुषाराधनवेषं तत्प्राप्तिफलम्। अत्र तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सांसारिकफलं कर्म ' अनृतं ' ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि,

' एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः। ' (छा. ८।३।२)

इति वचनात्।

' नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् ' (तै. ब्रा. २।८।९।३)

इत्यत्रापि ' सदसत् 'शब्दौ चिदचिद्व्यष्टिविषयौ। उत्पत्तिवेलायां ' सत् त्यत् ' शब्दाभिहितयोश्चिदचिद्व्यष्टिभूतयोर्वस्तुनोरप्ययकालेऽचित्समष्टिभूते ' तमः 'शब्दाभिधेये वस्तुनि

---

the particular time [and] fit to be experienced in the particular ways. There, the relation of the stultified and the stultifying does fit in on account of its being the object of experience of all and on account of being devoid of that and so everything is quite reasonable.

Again, as to what [has been stated]—Ajñāna, indefinable either as 'Sat' or as 'Asat' is established by the Śruti,—[we reply]—It is false, on account of the word 'Anṛta' indeed, not denoting something indefinable in the passage,

'*By falsehood indeed, they are drawn away* [*from Brahman*].' (Chā. 8·3 2)

For, the word 'Anṛta' refers to something other than 'Ṛta'. 'Ṛta' it expressive of [sacrificial] act, on account of the expression,

'[*The two*] *drinking the Ṛta*'. (Kā. 3·1)

'Ṛtam' [is] Karman devoid of attachment to fruit, steeped in worship of the Highest Puruṣa ; having for its fruit the aquisition of Him. Here, the Karman other than that giving the fruit belonging to worldly existence—'Anṛta' [is] opposed to the attainment of Brahman on account of the Sruti statement—

'*They do not secure this Brahman world, for by falsehood, indeed, they are drawn away* [*from Brahman*]'. (Chā. 8·3·2)

In the [following] passage also—

'*There was neither* '*Sat*' *nor* '*Asat*' *at that time*'. (Tait. Br. 2·8·9·3)

the words 'Sat' and 'Asat' refer to the sentient and non-sentient individually. Here, there is not stated at all 'indefinable character' of something either as existent or non-existent, owing to this passage aiming at the exposition of the merging into the thing denotable by the word 'Tamas' which has become the

प्रलयप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, अस्य वाक्यस्य नात्र कस्यचित् सदसदनिर्वचनीयतोच्यते, सदसतोः कालविशेषेऽसद्भावमात्रवचनात्। अत्र 'तमः'शब्दाभिहितस्य, अचित्समष्टित्वं श्रुत्यन्तरादवगम्यते —

'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते। अक्षरं तमसि लीयते। तमः परे देव एकीभवति।'
(सुबालोपनिषत्)

इति। सत्यं, 'तमः'शब्देन, अचित्समष्टिरूपायाः प्रकृतेः सूक्ष्मावस्थोच्यते। तस्यास्तु —

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' (श्वेता. ४।१०)

इति 'माया'शब्देनाभिधानात्, अनिर्वचनीयत्वम् — इति चेत् — नैतदेवम्, 'माया'-शब्दस्यानिर्वचनीयवाचित्वं न दृष्टम्, इति।

'माया'शब्दस्य 'मिथ्या'पर्यायत्वेनानिर्वचनीयत्वम्, इति चेत् — तदपि नास्ति। न हि सर्वत्र 'माया'शब्दो मिथ्याविषयः, असुरराक्षसशस्त्रादिषु सत्येष्वेव 'माया'शब्दप्रयोगात्। यथोक्तम्—

'तेन मायासहस्रं तच्छम्बरस्याशुगामिना।
बालस्य रक्षता देहमेकैकांशेन सूदितम्॥' (वि. पु. १।१९।२०)

---

totality of the non-sentient at the time of Dissolution, of the two objects, sentient and non-sentient individually, expressed by the words 'Sat' and 'Tyat' at the time of creation, because of the statement about merely the absence at a particular time in the case of 'Sat' and 'Asat'. Here is understood from another Śruti passage, the non-sentient cosmic nature of the thing denoted by the word 'Tamas'—

'The Unmanifest is merged into the Imperishable; the Imperishable is merged into the Tamas; the Tamas becomes one in the Highest God.' (Subālopaniṣad)

If it be argued— True, by the word 'Tamas' is spoken of, the subtle state of the Prakṛti constituted of the non-sentient cosmic nature, but of that [Prakṛti], there is the indefinable nature owing to its denotation by the word 'Māyā' in the passage,

'And one should know Prakṛti as 'Māyā' (Śve. 4·10)

—[We reply]—Not this thus; because the word 'Māyā' is not seen to denote the indefinable.

If it were argued— The word 'Māyā' [expresses] indefinable nature on account of its being a synonym for 'Mithyā' [false],—[we reply]—That too exists not. Not indeed is the word 'Māyā' everywhere referring to 'Mithyā', on account of the use of the word 'Māyā' to refer definitely to real [objects], weapons etc. of Asuras and Rākṣasas. As has been stated—

'By that quickly moving [discus of the Lord], protecting the body of the child, was destroyed that [well-known] thousand 'Māyās' of Sambara, with its each individual portion.' (V. P. 1·19·20)

इति। अतो 'माया'शब्दो विचित्रार्थसर्गकराभिधायी। प्रकृतेश्च 'माया'शब्दाभिधानं विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वादेव।

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्।
तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः॥' (श्वे. ४।९)

इति 'माया'शब्दवाच्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्वं दर्शयति। परमपुरुषस्य च तद्वत्तामात्रेण मायित्वमुच्यते, न, अज्ञत्वेन। जीवस्यैव हि मायया विरोधः श्रूयते —

'तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः।' (श्वेता. ४।९)
'अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते' (गौडपाद १।१६)

इति च।

'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते' (बृ. २।५।१९) (ऋ. ६।४७।१८)

इति, अत्रापि विचित्राः शक्तयोऽभिधीयन्ते। अत एव हि—

'भूरि त्वष्टेह (व) राजति' (ऋ. ६।४७।१९)

इत्युच्यते। न हि मिथ्याभूतः कश्चिद्विराजते।

'मम माया दुरत्यया' (गीता ७।१४)

इति, अत्रापि 'गुणमयी'इति वचनात् सैव त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृतिरुच्यते इति, न श्रुतिभिः सदसदनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानप्रतिपादनम्।

Therefore, the word 'Māyā' is expressive of the nature of the creator of varie d objects. And the denotation by the word 'Māyā' of Prakṛti is definitely on account of its being the creator of varied objects. The passage—

'From this, the Māyin creates this universe, and therein another is well restrained by the Māyā.' (Śvet. 4·9)

indicates the nature of a creator of varied objects in the case of Prakṛti—denoted by the word 'Māyā.' The nature of the Māyin is spoken of in respect of the Highest Puruṣa, simply on account of his being possessed of that [Māyā] and not as being ignorant. Indeed, the restraint by [or, opposition to] Māyā of the individual self himself, is, verily, found in the [following] Śruti [passages]—

'And therein, another is well-restrained by Māyā'. (Śve. 4·9)

'When the individual soul, asleep, owing to the beginningless Māyā is awakened'. (Gauḍa. 1·16)

And here also,

'Indra, of va forms, moves on with his Māyās.' (Bṛ. 2·5·19) (Ṛg. 6·47·18)

Here also, are denoted varied powers. For this very reason, it has been stated

'Here, [like] Tvaṣṭṛ, he shines a great deal.' (Ṛg. 6·47·19)

For, nobody who is false, shines. Even in the passage,

'My Māyā is difficult to transcend—' (Gītā 7·14)

is spoken of, that same Prakṛti constituted of the three Guṇas on account of the expression '[Prakṛti is] constituted of the Guṇas'—So there is no exposition of the Ajñāna indefinable either as 'Sat' or 'Asat,' by the Śruti passages.

नाप्यैक्योपदेशम्, अनुपपत्त्या। न हि

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति जीवपरयोरैक्योपदेशे सति सर्वज्ञसत्यसंकल्पे सकलजगत्सर्गस्थितिविनाशहेतुभूते 'तत्'शब्दावगते प्रकृते ब्रह्मणि विरुद्धाज्ञानपरिकल्पनाहेतुभूता काचिदप्यनुपपत्तिर्दृश्यते। ऐक्योपदेशस्तु 'त्वं'शब्देनापि जीवशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मण एवाभिधानात्, उपपन्नतरः।

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि।' (छा. ६।३।२)

इति सर्वस्य वस्तुनः परमात्मपर्यन्तस्यैव हि नामरूपभाक्त्वमुक्तम्। अतो न ब्रह्माज्ञानपरिकल्पनम्।

[69] इतिहासपुराणयोरपि न ब्रह्माज्ञानवादः क्वचिदपि दृश्यते।

ननु —

'ज्योतींषि विष्णुः' (वि. पु. २।१२।३८)

इति ब्रह्म, एकमेव तत्त्वम्, इति प्रतिज्ञाय —

'ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसौ' (वि. पु. २।१२।३९)

इति शैलाब्धिधरादिभेदभिन्नस्य जगतो ज्ञानैकस्वरूपब्रह्माज्ञानविजृम्भितत्वम्, एवाभिधाय,

---

Nor again, is there any instruction about the oneness on account of the impossibility thereof. Not indeed, when there is the instruction about the oneness of the individual soul and the highest soul, in the passage—

'*That thou art*' (Chā. 6·8·7)

is there seen no impossibility whatsoever that is the cause of the assumption of the contrary 'Ajñāna' in respect of the matter in hand, Brahman, known from the word 'That', [which is] omniscient, and having all desires fulfilled, [and which is] the cause of creation, sustenance, [and] destruction of the entire world. As to the instruction about oneness, it is, far more appropriate on account of the denotation of Brahman itself that has Jīva for its body, by the word 'Tvam' also,

'*Having entered subsequently by this living Ātman, let me modify name and form*'. (Chā. 6·3·2)

—in this passage is, indeed, stated being the possessor of name and form, verily, on the part of all objects right up to Paramātman himself. Therefore, there cannot be the assumption of Ajñāna in respect of Brahman.

[69] Nowhere even in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa [compositions], is seen the doctrine of Ajñāna in Brahman.

I say [says the objector]—Having solemnly declared that Brahman alone is the only one reality in the passage—

'*Luminaries, Viṣṇu*' (V. P. 2·12·38)

—having stated that the world differentiated by the distinctions such as mountain, ocean, earth etc. has, verily, the nature of the display of Ajñāna in Brahman that has the uniform nature viz. 'Jñāna' [as in]—

'*That Lord possessed of Jñāna as [His] nature.*' (V. P. 2·12·39)

'*यदा तु शुद्धं निजरूपि*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४०)

इति ज्ञानभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणः स्वस्वरूपावस्थितिवेलायां वस्तुभेदाभावदर्शनेन अज्ञानविजृम्भितत्वम्, एव स्थिरीकृत्य,

'*वस्त्वस्ति किम्*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४१)

'*मही घटत्वम्*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४२)

इति श्लोकद्वयेन जगदुपलब्धिप्रकारेणापि वस्तुभेदानामसत्यत्वम्, उपपाद्य,

'*तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृते*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४३)

इति प्रतिज्ञातं ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य, असत्यत्वमुपसंहृत्य,

'*विज्ञानमेकम्*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४३)

इति ज्ञानस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि भेददर्शनानिमित्ताज्ञानमूलं निजकर्मैव, इति स्फुटीकृत्य —

'*ज्ञानं विशुद्धम्*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४४)

इति ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपं विशोध्य,

'*सद्भाव एवं भवतो मयोक्तः*' (वि. पु. २।१२।४५)

इति ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मण एव सत्यत्वम्, न, अन्यस्य; अन्यस्य चासत्यत्वमेव, तस्य भुवनादेः सत्यत्वं व्यावहारिकम्, इति तत्त्वं तवोपदिष्टम् एव, इति—उपदेशो हि दृश्यते।

—having, verily, made firm the nature of display of Ajñāna in Brahman constituted of Jñāna, by pointing out to the negation of difference in things at the time of abiding in its own nature, [in the passage]—

'*But when pure and in its own form.*' (V. P. 2·12·40)

—having reasoned out the false nature of differences in things even by the mode of perception of the world in the two verses—

'*Is there a thing?*' (V. P. 2·12·41)

[and]

'*The earth, nature of a jar*' (V. P. 2·12·42)

—having wound up the false nature of things other than Brahman that is solemnly declared in the passage—

'*Therefore not excepting Vijñāna*' (V. P. 2·12·43)

—having made clear that one's own Karman itself is the root of Ajñāna, the cause of perception of difference in Brahman having Jñāna as its nature, [in the passage]—

'*The Vijñāna alone*' (V. P. 2·12·43)

—having made quite clear the nature of Brahman having Jñāna for its nature [in the passage],

'*Jñāna extremely pure*' (V. P. 2·12·44)

has been explained to you the reality viz. the real nature of Brahman alone having Jñāna as its nature and not of any other ; and the false nature, verily, of any other ; [and] the reality of universe etc. being phenomenal, in the passage—

'*In this way the nature of the Existent has been spoken to you by me.*' (V. P. 2·12·45)

—such instruction is seen.

नैतदेवम् । अत्र भुवनकोशस्य विस्तीर्णं स्वरूपमुक्त्वा पूर्वमनुक्तं रूपान्तरं संक्षेपतः

'श्रूयताम् ...' (वि. पु. २।१२।३६)

इति, आरभ्य, अभिधीयते । चिदचिन्मिश्रे जगति चिदंशो वाङ्मनसागोचरस्वसंवेद्यस्वरूपभेदो ज्ञानैकाकारतया, अस्पष्टप्राकृतभेदः, विनाशित्वेन 'अस्ति' शब्दवाच्यः। अचिदंशस्तु चिदंशकर्मनिमित्तपरिणामभेदो विनाशी, इति 'नास्ति' शब्दाभिधेयः। उभयं तु परब्रह्म-भूतवासुदेवशरीरतया तदात्मकम्, इति—एतद्रूपं संक्षेपेणात्राभिहितम् । तथाहि—

'यदम्बु वैष्णवः कायस्ततो विप्र वसुंधरा ।
पद्माकारा समुद्भूता पर्वताब्ध्यादिसंयुता ॥' (वि. पु. २।१२।३७)

इति, अम्बुनो विष्णुशरीरत्वेन, अम्बुपरिणामभूतं ब्रह्माण्डमपि विष्णोः कायः, तस्य च विष्णुरात्मा, इति सकलश्रुतिगततादात्म्योपदेशोपबृंहणरूपस्य सामानाधिकरण्यस्य,

'ज्योतींषि विष्णुः' (वि. पु. २।१२।३८)

इत्यारभ्य वक्ष्यमाणस्य, शरीरात्मभाव एव निबन्धनम्, इत्याह । अस्मिन् शास्त्रे पूर्व-मप्येतदसकृदुक्तम् —

[Our reply is]—Not this thus. Here, having stated the expansive nature of the universe-bud, has been stated, beginning with

'Listen', (V. P. 2·12·36)

in brief, another form not stated before. In the world, the mixture of the sentient and the non-sentient, the sentient portion with the difference in nature not within the ken of speech and mind and capable of being known by itself [and], with the differences caused by Prakṛti indistinct on account of its having the form of Jñāna alone, is expressed by the word 'Asti' [is] owing to its imperishable nature. The non-sentient portion, on the other hand, with the difference of modifications caused by the Karman of the sentient portion, is to be denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not], because it is perishable. Both [the forms], however, on account of their being the body of Vāsudeva who is the Highest Brahman, have Him as their Ātman.—This form has been stated here thus in brief. To explain the same—[in the passage]—

'What, water, the body of Viṣṇu; [O] Brahmin, from that up arose the earth in the form of a lotus, along with mountains, oceans etc.' (V. P. 2·12·37)

on account of water being the body of Viṣṇu, even the Brahmāṇḍa, the modified form of water, is the body of Viṣṇu, and Viṣṇu is the Ātman of that, and so he says that the relation of body and soul alone is the tie of the case-co-ordination of the nature of the amplification of the instruction regarding identity mentioned in the entire Sruti and which is being stated [down below in the passage] beginning with

'Luminaries, Viṣṇu'. (V. P. 2·12·38)

In this Sāstra, this has been stated even before more than once—[in passages]—

'तानि सर्वाणि तद्वपुः' (वि. पु. १।२२।८४)
'तत्सर्वं वै हरेस्तनुः' (वि. पु. १।२२।३७)
'स एव सर्वभूतात्मा प्रधानपुरुषात्मनः ।
विश्वरूपो यतोऽव्ययः ।' (वि. पु. १।२।६८)

इति ।

तत, इदं शरीरात्मभावापन्नं तादात्म्यं सामानाधिकरण्येन व्यपदिशति —
'ज्योतींषि विष्णुः' (वि. पु. २।१२।३८)

इति । अत्र, अस्त्यात्मकं नास्त्यात्मकं च जगदन्तर्गतं वस्तु विष्णोः कायतया विष्णवात्मकम्, इत्युक्तम् ।

'इदमस्त्यात्मकम्', 'इदं नास्त्यात्मकम्', 'अस्य च नास्त्यात्मकत्वे हेतुरयम्' इत्याह —
'ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसौ' (वि. पु. २।१२।३९)

इति । अशेषक्षेत्रज्ञात्मनावस्थितस्य भगवतो ज्ञानमेव स्वाभाविकं रूपम्, न देवमनुष्यादिवस्तुरूपम् । यत एवं तत एव, अचिद्रूपदेवमनुष्यशैलाब्धिधरादयश्च तद्विज्ञानविजृम्भिताः । तस्य ज्ञानैकाकारस्य सतो देवाद्याकारेण स्वात्मवैविध्यानुसंधानमूलाः, देवाद्याकारानुसंधानमूलकर्ममूलाः, इत्यर्थः । यतश्च, अचिद्वस्तु क्षेत्रज्ञकर्मानुगुणं परिणामास्पदम्, ततस्तत्,

---

'All those, His body' (V. P. 1·22·84)

'All that, verily, Hari's body' (V. P. 1·22·37)

'As He, [is] alone, [Ātman]' the constituent of all beings, encompassing Pradhāna, [and] Puruṣa, all-form, immutable'. (V. P. 1·2·68)

He points out therefore, this identity assuming the body and Ātman by case-co-ordination [in the passage]—

'Luminaries, Viṣṇu'. (V. P. 2·12·38)

Here it is stated—The objects within the world, having the nature of 'Asti' [is], [and] having the nature of 'Nāsti' [is not] have Viṣṇu as their Ātman, owing to their being the body of Viṣṇu.

This is of the nature of 'is' and that is of the nature of 'is not', and this is the cause of its being possessed of the nature of 'is not'— to point out to this, he says—

'In as much as the Lord is constituted of Jñāna'. (V. P. 2·12·39)

Jñāna alone is the natural form of the Lord abiding as the Ātman of all Kṣetrajñas, not the form of entities—gods, men etc. Because thus, for that very reason, gods, men, mountains, oceans etc. also of non-sentient nature are the all-out-displays of His Vijñāna. Of Him, being possessed of the form of Jñāna alone, [the displays] have for their basis continuity of their own varied nature owing to the forms of gods etc., having their root in the original Karman arising out of the continuity of the forms, gods and others— This is the sense. And because the non-sentient object in conformity with the Karman of the

'नास्ति'शब्दाभिधेयम्, इतरत् 'अस्ति'शब्दाभिधेयम्, — इत्यर्थादुक्तं भवति।

तदेव विवृणोति—

'यदा तु शुद्धं निजरूपि ...' (वि. पु. २।१२।४०)

इति। यदा, एतज्ज्ञानैकाकारमात्मवस्तु देवाद्याकारेण स्वात्मनि वैविध्यानुसंधानमूलसर्वकर्मक्षयान्निर्दोषं परिशुद्धं निजरूपि भवति, तदा देवाद्याकारेणैकीकृत्यात्मकल्पनमूलकर्मफलभूताः, तद्भोगार्थवस्तुषु वस्तुभेदा न भवन्ति। ये देवादिवस्तुष्वात्मतयाभिमतेषु योग्यभूता देवमनुष्यशैलाब्धिधरादिवस्तुभेदाः, ते तन्मूलभूतकर्मसु विनष्टेषु न भवन्ति, इति, अचिद्वस्तुनः कादाचित्कावस्थायोगितया 'नास्ति'शब्दाभिधेयत्वम्, इतरस्य सर्वदा निजसिद्धज्ञानैकाकारत्वेन 'अस्ति'शब्दाभिधेयत्वम्, इत्यर्थः।

[70] प्रतिक्षणमन्यथाभूततया कादाचित्कावस्थायोगिनोऽचिद्वस्तुनो 'नास्ति-'शब्दाभिधेयत्वमेव, इत्याह —

'वस्त्वस्ति किम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४१)

इति। 'अस्ति'शब्दाभिधेयो हि, आदिमध्यपर्यन्तहीनः सततैकरूपः पदार्थः, तस्य

Kṣetrajña is subject to modification, therefore it is fit to be denoted by the word 'is not;' other than that is fit to be denoted by the word 'is'— This is obviously the statement made.

The same he expounds in the passage,

'*But when pure and in its own form ...*' (V. P. 2·12·40)

—when this thing viz. Ātman having the one form as Jñāna, becomes possessed of his own form completely pure, free from defects due to the destruction of all Karman based upon the continuity of the varied nature in themselves in the form—gods etc., then there would not be distinctive objects, in the case of objects meant for his enjoyment, that are the result of the Karman which is at the root of various ideas about the Ātman, on account of the forms—gods etc. being merged into one. Those distinctions about objects, gods, men, mountains, oceans, the earth etc., that become fit for enjoyment in [the case of] objects gods etc., regarded as Ātman, would not be [there] when the Karmans that are their basis have perished—and so the non-sentient thing is fit to be denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not] on account of its being associated with a casual state; another than that is fit to be denoted by the word 'Asti' [is] on account of its being possessed of a uniform nature of Jñāna self-established—This is the sense.

[70] The non-sentient thing associated with a casual state, is definitely fit to be denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not] on account of its becoming otherwise every moment. So he says—

'*Is [there] a thing?*' (V. P. 2·12·41)

For, the object fit to be denoted by the word 'Asti' [is], is devoid of beginning, middle and end, [and] being possessed of a uniform nature, always on account of its not deserving the idea [viz.] 'Nāsti' [is not]. No non-sentient thing

कदाचिदपि 'नास्ति' बुद्ध्यनर्हत्वात्। अचिद्वस्तु किंचित्क्वचिदपि तथाभूतं न दृष्टचरम्। 'ततः किम्?' —इत्यत्राह —

'यच्चान्यथात्वम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४१)

इति। यद्वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं याति तत्, उत्तरोत्तरावस्थाप्राप्त्या पूर्वपूर्वावस्थां जहाति, इति तस्य पूर्वावस्थस्योत्तरावस्थायां न प्रतिसंधानमस्ति। अतः सर्वदा तस्य 'नास्ति-' शब्दाभिधेयत्वमेव। तथा ह्युपलभ्यते, इत्याह—

'मही घटत्वम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४२)

इति। स्वकर्मणा देवमनुष्यादिभावेन स्तिमितात्मनिश्चयैः स्वभोग्यभूतम्, अचिद्वस्तु प्रतिक्षणमन्यथाभूतमालक्ष्यते, अनुभूयते—इत्यर्थः। एवं सति, किमप्यचिद्वस्तु 'अस्ति' शब्दार्हमादिमध्यपर्यन्तहीनं सततैकरूपम्, आलक्षितमस्ति किम्? न हि, अस्ति, इत्यभिप्रायः।

यस्मादेवम्, तस्माज्ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मव्यतिरिक्तमचिद्वस्तु कदाचित्क्वाचित्केवल- 'अस्ति' शब्दवाच्यं न भवति — इत्याह —

'तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृते' (वि. पु. २।१२।४३)

इति। आत्मा तु सर्वत्र ज्ञानैकाकारतया देवादिभेदप्रत्यनीकस्वरूपोऽपि देवादिशरीरप्रवेश-

---

whatsoever is ever seen to be of that kind anywhere. 'What then?'—referring to this passage, does he state

'*And what is this being otherwise*'. (V. P. 2·12·41)

What thing attains to a form otherwise every moment, that discards each preceding state, securing each succeeding state and so there is no continuity of that with its previous state in the succeeding state. There, it has definitely the nature of always being denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not]. And in the same way it is so found—thus [he] says [in the passage]—

'*The earth, nature of a jar*'. (V. P. 2·12·42)

That is to say, it is experienced by those whose ascertainment of the Ātman brought to a stand still on account of their forms as gods, men etc. as a result of their Karman,—the non-sentient thing, which has become fit for their enjoyment is noticed as becoming otherwise every moment.—This is the sense. This being the case, is there noticed any non-sentient thing fit for being designated by the word 'Asti' which [is] devoid of beginning, middle and end, [and] always possessed of a uniform nature? Not indeed it exists—This is the purport.

Because it is so, therefore, the non-sentient thing other than the Atman having Jñāna as his nature, can never become fit to be expressed merely by the word 'Asti' [is], any time, anywhere—so he says [in the passage]—

'*Therefore, not without Vijñāna*'. (V. P. 2·12·43)

Ātman, on the other hand, though having the nature contrary to his distinctions, gods etc. owing to his having the form of Jñāna alone everywhere, is mostly associated with different forms by those who regard the Ātman to be

हेतुभूतस्वकृतविविधकर्ममूलदेवादिभेदभिन्नात्मबुद्धिभिः, तेन तेन रूपेण बहुधानुसंहितः, इति तन्नेदानुसंधानं नात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तम् — इत्याह —

'विज्ञानमेकम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४३)

इति—

आत्मस्वरूपं तु कर्मरहितम्। तत एव मलरूपप्रकृतिस्पर्शरहितम्। ततश्च तत्प्रयुक्तशोकमोहलोभाद्यशेषहेयगुणासङ्गि। उपचयापचयानर्हतया, एकम्। तत एव सदैकरूपम्। तच्च वासुदेवशरीरम्, इति तदात्मकम्। अतदात्मकस्य कस्यचिदप्यभावात्— इत्याह—

'ज्ञानं विशुद्धम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४४)

इति।

चिदंशः सदैकरूपतया सर्वदा, 'अस्ति'शब्दवाच्यः। अचिदंशस्तु प्रतिक्षण-परिणामित्वेन सर्वदा नाशगर्भः, इति सर्वदा 'नास्ति'शब्दाभिधेयः। एवंरूपं चिदचिदात्मकं जगत्, वासुदेवशरीरं तदात्मकम्, इति जगद्याथात्म्यं सम्यगुक्तम् — इत्याह —

'सद्भाव एवम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४५)

इति। अत्र सत्यम्-असत्यम्, इति, यदस्ति यन्नास्ति, इति प्रक्रान्तस्योपसंहारः। एवं ज्ञानैका-

---

different, owing to the distinctions, gods etc. based upon manifold Karman performed by themselves and that has become the cause of [Ātman's] entering into the bodies of gods etc. and so the continued association of those distinctions is not prompted by the nature of Ātman—thus [with this idea] he says—

'*Vijñāna alone*'. (V. P. 2·12·43)

The nature of Atman, on the other hand, is divorced from Karman, and for that very reason is devoid of contact with the Prakṛti constituted of impurity, and therefore, it is not associated with all the qualities fit to be abandoned, such as grief, infatuation, greed etc., prompted by that [Prakṛti]. He is one, on account of his not being fit for increase or decrease. For that very reason, it [the nature of Ātman] is always uniform—and so, that is the body of Vāsudeva, and so, that has Him for his Ātman, on account of the absence of anything not having Him for his Ātman—so [he] says—

'*Jñāna extremely pure*'. (V. P. 2·12·44)

The sentient portion on account of its having a uniform nature always, is always to be expressed by the word 'Asti' [is]. The non-sentient portion, on the other hand, is always fit to be denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not], because it is always potentially perishable on account of its nature of being modified every moment. The world of this form constituted of the sentient, and the non-sentient, the body of Vāsudeva, has Him as its Ātman,—thus the real nature of the world has been well expressed, and so he says—

'*The nature of the existent in this way*'. (V. P. 2·12·45)

Here, there is the winding up of what was introduced as 'what is' [and] 'what is not', by 'real' [and] 'unreal'. Thus, what is uniform on account

कारतया समम्, अशब्दगोचरस्वरूपभेदम्, एव, अचिन्मिश्रं भुवनाश्रितं देवमनुष्यादिरूपेण सम्यग्व्यवहारार्हभेदं यद्वर्तते, तत्र हेतुः कर्मैवेत्युक्तम् — इत्याह —

'एतत्तु यद्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४५)

इति। तदेव विवृणोति —

'यज्ञः पशुः' (वि. पु. २।१२।४६)

इति। जगद्याथार्थ्यज्ञानप्रयोजनं मोक्षोपाययतनम् — इत्याह —

'यच्चैतद्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४७)

इति।

[71] अत्र निर्विशेषे परे ब्रह्मणि, तदाश्रये सदसदनिर्वचनीये च, अज्ञाने जगतस्तत्कल्पितत्वे वा, अनुगुणं किंचिदपि पदं न दृश्यते। 'अस्ति' 'नास्ति—' शब्दाभिधेयं चिदचिदात्मकं कृत्स्नं जगत्परमस्य परेशस्य ब्रह्मणो विष्णोः कायत्वेन तदात्मकम्, ज्ञानैकाकारस्यात्मनो देवादिविविधाकारानुभवे, अचित्परिणामे च हेतुर्वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानविरोधि, क्षेत्रज्ञानां कर्म, एव, इति प्रतिपादनात्। 'अस्ति', 'नास्ति', 'सत्य', 'असत्य'—शब्दानां च सदसदनिर्वचनीयवस्त्वभिधानासामर्थ्यात्, च। 'नास्ति-असत्य',

---

of its having Jñāna alone as its form, with the difference in its nature not capable of being expressed in words, figures as mixed with non-sentient, as resorting to the universe and as possessed of differences fit for practical usage in the forms, gods, men etc.—the cause thereof is Karman alone—This he says, [in the passage]

'*This however, which*'. (V. P. 2·12·45)

The same he explains—

'*Sacrifice beast* [*victim*]'. (V. P. 2·12·46)

Striving after means for salvation, has for its purpose the knowledge of the world as it is. So, he says—

'*And what this*'. (V. P. 2·12·47)

[71] Here, in respect of the distinctionless, Highest Brahman, and in respect of Ajñāna having That as its resort, [and] indefinable either as existent or non-existent, or in respect of the world being imagined by that, there is not seen [any] word in conformity with this. The entire world constituted of the sentient and non-sentient, fit to be denoted by words 'Asti' [is], [and] 'Nāsti' [is not], on account of its being the body of Viṣṇu, the Highest Brahman [and] the Supreme Controller, has Him for its Atman, on account of the exposition that the Karman alone of the Kṣetrajña, opposed to the knowledge of things as they are, is the cause of the experience of various forms, gods and others, and in the modification of the non-sentient in respect of the Ātman having Jñāna as having one form; and on account of the powerlessness to denote a thing indefinable as existent or non-existent, in the case of the word 'Asti' [is], 'Nāsti' [is not], 'Satya' [true], [and] 'Asatya' [untrue]. The words 'Nāsti' and 'Asatya' are

शब्दौ, 'अस्ति-सत्य' शब्दविरोधिनौ। अतश्च, एताभ्यामसत्यत्वं हि प्रतीयते, नानिर्वचनीयत्वम्। अत्र च, अचिद्वस्तुनि 'नास्ति-असत्य'शब्दौ न तुच्छत्वमिथ्यात्वपरौ प्रयुक्तौ, अपि तु विनाशित्वपरौ।

'वस्त्वस्ति किम्' (वि. पु. २।१२।४१)

'मही घटत्वम्' (वि. पु २।१२।४२)

इति, अत्र विनाशित्वमेव ह्युपपादितम्, न निष्प्रमाणकत्वम् ज्ञानबाध्यत्वं वा, एकेनाकारेणैकस्मिन्काले ऽनुभूतस्य कालान्तरे परिणामविशेषेणान्यथोपलब्ध्या नास्तित्वोपपादनात्। 'तुच्छत्वं' हि प्रमाणसंबन्धानर्हत्वम्। बाधोऽपि यद्देशकालसंबन्धितया यत् 'अस्ति' इति, उपलब्धम्—तस्य तद्देशकालसंबन्धितया 'नास्ति' इति, उपलब्धिः, न तु कालान्तरेऽनुभूतस्य कालान्तरे परिणामादिना 'नास्ति' इति, उपलब्धिः, कालभेदेन विरोधाभावात्। अतो न मिथ्यात्वम्। एतदुक्तं भवति—

ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मवस्तु, आदिमध्यपर्यन्तरहितं सततैकरूपम्, इति स्वत एव सदा 'अस्ति'शब्दवाच्यम्। अचेतनं तु क्षेत्रज्ञभोग्यभूतं तत्कर्मानुगुणपरिणामि विनाशि, इति सर्वदा नास्त्यर्थगर्भम्, इति 'नास्ति-असत्य'शब्दाभिधेयम्—इति।

---

contradictory to the words 'Asti' and 'Satya'. Therefore, from these two, indeed, is apprehended the false nature and not the indefinable nature. And here in [respect of] the non-sentient thing, the words 'Nāsti' and 'Asatya' are not used as referring to unsubstantial nature and false nature, but as referring to perishability. Here [in the passages]—

'Is there a thing'? (V. P. 2 12·41)

[and]

'The earth, the nature of a jar'. (V. P. 2·12·42)

has, indeed, been pointed out perishability itself and not being subject to any means of proof, nor being stultified by Jñāna, on account of the pointing out to the nature of 'Nāsti' by the perception as otherewise, on account of the distinct modification at a different time of something experienced as having a particular form at a particular time. Unsubstantial nature, indeed, is, [does not mean] not deserving connection with the means of proof. Stultification also is, whatever is perceived as 'Asti' [is] on account of the connection of which space, time etc.—of that [there is] the perception as 'Nāsti' [is not], on account of the connection with that space, time etc., and not the perception as 'Nāsti' [is not] owing to the modification etc. at a different time of something experienced at a different time, on account of the absence of contradiction due to the difference in time. Therefore, there is no false nature. What is intended to be stated is—

The entity Ātman having Jñāna as its nature, devoid of beginning, middle and end, and [so] always uniform, and so, of its own accord it is expressible by the word 'Asti' [is]. The non-sentient, on the other hand, becoming the object of enjoyment for the Kṣetrajña, undergoing modification in conformity with his 'Karman' and [so] perishable, and so is expressible by the word 'Nāsti' [is not], [and] 'Asatya,' because it is always potentially possessed of the sense 'Nāsti' [is not].

यथोक्तम्—

'यत्तु कालान्तरेणापि नान्यसंज्ञामुपैति वै ।
परिणामादिसंभूतां तद्वस्तु नृप तच्च किम् ॥' (वि. पु. २।१३।९५)
'अनाशी परमार्थश्च प्राज्ञैरभ्युपगम्यते ।
तत्तु नाशि न संदेहो नाशिद्रव्योपपादितम् ॥' (वि. पु. २।१४।२४)

इति देशकालकर्मविशेषापेक्षया, अस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोगिनि वस्तुनि केवलास्तिबुद्धिबोध्यत्वम्, अपरमार्थः, इति हि, अपरमार्थः, इत्युक्तम् । आत्मन एव केवलास्तिबुद्धिबोध्यत्वम्, इति स परमार्थः, इत्युक्तम् । श्रोतुश्च मैत्रेयस्य—

'विष्ण्वाधारं यथा चैतत् त्रैलोक्यं समवस्थितम् ।
परमार्थश्च मे प्रोक्तो यथा ज्ञानं प्रधानतः ॥' (वि. पु. २।१३।२)

इति, अनुभाषणाच्च ।

'ज्योतींषि विष्णुः' (वि. पु. २।१२।३८)

इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यस्यात्मशरीरभाव एव निबन्धनम्, चिदचिद्वस्तुनोश्च, 'अस्ति'-'नास्ति'शब्दयोगनिबन्धनम्, ज्ञानस्य, अकर्मनिमित्तस्वाभाविकस्वरूपत्वेन स्वरूपप्राधान्यम्, अचिद्वस्तुनश्च तत्तत्कर्मनिमित्तपरिणामित्वेन, अप्राधान्यम्—इति प्रतीयते ।

As has been stated—

'What again does not attain to another appellation arising from modification etc. even after a lapse of time,—what [is] that thing?' [O] king, and what [is] all that?' (V. P. 2·13·95)

'And the reality is admitted by the wise as indestructible. There is no doubt that anything produced by a perishable substance is but perishable.' (V. P. 2·14·24)

Thus, because unreality is the nature of being known by the mere notion 'Asti' in respect of a thing associated with the nature of 'Asti' [is], and the nature of 'Nāsti' [is not], owing to its dependence upon particular space, time and action,—therefore, indeed, it is spoken of as unreality. It has been stated that because Atman alone has the nature of being known by the mere notion of 'Asti' and so, he is reality; and on account of the listener-Maitreya's after-speech—

'How these three worlds with Viṣṇu as their support are well stationed [and] how consciousness in the main is the reality, have been spoken of to me.' (V. P. 2·13·2)

It is apprehended that the case-co-ordination in—

'Luminaries, Viṣṇu' etc. (V. P. 2·12·38)

has for its basis the relation of body and soul alone, and the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' objects have for their basis the use of the words 'Asti' [is], and 'Nāsti' [is not] ; a quite prominent nature of its own in the case of knowledge on account of its having the original nature not caused by Karman ; and the non-prominence of the 'Acit' on account of its nature of undergoing modifications caused by the various Karmans.

[72] यदुक्तम्—निर्विशेषब्रह्मज्ञानादेवाविद्यानिवृत्तिं वदन्ति श्रुतयः—इति, तदसत्,

'वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।' (श्वे. ३।८)
'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति ।
नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥' (तै. आ. ३।१३।१)
'सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे विद्युतः पुरुषादधि ।
न तस्येशे कश्चन । तस्य नाम महद्यशः ।
य एनं विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ।' (म. ना. १।८।१०–११)

इत्याद्यनेकवाक्यविरोधात् । ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वादेव सर्वाण्यपि वाक्यानि सविशेषज्ञानादेव मोक्षं वदन्ति । शोधकवाक्यान्यपि सविशेषमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति—इत्युक्तम् ।

'तत्त्वमसि'—आदिवाक्येषु, सामानाधिकरण्यं न निर्विशेषवस्त्वैक्यपरम्, 'तत्,' 'त्वम्'-पदयोः सविशेषब्रह्माभिधायित्वात् । 'तत्'पदं हि सर्वज्ञं सत्यसंकल्पं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म परामृशति,

'तदैक्षत । बहु स्याम्' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यादिषु तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात्, 'तत्' समानाधिकरणं 'त्वम्' पदं च, अचिद्विशिष्टजीवशरीरकं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, प्रकारद्वयावस्थितैकवस्तुपरत्वात्सामानाधिकरण्यस्य । प्रकार-

---

[72] As to what has been said—that the Śruti-passages speak of the turning away of Avidyā by the knowledge of the distinctionless Brahman alone, [we reply]—That is false, due to the contradiction with many passages like,

'I know this great Puruṣa, fire-coloured and beyond darkness.' (Śve. 3·8)

'Knowing him thus, he becomes immortal. There is no other path for salvation'. (Tait. Ā. 3·13·1)

'All 'Nimeṣas' [moments] arose of the Lightning-Puruṣa; no one rules over Him; His name is 'Mahadyaśaḥ'. Those who know Him, immortal they become'. (M. Nā. 1·8·10,11)

On account of Brahman being, verily, possessed of qualifying attributes, all the passages as well speak of salvation, only from the knowledge of [Brahman having] qualifying attributes. It has been [already] stated that even the probative passages propound Brahman as definitely being with qualifying attributes.

The case-co-ordination in passages like 'That thou art' does not aim at the oneness of the distinctionless thing, on account of the words 'Tat' and 'Tvam' denoting Brahman with qualifying attributes. The word 'Tat' indeed, touches upon the Brahman—omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled, the cause of the world—on account of the same being the matter in hand in passages like,

'That reflected,—May I be many.' (Cha. 6·2·3)

And the word 'Tvam' having the case-co-ordination with 'Tat' propounds Brahman having for its body the Jīva [the individual Soul] particularised by the 'Acit', on account of the case-co-ordination referring to one thing remaining in two modes. If [there is the] giving up of the two modes, the

द्वयपरित्यागे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदासंभवेन सामानाधिकरण्यमेव परित्यक्तं स्यात् । द्वयोः पदयोर्लक्षणा च । 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यत्रापि न लक्षणा, भूतवर्तमानकालसंबन्धितया, ऐक्यप्रतीत्यविरोधात् । देशभेदविरोधश्च कालभेदेन परिहृतः ।,

'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्युपक्रमविरोधश्च । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा च न घटते । ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य निरस्तनिखिलदोषस्य सर्वज्ञस्य समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकस्य, अज्ञानतत्कार्यानन्तापुरुषार्थाश्रयत्वं च न संभवति ।

बाधार्थत्वे च सामानाधिकरण्यस्य 'तत्'' त्वं'-पदयोरधिष्ठानलक्षणा निवृत्तिलक्षणा च, इति लक्षणादयस्त एव दोषाः । इयांस्तु विशेषः—'न, इदं रजतम्' इतिवत्, अप्रतिपन्नस्यैव बाधस्य, अगत्या परिकल्पनम् । 'तत्'पदेनाधिष्ठानातिरेकिधर्मानुपस्थापनेन बाधानुपपत्तिश्च ।

अधिष्ठानं तु प्राक्तिरोहितम्, अतिरोहितस्वरूपं 'तत्' पदेनोपस्थाप्यते, इति चेत्—न, अधिष्ठानाप्रकाशे तदाश्रयभ्रमबाधयोरसंभवात् ।

---

case-co-ordination itself would be given up on account of the impossibility of difference due to activity, and there would be an indicative sense in both the words. Even in the passage 'that is this Devadatta' there is no indicative sense on account of the absence of contradiction of the apprehension of oneness owing to its being connected with past and present times. And the contradiction regarding the difference of space is refuted by [taking into consideration] the difference in time; and there would be the contradiction with the introduction in [the passage],

'That reflected, May I be many'. (Chā. 6·2·3)

And the solemn declaration of the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one, would not fit in. In the case of one with Jñāna as his nature, with all blemishes banished away, omniscient [and] possessed of all auspicious qualities—being the resort of Ajñāna, its functions, [and] endless pseudo-purposes of life, is not possible.

With the case-co-ordination pointing out to stultification, there would be the indication about the basis in the case of 'Tat' and 'Tvam', and the indication about the removal, and thus there would be the same blemishes as in indication and others. This, however, is the special feature here. As in the case of 'This is not silver,' there being no other alternative, there is the assumption of a stultification although not apprehended. And further, there is the impossibility of the stultification by the non-establishment of an attribute over and above the basis by the word 'Tat'.

If it were argued—That as for the basis, it is already screened [and] by the word 'Tat' is established its non-screened nature, [we reply]—No, on account of the impossibility of delusion and stultification having that [basis] for its resort, when there is non-illumination of the basis.

[73] भ्रमाश्रयम्, अधिष्ठानम्, अतिरोहितम्—इति चेत्—तदेवाधिष्ठानस्वरूपं, भ्रमविरोधि इति, तत्प्रकाशे सुतरां न तदाश्रयभ्रमबाधौ। अतोऽधिष्ठानातिरेकिपारमार्थिकधर्मतात्तिरोधानानभ्युपगमे भ्रान्तिबाधौ दुरुपपादौ। अधिष्ठाने हि पुरुषमात्राकारे प्रतीयमाने, तदतिरेकिणि पारमार्थिके राजत्वे तिरोहिते सति, एव व्याधत्वभ्रमः। राजत्वोपदेशेन च तन्निवृत्तिर्भवति, नाधिष्ठानमात्रोपदेशेन, तस्य प्रकाशमानत्वेनानुपदेश्यत्वात्, भ्रमानुपमर्दित्वाच्च।

जीवशरीरकजगत्कारणब्रह्मपरत्वे मुख्यवृत्तं पदद्वयम्। प्रकारद्वयविशिष्टैकवस्तुप्रतिपादनेन सामानाधिकरण्यं च सिद्धम्। निरस्तनिखिलदोषस्य समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मकस्य ब्रह्मणो जीवान्तर्यामित्वम्, अपि, ऐश्वर्यमपरं प्रतिपादितं भवति, उपक्रमानुकूलता च, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानोपपत्तिश्च, सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरस्यैव ब्रह्मणः स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरत्वेन कार्यत्वात्।

'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरम्' (श्वे. ६।७)

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते' (श्वे. ६।८)

'अपहतपाप्मा' (छा. ८।१।५; ८।७।१)

---

[73] If it be argued,—The basis, the resort of delusion is not screened, [we reply]—Because that same nature of the basis is contrary to illusion, there would not be by far and away the illusion and stultification having that as their resort, when there is its illumination. Therefore, delusion and stultification would be difficult to explain in the non-admission of the real attribute over and above the basis, and its screening; for, when the basis having the form of a mere human being is apprehended, there is the illusion about the nature of a hunter only when the kingly nature over and above that, and real, is screened. And there is its removal by the instruction about merely the kingly nature and not by the instruction about merely the basis, on account of its being not fit to be instructed about, owing to its being illumining [evident] before, and, on account of the delusion not being smothered over.

The two words have their primary power in pointing to the Brahman as the cause of the world, and having Jīva for its body. And the case-co-ordination is established by the propounding of one thing particularised by two modes. And there would be propounded another lordly characteristic also,—the nature of being the Inner Controller of the world—of Brahman with all blemishes banished away, [and] possessed of all auspicious qualities; there is also the conformity with the introduction, and also the accounting for of the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one, because Brahman having for its body the subtle 'Cit' and 'Acit' things, becomes the effect owing to its having the gross 'Cit' and 'Acit' things for its body. There would be the non-contradiction as well with other Śruti passages such as—

'Him, the highest great Lord of Lords'. (Śve. 6·7)

'His highest power is, verily, known to be manifold'. (Śve. 6·8)

'With sins destroyed'. (Chā. 8·1·5, 8·7·1)

'सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. ८।१।५; ८।७।१)

इत्यादिश्रुत्यन्तराविरोधश्च ।

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, अत्र, उद्देश्योपादेयविभागः कथम् ?—इति चेत्—नात्र किंचिदुद्दिश्य किमपि विधीयते,

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति, अनेनैव प्राप्तत्वात् । अप्राप्ते हि शास्त्रमर्थवत् । 'इदं सर्वम्' इति सजीवं जगन्निर्दिश्य, 'ऐतदात्म्यम्' इति, 'तस्यैष आत्मा' इति तत्र प्रतिपादितम् । हेतुरप्युक्तः—

'सन्मूलाः सौम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः' (छा. ६।८।४)

इति ।

'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म, तज्जलानिति शान्तः' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इतिवत् ।

तथा श्रुत्यन्तराणि च ब्रह्मणस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनश्च शरीरात्मभावमेव तादात्म्यं वदन्ति ।

'अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै. आ. ३।११।२)

'य पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरः । यं पृथिवी न वेद । यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् । यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति । स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ।' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

'*With desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled*'. (Chā. 8·1·5, 8·7·1)

If it be argued,— How is that in [the passage],

'*That thou art*'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

there is the division of the subject and the predicate ?—[We reply]—Here nothing is predicated in respect of any subject, on account of this being already ascertained in the passage—

'*All this has that as the Ātman*'. (Chā. 6·8·7)

For, the Śāstra is significant only in respect of a thing not ascertained before. Having [first] pointed out to the world along with the individual souls in [the passage] 'all this', it is propounded in that context that 'this is its Ātman' in [the passage] 'this as Ātman'. And the reason thereof is also stated such as—

'*Dear one, these beings have their root in 'Sat', have their abode in 'Sat' [and] have their stability in 'Sat'*'. (Chā. 6·8·4)

'*All this, indeed is Brahman ; it is produced from, it is sublated in, it subsists because of, that, thus becoming tranquil*'. (Chā. 3·14·1)

And likewise, other Śruti passages speak of the relation of the body and soul alone as identity of Brahman, and 'Cit' and 'Acit' thing over and above that—

'*Entered within, the Controller of beings, the Ātman of all*'. (Tait. Ā. 3·11·2)

'*Who residing in the earth [is] different from the earth ; whom the earth knows not ; whose body [is] the earth ; who controls the earth inside, He is your Ātman, the Inner-Controller, immortal*'. (Bṛ. 3·7·23)

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरः । यमात्मा न वेद । यस्यात्मा शरीरम् । य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति । स ते आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ।' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

'यः पृथिवीमन्तरे संचरन्' इत्यारभ्य—

'यस्य मृत्युः शरीरम् । यं मृत्युर्न वेद । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः ।' (ना. २)

'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् ।' (तै. आ. २।६।१)

इत्यादीनि । अत्रापि—

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' (छा. ६।३।२)

इति, ब्रह्मात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशेनैव सर्वेषां वस्तुत्वं शब्दवाच्यत्वं च प्रतिपादितम्,

'तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्' (तै. आ. २।६।१)

इति, अनेनैकार्थ्यात्, जीवस्यापि ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं ब्रह्मानुप्रवेशादेव, इत्यवगम्यते । अतः, चिदचिदात्मकस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मतादात्म्यम्, आत्मशरीरभावादेव, इति निश्चीयते । तस्मात्, ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य तच्छरीरत्वेनैव वस्तुत्वात्, तस्य प्रतिपादकोऽपि शब्दः,

---

'Who, residing in the Ātman [is] different from the Ātman, whom the Ātman knows not, whose body [is] the Ātman, who controls the Ātman inside—He is your Ātman, the Inner-Controller, immortal'. (Bṛ. 3·7·22)

There are the passages beginning with 'who, moving about within the earth,

Whose body [is] Death; whom Death knows not—this one, the inner Ātman of all beings, with the sins destroyed, divine, refulgent, one [alone] Nārāyaṇa'. (Nā. 2)

'Having created it, it entered the same after. Having entered that, subsequently became 'Sat' and 'Tyat'. (Tait. Ā. 2·6·1)

In [the passage] also—

'Having subsequently entered into, with this living Self, let me modify name and form'. (Chā. 6·3·2)

has been propounded that, all become entities [and] are expressible in words, on account of the entrance within itself, of the individual souls with Brahman as their Ātman, as it has the same sense with that of the passage—

'Having entered within, that subsequently became 'Sat' and 'Tyat''. (Tait. Ā. 2·6·1)

The nature of having Brahman as his Atman, of Jīva also, is apprehended by the very entrance within, subsequently of Brahman. Therefore, it is ascertained that the identity with Brahman is due to the whole concourse of entities constituted of the 'Cit' and 'Acit' being its own body. Therefore, everything over and above Brahman, has the nature of an entity, verily, owing to its being the body of that Brahman, the word also propounding that denotes

तत्पर्यन्तमेव स्वार्थमभिदधाति । अतः सर्वशब्दानां लोकव्युत्पत्त्या, अवगततत्तत्पदार्थ-विशिष्टब्रह्माभिधायित्वं सिद्धम्, इति,

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् ।' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य

'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. ६।८।७)

इति सामानाधिकरण्येन विशेषेणोपसंहारः ।

अतो निर्विशेषवस्त्वैक्यवादिनः, भेदाभेदवादिनः, केवलभेदवादिनश्च वैयधिकरण्येन सामानाधिकरण्येन च सर्वे ब्रह्मात्वभावोपदेशाः परित्यक्ताः स्युः ।

[74] एकस्मिन्वस्तुनि कस्य तादात्म्यमुपदिश्यते ? तस्यैव—इति चेत्,—तत्स्ववाक्येनैवावगतम्, इति न तादात्म्योपदेशावसेयम्, अस्ति किंचित् ।

कल्पितभेदनिरसनम्—इति चेत्,--तत् तु न सामानाधिकरण्यतादात्म्योपदेशावसेयम्, इत्युक्तम् । सामानाधिकरण्यं तु ब्रह्मणि प्रकारद्वयप्रतिपादनेन विरोधमेवावहेत् ।

भेदाभेदवादे तु ब्रह्मण्येवोपाधिसंसर्गात्तत्प्रयुक्तजीवगतदोषा ब्रह्मण्येव प्रादुःष्युः, इति निरस्तनिखिलदोषकल्याणगुणात्मकब्रह्मात्मभावोपदेशा हि विरोधादेव परित्यक्ताः स्युः ।

---

its own sense right up to that [Brahman]. Therefore, it is proved that all words have the nature of denoting Brahman characterised by different entities apprehended by popular import, and so, there is the winding up particularly by the case-co-ordination in

'That thou art' (Chā. 6·8·7)

of the matter solemnly declared in

'All this has that as the Ātman' (Chā. 6·8·7)

Therefore, all the theories regarding the relation of Brahman being Atman by case-co-ordination [having the same abode] and non-case-co-ordination [having different abodes] would be fit to be abandoned-[the theories] of one who holds the oneness of the distinctionless thing, of one who holds that there is difference and non-difference, and of one who holds the view that there is absolute difference.

[**74**] Whose identity is to be preached in respect of one thing ? If it be argued—'Of that same', [we reply]—That has been already apprehended by the scriptural passage itself. Hence, nothing is to be ascertained by the instruction about identity.

If it be argued—There is the refutation of the assumed differences, [we reply] — It has already been said, that again is not to be ascertained by the instruction about identity due to the case-co-ordination. The case-co-ordination, on the other hand, would bring about contradiction itself, by propounding two modes in respect of Brahman.

In the Difference-cum-non-difference theory, however, because of the contact with the limiting adjuncts in Brahman, the blemishes belonging to the Jīva prompted by that, would appear in Brahman itself, and so, the instructions regarding the relation of Ātman being Brahman, with all blemishes vanished away, and possessed of all auspicious qualities, would have to be abandoned, on account of the contradiction itself.

स्वाभाविकभेदाभेदवादेऽपि ब्रह्मणः स्वत एव जीवभावाभ्युपगमात्, गुणवत्, दोषाः, च स्वाभाविका भवेयुः, इति निर्दोषब्रह्मतादात्म्योपदेशा विरुद्धा एव ।

केवलभेदवादिनां च, अत्यन्तभिन्नयोः केनापि प्रकारेणैक्यासंभवादेव ब्रह्मात्मभावोपदेशो न संभवति, इति सर्ववेदान्तपरित्यागः स्यात् ।

निखिलोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धं कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मशरीरभावमातिष्ठमानैः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मात्मभावोपदेशाः सर्वे सम्यगुपपादिता भवन्ति । जातिगुणयोरिव द्रव्याणामपि शरीरभावेन विशेषणत्वेन 'गौः, अश्वो मनुष्यो देवो जातः कर्मभिः' इति सामानाधिकरण्यं लोकवेदयोर्मुख्यमेव दृष्टचरम् । जातिगुणयोरपि द्रव्यगुणत्वमेव, 'षण्डो गौः, शुक्लः पटः' इति तथा सामानाधिकरण्यनिबन्धनम् । मनुष्यत्वादिविशिष्टपिण्डानामपि, आत्मनः प्रकारतयैव पदार्थत्वात् 'मनुष्यः पुरुषः षण्डो योषित्, वा, आत्मा जातः' इति सामानाधिकरण्यं सर्वत्रानुगतम्, इति प्रकारत्वमेव सामानाधिकरण्यनिबन्धनम्, न परस्परव्यावृत्ता जात्यादयः । स्वनिष्ठानामेव हि द्रव्याणां कदाचित्क्वचिद्द्रव्यविशेषणत्वे मत्वर्थीयः प्रत्ययो 'दण्डी' 'कुण्डली' इति, न पृथक्प्रतिपत्तिस्थित्यनर्हाणां द्रव्याणाम् । तेषां विशेषणत्वं

Even in the natural Difference-cum-non-difference theory, because on account of Brahman being admitted to have the nature of the [individual soul] Jīva, of its own accord, like good qualities, blemishes would also be natural—so, the instructions regarding the identity of Brahman void of blemishes do remain contradictory.

And in the case of those who hold the theory of Absolute-difference, on account of the very impossibility of identity in any mode whatsoever, of two absolutely different things, the instruction regarding the relation of Brahman and Ātman is not possible, and so, there would be bidding good-bye to all Vedānta !

All instructions regarding everything having Brahman as its Ātman, are reasonably put forward by those who stand fast by 'everything being the body of the Brahman,' firmly established in all the Upaniṣads. As in the case of generality, quality etc., so, in the case of substances also, the case-co-ordination owing to the one nature of the qualifying attribute viz., being the body, in the form—'bull, horse, human being, god—born due to Karmans,' is already seen in its primary sense, in popular usage and in the Veda. Even in the case of generality and quality, the nature of substance and quality itself as in the 'broken-horned bull, white cloth [etc.],' is the basis of the case-co-ordination of that type. In the case of bodies characterised by the nature of human beings also, there perseveres everywhere, the case-co-ordination in the form, 'human being—man, eunuch, woman, etc. Ātman is born,' on account of Ātman being possessed of the nature of an entity, owing to the nature itself of the modes—And so, being the mode itself, is the basis of the case-co-ordination, and not generality etc. that are mutually excluded. For, in the case of substances abiding in themselves alone, there is the termination showing the meaning of possessing (*Matup*) being the qualifying attribute of the substances, sometimes and somewhere such as 'Daṇḍin' [possessing Daṇḍa] or 'Kuṇḍalin' [possessing ear-rings] —and not in the case of substances deserving distinct apprehensions and

सामानाधिकरण्यावसेयमेव ।

यदि 'गौः, अश्वो मनुष्यो देवः पुरुषो योषित्षण्ड आत्मा कर्मभिर्जातः' इति, अत्र 'षण्डो मुण्डो गौः शुक्लः, कृष्णः पटः' इति जातिगुणवत्, आत्मप्रकारत्वं मनुष्यादिशरीराणामिष्यते, तर्हि जातिव्यक्त्योरिव प्रकारप्रकारिणोः शरीरात्मनोरपि नियमेन सह प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्—न चैवं दृश्यते । न हि नियमेन गोत्वादिवत्, आत्माश्रयतयैवात्मना सह मनुष्यादिशरीरं पश्यन्ति । अतो 'मनुष्य आत्मा', इति सामानाधिकरण्यं लाक्षणिकमेव ।

नैतदेवम् । मनुष्यादिशरीराणामपि, आत्मैकाश्रयत्वम्, तदेकप्रयोजनत्वम्, तत्प्रकारत्वं च जात्यादितुल्यम् । आत्मैकाश्रयत्वम्, आत्मविश्लेषे शरीरविनाशादवगम्यते । आत्मैकप्रयोजनत्वं च तत्तत्कर्मफलभोगार्थतयैव सद्भावात् । तत्प्रकारत्वम्, अपि 'देवो मनुष्यः' इत्यात्मविशेषणतयैव प्रतीतेः । एतदेव हि 'गवादि'शब्दानां व्यक्तिपर्यन्तत्वे हेतुः । एतत्स्वभावविरहादेव दण्डादीनां विशेषणत्वे 'दण्डी', 'कुण्डली' इति मत्वर्थीयः प्रत्ययः । देवमनुष्यादिपिण्डानाम्, आत्मैकाश्रयत्वतदेकप्रयोजनत्वतत्प्रकारत्वस्वभावात्, 'देवो मनुष्य आत्मा' इति लोकवेदयोः सामानाधिकरण्येन व्यवहारः । जातिव्यक्त्योर्नियमेन सहप्रतीतिः, उभयोश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । आत्मनः, तु, अचाक्षुषत्वात्, चक्षुषा शरीरग्रहणवेलायामात्मा न

---

conditions. Their being the qualifying attribute is to be concluded from the case-co-ordination itself.

If in the case of the expression 'Atman is born as a bull, as a horse, a human being, a god, a man, a woman, an eunuch etc. by the Karmans',—here, being the mode of Ātman is accepted in the case of bodies of men and others, like the generality and qualities as in the expression 'Broken-horned shaven white bull, black cloth, etc.', then there would be as a rule, co-apprehension even of the body and soul being the mode, and the one possessed of modes, like the generality and individual. But it is not seen thus. Not indeed, do they see as a rule the body of the man etc. along with the Ātman, verily, on account of its being the resort of Ātman, like bullness etc. So, the case-co-ordination in 'man-Ātman', is but metaphorical.

[The reply is]—Not this thus. In the case of the bodies of man etc. also, being the only resort of Ātman, being his sole purpose, and being his mode, are similar to the generality and others. Being the sole resort of Ātman is known from the destruction of the body on the disconnection from the Ātman; the Ātman's sole purpose is there, only on account of his existence for the sake of enjoyment of the fruit of different Karmans. Being his mode is also definitely due to the apprehension as being the qualifying attribute of Ātman as 'god, man'. This, verily, is the cause of the word like 'Go' etc. reaching up to the individual. On account of the absence of such nature, there is the termination having the sense of possession (*Matup*), in 'Daṇḍin' and 'Kuṇḍalin' for the purpose of the 'Daṇḍa' and others being the qualifying attributes. On account of the bodies of men, gods etc. being the Ātman's sole resort, being his sole purpose, being his mode, there is the popular and Vedic usage, by case-co-ordination as in 'god, man, Ātman' etc. There is the co-apprehension, as a rule, of generality and individual, owing to both being perceptible to the eye. Ātman, on the other hand, being not perceptible to the eye, is not apprehended at the time of comprehension of the body, by the eye.

गृह्यते। पृथग्ग्रहणयोग्यस्य प्रकारैकस्वरूपत्वं दुर्घटम्, इति मा वोचः, जात्यादिवत्, तदेकाश्रयत्व-तदेकप्रयोजनत्व-तद्विशेषणत्वैः शरीरस्यापि तत्प्रकारैकस्वभावत्वावगमात्। सहोपलम्भनियमः, तु, एकसामग्रीवेद्यत्वनिबन्धनः, इत्युक्तम्। यथा चक्षुषा पृथिव्यादेर्गन्धरसादिसंबन्धित्वं स्वाभाविकम्, अपि न गृह्यते, एवं चक्षुषा गृह्यमाणं शरीरम्, आत्मप्रकारैकस्वभावम्, अपि, न तथा गृह्यते, आत्मग्रहणे चक्षुषः सामर्थ्याभावात्। न, एतावता शरीरस्य तत्प्रकारत्वस्वभावविरहः। तत्प्रकारैकस्वभावत्वमेव सामानाधिकरण्यनिबन्धनम्।

आत्मप्रकारतया प्रतिपादनसमर्थस्तु शब्दः सहैव प्रकारतया प्रतिपादयति।

[75] ननु च शाब्देऽपि व्यवहारे 'शरीर'शब्देन शरीरमात्रं गृह्यते, इति नात्मपर्यन्तता 'शरीर'शब्दस्य। नैवम्। आत्मप्रकारभूतस्यैव शरीरस्य पदार्थविवेकप्रदर्शनाय निरूपकाणां निष्कर्षशब्दोऽयम्, यथा—'गोत्वम्' 'शुक्लत्वम्' 'आकृतिः' 'गुणः' इत्यादिशब्दाः। अतो 'गवादि'शब्दवत्, देवमनुष्यादिशब्दा आत्मपर्यन्ताः। एवं देवमनुष्यादिपिण्डविशिष्टानां जीवानां परमात्मशरीरतया तत्प्रकारत्वाज्जीवात्मवाचिनः शब्दाः परमात्म-

---

Do not say that it is difficult to realise the sole nature of being the mode in the case of an object fit to be apprehended separately, on account of the apprehension of even the body having the sole nature of being his mode, being his sole resort, being his sole purpose, and being his qualifying attribute, as in the case of generality and others. It has been said that co-perception, as a rule, has for its basis, being fit to be known by the same set of means. Just as the connection of earth and others with fragrance, flavour etc., is not apprehended, in the same way, the body while being apprehended by the eye, although having the sole nature of being the Ātman's mode is not so apprehended on account of the absence of power in the eye to apprehend the Ātman. Not by this much, there is the separation of the body from its nature of being his mode; having the sole nature of being his mode, is alone the basis of the case-co-ordination.

The word, again, capable of propounding as being the mode of Atman, propounds the same, verily, along with this mode.

[75] But, I say [says the objector]—In the popular practice of the use of word, by the word 'Śarīra' is apprehended only the body—[and] so, the word 'Śarīra' cannot reach right up to the Ātman—[We reply]—Not so; In order to point out discrimination from [different] objects, of the body which has definitely become a mode of the Ātman, this word [viz.] 'Śarīra' points out in a nut-shell the various indicatories as the word 'bullness', 'whiteness', 'form', 'quality,' etc. So, words like 'Deva', 'Manuṣya' etc. have their limit right up to the Ātman, like the words 'Go' etc. Thus, the words expressive of the individual Ātman have limit right up to the Highest Ātman owing to the individual Ātmans particularised by the bodies of men, gods etc. on account of their being His modes, owing to their being the body of the Highest Ātman,

पर्यन्ताः । अतः परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रकारतयैव चिदचिद्वस्तुनः पदार्थत्वम्, इति तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रयोगः । अयमर्थः, वेदार्थसंग्रहे समर्थितः । इदमेव शरीरात्मभावलक्षणं तादात्म्यं

'आत्मेति तूपगच्छान्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।१।३)

इति वक्ष्यति । 'आत्मेत्येव तु गृह्णीयात्' इति च वाक्यकारः ।

अत्रेदं तत्त्वम्—अचिद्वस्तुनश्चिद्वस्तुनः परस्य च ब्रह्मणो भोग्यत्वेन भोक्तृत्वेन स्वरूपविवेकमाहुः काश्चन श्रुतयः—

'अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः ।' (श्वे. ४।९)
'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।' (श्वे. ४।१०)
'क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।' (श्वे. १।१०)

'अमृताक्षरं हरः' इति भोक्ता निर्दिश्यते, प्रधानमात्मनो भोग्यत्वेन, हरतीति हरः ।

'स कारणं कारणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः' (श्वे. ६।९)
'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः ।' (श्वे. ६।१६)

Therefore, because the 'Cit' and 'Acit' entities possess the nature of an object owing to their being, verily, the modes of the Highest Brahman— and so, there is their use in the case-co-ordination with that. This point has been justified in [our] 'Vedārthasaṁgraha'. And the same identity characterised by the relation of body and soul, [the 'Sūtrakāra'] would state [in the Sūtra]—

'*But they worship Him as Ātman and make others grasp.*' (Br. Sū. 4·1·3)

And the Vākyakāra [also says]—'One should apprehend [everything] as Ātman alone'.

This [is] the idea herein—Several Śruti passages speak of the discrimination of the natures of the 'Acit' thing, the 'Cit' thing and the Highest Brahman as being [respectively] possessed of the nature, of the object fit to be enjoyed, that of the enjoyer and that of the Controller.—

'*From this, the Māyin creates this universe; and there is another well-restrained by the Māyā*'. (Śve. 4·9)

'*One should know then Nature [Prakṛti] as the Māyā, [and] the Highest Lord as the Māyā-wielder*'. (Śve. 4·10)

'*The Pradhāna is perishable, Hara is immortal, Imperishable; One God rules the perishable and the Ātman*'. (Śve. 1·10)

By the expression 'Hara is immortal, imperishable' [*Amṛtākṣaram Haraḥ*] is pointed out the enjoyer and the Pradhāna as being fit to be enjoyed by the Ātman. [The word] 'Hara' is so called, because 'He takes away',

'*He is the cause, the Lord of the Lord of the sense-organs; and there is no one progenator for Him, nor a Lord.*' (Śve. 6·9)

'*The Lord of the Pradhāna and the Kṣetrajña; the Controller of the qualities,*' (Śve. 6·16)

'पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरं शाश्वतं शिवमच्युतम् ।' (ना. १३।१)
'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ ।' (श्वे. १।९)
'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।' (श्वे. ६।१३)
'भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा ।' (श्वे. १।१२)
'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ।' (श्वे. ४।६)
'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति ।' (श्वे. १।६)
'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीं प्रजां जनयन्तीं सरूपाम् ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥' (तै. आ. ६।१०, ना. १२।१)
'समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः ।
जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमितरो वीतशोकः ॥' (श्वे. ४।७)

इत्याद्याः । स्मृतावपि—

'अहंकार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा ॥
अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।
जीवभूतां महाबाहो ययेदं धार्यते जगत् ॥' (गीता ७।४-५)

'To the Lord of the universe, the Controller of the Ātmans, him who is eternal, auspicious and undeviating.' (Nā. 13·1)

'The wise [and] the unwise, the two unborn, the Lord [and] the non-lord.' (Śve. 1·9)

'The Eternal of the eternals, the Sentient of the sentients, One, who grants the desires of the many.' (Śve. 6·13)

'Having thought [respectively] as the enjoyer, [the object] fit to be enjoyed, and as the impeller.' (Śve. 1·12)

'One of the two, eats the sweet fruit of the Pippala and not eating, another continues to look on'. (Śve. 4·6)

'Having thought the Ātman and the Impeller [Paramātman] as separate, satisfied thereafter by that, he attains to immortality.' (Śve. 1·6)

'The one unborn female— red, white and black, producing many a progeny of similar form, the one unborn male, indeed, taking to her, sleeps with her; another unborn abandons this one who has enjoyed objects of enjoyments.' (Tait. Ā. 6·10, Nā. 12·1)

'On the same tree the Puruṣa sunk deep, being infatuated owing to helplessness, feels aggrieved. When he perceives another, the acceptable Lord, then with grief passed away, the other one attains to His Greatness.' (Śve. 4·7)

and such others. In the Smṛti also [are to be found in this connection the following passages] —

'This my nature viz. 'Ahaṁkāra' divided into eight forms, which is inferior; other than this, know, [O] great-armed one, this to be my superior nature which is the Individual Soul, by which is supported this world. (Gītā 7·4–5)

' सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृतिं यान्ति मामिकाम् ।
कल्पक्षये पुनस्तानि कल्पादौ विसृजाम्यहम् ॥
प्रकृतिं स्वामवष्टभ्य विसृजामि पुनः पुनः ।
भूतग्राममिमं कृत्स्नमवशं प्रकृतेर्वशात् ॥ ' (गीता ९।७–८)
' मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगद्विपरिवर्तते ॥ ' (गीता ९।१०)
' प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्धयनादी उभावपि । ' (गीता १३।१९)
' मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन्गर्भं सृजाम्यहम् ।
संभवः सर्वभूतानां ततो भवति भारत ॥ ' (गीता १४।३)

इति । जगद्योनिभूतं ' महद्ब्रह्म ' मदीयं प्रकृत्याख्यं भूतसूक्ष्मम्, अचिद्वस्तु यस्मिश्चेतनाख्यं गर्भं संयोजयामि । ततो मत्कृताच्चिदचित्संसर्गात्, देवादिस्थावरान्तानाम्, अचिन्मिश्राणां सर्वभूतानां संभवो भवति, इत्यर्थः ।

[76] एवं भोक्तृभोग्यरूपेणावस्थितयोः सर्वावस्थावस्थितयोः, चिदचितोः परमपुरुषशरीरतया तन्नियाम्यत्वेन तदपृथक्स्थितिं परमपुरुषस्य च, आत्मत्वमाहुः काश्चन श्रुतयः—

'All beings, [O] Son of Kuntī, attain to the Prakṛti belonging to me at the end of the Kalpa; and I let then go forth again at the beginning of the Kalpa. Resting on my own Prakṛti, I let them go forth again and again, this entire aggregate of beings, which is helpless through the force of Prakṛti.' (Gītā 9·7–8)

'With Me as a superviser, the Prakṛti produces [the world] along with the movable and the immovable; and by this reason, [O] Son of Kuntī, the world goes on, revolving.' (Gītā 9·10)

'Know the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa as well, both as beginningless. (Gītā 13·19)

'The great Brahman [Prakṛti] is my womb and therein I deposit the fœtus and therefrom, [O] descendant of Bharata, takes place the birth of all beings.' (Gītā 14·3)

The great Brahman which has become the womb of the world, belonging to Me and called *Prakṛti*; the subtle element is the 'Acit' thing in which I arrange for the fœtus called the 'Cit', and from that, owing to the contact with the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' effected by Me, there takes place the birth of all beings mingled with the 'Acit,' beginning with gods and ending with the immovable— This is the meaning.

[76] In this way, in the case of the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' remaining in the form of the enjoyer and to be enjoyed [and] remaining in all states, several Srutis speak of their non-different state, owing to their being controlled by Him, due to their being the body of the highest Puruṣa and also the highest Puruṣa being their Ātman—

'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरः । यं पृथिवी न वेद । यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् । यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति ।' (बृ. ३।७।३)

इत्यारभ्य—

'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरः । यमात्मा न वेद । यस्यात्मा शरीरम् । य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति । स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः ।' (बृ. ३।७।२२)

इति । तथा—

'यः पृथिवीमन्तरे संचरन्यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् । यं पृथिवी न वेद ।'

इत्यारभ्य—

'यो मृत्युमन्तरे संचरन्यस्य मृत्युः शरीरम् । यं मृत्युर्न वेद । एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः ।' (ना. २)

अत्र 'मृत्यु'शब्देन 'तमः'शब्दवाच्यं सूक्ष्मावस्थम्, अचिद्वस्तु, अभिधीयते । अस्यामेवोपनिषदि

'अव्यक्तमक्षरे लीयते । अक्षरं तमसि लीयते ।' (ना. २)

इति वचनात् ।

'अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा' (तै. आ. ३।११।२)

इति च ।

'*Who, residing in the earth, [is] different from the earth; whom the earth knows not; whose body [is] the earth; who controls the earth inside.*' (Bṛ. 3·7·3)

—Beginning with this [there is] the passage—

'*Who, residing in the Ātman [is] different from the Ātman; whom the Ātman knows not; whose body [is] the Ātman; who controls the Ātman inside; He is your Ātman, the Inner-Controller, immortal.*' (Bṛ 3·7·22)

Likewise, beginning with—

'*Who, moving within the earth; whose bady [is] the earth; whom the earth knows not.*'

[there is the passage]—

'*Who, moving within Death; whose body is Death; whom Death knows not. This one, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed, refulgent, divine one, the one Nārāyaṇa.*' (Nā. 2)

Here by the word 'Mṛtyu' is denoted the 'Acit' thing in a subtle condition and expressed by the word 'Tamas', on account of the statement in this very Upaniṣad—

'*The manifest merges into the Imperishable, and the Imperishable merges into the Tamas.*' (Nā. 2)

and also in—

'*Entered within, the Controller of the people, the All-Ātman.*' (Tait. Ā. 3·11·2)

एवं सर्वावस्थावस्थितचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया तत्प्रकारः परमपुरुष एव कार्यावस्थकारणावस्थजगद्रूपेणावस्थितः, इति, इममर्थं ज्ञापयितुं काश्चन श्रुतयः कार्यावस्थं कारणावस्थं च जगत्स एव—इत्याहुः

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।' (छा. ६।२।१)

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजोऽसृजत ।' (छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यारभ्य—

'सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः ।' (छा. ६।८।४)

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् । तत्सत्यम् । स आत्मा । तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो ।' (छा. ६।८।७)

'सोऽकामयत । बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा । इदं सर्वमसृजत ।' (तै. २।६।१)

इत्यारभ्य—

'सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् ।' (तै. २।६।१)

इत्याद्याः । अत्रापि श्रुत्यन्तरसिद्धश्चिदचितोः परमपुरुषस्य च स्वरूपविवेकः स्मारितः ।

'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणी ।' (छा. ६।३।२)

इति ।

In this manner, several Śrutis state— He alone [is] the world, existing as cause and existing as effect, in order to intimate this sense viz. the highest Puruṣa alone remains in the form of the world, existing as the cause, and existing as the effect and having that as his mode, owing to his having the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' things existing in all conditions, for his body—

'Existence alone, my dear, was all this, in the beginning, one alone without a second.' (Chā. 6·2·1)

'It reflected "let me be many, may I procreate." It created light.' (Chā. 6·2·3)

—Beginning with this [the passage]—

'Dear one, these beings have their root in 'Sat', have their abode in 'Sat' [and] have their stability in 'Sat'. (Chā 6·8·4)

'All this has that as the self; That [is] Reality. He [is] the self; That thou art, [O] Śvetaketu.' (Chā. 6·8·7)

'He desired, "Let me be many; may I procreate". He practised penance. He, having practised penance, created all this.' (Tait. 2·6·1)

—Beginning with these [passages] —

'Truth and untruth became the truth'. (Tait. 2·6·1)

etc. Here also the discrimination between the natures of the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' [on the one hand] and the highest Puruṣa [on the other], is brought to the mind, established by other Śruti passages—

'Good !—having entered into subsequently these three divinities with this Living Self, let me modify name and form.' (Chā. 6·3·2)

'तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । ... विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च । सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् ।' (तै. २।६।१)

इति च ।

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' (छा. ६।३।२)

इति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं,

'तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । ... विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च ।' (तै. २।६।१)

इति— अनेनैकार्थ्यात्, आत्मशरीरभावनिबन्धनम्, इति विज्ञायते । एवंभूतमेव नामरूपव्याकरणम्,

'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत् । तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत ।' (बृ. १।४।७)

इति—अत्राप्युक्तम् ।

अतः कार्यावस्थः कारणावस्थश्च स्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरः परमपुरुष एव— इति कारणात्, कार्यस्यानन्यत्वेन कारणविज्ञानेन कार्यस्य विज्ञाततया, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च समीहितमुपपन्नतरम् ।

[77] 'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।' (छा. ६।३।२)

And also —

'Having created that, it subsequently entered into that; having subsequently entered into that, became 'Sat' and 'Tyat', special knowledge [vijñāna] and non-special knowledge [Avijñāna], truth and untruth, became the truth.' (Tait. 2·6·1)

In the passage —

'Having entered into subsequently with this Individual Self,' (Chā. 6·3·2)

—thus that the Individual Soul has Brahman for its basis, is known as confined to the relation of soul and body, on account of [the passage] having the same sense as that in

'Having subsequently entered into, He became 'Sat', and 'Tyat'...and special knowledge and non-special knowledge ['Vijñāna' and 'Avijñāna'].' (Tait. 2·6·1)

The modification in name and form, effected in this way is stated even here—

'That, verily, this, was then unmodified, and that became modified by name and form.' (Bṛ. 1·4·7)

Therefore, the highest Puruṣa himself is existing as the effect, and is existing as the cause, having for His body, gross, subtle, 'Cit' and 'Acit' entities — And so, on account of the effect being known by the knowledge of the cause, since the effect is not different from the cause, the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one, which is the desired object, becomes far more reasonable.

[77] *'Good!—having subsequently entered into these three divinities with this Living Self, let me modify name and form'.* (Chā. 6·3·2)

इति, 'तिस्रो देवता' इति सर्वमचिद्वस्तु निर्दिश्य, तत्र स्वात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशेन नामरूपव्याकरणवचनात्सर्वे वाचकाः शब्दा अचिज्जीवविशिष्टपरमात्मन एव वाचका इति, कारणावस्थपरमात्मवाचिना शब्देन कार्यवाचिनः शब्दस्य सामानाधिकरण्यं मुख्यवृत्तम्। अतः स्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचित्प्रकारकं ब्रह्मैव कार्यं कारणं च, इति ब्रह्मोपादानं जगत्। सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्मैव कारणमिति ब्रह्मोपादानत्वेऽपि संघातस्योपादानत्वेन चिदचितोर्ब्रह्मणश्च स्वभावासंकरोऽप्युपपन्नतरः। यथा शुक्लरक्तकृष्णतन्तुसंघातोपादानत्वेऽपि चित्रपटस्य तत्तत्तन्तुप्रदेश एव शौक्ल्यादिसंबन्धः, इति कार्यावस्थायामपि न सर्वत्र वर्णसंकरः, तथा चिदचिदीश्वरसंघातोपादानत्वेऽपि जगतः कार्यावस्थायामपि भोक्तृत्वभोग्यत्वनियन्तृत्वाद्यसंकरः। तन्तूनां पृथक्स्थितियोग्यानामेव पुरुषेच्छया कदाचित्संहतानां कारणत्वं कार्यत्वं च।

इह तु सर्वावस्थावस्थयोः परमपुरुषशरीरत्वेन चिदचितोस्तत्प्रकारतयैव पदार्थत्वात्, तत्प्रकारः परमपुरुषः सर्वदा सर्वशब्दवाच्यः, इति विशेषः। स्वभावभेदस्तदसंकरश्च तत्र चात्र च तुल्यः। एवं च सति, परस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेऽपि स्वरूपान्यथा-

---

—Having pointed out [here] the entire 'Acit' thing by [the expression] 'three divinities', there on account of the statement of the modification of name and form by the entrance within of the individual Soul having Her [the Highest Divinity] for their self, all the denotative words are denotative of the highest 'Ātman' particularised by the 'Acit' and the individual Soul — and so, the case-co-ordination of the word expressive of the effect with the word expressive of the highest Ātman existing as the cause, is the principal purport. Therefore, Brahman alone [having] gross, subtle, 'Cit' and 'Acit' [entities] as his modes, as the effect and the cause, and so the world has Brahman as its material cause. Even though Brahman is the material cause as Brahman alone is the cause, having the subtle 'Cit' and 'Acit' entities for its body, the absence of commixture of the natures 'Cit' and 'Acit' on the one hand, and the Brahman on the other, is more reasonably accounted for, on account of the composite aggregate being the material. Just as even though the variegated piece of cloth has for its material the aggregate of white, red and black threads, there is its connection with whiteness etc. only in regions occupied by the various threads — and so, there is nowhere the commixture of colours even in the state of the effect; even so, in the case of the world having for its material the aggregate 'Cit', 'Acit' and Controller, there is no commixture of being the enjoyer, being the object of enjoyment, and being the Controller even in the state of effect. The threads just fit for remaining apart, coming together sometime at the will of the individual, have the nature of the cause and have the nature of the effect.

The speciality however, in this case is— On account of the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' having the nature of objects, on account of their being the body of the highest Puruṣa; owing to their being His modes, in all conditions the highest Puruṣa having these as His modes, is expressed by all words at all times. As for the difference in nature, and the absence of their commixture, is the same there as well as here. And this being the case, even when there is the entrance

भावाभावात्, अविकृतत्वमुपपन्नतरम् । स्थूलावस्थस्य नामरूपविभागविभक्तस्य चिद्चिद्वस्तुन आत्मतयावस्थानात्, कार्यत्वमप्युपपन्नतरम् । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरेव हि कार्यता ।

निर्गुणवादाश्च परस्य ब्रह्मणो हेयगुणासंभवादुपपद्यन्ते ।

'अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको ऽविजिघत्सो ऽपिपासः ।' (छा. ८।१।५)

इति हेयगुणान्प्रतिषिध्य—

'सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा. ८।१।५)

इति कल्याणगुणान्विदधती, इयं श्रुतिरेवान्यत्र सामान्येनावगतं गुणनिषेधं हेयगुणविषयं व्यवस्थापयति ।

[78] 'ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म' इति वादश्च सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तेरखिलहेयप्रत्यनीककल्याणगुणाकरस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपं ज्ञानैकनिरूपणीयं स्वप्रकाशतया ज्ञानस्वरूपं च, इत्यभ्युपगमादुपपन्नतरः ।

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' (मु. १।१।९)

'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।' (श्वे. ६।८)

'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' (बृ. २।४।१४)

---

within the effect, of the highest Brahman, its unmodified nature is more reasonably accounted for, on account of the absence of its being otherwise in its own nature. [The Parama-Puruṣa] remaining in the gross state differentiated by the division,—name and form, being the effect, is more reasonably accounted for, on account of His being the Ātman of the 'Cit' and 'Acit' things; for, being the effect is, verily, attainment of another condition.

The theories regarding the qualitiless [Brahman] also are accounted for, on account of the absence of qualities to be abandoned in the case of the highest Brahman.

'[*Ātman*] *with sins destroyed, bereft of old age, bereft of death, bereft of grief, without hunger, without thirst.*' (Chā. 8·1·5)

—Having [in the above passage] denied the qualities to be abandoned, and postulating the auspicious qualities in

'*With desires fulfilled, with thoughts fulfilled*' (Chā. 8·1·5)

—This very Śruti passage properly adjusts the denial of qualities as referring to qualities fit to be abandoned, known in a general manner elsewhere.

[78] And the doctrine that 'Brahman is of the nature of Jñāna' is more reasonably accounted for, by admitting the nature of Brahman which is omniscient, all-powerful, the store of auspicious qualities opposed to all [qualities] fit to be abandoned— it is to be pointed as knowledge alone, and has the nature of Jñāna on account of its having a self-illumining nature.

'*Who, the omni-scient, all-knower.*' (Mu. 1·1·9)

'*His supreme power is described in the Śruti* [*passages*] *as varied, natural, and* [*as*] *being knowledge, strength and action.*' (Śve. 6·8)

'*By what, O dear one, would one know the knower?*' (Br̥. 2·4·14)

इत्यादिका ज्ञातृत्वमावेदयन्ति ।

'सत्यं ज्ञानं ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यादिकाश्च ज्ञानैकनिरूपणीयतया स्वप्रकाशतया च ज्ञानस्वरूपताम् ।

'सोऽकामयत बहु स्याम्' (तै. २।६।१)
'तदैक्षत । बहु स्याम् ।' (छा. ६।२।३)
'तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत ।' (बृ. १।४।७)

इति, ब्रह्मैव स्वसंकल्पाद्विचित्रस्थिरचरस्वरूपतया नानाप्रकारमवस्थितम्, इति, तत्प्रत्यनीकाब्रह्मात्मकं वस्तुनानात्वम् अतत्त्वम्, इति, तत्प्रतिषिध्यते—

'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ।' (बृ. ४।४।१९)
'नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।' (बृ. ४।४।१९)
'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति ... तदितर इतरं पश्यति । ... यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्, ... तत्केन कं पश्येत् ... तत्केन कं विजानीयात् ।' (बृ. २।४।१४)

इत्यादिना । न पुनः

'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (तै. २।६।१, छा. ६।२।३)

इत्यादि श्रुतिसिद्धं स्वसंकल्पकृतं ब्रह्मणो नानानामरूपभाक्त्वेन नानाप्रकारत्वम्, अपि निषिध्यते ।

—These and others [Śruti passages] announce the nature of a knower [in the case of Brahman] and passages like

'Existence, knowledge.' (Tait. 2·1·1)

[announce] [its] possession of the nature of Jñāna, on account of its being fit to be pointed as knowledge alone and its being self-illumining.

'He desired, 'Let me be many.' (Tait. 2·6·1)
'He reflected, 'Let me be many'. (Chā. 6·2·3)
'That became modified by name and form'. (Br. 1·4·7)

—In these passages [it is stated that] Brahman itself stands in different forms, possessed of the nature of variegated immovable and movable, by its own thought— and so, the manifoldness of things opposed to it and not having Brahman as its self, is not the reality and so, it is denied by passages like—

'From death, he to death passess, who here sees as though multiplicity'. (Bṛ. 4·4·19)

'Not here, is there any multiplicity whatsoever'. (Bṛ. 4·4·19)

'For, where there is as it were duality,...then another sees another,...But, where everything has become one's own Ātman,...then by what and whom would one see,...then by what and whom would one know ?' (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

And not again, is denied the nature of being manifold due to its own resorting to various names and forms, in the case of Brahman, effected by its own thought [and] established by the Śruti passage

'Let me be many; May I procreate'. (Tait. 2·6·1, Chā. 6·2·3)

'*यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्*' (बृ. २।४।१४)

इति निषेधवाक्यादौ च । तत्स्थापितं—

'*सर्वं तं परादोऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ।*' (बृ. २।४।६)

'*तस्य ह वा महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदः ।*' (बृ. २।४।१०)

इत्यादिना ।

एवं चिदचिदीश्वराणां स्वभावभेदं स्वरूपभेदं च वदन्तीनां कार्यकारणभावम्, कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं वदन्तीनां च सर्वासां श्रुतीनामविरोधः, चिदचितोः परमात्मनश्च सर्वदा शरीरात्मभावम्, शरीरभूतयोः कारणदशायां च तदर्हस्थूलदशापत्तिं वदन्तीभिः श्रुतिभिरेव ज्ञायते, इति ब्रह्माज्ञानवादस्य, औपाधिकब्रह्मभेदवादस्य, अन्यस्य, अप्यन्यायमूलस्य सकलश्रुतिविरुद्धस्य न कथंचिदप्यवकाशो दृश्यते । चिदचिदीश्वराणां पृथक्स्वभावतया तत्तच्छ्रुतिसिद्धानां शरीरात्मभावेन प्रकारप्रकारितया श्रुतिभिरेव प्रतिपन्नानां श्रुत्यन्तरेण कार्यकारणभावप्रतिपादनं कार्यकारणयोरैक्यप्रतिपादनं च, हि, अविरुद्धम्, इति सिद्धम् । यथा, आग्नेयादीन् षड्यागान्, उत्पत्तिवाक्यैः पृथगुत्पन्नान्, समुदायानुवादिवाक्यद्वयेन

And also in the denial passage viz.

'*But, where everything has become one's own Ātman*' etc. (Br. 2·4·14)

And that has been established by the following Sruti passages—

'*Everything abandons him, who knows everything elsewhere than in Ātman*'. (Br. 2·4·6)

'*Of that, verily, again, of the great Being, is the breathing forth—what* [*is*] *this Ṛgveda*'. (Br. 2·4·10)

Thus, non-contradiction of the Śruti passages all those speaking of the difference in nature and difference in form of the 'Cit', the 'Acit', and the Controller and those speaking of the relation of effect and cause and non-distinction between effect and cause, is certainly known by the Śrutis speaking of the relation of body and soul always between the 'Cit' and the 'Acit' [on the one hand] and the Highest Ātman [on the other] and the attainment of the gross state compatible with that in the causal state of [the 'Cit' and the 'Acit'], that becomes [His] body — and so, there is not seen scope in any way for the theory of Ajñāna superimposed upon Brahman, for the theory of difference in Brahman possessed of limiting adjuncts, or for any other [theory] for the matter of that, that is based upon fallacious reasoning and opposed to all Śrutis. [In the case] of the 'Cit', the 'Acit' and the Controller established by various Śruti passages as having different natures [and] admitted by the Śrutis themselves as their having the relation of body and soul, and as having the relation of the mode and one possessed of modes, the propounding of the relation of effect and cause, and the propounding of the oneness of effect and cause by another Śruti, is not indeed, incompatible — This is established. Just as the authoritative passage [describing the qualification in the Karmakāṇḍa] 'By the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices' enjoins upon one desirous [of Svarga] as obligatory, the six sacrifices 'Āgneya' [dedicated to Agni]

समुदायद्वयत्वमापन्नान् 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्याम्' इति, अधिकारवाक्यं कामिनः कर्तव्यतया विदधाति, तथा चिदचिदीश्वरान् विविक्तस्वरूपस्वभावान्,

'क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः
क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः।' (श्वे. १।१०)
'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः' (श्वे. ६।१६)
'पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरम्,' (ना. १३।१)
'आत्मा नारायणः परः' (ना. १३।१)

इत्यादिवाक्यैः पृथक्प्रतिपाद्य,

'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्। यस्यात्मा शरीरम्। यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरम्। यस्याक्षरं शरीरम्। एष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः।' (ना. २)

इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैश्चिदचितोः सर्वावस्थावस्थितयोः परमात्मशरीरताम्, परमात्मनस्तदात्मतां च प्रतिपाद्य, शरीरिभूतपरमात्माभिधायिभिः 'सत्' 'ब्रह्म' 'आत्मा'दिशब्दैः कारणावस्थः कार्यावस्थश्च परमात्मा, एक एव, इति पृथक्प्रतिपन्नं वस्तुत्रितयं—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' (छा. ६।२।१)
'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' (छा. ६।८।७)
'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' (छा. ३।१४।१)

इत्यादिवाक्यं प्रतिपादयति।

---

and others taking distinct shapes from passages describing their origin and attaining to two groups by two passages that refer to their grouping; so, having propounded 'Cit' [and] 'Acit' [and] Th Controller eseparately in the passages—

'*Perishable the Pradhāna [is]; Immortal, imperishable Hara [is]; one God rules the perishable and the Ātman.*' (Śve. 1·10)

'*The Lord of Pradhāna, and the Kṣetrajña; the Controller of the qualities.*'. (Śve. 6·16)

'*To the Lord of the Universe, the Controller of the Ātmans.*' (Nā. 13·1)

'*The Highest Ātman [is] Nārāyaṇa.*' (Nā. 13·1)

as having distinct form and nature, and having propounded in the passage —

'*Whose body [is] the Earth; whose body [is] the Ātman; whose body [is] the Unmanifest; whose body [is] the Imperishable; —'This one, the inmost Ātman of all beings, with sins destroyed the refulgent, divine, one, [alone] Nārāyaṇa*' (Nā. 2)

'Cit' and 'Acit' remaining in all states as being the body of the Highest Ātman and the Paramātman being their Ātman. The passages such as —

'*Existence alone, [my] dear, was all this in the beginning.*' (Chā 6·2·1)

'*All this has that as the Ātman.*' (Chā 6·8·7)

'*All this, indeed, is Brahman.* (Chā. 3·14·1)

propound three things admitted as separate as the one Paramātman alone abiding in the state of cause, the Paramātman existing as cause and existing as effect by the words 'Sat', 'Brahman' and 'Ātman', denoting the Paramātman having a body.

चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरिणः परमात्मनः 'परमात्म'शब्देनाभिधाने हि नास्ति विरोधः, यथा मनुष्यपिण्डशरीरकस्यात्मविशेषस्य 'अयमात्मा सुखी' इति, 'आत्म'शब्देनाभिधाने— इति, अलमतिविस्तरेण ।

[79] यत्पुनरिदमुक्तम्—ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेनैव, अविद्यानिवृत्तिः, युक्ता— इति—

तदयुक्तम्, बन्धस्य पारमार्थिकत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावात् । पुण्यापुण्यरूपकर्म-निमित्तदेवादिशरीरप्रवेशतत्प्रयुक्तसुखदुःखानुभवरूपस्य बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वं कथमिव शक्यते वक्तुम्? एवंरूपबन्धनिवृत्तिः, भक्तिरूपापन्नोपासनप्रीतपरमपुरुषप्रसादलभ्या, इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । भवदभिमतस्यैक्यज्ञानस्य यथावस्थितवस्तुविपरीतविषयस्य मिथ्या-रूपत्वेन बन्धविवृद्धिरेव फलं भवति,

'मिथ्यैतदन्यद्द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतां यतः' (वि. पु. २।१४।२७)

इति शास्त्रात्,

'उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः।' (गीता १५।१७)

'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा।' (श्वे. १।१६)

There is indeed no contradiction in the denotation by the word 'Parmātman' of the Highest Ātman possessed of a body constituted of 'Cit' and 'Acit' things, as in the denotation by the word Ātman in the form 'This Ātman is happy' in respect of a particular Ātman having for his body, the body of a man — So, enough of the great prolixity.

[79] As to what again this has been stated—The removal of Avidyā is proper by the special knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, [we reply]—

It is improper, on account of the absence of its being removed by the knowledge of the bondage which is real. How, indeed, is it possible to speak of the falsity of the bondage having the form of the entrance into the body of gods etc. caused by the Karman made up of merit and demerit, and having the form of the experience of weal and woe prompted by that? It has already been said that the removal of such a bondage is to be secured by the grace of the Highest Puruṣa pleased by the worship assuming the form of devotion. In the case of your favourite knowledge of oneness, referring to the opposite of a thing as it is, owing to its false nature, there would be tightening [intensification] of the bondage itself as its fruit, on account of the Sāstra-[passage]

'[*But*] *this is false, for a substance different from one cannot be possessed of the nature of that substance*'. (V. P. 2·14·27)

and on account of the instruction that the knowledge of Brahman heterogenous with individual Ātmans, [and being] Inner Controller of them, is the means of salvation defined as the highest purpose of life; in the passage —

'*But another excellent Puruṣa*'. (Gītā 15·17)

'*Having thought the Ātman and the Impeller* [*Paramātman*] *as separate*'. (Śve. 1·16)

इति जीवात्मविसजातीयस्य तदन्तर्यामिणो ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानं परमपुरुषार्थलक्षणमोक्षसाधनम्, इत्युपदेशाच्च ।

अपि च, भवदभिमतस्यापि 'निवर्तकज्ञान'स्य मिथ्यारूपत्वात्, तस्य निवर्तकान्तरं मृग्यम्। निवर्तकज्ञानम्, इदं स्वविरोधि सर्वं भेदजातं निवर्त्य क्षणिकत्वात्स्वयमेव विनश्यति—इति चेत्, न। तत्स्वरूपतदुत्पत्तिविनाशानां काल्पनिकत्वेन विनाशतत्कल्पनाकल्पकरूपा-विद्याया निवर्तकान्तरम्, अन्वेषणीयम् ।

तद्विनाशो ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेव, इति चेत्—तथा सति, निवर्तकज्ञानोत्पत्तिरेव न स्यात्, तद्विनाशे तिष्ठति तदुत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ।

अपि च, चिन्मात्रब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तकृत्स्ननिषेधविषयज्ञानस्य कोऽयं ज्ञाता ? अध्यासरूपः—इति चेत्—न, तस्य निषेध्यतया निवर्तकज्ञानकर्मत्वात्, तत्कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेव—इति चेत्, ब्रह्मणो 'निवर्तकज्ञानं' प्रति ज्ञातृत्वं किं स्वरूपम्, उत, अध्यस्तम् । अध्यस्तं चेत्, अयमध्यासः, तन्मूलाविद्यान्तरं च निवर्तकज्ञानाविषयतया तिष्ठत्येव । निवर्तकज्ञानान्तराभ्युपगमे तु तस्यापि त्रिरूपत्वात्, ज्ञात्रपेक्षयानवस्था

And further, on account of the false nature of the 'remover-knowledge' which is your favourite [doctrine], another remover for it has to be searched after. If it be argued—This remover-knowledge having removed all differences whatsoever opposed to it, itself perishes owing to its being momentary, [we reply]—No. Owing to its nature, its origin and destruction being all imagined, another remover has to be searched for the Avidyā having the form of one giving rise to the assumption about its destruction.

If it be argued—Its destruction is the nature of Brahman itself, [we reply]—Then in that case there would not be the origination of the remover-knowledge itself, on account of the impossibility of its origin so long as its destruction stands.

Moreover, who [is] this knower of the knowledge pertaining to the denial of everything over and above Brahman that is mere 'Cit'? If it be said—[That the knower is] of the form of superimposition—[we reply]—No, on account of the impossibility of his being the agent owing to his being the object of the 'remover-knowledge' as he is fit to be denied.

If it be argued—[The knower] is the nature itself of Brahman,—[we ask]—Is the state of the knower of Brahman in respect of the 'remover-knowledge' its own nature or is it [something] superimposed? If it is [something] superimposed, this superimposition and another Avidyā based upon that, do remain [in fact] owing to their not being subject to the remover-knowledge. In admitting another remover-knowledge, however, there would be the [fault of] endlessness in respect of the knower, as that also possesses three forms. If the nature of Brahman is itself the knower, our own point of view

स्यात्। ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वे, अस्मदीय एव पक्षः परिगृहीतः स्यात्। निवर्तकज्ञानस्वरूपं स्वस्य ज्ञाता च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन स्वनिवर्त्यान्तर्गतम्, इति वचनं 'भूतलव्यतिरिक्तं कृत्स्नं देवदत्तेन च्छिन्नम्' इति—एकस्यामेव च्छेदनक्रियायामस्य च्छेत्तुः, अस्याश्छेदनक्रियायाश्च च्छेद्यानुप्रवेशवचनवत्, उपहास्यम्। अध्यस्तो ज्ञाता स्वनाशहेतुभूतनिवर्तकज्ञाने स्वयं कर्ता च न भवति, स्वनाशस्यापुरुषार्थत्वात्। तन्नाशस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमे, भेदतद्दर्शनतन्मूलाविद्यादीनां कल्पनमेव न स्यात्— इति, अलमनेन विघ्नहतमुद्गराभिघातेन।

तस्मात्, अनादिकर्मप्रवाहरूपाज्ञानमूलत्वात्, बन्धस्य— तन्निबर्हणम्, उक्तलक्षणज्ञानादेव। तदुत्पत्तिः, च, अहरहरनुष्ठीयमानपरमपुरुषाराधनवेषात्मयाथात्म्यबुद्धिविशेषसंस्कृतवर्णाश्रमोचितकर्मलभ्या। तत्र केवलकर्मणामल्पास्थिरफलत्वम्, अनभिसंहितफलपरमपुरुषाराधनवेषाणां कर्मणामुपासनात्मकज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यानुभवरूपानन्तस्थिरफलत्वं च कर्मस्वरूपज्ञानादृते न ज्ञायते। केवलाकारपरित्यागपूर्वकयथोक्तस्वरूपकर्मोपादानं च न संभवति, इति, कर्मविचारानन्तरं तत एव हेतोर्ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति, 'अथातः' इत्युक्तम्।

---

would be accepted [by you]. The statement that the nature of the remover-knowledge and its knower are included in things to be removed by itself, on account of its being over and above Brahman, is fit to be ridiculed, like the statement about the entrance within, of the thing to be cut off, of its cutter and of this cutting process, at one and the same cutting process, in the form 'everything over and above the surface of the earth has been cut by Devadatta.' The superimposed knower cannot become himself the agent as well in [respect of] the remover-knowledge which is to be the cause of its own destruction, on account of one's own destruction not being the human purpose of life. In admitting its own destruction as being the nature of Brahman, there would not even be the assumption of difference, the perception of that [difference], and of its root [cause] viz. Avidyā—and others,— so, enough of this [giving] a blow with a club to one beaten by fate.

Therefore, on account of the bondage having its root in Ajñāna in the form of a stream of beginningless Karman, its rooting out is [certainly] due to knowledge alone with its characteristics [already] described. And its production is to be had by Karman in conformity with [rules and regulations] of caste and Aśrama [stage in life] purified by the distinctive right knowledge of the Ātman, having the garb of worship of the Highest Puruṣa, carried on day after day. There, that mere Karmans have a scanty and impermanent fruit and that the Karmans having the garb of the worship of the Highest Puruṣa, with [their] fruit not being sought after, have endless and permanent fruit in the form of the realisation of the right nature of Brahman through the production of knowledge constituted of worship — this cannot be known without the knowledge of the nature of Karman. And it is not possible to take to Karman of the nature already spoken of, preceded by the abandonment of its mere form— and so, after the consideration of Karman, for the very same reason, the consideration of Brahman is to be gone through — and so it has been said —'Now, therefore' (*athātaḥ*).

[80] अत्र पूर्वपक्षवादी मन्यते—

वृद्धव्यवहारादन्यत्र शब्दस्य बोधकत्वशक्त्यवधारणासंभवात्, व्यवहारस्य च कार्यबुद्धिपूर्वकत्वेन, कार्यार्थ एव शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्, इति कार्यरूप एव वेदार्थः। अतो वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्ने परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि न प्रमाणभावमनुभवितुमर्हन्ति। न च पुत्रजन्मादिसिद्धवस्तुविषयवाक्येषु, हर्षहेतूनां कालत्रयवर्तिनामर्थानामानन्त्यात्, सुलग्नजन्मसुखप्रसवादिहर्षहेत्वर्थान्तरोपनिपातसंभावनया च प्रियार्थप्रतिपत्तिनिमित्तमुखविकासादिलिङ्गेन, अर्थविशेषबुद्धिहेतुत्वानिश्चयः। नापि व्युत्पन्नेतरपदविभक्त्यर्थस्य पदान्तरार्थनिश्चयेन वा, प्रकृत्यर्थनिश्चयेन वा, शब्दस्य सिद्धवस्त्वभिधानशक्तिनिश्चयः, ज्ञातकार्याभिधायिपदसमुदायस्य तदंशविशेषनिश्चयरूपत्वात्तस्य। न च सर्पाद्भीतस्य 'नायं सर्पः, रज्जुरेषा' इति शब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं भयनिवृत्तिदर्शनेन सर्पाभावबुद्धिहेतुत्वनिश्चयः, अत्रापि 'निश्चेष्टं निर्विषमचेतनमिदं वस्तु' इत्याद्यर्थबोधेषु बहुषु भयनिवृत्तिहेतुषु सत्सु विशेषनिश्चयायोगात्। कार्यबुद्धिप्रवृत्तिव्याप्तिबलेन शब्दस्य प्रवर्तकार्थावबोधित्वमवगतम्, इति सर्वपदानां

---

[80] In this connection, the holder of the prima facie view thinks :—

On account of impossibility in the case of the word, of determining the power of signification elsewhere than by the practical dealing of the elderly persons, and because owing to the practical dealing, being preceded by the thought about the action, there is the authoritative nature of the word in respect of the action itself and so — the sense of the Vedas is of the form of the [sacrificial] act. Therefore, the *Vedānta* texts do not deserve to be treated as authoritative in respect of the Highest Brahman which is completely established [already]. In the passages referring to objects established like the birth of a son etc., on account of the endlessness of objects existing in all the three times, which are the causes of joy, and on account of the possibility of coming together on the part of other causes of joy, such as the birth on an auspicious moment, a painless delivery etc., there cannot be the definite ascertainment about the knowledge of a particular thing being the cause, by the signs such as the blooming of the face etc. due to the knowledge of an agreeable news. Nor again, would there be the ascertainment of the denotative power of the word in respect of a finished object, either by the ascertainment of the meaning of another word or by the ascertainment of the etymological sense, as regards the meaning of the case of words other than those understood, as the group denoting the action already known has an ascertainment in respect of that particular portion [alone]. Nor is there the ascertainment of the knowledge of the absence of the serpent being the cause, by the perception of the removal of fear in the case of one afraid of a serpent, immediately on hearing the words ' This [is] not a serpent, this [is] a rope '; here also, there is no possibility of a particular ascertainment, there being many a perception of the object—the cause of the removal of fear in the form—' Motionless, poisonless, non-sentient is this object'. The nature of making one understand the sense that makes one act in the case of a word, is apprehended on the strength of the invariable association of the knowledge and activity in respect of the object of action —

कार्यपरत्वेन सर्वैः पदैः कार्यस्यैव विशिष्टस्य प्रतिपादनात्, कार्यान्वितस्वार्थमात्रे पदशक्तिनिश्चयः। इष्टसाधनताबुद्धिस्तु कार्यबुद्धिद्वारेण प्रवृत्तिहेतुः, न स्वरूपेण, अतीतानागतवर्तमानेष्टोपायबुद्धिषु प्रवृत्त्यनुपलब्धेः। 'इष्टोपायो हि मत्प्रयत्नादृते न सिध्यति, अतो मत्कृतिसाध्यः' इति-बुद्धिर्यावन्न जायते, तावन्न प्रवर्तते। अतः कार्यबुद्धिरेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः, इति प्रवर्तकस्यैव शब्दवाचितया, कार्यस्यैव वेदवेद्यत्वात्परिनिष्पन्नरूपब्रह्मप्राप्तिलक्षणानन्तस्थिरफलापातप्रतिपत्तेः,

'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति' (आ. श्रौ. सू. २।१।१)

इत्यादिभिः कर्मणामेव स्थिरफलत्वप्रतिपादनाच्च, कर्मफलाल्पास्थिरत्वब्रह्मज्ञानफलानन्तस्थिरत्वज्ञानहेतुको ब्रह्मविचारारम्भो न युक्तः — इति।

[81] अत्राभिधीयते—

निखिललोकविदितशब्दार्थसंबन्धावधारणप्रकारमपनुद्य, सर्वशब्दानामलौकिकैकार्थावबोधित्वावधारणं प्रामाणिका न बहु मन्यन्ते। एवं किल बालाः शब्दार्थसंबन्धमव-

---

and so, on account of the propounding of a particular object of action itself by all words — because all words refer to the object of action — there is the ascertainment of the power of words in respect of its sense associated with the action. The knowledge, viz. something being the means [of accomplishing] the desired object [or the sacrificial rite], however, is the cause of activity through the channel of the knowledge of the act and not through its own nature, on account of the non-perception of the activity in respect of the knowledges about the means of desired objects— past, future and present. 'The means of the desired object is not established without my effort, and so it is capable of being established by my activity'—as long as this apprehension is not produced, he does not proceed. Therefore, the knowledge about the action is alone the cause of activity — and so, because the action alone is to be known through the Vedas, on account of the impelling agent himself being denoted by the word, on account of the apprehension of the ensuing fruit,— endless, characterised by the attainment of the completely established Brahman,— and on account of the propounding of Karmans alone having permanent fruit in [accordance with] such passages as

'Undecaying indeed, verily, becomes the merit of Cāturmāsya -sacrificer.' (Ā. Śrau. Sū. 2·1·1)

the commencement of the consideration of Brahman on the ground of [the knowledge of] the fruit of Karman being scanty and impermanent, and of the knowledge of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman, being endless and permanent, is not proper.

[81] To this it is said [in reply] —

People who stand by the means of proof, do not think highly of the ascertainment of making [one] understand some uncommon sense alone in the case of all words, after setting aside the mode of comprehending the relation of word and sense known in the entire world. In this way, indeed (*kila*),

धारयन्ति — मातापितृप्रभृतिभिरम्बाताततमातुलादीञ्छशिपशुमृगनरपक्षिसर्पादींश्च 'एनमवेहि, इमं चावधारय' इत्यभिप्रायेणाङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तैस्तैः शब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु बहुशः शिक्षिताः, शनैः शनैस्तैस्तैः शब्दैरेव तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु स्वात्मना बुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं दृष्ट्वा, शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धान्तरादर्शनात्, संकेतयितृपुरुषाज्ञानाच्च 'तेष्वर्थेषु तेषां शब्दानां प्रयोगो बोधकत्वनिबन्धनः,' इति निश्चिन्वन्ति। पुनश्च 'व्युत्पन्नेतरशब्देष्वस्य शब्दस्यायमर्थः,' इति पूर्ववृद्धैः शिक्षिताः सर्वशब्दानामर्थमवगम्य परप्रत्यायनाय तत्तदर्थावबोधिवाक्यजातं प्रयुञ्जते।

प्रकारान्तरेणापि शब्दार्थसंबन्धावधारणं सुशकम्। केनचित्पुरुषेण हस्तचेष्टादिना 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते, इति देवदत्ताय ज्ञापय' इति प्रेषितः कश्चित्तज्ज्ञापने प्रवृत्तः 'पिता ते सुखमास्ते,' इति शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते। पार्श्वस्थोऽन्यः व्युत्पित्सुर्मूकवच्चेष्टाविशेषज्ञः, तज्ज्ञापने प्रवृत्तमिमं ज्ञात्वा, अनुगतः, तज्ज्ञापनाय प्रयुक्तमिमं शब्दं श्रुत्वा 'अयं शब्दस्तदर्थबुद्धिहेतुः' इति निश्चिनोति, इति 'कार्यार्थे एव व्युत्पत्तिः' इति निर्बन्धो निर्निबन्धनः। अतो वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्नं ब्रह्म, तदुपासनं च, अपरिमितफलं बोधयन्ति, इति तन्निर्णयफलो ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः।

---

children bear in mind the relation between the word and the sense— [children] mostly instructed by mother, father, etc., pointing out by the finger, to mamma, father, maternal uncle, etc. and the moon, beast, deer, man, bird, serpent etc. conveying the idea 'Know this one,' 'Bear in mind this one', by [using] the various words in their respective various senses; having gradually realized by themselves the rise of knowledge by means of various words in respect of the various meanings, [children] conclude that the use of the words in the various senses is the basis of making one understand, on account of the non-perception of another relation between word and sense and as the person who has made the convention is not known. And [they] further, instructed by the senior elderly persons to the effect 'This is the sense of this word with the other words, that are known,' having understood the sense of all words, [they] use various sentences making one understand the various senses for convincing others.

It is fairly easy to conclude the relation between word and sense, even by [resorting to] another way. Some one sent with the message by some person, 'Convey this to Devadatta, viz.' 'Your father rests happily' by means of the gestures by the hands etc. and ready for conveying the same, uses the words 'Your father rests happily.' Some one standing near by, desirous of knowing [what it is], expert in reading the gestures like a dumb person, having known him started for conveying [the message], following him, and having heard these words used for conveying that, comes to the conclusion—'This word is the cause of the knowledge of meaning thereof,' and so, the restriction that 'the sense is confined only to action,' is without foundation. Therefore, because the Vedānta texts are informative of the fully established Highest Brahman, and Its worship as having immeasurable fruit, the consideration of Brahman is to be gone through, leading to ascertainment about That.

कार्यार्थत्वेऽपि वेदस्य ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य एव, —
कथम् ?

'आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ. २।४।५)
'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छा. ८।७।१)
'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत' (बृ. ४।४।२१)
'दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाशः । तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम् । तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यम् ।' (छा. ८।१।१)
'तत्रापि दहरं गगनं विशोकस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदुपासितव्यम् ।' (ना. १२।३)

इत्यादिभिः प्रतिपन्नोपासनविषयकार्याधिकृतफलत्वेन

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यादिभिर्ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः श्रूयते-इति, ब्रह्मस्वरूपतद्विशेषणानां दुःखासंभिन्नसुखविशेषरूपस्वर्गादिवत्, रात्रिसत्रप्रतिष्ठादिवत्, अपगोरणशतयातनासाध्यसाधनभाववच्च, कार्योपयोगितयैव सिद्धेः।

[82] 'गामानय', इत्यादिष्वपि वाक्येषु न कार्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिः, भवदभिमतस्य कार्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् । कृतिभावभावि कृत्युद्देश्यं हि भवतः कार्यम् । 'कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं'

Even though the Veda is for the purpose of action, the consideration of Brahman is certainly to be gone through.

How ? [Our reply is]— On account of the nature of Brahman and its qualifying attributes, being established as being useful only for action, because the attainment of Brahman is mentioned in the scriptural passages like—

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

as being the fruit ear-marked by the action referring to worship apprehended from the passages—

'Ātman, O [Maitreyī], to be sure, should be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon.' (Bṛ. 2·4·5)

'He should be searched for; he should be specially desired to be known.' (Chā. 8·7·1)

'Having particularly known [Him], one should practise wisdom'. (Bṛ. 4·4·21)

'There is in this the small sky; what is inside it is to be searched after; that, verily, should be specially desired to be known.' (Chā, 8·1·1)

'And there also is the small sky, [and also the Ātman] free from grief; what is within it is to be worshipped.' (Nā. 12·3)

like heaven and others constituted of a distinctive bliss unmixed with grief, like the stability etc. due to night-sacrifices, and like the relation of cause and effect as in reviling [beating] and the fine of a hundred [gold coins.].

[82] Even in the sentences like, 'Bring the bull', the meaning is not in respect of the action, on account of the difficulty of pointing to the action as cherished by you; for 'your' action comes into existence due to the

कृतिकर्मत्वम्। 'कृतिकर्मत्वं' च कृत्या प्राप्तुमिष्टतमत्वम्। 'इष्टतमं' च सुखम्, वर्तमानदुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा। तत्र, इष्टसुखार्थिना पुरुषेण स्वप्रयत्नादृते यदि तदसिद्धिः प्रतीता, ततः प्रयत्नेच्छुः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः, इति, न क्वचिदपि, इच्छाविषयस्य कृत्यधीनसिद्धित्वमन्तरेण 'कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं' नाम किंचिदप्युपलभ्यते। इच्छाविषयस्य प्रेरकत्वं च प्रयत्नाधीनसिद्धित्वमेव, तत एव प्रवृत्तेः।

न च पुरुषानुकूलत्वं 'कृत्युद्देश्यत्वम्', यतः सुखमेव पुरुषानुकूलम्। न च दुःखनिवृत्तेः पुरुषानुकूलत्वम्। पुरुषानुकूलं सुखम्, तत्प्रतिकूलं दुःखम्, इति सुखदुःखयोः स्वरूपविवेकः। दुःखस्य प्रतिकूलतया तन्निवृत्तिरिष्टा भवति, न अनुकूलतया। अनुकूलप्रतिकूलान्वयविरहे स्वरूपेणावस्थितिर्हि दुःखनिवृत्तिः। अतः सुखव्यतिरिक्तस्य क्रियादेरनुकूलत्वं न संभवति। न च सुखार्थतया तस्याप्यनुकूलत्वं, दुःखात्मकत्वात्तस्य। सुखार्थतयापि तदुपादानेच्छामात्रमेव भवति।

न च कृतिं प्रति शेषित्वं 'कृत्युद्देश्यत्वम्', भवत्पक्षे शेषित्वस्यानिरूपणात्। न च

---

existence of the act, and the thing aimed at by the act. 'The nature of being the thing to be aimed at by the act' is being the object of the act. And 'Being the object of the act' is being the most coveted thing for being obtained by the act, and 'The most coveted thing' is happiness or the removal of the present grief. There, if by a person desirous of having the desired happiness is visualised non-accomplishment of that without his own effort, then the person desirous of making an effort proceeds on; and so, there is not to be found anything anywhere known as 'Being the thing aimed at by the act' other than the nature of accomplishment depending upon the act in respect of the object of desire. Being the impeller of the object of desire is nothing but being the accomplishment depending upon the effort, because the activity proceeds from that alone.

Nor again, 'Being the thing aimed at by the act' is being favourable to the person; for happiness alone is favourable to a person. Nor again, is the removal of grief favourable to a person. Whatever is favourable to a person [is] happiness, and the opposite of that [is] grief— this is the discrimination between the natures of happiness and grief. Removal of that [grief] is desired on account of the unfavourable nature of grief and not on account of any favourable nature; for, the removal of grief is [but] remaining in one's own nature in the absence of association with the favourable or the unfavourable. Therefore, the favourable nature of action etc. over and above happiness is not possible. Nor again, is the favourable nature of that [action] also, as being due to its being the purpose of happiness, because that is made up of grief. Even if it is for the purpose of happiness, there is merely the desire to take it.

Nor is, 'Being the thing to be aimed at by action', the principal in respect of the act [which is thus subordinate], on account of the non-pointing to the nature of the principal in your theory. Nor again, is apprehended the

परोद्देशप्रवृत्तकृतिव्याप्त्यर्हत्वं शेषत्वम्, इति तत्प्रतिसंबन्धी शेषी, इति, अवगम्यते, तथा सति, कृतेरशेषत्वेन तां प्रति तत्साध्यत्वस्य शेषित्वाभावात् । न च परोद्देशप्रवृत्त्यर्हतायाः शेषत्वेन परः शेषी, उद्देश्यत्वस्यैव निरूप्यमाणत्वात्, प्रधानस्यापि भृत्योद्देशप्रवृत्त्यर्हत्व-दर्शनाच्च ।

प्रधानस्तु भृत्यपोषेऽपि स्वोद्देशेन प्रवर्तते - इति चेत्, — न । भृत्योऽपि हि प्रधानपोषे स्वोद्देशेनैव प्रवर्तते । कार्यस्वरूपस्यैवानिरूपणात्, कार्यप्रतिसंबन्धी शेषः, तत्प्रतिसंबन्धी शेषी, इत्यप्यसंगतम् ।

नापि कृतिप्रयोजनत्वं 'कृत्युद्देश्यत्वम्'। पुरुषस्य कृत्यारम्भप्रयोजनमेव हि कृतिप्रयोजनम् । स च, इच्छाविषयः । तस्मात्, इष्टतातिरेकिकृत्युद्देश्यत्वानिरूपणात् कृति-साध्यताकृतिप्रधानत्वरूपं कार्यं दुर्निरूपमेव ।

'नियोग'स्यापि साक्षादिच्छाविषयभूतसुखदुःखनिवृत्तिभ्यामन्यत्वात्, तत्साधन-तयैव, इष्टत्वं कृतिसाध्यत्वं च । अत एव हि तस्य क्रियातिरिक्तता । अन्यथा क्रियैव कार्यं

---

principal, as its [of the subordinate] correlative, because 'Being the subordinate' is being fit for the invariable association with the act started with another aim ; —and its correlative is the 'principal'; because in that case, as the act has not the nature of the subordinate, what is to be accomplished by that, has no nature of the principal in respect of that. Nor again, is the other one the principal, because being fit for activity towards another aim is the subordinate ; because the nature of the thing aimed at is itself yet to be pointed out, and because the principal [master] is also seen to have the fitness for activity towards the servant.

If it be argued — The principal [master], however, even in nourishing the servant, proceeds with his own aim [in view], [we reply] — No, for the servant also proceeds in nourishing the principal [master] with his own aim [in view]. Owing to the nature of the action itself being not pointed out, the subordinate is the correlative of the action, and its correlative [in turn] is the principal — This also does not go well.

Nor again, is 'Being the thing aimed at by the act' the nature of being the purpose of the act ; for the purpose of the act is putting into effect the act by a person, and that [commencement of the act] comes within the sphere of desire. Therefore, on account of the non-pointing out of the nature of the thing aimed at, over and above being desirable, the action of the nature of being accomplished by the act, and being the principal in respect of the act, is certainly difficult to point out.

As regards the 'commandment' also, on account of its being different from happiness and removal of grief that directly become the object of desire, it is something desirable as its means only, and as the nature of being accomplished by the act. For this very reason, indeed, it is different from action; otherwise, the process [of action] itself would be the action.

स्यात्। 'स्वर्गकाम'पदसमभिव्याहारानुगुण्येन लिङादिवाच्यं कार्यं स्वर्गसाधनम्, एवेति क्षणभङ्गिकर्मातिरेकि स्थिरं स्वर्गसाधनमपूर्वमेव कार्यम्, इति, स्वर्गसाधनतोल्लेखेनैव ह्यपूर्व-व्युत्पत्तिः। अतः प्रथमम्, अनन्यार्थतया प्रतिपन्नस्य कार्यस्य, अनन्यार्थत्वानिर्वहणाय, अपूर्वमेव पश्चात्स्वर्गसाधनं भवति, इत्युपहास्यं, 'स्वर्गकाम'पदान्वितकार्याभिधायिपदेन प्रथममप्यनन्यार्थतानभिधानात्, सुखदुःखनिवृत्तितत्साधनेभ्योऽन्यस्यानन्यार्थस्य कृति-साध्यताप्रतिपत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च।

[83] अपि च, किमिदं नियोगस्य प्रयोजनत्वम्? सुखवन्नियोगस्याप्यनुकूलत्व-मेव— इति चेत्, — किं नियोगः सुखम्? सुखमेव ह्यनुकूलम्। सुखविशेषवत्, नियोग, – अपरपर्यायं विलक्षणं सुखान्तरम् – इति चेत्, किं तत्र प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम्। स्वानुभवश्चेत्, न। विषयविशेषानुभवसुखवत् 'नियोगानुभवसुखम्, इदम्' इति भवतापि नानुभूयते।

शास्त्रेण नियोगस्य पुरुषार्थतया प्रतिपादनात् पश्चात्तु भोक्ष्यते-इति चेत्,— किं तन्नियोगस्य पुरुषार्थत्ववाचि शास्त्रम्? न तावल्लौकिकं वाक्यम्, तस्य दुःखात्मक-

---

The action expressed by the potential mood etc. is indeed the means of securing heaven, on account of its compatibility, viz. being spoken of along with the word 'Svargakāma' and thus the action is nothing but the 'Apūrva' [the unseen fruit] which is the stable means of [securing] heaven, different from the Karman which is destroyed every moment, and thus [follows], indeed, the understanding of Apūrva by the reference itself as being the means of heaven. Therefore, it is ridiculous to say that in the case of the action apprehended first as having the same object, the Apūrva itself becomes the subsequent means or [securing] heaven, for the sake of concluding its being the same object; because having the same object cannot be denoted even at the beginning by the word denoting the action associated with the word 'Svargakāma', and on account of the impropriety of understanding something another, having the same aim, different from happiness, removal of grief and their means, as fit to be accomplished by the action.

[83] And further, what is meant by the commandment having a purpose? If it be argued that commandment is also favourable like happiness, [we ask]—Can a commandment be happiness? For, happiness alone is favourable. If it be argued, — It is another distinct kind of happiness, with 'Niyoga' as its another synonym, like a particular variety of happiness, you should speak out what means of proof is there for that [statement]! If [you want to say that] it is one's own experience, [we reply] — No, that even by your honourable self is not experienced 'this is the happiness due to the experience of commandment' like the happiness accruing from the experience of the particular objects of sense.

If it be argued—A person, however, enjoys [freedom from Saṁsāra] afterwards, because by the Śāstra is propounded the commandment as being the human purpose of life, [we ask] — What is that Śāstra that expresses the commandment having the nature of human purpose? Not, for the matter of

क्रियाविषयत्वात्, तेन सुखसाधनतयैव 'कृतिसाध्यतामात्र'प्रतिपादनात्। नापि वैदिकम्, तेनापि स्वर्गसाधनतयैव कार्यस्य प्रतिपादनात्। नापि नित्यनैमित्तिकशास्त्रम्, तस्यापि तदभिधायित्वं 'स्वर्गकाम'वाक्यस्थापूर्वव्युत्पत्तिपूर्वकम्, इत्युक्तनीत्या तेनापि सुखादि-साधनभूतकार्याभिधानम्, अवर्जनीयम्। नियतैहिकफलस्य कर्मणोऽनुष्ठितस्य फलत्वेन तदानीमनुभूयमानान्नाद्यरोगतादिव्यतिरेकेण नियोगरूपसुखानुभवानुपलब्धेश्च 'नियोगः सुखम्' इति, अत्र न किंचन प्रमाणमुपलभामहे। अर्थवादादिष्वपि स्वर्गादिसुखप्रकारकीर्तन-वत्, 'नियोग'रूपसुखप्रकारकीर्तनं भवतापि न दृष्टचरम्।

[84] अतो विधिवाक्येष्वपि धात्वर्थस्य कर्तृव्यापारसाध्यतामात्रं शब्दानुशासन-सिद्धमेव लिङादेर्वाच्यम्, इत्यध्यवसीयते। धात्वर्थस्य यागादेरग्न्यादिदेवतान्तर्यामिपरम-पुरुषसमाराधनरूपता समाराधितात्परमपुरुषात्फलसिद्धिश्चेति —

'फलमत उपपत्तेः।' (ब्र० सू० ३।२।३७)

इति, अत्र प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अतो वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्नं ब्रह्म बोधयन्ति, इति ब्रह्मोपासनफला-

---

that, popular statement, because that refers to an action leading to grief, because by that [the Śāstra] is propounded 'only being accomplished by the act' as being the means of happiness alone. Nor again, a Vedic [statement]; for, by that also is propounded action as being the means alone of [securing] heaven. Nor still, the Śāstra dealing with obligatory and occasional [rites], because that also can denote that as preceded by the explanation of 'Apūrva' in the 'Svargakāma'-passage, and so in the manner [reasoning] stated [before], the denotation of action which becomes the means of [attaining] happiness etc. by that also, is unavoidable. And the non-perception of experience of happiness of the form of commandment, owing to its being other than food etc. and freedom from disease, etc., that are being experienced at the time, on account of its being the fruit of the Karman which has the prescribed fruit belonging to this world, we do not see any means of proof to say here that 'commandment [is] happiness.' In [respect of] the glorificatory passages also, has not been seen before even by your honoured self, the description of the variety of the happiness of the form 'commandment' like the description of the variety of happiness, heaven and others.

[**84**] Therefore, even in the case of the injunction-passages, it is concluded that the expressed sense of the potential mood etc. as definitely proved by the rules of grammar is merely what is accomplished by the operation of the agent, which is the sense of the root. And the root-meaning of sacrifice etc. as having the form of worship of the Highest Puruṣa, the Inner-Controller of the deities Fire and others, and the accomplishment of the fruit from the Highest Puruṣa who is worshipped, would be propounded, here in [the Sūtra]—

'The fruit from this, on account of the reasonableness.'

(Br. Sū. 3·2·37)

Therefore, the Vedānta texts enlighten one about the completely established Brahman and so, the infinite nature of the fruit due to the worship of Brahman

नन्त्यं स्थिरत्वं च सिद्धम् । 'चातुर्मास्या'दिकर्मस्वपि केवलस्य कर्मणः क्षयिफलत्वोपदेशात्, अक्षयफलश्रवणं —

'वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं चैतदमृतम्' (बृ. २।३।३)

इत्यादिवत्, आपेक्षिकं मन्तव्यम् । अतः केवलानां कर्मणामल्पास्थिरफलत्वात्, ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यानन्तस्थिरफलत्वाच्च तन्निर्णयफलो ब्रह्मविचारारम्भो युक्तः, इति स्थितम् ॥१॥

[85] किं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्म यज्जिज्ञास्यमुच्यते — इत्यत्राह —

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

'जन्मादि' इति सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयम् । तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । 'अस्य'— अचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनस्य, नियतदेशकालफलभोगब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तक्षेत्रज्ञामिश्रस्य जगतः, 'यतः'—यस्मात्, सर्वेश्वरात्, निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकस्वरूपात्, सत्यसंकल्पात्, ज्ञानानन्दाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणात्, सर्वज्ञात्, सर्वशक्तेः, परमकारुणिकात्, परस्मात् पुंसः, सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयाः प्रवर्तन्ते, तद्ब्रह्म, इति सूत्रार्थः ।

'भृगुर्वै वारुणिः । वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्म' (तै. ३।१।१)

---

and [its] permanence is established. Even in respect of the 'Cāturmāsya' rites [four months' sacrifice] etc., on account of the instruction about the fruit of mere Karman, being perishable, the statement in the Sruti about the imperishable fruit must be understood in a relative sense, like—

'The wind, as well as the mid-region, [all] this is immortal.' (Bṛ. 2·3·3)

Therefore, it is proved, that on account of mere Karmans having a scanty and impermanent fruit, and on account of the knowledge of Brahman having an endless and permanent fruit, the commencement of the consideration of Brahman having for its fruit the ascertainment of that, is proper. ॥ 1 ॥

[**85**] What again [is] that Brahman which is stated to be fit to be known? With reference to this, says [the Sūtrakāra]—

'Birth etc. of this, from whom' ॥ 2 ॥

'Janmādi' means creation, sustenance and dissolution. This is a Bahuvrīhi compound pointing out to its attributes, 'Asya'— of the world, with its unthinkable manifold variegated arrangement, mixed up with the Kṣetrajña, right up from Brahman to the clump of grass, with the space, time, fruit and enjoyment regulated. 'Yataḥ'— from whom, from the Supreme Controller with His nature opposed to every thing fit to be abandoned, with thoughts fulfilled, possessed of infinite qualities like knowledge, bliss etc., omniscient, all-powerful, extremely merciful [and] the Highest Puruṣa, proceed creation, sustenance and dissolution—That [is] Brahman—This is the sense of the Sūtra.

Beginning with the passage—

'Bhṛgu, verily, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa [saying] 'Teach [me], [O] Revered one, Brahman' (Tait. 3·1·1)

इत्यारभ्य,

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्म । (तै. ३।१।१)

इति श्रूयते । तत्र संशयः—किमस्माद्वाक्याद्ब्रह्म लक्षणतः प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते न वा, इति ?

किं प्राप्तम् ? न शक्यम्–इति । न तावत् जन्मादयो विशेषणत्वेन ब्रह्म लक्षयन्ति, अनेकविशेषणव्यावृत्तत्वेन ब्रह्मणोऽनेकत्वप्रसक्तेः । विशेषणत्वं हि व्यावर्तकत्वम् ।

ननु 'देवदत्तः श्यामो युवा लोहिताक्षः समपरिमाणः' इत्यत्र विशेषणबहुत्वेऽप्येक एव देवदत्तः प्रतीयते । एवम्, अत्राप्येकमेव ब्रह्म भवति । नैवम् । तत्र प्रमाणान्तरेणैक्यप्रतीतेः, एकस्मिन्नेव विशेषणानामुपसंहारः । अन्यथा, तत्रापि व्यावर्तकत्वेनानेकत्वमपरिहार्यम् । अत्र तु, अनेकेनैव विशेषणेन लिलक्षयिषितत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरेणैक्यम्, अनवगतम्, इति व्यावर्तकभेदेन ब्रह्मबहुत्वमवर्जनीयम् ।

---

it is stated in the Sruti [as follows]—

'*From whom again, these beings are produced; by whom [when] produced, they live on; to whom they go [and whom they] enter within—Desire to know that definitely, that [is] Brahman.*' (Tait. 3·1·1)

There arises a doubt— Is it possible or not from this passage to know Brahman, from [these] attributes ?

What is arrived at [the prima-facie view]—? Not possible. Not for the matter of that, do birth etc. point out to Brahman, by being its qualifying attributes, because there would arise the undesirable result viz. the manifold nature of Brahman owing to its being excluded from many qualifying attributes; for, being a qualifying attribute is, indeed, being the excluding factor.

I say [says the objector]—As in 'Devadatta of a dark complexion, young, red-eyed, possessed of a proportionate stature;'—here only one Devadatta is apprehended in spite of there being too many qualifying attributes. Thus, here also, there would be only one Brahman. [The reply is]—Not so. There [in the case of Devadatta] on account of the apprehension of oneness by another means of proof, there is the grouping together of the qualifying attributes in one and the same [entity]; otherwise, there also, a manifold nature would be unavoidable owing to the excluding nature. Here, however, the oneness of Brahman is not apprehended by another means of proof, on account of the fact that it is intended to point out Brahman just by many qualifying attributes, and therefore, the manifold nature of Brahman is unavoidable owing to the different excluding factors.

'ब्रह्म'शब्दैक्यादत्राप्यैक्यं प्रतीयते— इति चेत्, न, अज्ञातगोव्यक्तिजिज्ञासोः पुरुषस्य 'षण्डो मुण्डः पूर्णशृङ्गो गौः', इत्युक्ते 'गो'पदैक्येऽपि षण्डत्वादिव्यावर्तकभेदेन गोव्यक्तिबहुत्वप्रतीतेर्ब्रह्मव्यक्तयोऽपि बह्व्यः स्युः। अत एव लिलक्षयिषिते वस्तुनि, एषां विशेषणानां संभूय लक्षणत्वमनुपपन्नम्। नापि, उपलक्षणत्वेन लक्षयन्ति, आकारान्तराप्रतिपत्तेः। उपलक्षणानाम्, एकेनाकारेण प्रतिपन्नस्य केनचिदाकारान्तरेण प्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वं हि दृष्टं 'यत्रायं सारसः स देवदत्तकेदारः' इत्यादिषु।

[86] ननु च —

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इति प्रतिपन्नाकारस्य जगज्जन्मादीन्युपलक्षणानि भवन्ति। न, इतरेतरप्रतिपन्नाकारापेक्षत्वेन, उभयोर्लक्षणवाक्ययोरन्योन्याश्रयणात्। अतो न लक्षणतः, ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते— इति—

एवं प्राप्तेऽभिधीयते— जगत्सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयैरुपलक्षणीभूतैर्ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते। न च, उपलक्षणोपलक्ष्याकारव्यतिरिक्ताकारान्तराप्रतिपत्तेर्ब्रह्मणोऽप्रतिपत्तिः। उपलक्ष्यं

If it be argued— Here also, owing to the oneness of the word 'Brahman' is apprehended the oneness— [we reply]—No, on account of the apprehension, on the part of a person desiring to know the unknown individual bull, of the plurality of individual bulls owing to the different [distinguishing] factors, like being broken-horned etc., even though the word 'Go' is the same, when it is said 'The broken-horned, hornless, full-horned bull', so there would be many individual Brahmans also. For this very reason, it is improper, in the case of a thing desired to be pointed out, for all these qualifying attributes together to be the defining attributes. Nor do they point out as being accidental characteristics, on account of the non-apprehension of another form; [for, in the case] of the accidental attributes, there is, indeed, seen their being the cause of apprehension of a thing apprehended as having one form, as having some other form, as in [the statement like] 'where this crane, there [is] Devadatta's field etc.'

[**86**] Further, I say [says the objector],— The origination etc. of the world, can be the accidental attributes of [Brahman] whose form is apprehended as

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite* [*is*] *Brahman*'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

[The reply is]— No, on account of the mutual interdependence of both the defining passages, owing to their being dependent upon the form apprehended from each other's form. Therefore, it is not possible to point out Brahman from a defining attribute.

This [prima-facie view] being reached, it is [now] stated— [in reply]— It is possible to apprehend Brahman by the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world,— [its] accidental attributes. Nor again, is the non-apprehension of Brahman on account of the non-apprehension of another form over and above the form of the thing to be defined by the accidental attributes;

हि, अनवधिकातिशयबृहत् । बृंहणं च ब्रह्म, बृहतेर्धातोस्तदर्थत्वात् । तदुपलक्षणभूताश्च जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयाः । 'यतो' 'येन' 'यद्' इति प्रसिद्धवज्जन्मादिकारणनिर्देशेन यथाप्रसिद्धि जन्मादिकारणमनूद्यते । प्रसिद्धिश्च—

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजोऽसृजत ।' (छा. ६।२।२–३)

इति, एकस्यैव 'सत्' शब्दवाच्यस्य निमित्तोपादानरूपकारणत्वेन, तदपि

'सदेवेदमग्र एकमेवासीत्'— (छा. ६।२।२)

इति, उपादानतां प्रतिपाद्य

'अद्वितीयम्'

इत्यधिष्ठात्रन्तरं प्रतिषिध्य

'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजोऽसृजत ।' (छा. ६।२।२–३)

इति, एकस्यैव प्रतिपादनात् । तस्मात्, यन्मूला जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयाः, तत्, ब्रह्म, इति जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयाः स्वनिमित्तोपादानभूतं वस्तु ब्रह्म, इति लक्षयन्ति । जगन्निमित्तोपादानता-

---

for, the thing to be defined is vast with limitless excellence, and vastness is Brahman, on account of the root 'Bṛh' having that meaning. And the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world constitute the accidental attributes of that. The cause of birth etc. as established, is restated by pointing out the cause of birth, etc. as quite established in [the passage] 'from whom', 'by whom', and 'which'; and this full establishment is one and the same thing expressed by the word 'Sat' as the form of the material and the instrumental cause [of the world] in the passage—

'Existence alone, [my] dear, was all this, in the beginning, one alone without the second'. That reflected:—'Let me be many, may I procreate'. It created Light'. (Chā. 6·2·2–3)

—By [the statement]

'Existence alone was all this, in the beginning', (Chā. 6·2·2)

having propounded that too, as the material cause, and having denied another supervisor by [the expression]

'Without a second',

[the Sruti] propounds only one thing in [the passage],

'That reflected—, 'Let me be many, may I procreate.' It created Light'.— (Chā. 6·2·2–3)

Therefore, that, rooted in which are the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world, [is] Brahman; and so, the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world, point out the thing that has become their instrumental [cause], and material cause as Brahman. And because, Brahman is apprehended as

क्षिप्तसर्वज्ञत्वसत्यसंकल्पत्वविचित्रशक्तित्वाद्याकारबृहत्त्वेन प्रतिपन्नं ब्रह्म, इति च जन्मादीनां तथाप्रतिपन्नस्य लक्षकत्वेन नाकारान्तराप्रतिपत्तिरूपानुपपत्तिः।

जगज्जन्मादीनां विशेषणतया लक्षणत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्दोषः। लक्षणभूतान्यपि विशेषणानि स्वविरोधिव्यावृत्तं वस्तु लक्षयन्ति। अज्ञातस्वरूपे वस्तुन्येकस्मिँल्लिलक्षयिषितेऽपि परस्पराविरोध्यनेकविशेषणलक्षणत्वं न भेदमापादयति, विशेषणानामेकाश्रयतया प्रतीतेरेकस्मिन्नेवोपसंहारात्। षण्ढत्वाद्यस्तु विरोधादेव गोव्यक्तिभेदमापादयन्ति। अत्र तु कालभेदेन जन्मादीनां न विरोधः।

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' (तै. ३।१।१)

इत्यादिवाक्येन प्रतिपन्नस्य जगज्जन्मादिकारणस्य ब्रह्मणः सकलेतरव्यावृत्तं स्वरूपमभिधीयते—

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म।' (तै. २।१।१)

इति, तत्र 'सत्य'पदं निरुपाधिकसत्तायोगि ब्रह्माह। तेन विकारास्पदम्, अचेतनं, तत्संसृष्टचेतनश्च व्यावृत्तः, नामान्तरभजनार्हावस्थान्तरयोगेन तयोर्निरुपाधिकसत्तायोगरहितत्वात्। 'ज्ञान'पदं नित्यासंकुचितज्ञानैकाकारमाह। तेन कदाचित्संकुचितज्ञानत्वेन मुक्ताः

---

characterised by the vastness of its form, such as omniscience, having thoughts fulfilled, having variegated powers etc. implied in being the instrumental and material cause of the world, there is not the impropriety of the nature of non-apprehension of another form, on account of birth etc. pointing out to it, which is apprehended like that.

Even though the birth etc., of the world, be the defining characteristics owing to their being the qualifying attributes, there would not be any blemish whatsoever. The qualifying attributes, even though they become the defining characteristics, point out a thing excluded from their opposite. Even in the case of one thing with its nature unknown, desired to be pointed out, the nature of defining characteristic by many qualifying attributes, not mutually opposed, does not lead to any difference, because, the qualifying attributes converge together in one thing alone, on account of their being apprehended as having one resort. Being broken-horned etc. on the other hand, lead to the difference in the individual bulls owing to the very contradiction in [the qualifying attributes]. Here, however, there is no contradiction in [the qualifying attributes like] birth etc., owing to the difference in time.

'*From whom again, these beings*' (Tait. 3·1·1)

—By this and other passages, the nature of Brahman, as being excluded from everything else, [stated as] the cause of the birth etc. of the world, is stated in the passage,

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite* [*is*] *Brahman.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

There, the word 'Satya' speaks of Brahman as associated with adjunct-less existence. By that are excluded the non-sentient, the abode of modifications and the sentient mixed up with that, on account of these two being bereft of the association with adjunct-less existence, owing to their association with another condition fit to be called by some other name. The word 'Jñāna' speaks of having the nature of Jñāna alone, always uncontracted. By that are excluded the released souls on account of [their] Jñāna [being] occasionally contracted. The

व्यावृत्ताः । 'अनन्त 'पदं देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदरहितस्वरूपमाह । सगुणत्वात्स्वरूपस्य स्वरूपेण गुणैश्चानन्त्यम् । तेन पूर्वपदद्वयव्यावृत्तकोटिद्वयविलक्षणाः सातिशयस्वरूपस्वगुणा नित्या व्यावृत्ताः, विशेषणानां व्यावर्तकत्वात् । ततः —

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यनेन वाक्येन जगज्जन्मादिनावगतस्वरूपं ब्रह्म सकलेतरवस्तुविसजातीयम्, इति लक्ष्यते, इति नान्योन्याश्रयणम् । अतः सकलजगज्जन्मादिकारणं निरवद्यं सर्वज्ञं सत्यसंकल्पं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म लक्षणतः प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते, इति सिद्धम् ।

ये तु निर्विशेषं वस्तु जिज्ञास्यम्, इति वदन्ति, तन्मते 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इत्यसंगतं स्यात्, 'निरतिशयबृहद् बृंहणं' च ब्रह्म, इति निर्वचनात्, तच्च ब्रह्म जगज्जन्मादिकारणम्, इति वचनाच्च । एवम्, उत्तरेष्वपि सूत्रगणेषु सूत्रोदाहृतश्रुतिगणेषु च, ईक्षणाद्यन्वयदर्शनात्, सूत्राणि सूत्रोदाहृताः श्रुतयश्च न तत्र प्रमाणम् । तर्कश्च साध्यधर्माव्यभिचारिसाधनधर्मान्वितवस्तुविषयत्वात्, न निर्विशेषवस्तुनि प्रमाणम् । 'जगज्जन्मादिभ्रमा यतस्तद्ब्रह्म,' इति स्वोत्प्रेक्षापक्षेऽपि न निर्विशेषवस्तुसिद्धिः; भ्रममूलमज्ञानम्, अज्ञान-

---

word 'Ananta' speaks of the nature as bereft of limitations of the things in respect of space and time. On account of the nature being possessed of qualities, there is the endlessness in respect of the nature and in respect of the qualities. By that, are excluded its own qualities with their nature possessed of abundance, [and] different from the two ends, excluded by the first two words, because, the qualifying attributes are the excluding factors. Therefore, because Brahman with its nature apprehended from birth etc. of the world is defined as heterogeneous from everything else by the passage —

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite* [*is*] *Brahman*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

there is no [fault of] mutual interdependence. Therefore, it is established that, Brahman, the cause of birth etc. of the entire world, blameless, omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled, [and] all-powerful, is possible to be apprehended from the defining characteristics.

As for those who say that a distinctionless thing should be desired to be known, [the Sūtras] 'The desire to know Brahman' and 'Birth etc. of this, from whom' etc. would not harmonize, according to their view, on account of the etymological statement 'Brahman is excessively vast and vastness'; and on account of the statement that the same Brahman is the cause of the birth etc. of the world. Similarly, there being seen harmony with reflection etc., in groups of later Sūtras also, and the groups of Śruti passages quoted in the Sūtras, the Sūtras and the Śruti passages quoted in the Sūtras would not be authority in respect of that. Logical reasoning is not authority either, in respect of a distinctionless thing, on account of its referring to a thing associated with the attributes of the logical mark invariably associated with the qualities of a thing to be established. Even according to their fancied theory viz. 'That [is] Brahman from which [arise] the illusions such as the birth etc. of the world,' there is no establishment of a distinctionless thing, on account

साक्षि ब्रह्म, इत्यभ्युपगमात्। साक्षित्वं हि प्रकाशैकरसतयोच्यते। प्रकाशत्वं तु जडाद्व्यावर्तकं स्वस्य परस्य च व्यवहारयोग्यतापादनस्वभावेन भवति। तथा सति सविशेषत्वम्। तदभावे प्रकाशतैव न स्यात्, तुच्छतैव स्यात्॥ २॥

जगज्जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म वेदान्तवेद्यमित्युक्तम्। तदयुक्तम्। तद्धि न वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यम्। अनुमानेन सिद्धेः — इत्याशङ्क्याह —

[87]

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्॥ ३॥

'शास्त्रं' यस्य 'योनिः' कारणं प्रमाणं तत्, 'शास्त्रयोनि', तस्य भावः 'शास्त्रयोनित्वम्', तस्मात्। ब्रह्मज्ञानकारणत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य तद्योनित्वम्। ब्रह्मणोऽत्यन्तातीन्द्रियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयतया ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकप्रमाणत्वादुक्तस्वरूपं ब्रह्म—

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' (तै. ३।१।१)

इत्यादिवाक्यं बोधयति, एव, इत्यर्थः।

---

of their admitting that Ajñāna is rooted in illusion, [and] Brahman is the witness of Ajñāna. Being a witness is, indeed, spoken of as having a uniform illumination, and being the illumination is the factor to exclude the non-sentient by its nature of making itself and another fit for practical usage. In that case, there would be the possession of distinctive attributes, [and] in its absence there would be no illuminating nature itself—there would be only unsubstantial nature. ॥ 2 ॥

It has been stated that Brahman, the cause of birth etc. of the world, is to be known from the Vedānta— That is improper, for that is not something to be propounded by the Vedānta passages, on account of [its] establishment by an inference,—With this objection in view, [the Sūtrakāra] says—

[87] 'On account of the Śāstra being the cause' ॥ 3 ॥

Of what the 'Śāstra' is the 'yoni' source, [i. e.], the cause, the authority,—That is 'Śāstrayoni', its nature [is] 'Śāstrayonitvam'—from that. Śāstra has the nature of its 'yoni', on account of its being the cause of the knowledge of Brahman. On account of Brahman having Śāstra as the only means of proof, owing to its being absolutely supra-sensuous, and owing to its not being within the province of the means of proof, like Direct perception etc., the passage,

'*From whom again, these beings are produced*'. (Tait. 3·1·1)

definitely enlightens [one] about Brahman with its nature [already] stated.—This is the meaning.

ननु शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो न संभवति, प्रमाणान्तरवेद्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। अप्राप्ते तु शास्त्रमर्थवत्।

किं तर्हि तत्र प्रमाणम्? न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्। तद्धि द्विविधम्, इन्द्रियसंभवं योगसंभवं चेति। इन्द्रियसंभवं च बाह्यसंभवम्, आन्तरसंभवं च, इति द्विधा। बाह्येन्द्रियाणि विद्यमान-संनिकर्षयोग्यस्वविषयबोधजनकानि, इति, न सर्वार्थसाक्षात्कारतन्निर्माणसमर्थपरमपुरुष-विशेषविषयबोधजनकानि; नाप्यान्तरम्, सुखादिव्यतिरिक्तबहिर्विषयेषु तस्य बाह्येन्द्रियान-पेक्षप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। नापि योगजन्यम्, भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मनस्तस्य विशदावभासत्वेऽपि पूर्वानुभूतविषयस्मृतिमात्रत्वात्, न प्रामाण्यम्, इति कुतः प्रत्यक्षता? तदतिरिक्तविषये कारणाभावात्। तथा सति, तस्य भ्रमरूपता। नाप्यनुमानम्, विशेषतो दृष्टं सामान्यतो दृष्टं वा। अतीन्द्रिये वस्तुनि संबन्धावधारणविरहात्, न विशेषतो दृष्टम्। समस्तवस्तुसाक्षा-त्कारतन्निर्माणसमर्थपरमपुरुषविशेषनियतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि न लिङ्गमुपलभ्यते।

[88] ननु च, जगतः कार्यत्वं तदुपादानोपकरणसंप्रदानप्रयोजनाभिज्ञकर्तृकत्व-व्याप्तम्। अचेतनारब्धत्वं जगतः, च, एकचेतनाधीनत्वेन व्याप्तम्। सर्वं हि घटादिकार्यं

I say [says the objector]— 'Having Śāstra for its Yoni' is not possible in the case of Brahman on account of Brahman being fit to be known by other means of proof; for, Śāstra has significance, [only] in [respect of something] not [already] known [reached].

[The reply is]— What then the means of proof thereof? Not, for the matter of that, Direct perception. That, indeed, is two-fold— Sensuous and Yoga-produced. The sensuous is two-fold— Produced by the external, and produced by the internal [sense-organs]. The external sense-organs, because they are the producers of knowledge about their objects fit for existing juxta-position, are not the producers of the knowledge having for its object the direct realisation of all objects and the Highest distinguished Puruṣa capable of creating that. Not again, the internal [perception], on account of the impossibility of its activity not depending upon the external sense-organs in respect of external objects different from happiness etc. Nor again, the Yoga-produced [Pratyakṣa], even though that, arising from the utmost intensification of Bhāvanās, has the nature of clearly shining forth, it has no authoritative nature, as it is merely the remembrance of objects already experienced, and so, whence then the nature of Direct perception, on account of the [Yogajanya Pratyakṣa] not being the cause in respect of objects different from that? In that case, that would have the nature of delusion. Nor again, [is] Inference, either arrived at particularly or arrived at generally. There cannot be [the inference] arrived at particularly, on account of the absence of the fixing up of the relation in respect of a super-sensuous object. No logical mark is found out, even in a generally arrived inference, restricted to the realisation of all objects, and the Highest distinguished Puruṣa capable of creating that.

[88] Further, I say [says the objector],— The world being a product, is invariably associated with the nature of the agent conversant with its material cause, the accessories, the disposal and the purpose [of them]. For, the world to be produced from the non-sentient, is invariably associated with being dependent upon the one sentient. All products like jar etc. are, indeed

तदुपादानोपकरणसंप्रदानप्रयोजनाभिज्ञकर्तृकं दृष्टम् । अचेतनारब्धम्, अरोगं स्वशरीरमेकचेतनाधीनं च । सावयवत्वेन जगतः कार्यत्वम् ।

उच्यते । किमिदम् 'एकचेतनाधीनत्वम् ?' न तावत् तदायत्तोत्पत्तिस्थितित्वम् । दृष्टान्तो हि साध्यविकलः स्यात् । न ह्यरोगं स्वशरीरमेकचेतनायत्तोत्पत्तिस्थिति, तच्छरीरस्य भोक्तॄणां भार्यादिसर्वचेतनानामदृष्टजन्यत्वात्तदुत्पत्तिस्थित्योः । किं च शरीरावयविनः स्वावयवसमवेततारूपा स्थितिः, अवयवसंश्लेषविशेषव्यतिरेकेण न चेतनमपेक्षते । प्राणनलक्षणा तु स्थितिः पक्षत्वाभिमते क्षितिजलधिमहीधरादौ न संभवति, इति, पक्षसपक्षानुगतामेकरूपां स्थितिं नोपलभामहे ।

[89] 'तदायत्तप्रवृत्तित्वं' तदधीनत्वम् — इति चेत् — अनेकचेतनसाध्येषु गुरुतररथशिलामहीधरादिषु व्यभिचारः। चेतनमात्राधीनत्वे सिद्धसाध्यता ।

किं च, उभयवादिसिद्धानां जीवानामेव लाघवन्यायेन कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमो युक्तः ।

---

seen to have the agent conversant with their material cause, accessories, disposal and purpose. And one's own body produced from the non-sentient, and free from disease, is dependent upon the one sentient. The world is a product on account of its being possessed of parts.—

It is stated [in reply]— What this 'Being dependent upon the one sentient'? Not, for the matter of that, the nature of origination and sustenance, dependent upon that. The illustrative instance, indeed, would be incapable of proving what is to be proved. Not, indeed, has one's own body free from disease, the origination and sustenance dependent upon the one sentient, on account of the origination and sustenance of that being produced by the 'Adṛṣṭa' of all the sentient objects like wife etc., that are the enjoyers of that body. Further, the state of the body, which is possessed of parts, which is of the form of being intimately related with its parts, does not stand in need of the sentient, over and above the particular kind of the close contact of the parts. The state characterised by the animation, however, is not possible in the earth, ocean, mountain etc. admitted as being the 'Pakṣa' [about which something is to be proved]. And so, we do not come across a uniform nature existing alike in the matter in hand, and in similar instances.

[**89**] If it be argued— 'Being dependent upon that' means having its activity depending upon that,— [we reply],—There would be the violation of the rule in the case of extremely heavy chariots, slabs and mountains etc., which can be accomplished by many sentients. If they are dependent on the mere sentient, there would be the state of proving the proved.

Furthermore, the admission of the nature of an agent in the case of the individual souls alone, admitted by both the disputants, is proper in accordance

न च जीवानामुपादानाद्यनभिज्ञतया कर्तृत्वासंभवः, सर्वेषामेव चेतनानां पृथिव्याद्युपादानयागाद्युपकरणसाक्षात्कारसामर्थ्यात्, यथेदानीं पृथिव्यादयो यागादयश्च प्रत्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते। उपकरणभूतयागादिशक्तिरूपापूर्वादिशब्दवाच्यादृष्टसाक्षात्काराभावेऽपि चेतनानां न कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः, तत्साक्षात्कारानपेक्षणात्कार्यारम्भस्य। शक्तिमत्साक्षात्कार एव हि कार्यारम्भोपयोगी। शक्तेस्तु ज्ञानमात्रमेवोपयुज्यते, न साक्षात्कारः। न हि कुलालादयः कार्योपकरणभूतदण्डचक्रादिवत्, तच्छक्तिमपि साक्षात्कृत्य घटमणिकादिकार्यमारभन्ते। इह तु चेतनानाम्, आगमावगतयागादिशक्तिविशेषाणां कार्यारम्भो नानुपपन्नः।

किं च, यच्छक्यक्रियं शक्योपादानादिविज्ञानं च, तदेव तदभिज्ञकर्तृकं दृष्टम्। महीधरमहार्णवादि तु, अशक्यक्रियम्, अशक्योपादानादिविज्ञानं च, इति न चेतनकर्तृकम्। अतो घटमणिकादिसजातीयशक्यक्रियशक्योपादानादिविज्ञानवस्तुगतमेव कार्यत्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वसाधने प्रभवति।

---

with the maxim preferring simplicity. Nor again, is there the impossibility of the nature of an agent in the case of individual souls, on account of their not being conversant with the material cause etc. on account of all sentients without exception having the power to know directly the material cause,—the earth and others, and accessories like sacrifice etc., as the earth and others, and the sacrifice and others are directly observed [even] at the present time. There cannot be the impossibility of the nature of an agent in the case of the sentients even in the absence of direct knowledge of ‘ Adṛṣṭa ’ expressed by the words like ‘ Apūrva ’ in the form of the power of the sacrifice and others that are accessories, on account of the commencement of the work not being dependent upon the direct knowledge of that. The direct knowledge possessed of power alone is, indeed, useful for the commencement of the work. In the case of the power, however, knowledge alone can be made use of, and not the direct knowledge; for, [surely] the potter and others do not commence the products like the jars, pots etc. after having directly known the power also, like [as they do in case of] staff, wheel etc. that are the accessories for the product. Here, however, the commencement of the work is not unreasonable in the case of the sentients who have apprehended from the scriptures the peculiar powers of sacrifice and others.

Furthermore, whatever [is] possible to be produced, and where the special knowledge of the material cause and others is possible, that same is seen to have an agent conversant with them. Mountains, oceans etc., on the other hand, are impossible to be produced, and in whom the special knowledge about the material cause etc. is impossible— and so, they cannot have the sentient as their agent. Therefore, being a product definitely in respect of a thing where the special knowledge of the material cause etc. is possible, and which is possible to be produced, being of the same category as the jar, pots etc. is competent in establishing the precedence of an intelligent agent.

किं च, घटादिकार्यम्, अनीश्वरेणाल्पज्ञानशक्तिना सशरीरेण परिग्रहवता, अनाप्तकामेन निर्मितं दृष्टम्, इति, तथाविधमेव चेतनं कर्तारं साधयत्रयं 'कार्यत्व'-हेतुः सिषाधयिषितपुरुषसार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्यादिविपरीतसाधनात् 'विरुद्धः' स्यात्। न च, एतावता सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। लिङ्गिनि प्रमाणान्तरगोचरे लिङ्गबलोपस्थापिता विपरीतविशेषास्तत्प्रमाणप्रतिहतगतयो हि निवर्तन्ते। इह तु सकलेतरप्रमाणाविषये लिङ्गिनि निखिलजगन्निर्माणचतुरे, अन्वयव्यतिरेकावगताविनाभावनियमा धर्माः सर्व एवाविशेषेण प्रसज्यन्ते, निवर्तकप्रमाणाभावात्तथैवावतिष्ठन्ते। अत आगमादृते कथमीश्वरः सेत्स्यति?

अत्राहुः—सावयवत्वादेव जगतः कार्यत्वं न प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यते। भवन्ति च प्रयोगाः—

(१) विवादाध्यासितं भूभूधरादि कार्यम्।
सावयवत्वात्।
घटादिवत्।

तथा—

(२) विवादाध्यासितम्, अवनिजलधिमहीधरादि कार्यम्।
महत्त्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वात्।
घटादिवत्।

Furthermore, because the products such as jar and others are seen to be produced by someone not the Controller, with scanty power and knowledge, with a body and possessed of means [and] with desires not fulfilled,— this logical mark 'being a product' proving a sentient agent of that same nature, would be a 'contrary' one owing to the establishment of the opposite of omniscience, controlling everything etc. in the case of the Puruṣa that is desired to be proved. By so much again, there would not be the undesirable result of bidding good-bye to all Inference. When the thing to be established by the logical mark is known from another means of proof, the particular opposites established on the strength of the logical mark, indeed, turn away with their course obstructed by that means of proof. Here, however, in the case of [Him] to be proved by the logical mark, not subject to all other means of proof, and skilled in creating the entire world, would be forthcoming without exception all the attributes with the rule of their invariable association being known positively and negatively, and would be staying on exactly in the same form owing to the absence of [any] means of proof removing [them away]. Therefore, how can the Controller [Īśvara] be proved without the scriptures?

Here they say— That the world is a product owing to its being possessed of parts itself, cannot be repudiated. And there are the [following] syllogisms—

[1] The earth, mountain etc.,— the matt er under dispute,— [are] a product.
On account of their being possessed of parts.
Like jar and others.

Similarly,

[2] The earth, ocean, mountain etc.,— the matter under dispute,— [are] a product.
On account of their being possessed of action, being possessed of magnitude.
Like jar and others.

(३) तनुभुवनादि कार्यम् ।

महत्त्वे सति मूर्तत्वात् ।

घटादिवत् ।

इति ।

सावयवेषु द्रव्येषु, 'इदमेव क्रियते नेतरत्' इति कार्यत्वस्य नियामकं सावयवत्वातिरेकि रूपान्तरं नोपलभामहे ।

[90] कार्यत्वप्रतिनियतं शक्यक्रियत्वं शक्योपादानादिविज्ञानत्वं च, उपलभ्यते—इति चेत्— न । कार्यत्वेनानुमितेऽपि विषये, ज्ञानशक्ती कार्यानुमेये, इति, अन्यत्रापि सावयवत्वादिना कार्यत्वं ज्ञातम्, इति, ते च प्रतिपन्ने एव, इति, न कश्चिद्विशेषः । तथाहि— घटमणिकादिषु कृतेषु कार्यत्वदर्शनानुमितकर्तृगततन्निर्माणशक्तिज्ञानः पुरुषोऽदृष्टपूर्वं विचित्रसंनिवेशं नरेन्द्रभवनमालोक्य, अवयवसंनिवेशविशेषेण तस्य कार्यत्वं निश्चित्य, तदानीमेव कर्तुस्तज्ज्ञानशक्तिवैचित्र्यमनुमिनोति । अतः, तनुभुवनादेः कार्यत्वे सिद्धे सर्वसाक्षात्कारतन्निर्माणादिनिपुणः कश्चित्पुरुषविशेषः सिध्यत्येव ।

---

[3] The body, universe etc., are a product.

On account of their being possessed of a [limited] form, being possessed of magnitude.

Like jar and others.

We do not come across another form other than those possessed of parts in the case of the substances possessed of parts, regulating the nature of the product in the form 'This alone is to be produced and not anything else'.

[90] If it were argued— The nature of being possible to be produced and the nature of the special knowledge of accessories etc. possible, restricted by its being a product, are met with, [we reply]—No. Even in the case of the object inferred from its being a product, the knowledge and the power are to be inferred from the product,— And so, in other cases also, the nature as a product is known owing to its being possessed of parts,— and so, there is no difference whatsoever, as they also, indeed, are apprehended. To explain the same— When jars, pots etc. are produced, a person who is possessed of the knowledge of the power of creating them possessed by the agent inferred from the sight of their nature as products, having beheld the King's abode, not seen before, [and] of a wonderful structure, having concluded about its being a product owing to the distinctive arrangement of parts, infers at the very same time the wonderful nature of the knowledge and power in respect of it in the case of the agent. So, when the nature of the product in respect of the body and the universe etc. is established, some distinguished person expert in realising everything and creating that etc. is undoubtedly established [to exist].

किं च, सर्वचेतनानां धर्माधर्मनिमित्तेऽपि सुखदुःखोपभोगे, चेतनानधिष्ठितयोस्तयोरचेतनयोः फलहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः, सर्वकर्मानुगुणसर्वफलप्रदानचतुरः कश्चिदास्थेयः, वर्धकिनानधिष्ठितस्य वास्यादेरचेतनस्य देशकालाद्यनेकपरिकरसंनिधानेऽपि यूपादिनिर्माणसाधनत्वादर्शनात् । बीजाङ्कुरादेः पक्षान्तर्भावेण तैर्व्यभिचारापादनं श्रोत्रियवेतालानामनभिज्ञताविजृम्भितम् । तत एव सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारदर्शनवचनम्, अपि तथैव । न च लाघवेन, उभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नक्षेत्रज्ञानामेवेदृशमधिष्ठातृत्वकल्पनं युक्तम्, तेषां सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टदर्शनाशक्तिनिश्चयात् । दर्शनानुगुणैव हि सर्वत्र शक्तिकल्पना । न च क्षेत्रज्ञवदीश्वरस्याशक्तिनिश्चयोऽस्ति । अतः प्रमाणान्तरतो न तत्सिद्ध्यनुपपत्तिः । समर्थकर्तृपूर्वकत्वनियतकार्यत्वहेतुना सिध्यन्, स्वाभाविकसर्वार्थसाक्षात्कारतन्नियमनशक्तिसंपन्न एव सिध्यति ।

[91] यत्तु, अनैश्वर्यापादनेन धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनत्वमुन्नीतम्, तत्, अनु-

---

Furthermore, in the case of all the sentients, although the enjoyment of happiness and grief is caused by merit and demerit, owing to the impossibility of being the cause of fruit in the case of the two non-sentients [merit and demerit] not presided over by a sentient, someone has got to be assumed, well-versed in bestowing every fruit in conformity with all Karmans, because there is the non-perception of being the means of manufacturing the sacrificial post etc. in the case of non-sentient hatchet and others when they are not handled by the carpenter, even though there is the proximity of space, time and other paraphernalia. On account of the seed, sprout etc. being included in the subject-matter under discussion, the imposition of the violation of the rule [about the Vyāpti] by them is [but] the proud display of [colossal] ignorance on the part of the devils,— Scripture-experts. For the same reason, the statement about the perception of violation in the case of happiness etc., is of the same nature. Nor again, is it proper on the strength of [the argument about] simplicity to assume in this way the nature as presiding agent in the case of the Kṣetrajñas themselves, well-admitted by both the disputants, owing to the ascertainment of their inability to perceive the subtle, the screened and the distant. Everywhere, indeed, is the assumption of power in conformity with the perception. Nor is [there] the ascertainment of powerlessness in the Controller as in the case of the Kṣetrajñas; so, there is no impropriety of his establishment through another means of proof. [Some one] being established by the logical mark 'being a product invariably associated with the nature of having a competent agent preceding,' does stand established, as endowed with the natural power of direct realisation of all objects [and] of controlling them.

[91] As to what has been brought on the scene viz. the establishment of the opposite of the distinctive attributes by the assumption of the absence of overlordship, that is based upon the ignorance about the inference-procedure,

मानवृत्तानभिज्ञत्वनिबन्धनम्। सपक्षे सहदृष्टानां, सर्वेषां कार्यस्याहेतुभूतानां च धर्माणां लिङ्गिन्यप्राप्तेः। एतदुक्तं भवति— केनचित्किंचित्क्रियमाणं स्वोत्पत्तये कर्तुः स्वनिर्माण-सामर्थ्यं स्वोपादानोपकरणज्ञानं चापेक्षते। न तु, अन्यासामर्थ्यम्, अन्याज्ञानं च, हेतुत्वाभावात्। स्वनिर्माणसामर्थ्यस्वोपादानोपकरणज्ञानाभ्यामेव स्वोत्पत्तावुपपन्नायां संबन्धितया दर्शनमात्रेण, अकिंचित्करस्यार्थान्तराज्ञानादेर्हेतुत्वकल्पनायोगात्— इति। किं च, क्रियमाणवस्तुव्यतिरिक्तार्थाज्ञानादिकं किं सर्वविषयं क्रियोपयोगि? उत कतिपयविषयम्? न तावत्सर्वविषयम्। न हि कुलालादिः क्रियमाणव्यतिरिक्तं किमपि न विजानाति। नापि कतिपयविषयम्, सर्वेषु कर्तृषु तत्तदज्ञानाशक्त्यनियमेन सर्वेषाम-ज्ञानादीनां व्यभिचारात्। अतः कार्यत्वस्यासाधकानामनीश्वरत्वादीनां लिङ्गिन्यप्राप्तेः, इति न विपरीतसाधनत्वम्।

[92] कुलालादीनां दण्डचक्राद्यधिष्ठानत्वं शरीरद्वारेण दृष्टम्, इति जगदुपादानोप-करणाधिष्ठानमीश्वरस्याशरीरस्यानुपपन्नम्— इति चेत्— न, संकल्पमात्रेणैव परशरीरगत-

---

on account of all the attributes met with together in a similar instance [sapakṣa] and also those which are not the cause for the products, not being found in the thing to be established by the logical mark. This is what is intended to be said— Something being produced by someone stands in need for its own origination, of the power to create itself on the part of the agent and the knowledge of its material and accessories; and not of the powerlessness [to create] another, and the ignorance regarding the other, owing to the absence of their being the cause [and] on account of the impropriety of assuming the nature of a cause in the case of ignorance and others belonging to other objects that do not in any way help, merely by the perception of their relationship when the origination is effected, by the power of creating itself and the knowledge of its material and accessories alone. Furthermore, do this ignorance and others of a thing different from the thing being produced, encompass all and contribute to the action ? Or encompass only some ? Not, for the matter of that, all-encompassing ; not, indeed, do the potter etc. not know anything over and above the thing to be effected ; nor again encompassing some , on account of the violation [of the general vyāpti-rule] by all, ignorance and others, in the case of all agents owing to the non-regulation about the various kinds of ignorance, and powerlessness. And thus [the attributes like] the nature of non-controller etc. that are impotent in respect of the nature of the product, not being found in the case of a thing to be established by the logical mark— And thus they do not establish the opposite.

[92] If it were argued— In the case of the potter and others, being the supervisors of the staff and the wheel, is seen through [their possessing of] a body—and so, the supervising nature over the material cause and the accessories of the world, of Īśvara not possessed of a body, does not stand

भूतवेतालगरलाद्यपगमविनाशदर्शनात्।

कथमशरीरस्येश्वरस्य परप्रवर्तनरूपः संकल्पः?— इति चेत्— न शरीरापेक्षः संकल्पः, शरीरस्य संकल्पहेतुत्वाभावात्। मन एव हि संकल्पहेतुः। तदभ्युपगतमीश्वरेऽपि, कार्यत्वेनैव ज्ञानशक्तिवन्मनसोऽपि प्राप्तत्वात्।

मानसः संकल्पः सशरीरस्यैव, शरीरस्यैव समनस्कत्वात्, इति चेत्— न, मनसो नित्यत्वेन देहापगमेऽपि मनसः सद्भावेनानैकान्तिकत्वात्। अतो विचित्रावयवसंनिवेश-विशेषतनुभुवनादिकार्यनिर्माणे पुण्यपापपरवशः परिमितशक्तिज्ञानः क्षेत्रज्ञो न प्रभवति, इति, निखिलभुवननिर्माणचतुरः, अचिन्त्यापरिमितज्ञानशक्त्यैश्वर्यः, अशरीरः, संकल्पमात्रसाधनपरिनिष्पन्नानन्तविस्तारविचित्ररचनप्रपञ्चः, पुरुषविशेषः, ईश्वरोऽनुमानेन सिध्यति। अतः प्रमाणान्तरावसेयत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः, नैतद्वाक्यं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति।

[93] किं च, अत्यन्तभिन्नयोरेव मृद्द्रव्यकुलालयोर्निमित्तोपादानत्वदर्शनेन, आकाशादेर्निरवयवद्रव्यस्य कार्यत्वानुपपत्त्या च, नैकमेव ब्रह्म कृत्स्नस्य जगतो निमित्त-मुपादानं च प्रतिपादयितुं शक्नोति—इति।

---

to reason, [we reply]—No; on account of the perception of going out and destruction merely by the thought alone of ghosts, goblins and poison associated with the bodies of others.

How can there be a thought of the nature of impelling others on the part of Īśvara not having a body?—If it were argued thus, [we reply]—The thought does not depend upon a body, as the body cannot be the cause of thought; for, the mind alone is the cause of thought. That is admitted even in [the case of] Īśvara, because like power and knowledge, the mind also is found, verily, as being a product itself.

If it were argued— The mental thought belongs to one alone, possessed of a body, on account of the body alone being possessed of the mind, [we reply]— No, because the mind is eternal and is existent even on the disappearance of the body, the reasoning is inconclusive. For this reason, the Kṣetrajña is not competent in respect of the creation of the product, body, universe etc. with a distinctive arrangement of the various parts—[the Kṣetrajña] who is dependent upon merit and demerit, with limited power and knowledge— and so is established by Inference, the Īśvara, a distinguished Puruṣa skilled in creating the entire universe, with unthinkable unlimited knowledge, power and overlordship, without a body, who has finished off the worldly creation with variegated arrangement and endless expanse, with mere thought as the means. Therefore, owing to Brahman being fit to be ascertained by another means of proof, this passage does not propound Brahman.

[93] Furthermore, owing to the perception of the nature of the instrumental and the material cause in the case of earth-substance and the potter, although quite different [from each other], and owing to the impropriety of being a product in the case of the impartite substance like the Ākāśa,

एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः— यथोक्तलक्षणं ब्रह्म जगज्जन्मादिवाक्यं बोधयत्येव। कुतः ? शास्त्रैकप्रमाणत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। यदुक्तम्— सावयवत्वादिना कार्यं सर्वं जगत्। कार्यं च तदुचितकर्तृविशेषपूर्वकं दृष्टम्, इति निखिलजगन्निर्माणतदुपादानोपकरणवेदनचतुरः कश्चिदनुमेयः। इति—

तदयुक्तम्, महीमहार्णवादीनां कार्यत्वेऽपि, एकदैवैकेन निर्मिताः, इत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात्। न चैकस्य घटस्येव सर्वेषामेकं कार्यत्वम्, येनैकदैवैकः कर्ता स्यात्, पृथग्भूतेषु कार्येषु कालभेदकर्तृभेददर्शनेन कर्तृकालैक्यनियमाभावात्। न च क्षेत्रज्ञानां विचित्रजगन्निर्माणाशक्त्या, कार्यत्वबलेन, तदतिरिक्तकल्पनायाम्, अनेककल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च, एक एव कर्ता भवितुमर्हति। क्षेत्रज्ञानामेवोपचितपुण्यविशेषाणां शक्तिवैचित्र्यदर्शनेन तेषामेवातिशयित-'अदृष्ट'संभावनया च तत्तद्विलक्षणकार्यहेतुत्वसंभवात्, तदतिरिक्तात्यन्तादृष्टपुरुषकल्पनानुपपत्तेश्च। न च युगपत्सर्वोच्छित्तिः सर्वोत्पत्तिश्च प्रमाणपदवीमधिरोहतः, अदर्शनात्,

---

no one is able to propound the one Brahman as the instrumental and the material cause of the entire world.

This [prima-facie view] being reached, we say [in reply]— The passage about the birth etc. of the world does enlighten us about Brahman as already defined. Whence ? On account of Brahman having Śāstra alone as the authority [to prove it]. As to what has been said [by the Pūrvapakṣin]— The entire world is a product owing to its being possessed of parts etc.; and a product is seen, as preceded by a particular agent befitting it, and so someone has got to be inferred as skilled in the creation of the entire world and in the knowledge of its material cause and accessories —

[We reply]— That is improper, on account of the absence of any means of proof to say that the earth, the great ocean etc., although being products, are created by one, once for all. Not again, as in the case of a jar, is there the nature of only one product in the case of all, so that there would be only one agent once for all, on account of the absence of [any] rule about the sameness of agent and time, owing to the perception of difference of time and difference of agent in respect of different products. And it is not that only one should be the creator, owing to the powerlessness for creating the variegated world on the part of the Kṣetrajñas, owing to the magnitude of the nature of the product and on account of the impropriety of the assumption of many [creators] in assuming one [creator] over and above that; because it is possible for the Kṣetrajñas themselves with distinctive merit gathered [to their credit], to be the cause of the different strange products, owing to the perception of distinctive power [in the Kṣetrajñas] and on account of the possibility of the ' Adṛṣṭa ' unsurpassed in them alone; and also because there is the impropriety of assumption of an absolutely unseen Puruṣa over and above them. And surely a simultaneous all-round destruction and an all-round origination, cannot have any means of proof, on account of [such a thing] not

क्रमेणैवोत्पत्तिविनाशदर्शनाच्च, कार्यत्वेन सर्वोत्पत्तिविनाशयोः कल्प्यमानयोर्दर्शनानुगुण्येन कल्पनायामपि विरोधाभावाच्च ।

अतो बुद्धिमदेककर्तृकत्वे साध्ये, 'कार्यत्व'स्य, अनैकान्त्यम्, 'पक्ष'स्य, अप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम्, 'साध्य'विकलता च दृष्टान्तस्य, सर्वनिर्माणचतुरस्यैकस्याप्रसिद्धेः । 'बुद्धि'मत्कर्तृकत्वमात्रे सिद्धसाध्यता। सार्वज्ञ्यसर्वशक्तियुक्तस्य कस्यचिदेकस्य साधकमिदं 'कार्यत्वम्', किं युगपदुत्पद्यमानसर्ववस्तुगतम्, उत क्रमेणोत्पद्यमानसर्ववस्तुगतम् ? युगपदुत्पद्यमानसर्ववस्तुगतत्वे, कार्यत्वस्यासिद्धिः । क्रमेणोत्पद्यमानसर्ववस्तुगतत्वे, अनेककर्तृकत्वसाधनात् विरुद्धता । अत्रापि, 'एककर्तृकत्व'साधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानविरोधश्च । शास्त्रविरोधश्च 'कुम्भकारो जायते' 'रथकारो जायते', इत्यादिश्रवणात् ।

[94] अपि च, सर्वेषां कार्याणां शरीरादीनां सत्त्वादिगुणरूपसुखाद्यन्वयदर्शनेन सत्त्वादिमूलत्वमवश्यमाश्रयणीयम् । कार्यवैचित्र्यहेतुभूताः कारणगता विशेषाः सत्त्वादयः ।

---

being seen, on account of the perception of origination and destruction in a graduated way alone, and on account of the absence of any contradiction even in assuming in conformity with the [actual] perception of all-round origination and destruction being assumed as products.

Therefore, if having one intelligent creator [for the world] is a thing to be proved (*sādhya*), there would be inconclusive nature of 'Kāryatva' [being a product] ; the 'Pakṣa' [a thing about which something is to be proved] [i. e. Jagat] would have attributes not established before, and the illustrative instance would be incompetent to prove the 'Sādhya' [thing to be proved], on account of the non-establishment of one skilled in creating everything. If the nature of an agent belongs to one possessed of 'Buddhi', there would be [the fault] of proving the proved. This— 'being a product'— proving someone [as the creator], endowed with omniscience and every power,—does this encompass all objects being produced simultaneously, or does this encompass all things being produced in a graduated way ? If there is the nature of encompassing all things being produced simultaneously, there would be the non-establishment of the nature as a product. If there is the nature of encompassing all things being produced in a graduated way, there would be a contradiction ['Hetvābhāsa'] owing to the establishment of having many creators. And here also, there would be the conflict with Direct perception and Inference, in the establishment of 'having one creator' [for the world]; and there would be the conflict with the Śāstra owing to [expressions] 'The potter is born', 'The chariot-maker is born etc.' being heard [used].

[94] And further, in the case of all products like body and others, their being founded on Sattva etc., has necessarily to be accepted, owing to the perception of the association with happiness and others constituted of the qualities Sattva and others. Sattva and others are distinctive attributes, belonging to the cause, forming the cause of the manifold nature of products.

तेषां कार्याणां तन्मूलत्वापादनं तद्युक्तपुरुषान्तःकरणविकारद्वारेण। पुरुषस्य च तद्योगः कर्ममूल इति, कार्यविशेषारम्भायैव ज्ञानशक्तिवत्कर्तुः कर्मसंबन्धः कार्यहेतुत्वेनैवावश्याश्रयणीयः, ज्ञानशक्तिवैचित्र्यस्य कर्ममूलत्वात्। 'इच्छायाः' कार्यारम्भहेतुत्वेऽपि विषयविशेषविशेषितायास्तस्याः सत्त्वादिमूलत्वेन कर्मसंबन्धोऽवर्जनीयः। अतः क्षेत्रज्ञा एव कर्तारः, न तद्विलक्षणः कश्चिदनुमानात्सिध्यति। भवन्ति च प्रयोगाः—

(१) तनुभुवनादि क्षेत्रज्ञकर्तृकम्।
कार्यत्वात्।
घटादिवत्।

(२) ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति।
प्रयोजनशून्यत्वात्।
मुक्तवत्।

(३) ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति।
अशरीरत्वात्।
तद्वदेव।

न च क्षेत्रज्ञानां स्वशरीराधिष्ठाने व्यभिचारः, तत्रापि, अनादेः सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य सद्भावात्।

In the case of those effects, there is the assumption of their being rooted in that, through the change coming over the inner sense-organ of a person associated with that [Sattva etc.]. And because the association of the person with that is rooted in Karman, the association of the agent with Karman as with knowledge and power, is definitely to be resorted to as being the cause of the product, for the purpose of commencing a particular product itself, because the manifold nature of knowledge and power is rooted in Karman. Even though 'desire' is the cause of the commencement of an undertaking, the association with Karman of that [desire] particularised by a particular object, is unavoidable, on account of its being rooted in Sattva and others. Therefore, the Kṣetrajñas alone are the creators and no one different from them becomes established by Inference. And there are the following syllogistic reasonings :—

[1] Body, universe etc. have the Kṣetrajñas as their creators.
On account of their being the products.
Like jar and others.

[2] Iśvara cannot be the creator,
On account of His having no purpose.
Like the Released Soul.

[3] Iśvara cannot be the creator,
On account of His being without a body.
Just like that [Released Soul].

Nor again, is there any violation in occupying their bodies in the case of the Kṣetrajñas, owing to the presence there also, of the beginningless subtle body.

(४) विमतिविषयः कालो न लोकशून्यः ।
कालत्वात् ।
वर्तमानकालवत् ।

अपि च, किम्, ईश्वरः सशरीरोऽशरीरो वा कार्यं करोति? न तावत्, 'अशरीरः', तस्य कर्तृत्वानुपलब्धेः । मानसान्यपि कार्याणि सशरीरस्यैव भवन्ति; मनसो नित्यत्वेऽपि, अशरीरेषु मुक्तेषु तत्कार्यादर्शनात् । नापि 'सशरीरः', विकल्पासहत्वात् । तच्च शरीरं किं नित्यम्, अनित्यं वा? न तावत्, 'नित्यम्', सावयवस्य तस्य नित्यत्वेन जगतोऽपि नित्यत्वाविरोधात्, ईश्वरासिद्धेः । नापि, 'अनित्यम्', तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य तच्छरीरहेतोस्तदानीमभावात् । स्वयमेव हेतुः—इति चेत्, न, अशरीरस्य तदयोगात् । अन्येन शरीरेण सशरीरः— इति चेत्— न, अनवस्थानात् ।

स किं सव्यापारो निर्व्यापारो वा? 'अशरीरत्वात्', एव न सव्यापारः । नापि निर्व्यापारः कार्यं करोति, मुक्तात्मवत् । कार्यं जगत्, इच्छामात्रव्यापारकर्तृकम्, इत्युच्यमाने, पक्षस्याप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वं दृष्टान्तस्य च साध्यहीनता । अतो दर्शनानुगुण्येन ईश्वरानुमानं

---

[4] Time, the subject of dispute, is not disconnected from worlds.
On account of being time.
Like the present time.

Moreover, does Īśvara do his work, possessed of a body or not possessed of a body? Not for the matter of that, 'not possessed of a body', on account of the non-perception of the nature of an agent in His case. Even the mental acts are possible only in the case of one possessed of a body; because even though the mind is eternal, no act in respect of that [mind] is seen in [the case of] the released souls not possessed of bodies. Nor again, 'possessed of a body', on account of the impossibility of any different ideas (*Vikalpa*) [in this connection]. And is that body eternal or non-eternal? Not for the matter that, 'eternal',— on account of the non-establishment of Īśvara, owing to the non-contradiction with eternality, also of the world, as a result of the eternality of that possessed of parts. Nor again, 'non-eternal', on account of the absence at that time of something different from that, which would be the cause of that body. If it were argued—It itself would be the cause—[we say] —It is not so, owing to the absence of any relation with that of one without a body. If it were argued,— He has a body owing to some other body— [we say]—It is not so, owing to [the fault of] endlessness.

Is He, [again], associated with activity or is He without activity? On account of 'being without a body' itself, He is not associated with activity. Nor does He do His work without activity, like the released souls. If it were said,—The product-world has for its creator the activity in the form of desire only, the Pakṣa [Jagat] would have a non-established attribute, and the illustrative instance would be without the thing to be established [the power to prove]. Therefore, the inference about Īśvara in conformity with perception, is repudiated by the conformity with perception; and so, the Excellent

दर्शनानुगुण्यपराहतम्, इति शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकः परब्रह्मभूतः सर्वेश्वरेश्वरः पुरुषोत्तमः। शास्त्रं तु सकलेतरपरिदृष्टसमस्तवस्तुविसजातीयं सार्वज्ञ्यसत्यसंकल्पत्वादिमिश्रानवधिकातिशयापरिमितोदारगुणसागरं निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकस्वरूपं प्रतिपादयति, इति न प्रमाणान्तरावसितवस्तुसाधर्म्यप्रयुक्तदोषगन्धप्रसङ्गः।

[95] यत्तु—निमित्तोपादानयोरैक्यम्, आकाशादेर्निरवयवस्य द्रव्यस्य कार्यत्वं चानुपलब्धम्, अशक्यप्रतिपादनम्—इत्युक्तम्—तदप्यविरुद्धम्, इति—

'प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्' (ब्र. सू. १।४।२३)

'न वियदश्रुतेः' (ब्र. सू. २।३।१)

इत्यत्र प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अतो प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वेन शास्त्रैकविषयत्वात्—

'यतो वा इमानि' (तै. ३।१।१)

इत्यादिवाक्यमुक्तलक्षणं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, इति सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

[96] यद्यपि प्रमाणान्तरागोचरं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरत्वाभावेन सिद्धरूपं ब्रह्म न शास्त्रं बोधयति—इत्याशङ्क्याह—

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

Puruṣa, the Supreme Īśvara of all Īśvaras, who is the Highest Brahman, has Śāstra alone as an authority [to prove His existence]. And the Śāstra propound sone, heterogeneous from all things perceived by all other [means of proof], the ocean of immeasurable noble qualities, of unlimited abundance along with omniscience, with thoughts fulfilled, etc., with nature the opposite of everything fit to be abandoned—and so, there is no undesirable contingency of [His] having even a tinge of a blemish prompted by similarity with objects ascertained by other means of proof.

[95] As to the statement [of the Pūrvapakṣin] that the identity of the instrumental and the material [cause], and the nature as a product of the impartite substances, Ākāśa etc. are not seen, [and] impossible to propound,—that also is not contradictory, as it would be propounded here [in the Sūtras].–

'And the material cause, owing to the non-contradiction with the solemn declaration and the illustrative instance'. (Br. Sū. 1·4·23)

'Not the sky, on account of the absence of the Śruti [passage]'. (Br. Sū. 2·3·1)

Therefore, it is established that this passage etc.,

'From whom again, these'. (Tait. 3·1·1)

propounds Brahman already defined, on account of its being dealt with by the Śāstra alone, as it is not within the ken of other means of proof. ॥ 3 ॥

[96] Even though Brahman is not within the ken of other means of proof, still the Śāstra does not enlighten one about Brahman of an established form, owing to the absence of having reference to activity and passivity.—Having raised this doubt, [the Sūtrakāra] says—

But that on account of co-relation ॥ 4 ॥

प्रसक्ताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थः 'तु' शब्दः । 'तत्' शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवत्येव । कुतः ? समन्वयात् । पुरुषार्थतयान्वयः 'समन्वयः', परमपुरुषार्थभूतस्य ब्रह्मणोऽभिधेयतया, अन्वयात् । एवमेव समन्वितो ह्यौपनिषदः पदसमुदायः —

'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ।' (तै. ३।१।१)

'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।
तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजोऽसृजत ।' (छा. ६।२।२-३)

'ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् एकमेव' (बृ. १।४।१०)

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. १।१)

'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः आकाशः संभूतः ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'एको ह वै नारायण आसीत् ।' (म. ना. १)

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'आनन्दो ब्रह्म ।' (तै. ३।६।१)

इत्येवमादिः । न च व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धपरिनिष्पन्नवस्तुप्रतिपादनसमर्थानां पदसमुदायानाम्, अखिलजगदुत्पत्तिविनाशहेतुभूताशेषदोषप्रत्यनीकापरिमितोदारगुणसागरानवधिकातिशया-

---

The word 'Tu' is for the purpose of removing the doubt put forward—'Tat'—having the Sāstra alone as the authority in the case of Brahman—is certainly possible. Whence? On account of the Samanvaya [co-relation]. 'Samanvaya' means relation with the nature of human purpose in life, on account of the relation with reference to Brahman, the highest human purpose in life, as the object fit to be denoted. Thus, indeed, related in this very manner, is the group of words in the Upaniṣads, such as —

'From whom, again, these beings are produced'. (Tait. 3·1·1)

'Existence, alone, [my] dear, was all this, in the beginning, one without a second. That reflected, 'Let me be many. May I procreate.' It created Light.' (Chā. 6·2·2–3)

'Brahman alone, verily, was [all] this in the beginning.' (Bṛ. 1·4·10)

'Ātman alone, verily, was [all] this in the beginning'. (Ait. 1.1)

'From that, this Ātman, verily, the Ākāśa originated. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'One Nārāyaṇa, verily, alone was there'. (M. Nā. 1)

'Existence, knowledge, infinite [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 2·1·1)

'Bliss [is] Brahman'. (Tait. 3·6·1)

In the case of groups of words capable of propounding a completely accomplished thing, etymologically established, co-related with Brahman having the nature of bliss of unlimited abundance, which is the ocean of unlimited noble qualities, the opposite of every blemish, that has become the cause of

नन्वस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि समन्वितानाम्, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनविरहादन्यपरत्वम्, स्वविषयावबोधपर्यवसायित्वात्सर्वप्रमाणानाम्। न च प्रयोजनानुगुणा प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिः। प्रयोजनं हि प्रमाणानुगुणम्। न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहिणः प्रयोजनशून्यत्वम्, पुरुषार्थान्वयप्रतीतेः। तथा स्वरूपपरेष्वपि 'पुत्रस्ते जातो' 'नायं सर्पः', इत्यादिषु हर्षभयनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वं दृष्टम्।

[97] अत्राह— न वेदान्तवाक्यानि ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यन्वयविरहिणः ·शास्त्रस्यानर्थक्यात्। यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादीनि वस्तुयाथात्म्यावबोधे पर्यवस्यन्ति, तथापि शास्त्रं प्रयोजनपर्यवसाय्येव। न हि लोकवेदयोः प्रयोजनरहितस्य कस्यचिदपि वाक्यस्य प्रयोग उपलब्धचरः। न च किंचित्प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य वाक्यप्रयोगः श्रवणं वा संभवति। तच्च प्रयोजनं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसाध्येष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारात्मकमुपलब्धम्— 'अर्थार्थी राजकुलं गच्छेत्,' 'मन्दाग्निर्नाम्बु पिबेत्' 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत', 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्' इत्यादिषु।

यत्पुनः— सिद्धवस्तुपरेष्वपि 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' 'नायं सर्पो रज्जुरेषा' इत्यादिषु

origination and destruction of the entire world, there is no reference to another owing to the absence of [any] purpose in the form of activity and passivity, as all means of proof have the nature of culminating in the enlightenment about their own objects. Nor again, is the activity of the means of proof, in conformity with the purpose. The purpose, indeed, is in conformity with the means of proof. Nor again, is there the absence of purpose in the case of one, bereft of any relation with activity and passivity, on account of the apprehension of the relation with the human purpose in life. Similarly, in respect of statements dealing with the [mere] nature [of objects], like 'A son is born to you', 'This is [not] a serpent', there is seen the possession of a purpose in the form of joy and the removal of fear.

[97] Here says [The Pūrvapakṣin]—The Vedānta passages do not propound Brahman, on account of the uselessness of a Śāstra bereft of the relation with activity and passivity. Even though Direct perception and others culminate in the enlightenment about the nature of things as they are, still the Śāstra definitely culminates in [pointing out] the purpose. Not indeed is seen before, the use in the Vedas, and among the people, of any passage whatsoever bereft of [any] purpose. Nor again, is possible the use of expressions [among people] and of the Śruti passage [in the Veda] without referring to some purpose or other. And that purpose is perceived to have the nature of acquisition and avoidance of desired and undesired [things] to be secured by activity and passivity [respectively], as in [the passages] like 'Desirous of wealth, one should go to the palace', 'One with weak digestion should not drink water', 'Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice', 'One should not eat the Kalañja'.

Again, as to what has been said even in the case of [passages] referring to the established things such as, 'A son is born to you', 'This [is] not a

हर्षभयाविनिवृत्तिरूपपुरुषार्थान्वयो दृष्टः — इत्युक्तम् — तत्र, किं पुत्रजन्माद्यर्थात्पुरुषार्थावाप्तिः, उत, तज्ज्ञानात्, इति विवेचनीयम्।

सतोऽप्यर्थस्य, अज्ञातस्य, अपुरुषार्थत्वेन — तज्ज्ञानात् — इति चेत् — तर्हि, असत्येऽप्यर्थे ज्ञानादेव पुरुषार्थः सिध्यति, इत्यर्थपरत्वाभावेन प्रयोजनपर्यवसायिनोऽपि शास्त्रस्य नार्थसद्भावे प्रामाण्यम्। तस्मात्सर्वत्र प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरत्वेन ज्ञानपरत्वेन वा प्रयोजनपर्यवसानम्, इति कस्यापि वाक्यस्य परिनिष्पन्ने वस्तुनि तात्पर्यासंभवात्, न वेदान्ताः परिनिष्पन्नं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति।

[98] अत्र कश्चिदाह — वेदान्तवाक्यान्यपि कार्यपरतयैव ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणभावमनुभवन्ति। कथम्? निष्प्रपञ्चम्, अद्वितीयं ज्ञानैकरसं ब्रह्म, अनाद्यविद्यया सप्रपञ्चतया प्रतीयमानं निष्प्रपञ्चं कुर्यात्, इति ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चविलयद्वारेण विधिविषयत्वम्, इति। कोऽसौ द्रष्टृदृश्यरूपप्रपञ्चविलयद्वारेण साध्यज्ञानैकरसब्रह्मविषयो विधिः?

'न दृष्टेः द्रष्टारं पश्येः ... ... न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथाः।'　　(बृ. ३।४।२)

---

serpent, this [is] a rope', there is seen the relation with the human purpose in life, in the form of joy and removal of fear etc.,— there, whether the acquisition of human purpose in life is from the matter like the birth of the son etc., or from the knowledge of that, — This has got to be scrutinised.

If it were argued, — From the knowledge of that [Puruṣārtha], because an unknown object although existing cannot be the human purpose in life, [we reply] — In that case, even though the object does not exist, the human purpose in life becomes established from the knowledge itself — and so, the Śāstra, although culminating in the purpose owing to the absence of [any] reference to the object, is not authoritative regarding the existence of the object. Therefore, everywhere there being culmination in the purpose either by reference to activity and passivity, or to knowledge, the Vedānta texts do not propound the completely established Brahman, because, any passage, for the matter of that, cannot have for its purport a completely established thing.

[98] Here someone says—Even the Vedānta passages do attain to the status of means of proof in regard to Brahman, only by their being intent upon action. How? Thus— Brahman, void of worldly existence, without a second, having a uniform nature as Jñāna [but] being apprehended as associated with worldly existence on account of the beginningless Avidyā ;— one should make [such Brahman] void of worldly existence— and so, Brahman becomes the subject of injunctions through the dissolution of the worldly existence. What is that injunction referring to Brahman, having the uniform nature as Jñāna to be established, through the channel of the dissolution of the worldly existence of the form of the perceiver and the perceivable? It is this and others—

'Thou shalt not see the Seer of the seeing; ... Thou shalt not think the Thinker of the thinking.'　　(Bṛ. 3·4·2)

इत्येवमादिः । द्रष्टृदृश्यभेदशून्यं दृशिमात्रं ब्रह्म कुर्यात्, इत्यर्थः । स्वतःसिद्धस्यापि ब्रह्मणो निष्प्रपञ्चतारूपेण साध्यत्वम्, अविरुद्धम्—इति—

तदयुक्तम् । नियोगवाक्यार्थवादिना हि नियोगो नियोज्यविशेषणम्, विषयः, करणम्, इतिकर्तव्यता, प्रयोक्ता च वक्तव्याः । तत्र हि नियोज्यविशेषणमनुपादेयम् । तच्च निमित्तं फलम्, इति द्विधा । अत्र किं नियोज्यविशेषणम् ? तच्च किं निमित्तं फलं वा, इति विवेचनीयम् ।

ब्रह्मस्वरूपयाथात्म्यानुभवः,—इति चेत्—तर्हि, न तन्निमित्तम्, जीवनादिवत्, अस्यासिद्धत्वात् । निमित्तत्वे च तस्य नित्यत्वेन, अपवर्गोत्तरकालमपि जीवननिमित्ताग्निहोत्रादिवत्, नित्यं तद्विषयानुष्ठानप्रसङ्गः । नापि फलम्, नैयोगिकफलत्वेन स्वर्गादिवत्, अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । कश्चात्र नियोगविषयः ? ब्रह्मैव—इति चेत्, न, तस्य नित्यत्वेन, अभव्यरूपत्वात्, अभावार्थत्वाच्च । निष्प्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म साध्यम्—इति चेत्, साध्यत्वेऽपि फलत्वमेव । अभावार्थत्वान्न विधिविषयत्वम् । 'साध्यत्वं' च कस्य ? किं ब्रह्मणः, उत

The sense is — One should realize Brahman as only 'dṛśi', void of difference as the perceiver and the perceivable. Being established as having the nature of being void of worldly existence, in the case of Brahman although self-established, is not contrary.

—That is improper, for by him who holds the view that the sense of the passage is injunction [application], should be stated the injunction, the attribute of the person to be enjoined, the object, the instrument, the procedure, and the performer. There, indeed, the attribute of the person to be enjoined cannot be admitted. And that is two-fold—the cause and the fruit. What is the attribute of the person to be enjoined? And as for that, is it the cause or fruit? Here it has got to be scrutinized.

If it be argued — Is that the experience of the nature of Brahman as it is? Then [in that case] it is not the cause, because it is not established in its case like life etc. If it were the cause, on account of its being eternal, there would be the undesired contingency of the performance referring to that for all time, like the 'Fire-worship' etc. dependent upon life, subsequent to salvation; nor again the fruit, owing to the undesired contingency of its being non-eternal like heaven etc. as being the fruit resulting from injunction. What again is the object of this injunction? If it be argued—It is Brahman alone, — [the reply is]—No, on account of its being without a form that is to come into existence, as it has eternality, and also due to its being negative in nature. If it be argued, — Brahman is to be established as void of worldly existence—[our reply is]—In being the thing to be established, it is being the fruit itself. It is not the object of an injunction, owing to its being negative in character. Whose again is the 'being the thing to be established'? Whether of Brahman or of the cessation of worldly existence? Not for the matter of

प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तेः ? न तावद्ब्रह्मणः, सिद्धत्वादनित्यत्वप्रसक्तेश्च। अथ प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तेः, न तर्हि ब्रह्मणः साध्यत्वम्।

[99] प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरेव विधिविषयः—इति चेत्—न, तस्याः फलत्वेन विधिविषयत्वायोगात्। प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरेव हि मोक्षः। स च फलम्। अस्य च नियोग-विषयत्वे नियोगात्प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिः प्रपञ्चनिवृत्त्या नियोगः, इति, इतरेतराश्रयत्वम्।

अपि च, किं निवर्तनीयः प्रपञ्चः मिथ्यारूपः, सत्यो वा ? मिथ्यारूपत्वे, ज्ञान-निवर्त्यत्वादेव नियोगेन न किञ्चित्प्रयोजनम्। नियोगस्तु निवर्तकज्ञानमुत्पाद्य तद्द्वारेण प्रपञ्चस्य निवर्तकः— इति चेत् —तत्, स्ववाक्यादेव जातमिति न नियोगेन प्रयोजनम्। वाक्यार्थज्ञानादेव ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य मिथ्याभूतस्य प्रपञ्चस्य बाधितत्वात्, सपरिकरस्य नियोगस्यासिद्धिश्च। प्रपञ्चस्य निवर्तको नियोगः किं ब्रह्मस्वरूपम्, एव; उत तद्व्यतिरिक्तः ? यदि ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेव निवर्तकम्, नित्यतया निवर्त्यप्रपञ्चसद्भाव एव न

that, of Brahman, as it is established [already] and as there would be the undesirable result of its being non-eternal. If, of the cessation of worldly existence, then Brahman would not be a thing to be established [secured].

[99] If it be argued — The cessation of worldly existence is itself the object of injunction—[we say]—No, on account of the impossibility of its being the object of injunction, because that is the fruit. The cessation of worldly existence itself is, indeed, salvation; and that [salvation] is the fruit. If this [salvation] were the object of injunction, there would be from the injunction the cessation of worldly existence, and from the cessation of worldly existence, the injuction, — and thus the [fault of] mutual interdependence.

Moreover,—Is the worldly existence to be turned away, of a false nature? Or real? If that were of a false nature, no purpose would be served by the injunction, on account of the worldly existence being fit to be turned away by knowledge alone. If it be argued, — Injunction, however, having produced the remover knowledge, becomes the remover of the worldly existence, through its channel;—[our reply is] — It is produced from the sense of the relevant passage, so, there is no purpose served by injunction, and there would be the non-establishment of the injunction along with its paraphernalia, on account of the entire false worldly existence over and above Brahman, being stultified by the knowledge itself of the sense of the passages. Is the injunction, the remover of worldly existence, Brahman's own nature itself or [something] over and above that? If Brahman's own nature itself is the remover, the existence itself of worldly existence to be removed is not possible, owing to its being

संभवति। नित्यत्वेन च नियोगस्य विषयानुष्ठानसाध्यत्वं च न घटते। अथ ब्रह्मस्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तः, तस्य कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरूपविषयानुष्ठानसाध्यत्वेन प्रयोक्ता च न दृष्टः, इत्याश्रयाभावादसिद्धिः। प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरूपविषयानुष्ठानेनैव ब्रह्मस्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्य निवृत्तत्वात्, न नियोगनिष्पाद्यं मोक्षाख्यं फलम्।

किं च, प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तेर्नियोगकरणस्य, इतिकर्तव्यताभावात्, अनुपकृतस्य च करणत्वायोगाच्च करणत्वम्। कथम्, इतिकर्तव्यताभावः? इति चेत् — इत्थम् — अस्य, इतिकर्तव्यता भावरूपा, अभावरूपा वा। भावरूपा च करणशरीरनिष्पत्तितदनुग्रहकार्यभेदभिन्ना। उभयविधा च न संभवति। न हि मुद्गराभिघातादिवत्कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चनिवर्तकः कोऽपि दृश्यते, इति दृष्टार्था न संभवति। नापि निष्पन्नस्य करणस्य कार्योत्पत्तावनुग्रहः संभवति, अनुग्राहकांशसद्भावेन कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरूपकरणस्वरूपासिद्धेः।

[100] ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वज्ञानं प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरूपकरणशरीरं निष्पादयति — इति चेत् — तेनैव प्रपञ्चनिवृत्तिरूपो मोक्षः सिद्धः, इति न करणादिनिष्पाद्यमवशिष्यते, इति

---

eternal; and further, owing to the eternality of injunction, the performance of the object being established would not be possible. If something over and above the nature of Brahman [is the remover], there would be the non-establishment of [injunction] owing to the absence of the resort, because no performer is seen on account of that being accomplished by the performance of the object in the form of the cessation of the entire worldly existence. On account of everything over and above Brahman's own nature being removed by the very performance of the object in the form of the cessation of worldly existence, there cannot be any fruit called salvation fit to be produced from injunction.

Furthermore, the cessation of worldly existence cannot be the instrument, on account of the absence of detailed procedure of the instrument of injunction, and on account of the impropriety of the nature of an instrument, for one that is not to be obliged. How is the absence of the detailed procedure ?—If it be asked thus—[our reply is]—Thus—Is the detailed procedure of this, of a positive nature or of a negative nature? If, of a positive nature, [it should be] divided into those that produce difference in the production of the nature of the instrument, and those who render help; and that of both kinds is not possible. Not, indeed, is seen anybody as the remover of the entire worldly existence, like strokes of a club,—and so, [the detailed procedure] in a visible form is not possible. Nor again, is possible help in the origination of the product on the part of the instrument that is established, on account of the non-establishment of the nature of the instrument in the form of the cessation of the worldly existence, owing to the existence of a portion of the helping factor.

[**100**] If it be argued,—The knowledge of Brahman as being without a second, produces the nature of the instrument in the form of the cessation of worldly existence, then, because by that same is established salvation of the form of the cessation of worldly existence, nothing remains to be produced

पूर्वमेवोक्तम्। अभावरूपत्वे च, अभावत्वादेव न करणशरीरं निष्पादयति। नापि, अनुग्रहम्। अतो निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मविषयो विधिर्न संभवति।

अन्योऽप्याह, — यद्यपि वेदान्तवाक्यानां न परिनिष्पन्नब्रह्मस्वरूपपरतया प्रामाण्यम्, तथापि ब्रह्मस्वरूपं सिध्यत्येव। कुतः ? ध्यानविधिसामर्थ्यात्। एवमेव हि समामनन्ति—

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ. २।४।५)
'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा...सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः। स विजिज्ञासितव्यः।' (छा. ८।७।१)
'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत।' (बृ. १।४।७)
'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत।' (बृ. १।४।१५)

इति। अत्र ध्यानविषयो हि नियोगः स्वविषयभूतं ध्यानं ध्येयैकनिरूपणीयम्, इति ध्येयमाक्षिपति। स च ध्येयः स्ववाक्यनिर्दिष्ट आत्मा। स किंरूपः, इत्यपेक्षायां तत्स्वरूपविशेषसमर्पणद्वारेण

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म।' (तै. २।१।१)
'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्। एकमेवाद्वितीयम्।' (छा ६।२।१)

---

by the instrument and others,—This has already been stated. If it has a negative form, it would not produce the nature of the instrument, owing to its very negative nature. Nor is the help. Hence, no injunction in respect of Brahman without the worldly existence, is possible.

Another [objector] al o says—Although the Vedānta passages are not authoritative, aiming [as they do] at the nature of the completely established Brahman, still the nature of Brahman does stand established. Whence ? [It is established] on the strength of the meditation-injunction. To the same effect, ordain [the Śruti pasages]

'Ātman, O [Maitreyi], to be sure, should be seen, heard, thought of [and] meditated upon'. (Br. 2·4·5)

'The Ātman, who [is] with sins destroyed,...he should be searched for, he should be specially desired to be known'. (Chā. 8·7·1)

'One should worship [him] as the Ātman alone'. (Br. 1·4·7)

'One should worship the world as the Ātman himself'. (Br. 1·4·15)

Here the injunction regarding meditation, indeed, implies the object of meditation because that—the meditation,— its [of the Niyoga] object, is to be pointed out as the one object to be secured. And that object of meditation is the Ātman pointed out in the relevant passages For the expectancy, as to of what form He is, [these] and other passages —

'Existence, knowledge, infinite [is] Brahman.' (Tait. 2·1·1)

'Existence alone was all this, my dear, in the beginning, one alone without a second'. (Chā. 6·2·1)

इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ध्यानविधिशेषतया प्रामाण्यम्, इति विधिविषयभूतध्यानशरीरानुप्रविष्टब्रह्मस्वरूपेऽपि तात्पर्यमस्त्येव। अतः—

'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्।' (छा ६।२।१)
'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा।' (छा. ६।८।७)
'नेह नानास्ति किंचन।' (बृ. ४।४।१९)

इत्येवमादिभिर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेकमेव सत्यम्, तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सर्वं मिथ्या— इति, अवगम्यते। प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्भेदावलम्बिना च कर्मशास्त्रेण भेदः प्रतीयते। भेदाभेदयोः परस्परविरोधे सति, अनाद्यविद्यामूलत्वेनापि भेदप्रतीत्युपपत्तेः, अभेद एव परमार्थः, इति निश्चीयते। तत्र ब्रह्मध्याननियोगेन तत्साक्षात्कारफलेन निरस्तसमस्ताविद्याकृतविविधभेदाद्वितीयज्ञानैकरसब्रह्मभावरूपो मोक्षः प्राप्यते। न च वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रेण ब्रह्मभावसिद्धिः, अनुपलब्धेः, विविधभेददर्शनानुवृत्तेश्च। तथा सति, श्रवणादिविधानमनर्थकं स्यात्।

[101] अथोच्येत—'रज्जुरेषा न सर्पः' इत्युपदेशेन सर्पभयनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् रज्जुसर्पवत्, बन्धस्य च मिथ्यारूपत्वेन ज्ञानबाध्यतया तस्य वाक्यजन्यज्ञानेनैव निवृत्ति-

have authority as being subordinate to the meditation-injunction through a reference to His special feature — and so, they do have a gist in respect of the nature of Brahman also, entering within the form [*Śarīra*] of meditation that has become the object of injunction. Therefore, from the passages viz.

'*One without a second*'. (Chā. 6·2·1)
'*That is Reality, He is Ātman*'. (Chā. 6·8·7)
'*Not here, is there any multiplicity whatsoever.*' (Bṛ. 4·4·19)

is understood that the nature of Brahman only is the one Reality and everything over and above that is false. By the [means of proof] Direct perception and others, and by the Karmaśāstra depending upon difference, is apprehended difference. When there is mutual contradiction between difference and non-difference, it is ascertained that non-difference is alone the highest Reality, on account of the apprehension of the difference being accounted for, also by its being rooted in the beginning-less Avidyā. There is attained salvation, constituted of the nature of Brahman, uniform Jñāna, without a second, with all the varied differences caused by Avidyā expelled away,—by the injunction regarding the meditation upon Brahman, having for its fruit the realization of that [Brahman]. Nor again, is the attainment of the nature of Brahman merely by the knowledge of the sense of the passages, on account of non-perception [of such an attainment], and on account of the persisting of the perception of the varied differences. In that case, the injunction regarding hearing etc. would be meaningless.

[101] If it be objected – On account of the perception of the cessation of fear from the serpent by the instruction 'This [is] a rope, and not a serpent', the removal of the bondage like that of a rope-serpent, is proper by means of the knowledge alone produced by the passage, on account of that being stultified by the [subsequent] knowledge owing to its being of a false nature and not by means of injunction. If salvation is to be accomplished by

युक्ता, न नियोगेन। नियोगसाध्यत्वे मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यात्स्वर्गादिवत्। मोक्षस्य नित्यत्वं हि सर्ववादिसंप्रतिपन्नम्। किं च धर्माधर्मयोः फलहेतुत्वं स्वफलानुभवानुगुणशरीरोत्पादनद्वारेण, इति ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तचतुर्विधशरीरसंबन्धरूपसंसारफलत्वमवर्जनीयम्। तस्मान्न धर्मसाध्यो मोक्षः। तथा च श्रुतिः—

'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति।
अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः।' (छा. ८।१२।१)

इति। अशरीरत्वरूपे मोक्षे, धर्माधर्मसाध्यप्रियाप्रियविरहश्रवणात्, न धर्मसाध्यम्, 'अशरीरत्वम्', इति विज्ञायते। न च नियोगविशेषसाध्य फलविशेषवत्, ध्याननियोगसाध्यम्, 'अशरीरत्वम्', अशरीरत्वस्य स्वरूपत्वेनासाध्यत्वात्। यथाहुः श्रुतयः—

'अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्।
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति॥' (का. १।२।२२)

'अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः।' (मु. २।१।२)

'असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः।' (बृ. ४।३।१५)

इत्याद्याः।

---

injunction, it would be non-eternal, like heaven and others. The eternal nature of salvation is, indeed, acquiesced in by all the disputants. Furthermore, merit and demerit are the cause of the fruit through the channel of the production of the body in conformity with the experience of one's own fruit—and so, [their] being the fruit of the worldly existence in the form of the relationship with the four-fold body, beginning with Brahman and ending with the immovable, is inevitable. Therefore, salvation cannot be attained by Dharma [i. e. Karmavidhi]. To the same effect [is] the Śruti passage—

'Not, indeed, verily, is there the destruction of the agreeable and disagreeable in the case of the one having a body; him, not, having a body, verily, touch not the agreeable and the disagreeable. (Chā. 8·12·1)

With salvation having the form of being without the body, it is known that, ' to have no body ' is not to be attained by Dharma [Karmavidhi] on account of the knowledge [from the Śruti passage] about the absence of the agreeable and the disagreeable that are to be attained by merit and demerit [respectively]. Nor again, is ' being without a body ' to be attained by meditation-injunction, like a particular fruit to be attained by a particular injunction, because, ' being without a body ' is fit to be secured in its own nature. As say the following Śruti passages—

' Without a body among the bodies, stable within the unstable, great, all pervading —Knowing [this] Ātman, the wise one grieves not.' (Kā. 1·2·22)

' Without the vital breath, without the mind, the refulgent.' (Mu. 2·1·2)

' Untouched, indeed, [is] this Puruṣa.' (Bṛ. 4·3·15)

अतोऽशरीरत्वरूपो मोक्षो नित्यः, इति न धर्माधर्मसाध्यः। तथा च श्रुतिः—

'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात्।
अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्वद ॥' (का. १।२।१४)

इति।

[102] अपि च, उत्पत्तिप्राप्तिविकृतिसंस्कृतिरूपेण चतुर्विधं हि साध्यत्वं मोक्षस्य न संभवति। न तावदुत्पाद्यः, मोक्षस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वेन नित्यत्वात्। नापि प्राप्यः, आत्मस्वरूपत्वेन ब्रह्मणो नित्यप्राप्तत्वात्। नापि विकार्यः, दध्यादिवदनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। नापि संस्कार्यः। संस्कारो हि दोषापनयनेन वा, गुणाधानेन वा साध्यते। न तावद्दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः। नापि, अतिशयाधानेन, अनाधेयातिशयस्वरूपत्वात्। नित्यनिर्विकारत्वेन स्वाश्रयायाः पराश्रयायाश्च क्रियाया अविषयतया, न निघर्षणेनादर्शादिवदपि संस्कार्यत्वम्। न च देहस्थया स्नानादिक्रियया, आत्मा संस्क्रियते, किं तु, अविद्यागृहीतस्तत्संगतः, 'अहंकर्ता'। तत्फलानुभवोऽपि तस्यैव। न च, 'अहंकर्ता' एवात्मा, तत्साक्षित्वात्। तथा च मन्त्रवर्णः—

So, salvation of the nature of being without a body is eternal; it cannot be attained by merit and demerit. To the same effect [is] the Śruti [passage]—

'Elsewhere other than merit, elsewhere other than demerit; elsewhere other than this done and the undone; elsewhere other than the past and the future, what that you see, speak that out.'
(Kā. 1·2·14)

[**102**] Moreover, the four-fold method of the accomplishment of salvation is not possible in the form of origination, acquisition, modification, refinement. Not, for the matter of that, is Mokṣa [something] to be produced, because salvation is eternal, owing to its being the nature of Brahman. Nor, is it to be acquired, because Brahman always stands acquired owing to its being the nature of Ātman; nor further, is it fit for modification, on account of the undesirable result of its being non-eternal, like curds etc.; nor still, is it fit to be polished; for, polishing is accomplished either by the removal of blemish or by the imposition of [good] qualities. Not, for the matter of that, by the removal of the blemish, as Brahman is eternally pure [i. e. free from blemishes]; nor again, by the imposition of excellence, on account of [Brahman] having the nature upon which no excellences can be imposed. Owing to its not being the subject to action belonging to itself or belonging to another, as it is always free from modification, there cannot be the state of being polished [in the case of Mokṣa] even as in the case of the mirror and others by rubbing against. Nor does the Ātman undergo refinement by the operation of bathing etc. associated with the body; but the 'I-doer' possessed by the Avidyā, and associated with that; and the experience of the fruit of that belongs to him alone. Further, not the 'I-doer' [is] the Ātman, on account of his being the witness. To the same effect [is] the Vedic Mantra-passage—

'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ।' (मु. ३।१।१)
'आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः ।' (का. १।३।४)
'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥' (श्वे. ६।११)
'स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम् ।
कविर्मनीषी ।' (ई. ८)

इति च, अविद्यागृहीतादहंकर्तुरात्मनः स्वरूपमनाधेयातिशयं नित्यशुद्धं निर्विकारं निष्कृष्यते । तस्मात्, आत्मस्वरूपत्वेन न साध्यो मोक्षः ।

[103] यद्येवम्, किं वाक्यार्थज्ञानेन क्रियते ? इति चेत्—मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रम्, इति ब्रूमः । तथा च श्रुतयः—

'त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्याया परं पारं तारयसि ।' (प्र. ६।८)
'श्रुतं ह्येवमेव भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति । सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि । तं मां भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु ।' (छा. ७।१।३)
'तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः' (छा. ७।२६।२)

इत्याद्याः ।

'One of the two eats the sweet fruit of the 'Pippala', and not eating, another continues to look on'. [Mu. 3·1·1]

'The wise men speak of him as an 'enjoyer' associated with the body, sense-organs, and mind'. [Kā 1·3 4]

'One God concealed in all beings, all-pervading, the inmost Ātman of all beings, the supervisor of Karman, residing in all beings, witness, sentient, absolute and qualitiless.' [Śve. 6·11]

'He, the wise one, and the thoughtful one, understood [lit. surrounded] [Him] as refulgent, bodiless, scatheless, without sinews, pure, unpierced by sin.' (Īśa. 8)

And in these passages, the nature of Ātman with excellences not to be imposed, always pure and without modifications, is distinguished from the 'I-doer' possessed by Avidyā. Therefore, being of the nature of Ātman, salvation cannot be [newly] accomplished.

[103] If [it is] so, what is effected by the knowledge of the sense of the passages ? — If it be argued thus,—[we say]—Merely the removal of the obstruction to salvation. To the same effect are the following and other passages —

'You, indeed, [are] our father, who [you] take us across the farthest limit of Avidyā.' (Pra. 6·8)

'It has, indeed, been heard from persons like Your Reverence, that the Ātman-knower transgresses grief; that I, Your Reverence, am feeling unhappy; so, let Your Reverence take me so [suffering] over beyond the limit of grief.' (Chā 7·1·3)

'The Revered Sanatkumāra, shows him whose evil tendencies have been smothered down, the limit of darkness'. (Chā. 7·26·2)

तस्मात्, नित्यस्यैव मोक्षस्य प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिर्वाक्यार्थज्ञानेन क्रियते। तन्निवृत्तिस्तु साध्यापि प्रध्वंसाभावरूपा न विनश्यति।

'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति।' (मु. ३।२।९)

'तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति।' (श्वे. ३।८)

इत्यादिवचनं मोक्षस्य वेदनानन्तरभावितां प्रतिपादयन्नियोगव्यवधानतां प्रतिरुणद्धि। न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन, ध्यानक्रियाकर्मत्वेन वा कार्यानुप्रवेशः, उभयकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात्,

'अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि।' (के. १।३)

'येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तत्केन विजानीयात्।' (बृ. २।४।१४)

इति।

'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते।' (के. १।४)

इति च। न च, एतावता शास्त्रस्य निर्विषयत्वम्, अविद्यापरिकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात्, शास्त्रस्य। न हि, इदंतया ब्रह्म विषयीकरोति शास्त्रम्। अपि तु, अविषयं प्रत्यगात्मस्वरूपं प्रतिपादयत्, अविद्याकल्पितज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानविभागं निवर्तयति। तथा च शास्त्रम्—

Therefore, by the knowledge of the sense of the [Śruti –] passages is effected the removal of obstruction to salvation that is nothing but eternal. And its removal, although capable of being accomplished, would not vanish away, being of the form of destruction-negation [Pradhvaṁsābhāva]. Such passages —

'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman himself.' (Mu. 3·2·9)

'Having known him alone, he passes over death.' (Śve. 3·8)

propounding salvation as coming after knowledge, wards off the intervening [screening] injunction. Nor again, is [salvation] tantamount to [lit. entering into] action, by being the object of the action of knowing, or by being the object of the action of meditation, on account of the repudiation of its being the object of both [as under]—

'Other than the known; further, also other than the unknown,' (Ke.1·3)

'By which he knows all this, by what should he know that?' (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

and also,

'Know you that to be Brahman, not this which here [Idam] they worship.' (Ke. 1·4)

Not by so much does Sāstra become without jurisdiction, because, the Sāstra deals with the removal of differences fancied by Avidyā. Not, indeed, does the Śāstra make Brahman its object [pointing out] as being 'This'. But, on the other hand, propounding the nature of the inmost Ātman as not being the object [of knowledge], it removes the division into the knower, the object of knowledge and knowledge fancied by Avidyā. To the same effect [says] the Śāstra—

'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः...... न मतेः......' (बृ. ३।४।२)

इत्येवमादि ।

[104] न च ज्ञानादेव बन्धनिवृत्तिः, इति श्रवणादिविध्यानर्थक्यम्, स्वभावप्रवृत्त-सकलेतरविकल्पविमुखीकरणद्वारेण वाक्यार्थावगतिहेतुत्वात्तेषाम् । न च, ज्ञानमात्राद्बन्ध-निवृत्तिर्न दृष्टा—इति वाच्यम्, बन्धस्य मिथ्यारूपत्वेन ज्ञानोत्तरकालं स्थित्यनुपपत्तेः। अत एव न शरीरपातादूर्ध्वमेव बन्धनिवृत्तिः, इति वक्तुं युक्तम्। न हि मिथ्यारूपसर्पभयनिवृत्ती रज्जुयाथात्म्यज्ञानातिरेकेण सर्पविनाशमपेक्षते । यदि शरीरसंबन्धः पारमार्थिकः, तर्हि तद्विनाशापेक्षा । स तु ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्ततया न पारमार्थिकः । यस्य तु बन्धो न निवृत्तः, तस्य ज्ञानमेव न जातम्, इत्यवगम्यते, ज्ञानकार्यादर्शनात्। तस्मात्, शरीरस्थितिर्भवतु वा, मा वा, वाक्यार्थज्ञानसमनन्तरं मुक्त एवासौ। अतो न नियोगसाध्यो मोक्षः, इति न ध्यानविधिशेषतया ब्रह्मणः सिद्धिः, अपि तु

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'तत्त्वमसि ।' (छा. ६।८।७)

'Thou shalt not see the seer of the seeing, not ... [the thinker] of the thinking....' (Bṛ. 3·4·2)

[104] Nor again, is there the meaninglessness of the injunction about hearing etc., because, there is the cessation of bondage by knowledge alone, on account of their being the cause of the apprehension of the sense of the passages through the channel of the repudiation of all other alternatives naturally set forth. Nor should it be said that cessation of bondage by mere knowledge, is not seen, on account of the impossibility of the bondage existing during the time subsequent to knowledge, as it is of a false nature. For this very reason, it is not proper to say that there is the cessation of bondage only after the falling away of the body. Not indeed, does the removal of the fear from the serpent that is of a false nature, stand in need of the destruction of the serpent as apart from the knowledge of the rope as it is. If the relation with the body be [regarded as] real, then [only], there would be the dependence upon its destruction. That, however, is not real, owing to its being distinct from Brahman. It should be known that in whose case, the bondage is not removed, in him knowledge itself is not produced, on account of the non-perception of the result of knowledge. Therefore, there may or may not be the existence of the body, immediately after the knowledge of the sense of the passages, he [the person in question] is definitely a released-one. Therefore, salvation is not to be accomplished by injunction. And so, Brahman cannot be established as being subordinate to meditation-injunction, but, on the other hand, it is established by the [passage] group of words referring to that alone, such as —

'Existence, knowledge, infinite [is] Brahman' — (Tait. 2·1·1)

'That thou art' (Chā. 6·8·7)

'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म ।' (बृ. २।५।१९)

इति तत्परेणैव पदसमुदायेन सिध्यति—इति—

तदयुक्तम्, वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्राद्बन्धनिवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। यद्यपि मिथ्यारूपो बन्धो ज्ञान-बाध्यः, तथापि बन्धस्यापरोक्षत्वात्, न परोक्षरूपेण वाक्यार्थज्ञानेन स बाध्यते, रज्ज्वादावपरोक्षसर्पप्रतीतौ विद्यमानायां 'नायं सर्पो, रज्जुरेषा' इत्याप्तोपदेशजनितपरोक्षसर्पविपरीत-ज्ञानमात्रेण भयानिवृत्तिदर्शनात् । आप्तोपदेशस्य तु भयनिवृत्तिहेतुत्वं वस्तुयाथात्म्या-परोक्षनिमित्तप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेन। तथाहि—रज्जुसर्पदर्शनभयात्परावृत्तः पुरुषो 'नायं सर्पो, रज्जुरेषा' इत्याप्तोपदेशात्, वस्तुयाथात्म्यदर्शने प्रवृत्तस्तदैव प्रत्यक्षेण दृष्ट्वा भयान्निवर्तते । न च शब्द एव प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं जनयति, इति वक्तुं युक्तम्, तस्यानिन्द्रियत्वात् । ज्ञानसामग्रीषु, इन्द्रियाण्येवापरोक्षज्ञानसाधनानि । न चास्य, अनभिसंहितफलकर्मानुष्ठानमृदितकषायस्य श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनविमुखीकृतबाह्यविषयस्य पुरुषस्य वाक्यम्, एवापरोक्षज्ञानं जनयति, निवृत्तप्रतिबन्धे तत्परेऽपि पुरुषे ज्ञानसामग्रीविशेषाणामिन्द्रियादीनां स्वविषयनियमातिक्रमा-दर्शनेन तदयोगात् ।

'This Ātman [is] Brahman' (Br. 2·5·19)

— All this [is] improper on account of the impossibility of the cessation of the bondage merely by the knowledge of the sense of the passages. Although the bondage of a false nature is fit to be stultified by knowledge, still, as bondage is directly perceptible, it cannot be stultified by the knowledge of the sense of the passages, of a form beyond [the reach of] the senses, because, when there exists the direct apprehension of the snake on the rope and others, there is seen the non-cessation of the fear merely by the indirect contrary knowledge of the serpent produced by the instruction of a reliable person, in the form 'this [is] not a serpent, this [is] a rope' in the case of the instruction by the reliable person, however, being the cause of the activity caused by the direct perception of the thing as it is. To explain the same — A person turning back through fear, at the perception of the rope-serpent, [and] proceeding to see the thing as it is, by the instruction of the reliable person, in the form, 'this [is] not the serpent, this [is] a rope' [and] having perceived that by direct perception, turns away from fear. And further, it is not proper to say that 'word' alone produces Direct perception on account of its being super-sensuous. Among the sets of means for knowledge, the sense-organs alone are the means of direct knowledge. Not again, does the passage alone produce direct knowledge in the case of this person, whose evil [thoughts] have been smothered down by the performance of Karman, without being attached to the fruit, who has turned his face away from the external objects by hearing, thinking and meditating; because, in the case of the person with obstructions removed, although intent upon it [direct knowledge], that is not possible as the sense-organs and others that are particular sets of means of knowledge are not seen to transgress the regulations relating to their objects.

[105] न च ध्यानस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानोपायता, इतरेतराश्रयत्वात्—वाक्यार्थज्ञाने जाते तद्विषयध्यानम्, ध्याने निर्वृत्ते वाक्यार्थज्ञानम्—इति। न च ध्यानवाक्यार्थज्ञानयोर्भिन्नविषयत्वम्। तथा सति, ध्यानस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानोपायता न स्यात्। नह्यन्यध्यानमन्यज्ञानान्मुख्यमुत्पादयति। ज्ञातार्थस्मृतिसंततिरूपस्य ध्यानस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वमवर्जनीयम्, ध्येयब्रह्मविषयज्ञानस्य हेत्वन्तरासंभवात्। न च ध्यानमूलं ज्ञानं वाक्यान्तरजन्यम्, निवर्तकज्ञानं 'तत्त्वमसि' आदिवाक्यजन्यम्, इति युक्तम्। ध्यानमूलमिदं वाक्यान्तरजन्यं ज्ञानं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानेनैकविषयं भिन्नविषयं वा? एकविषयत्वे, तदेवेतरेतराश्रयत्वम्। भिन्नविषयत्वे, ध्यानेन तदौन्मुख्यापादानासंभवः। किं च ध्यानस्य ध्येयध्यात्राद्यनेकप्रपञ्चापेक्षत्वात्, निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविषयवाक्यार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ द्दष्टद्वारेण नोपयोगः, इति वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रात्, अविद्यानिवृत्तिं वदतः श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनविधीनामानर्थक्यमेव।

यतो वाक्यादपरोक्षज्ञानासंभवात् वाक्यार्थज्ञानेनाविद्या न निवर्तते, तत एव

---

[105] Nor again, is there the utility of meditation for [securing] the knowledge of the sense of the passages, owing to the [fault of] mutual interdependence; —thus, when the knowledge of the sense of the passage is produced, there would be meditation referring to it; [and] when the meditation is gone through, there is the knowledge of the sense of the passages. And further, meditation and the knowledge of the sense of the passages do not pertain to different objects. In that case, there would not be the utility of meditation in [securing] the knowledge of the sense of the passages. For, the meditation of one does not produce the eagerness for the knowledge of another. In the case of meditation of the nature of the continuity of remembrance of the object known, being preceded by the knowledge of the sense of the passages is unavoidable, on account of the impossibility of another cause for [producing] the knowledge referring to Brahman, the object of meditation. And further, it is not proper [to say] that knowledge rested in meditation is fit to be produced from other passages, while the remover-knowledge is fit to be produced from passages like 'That thou art'. Does this knowledge rooted in meditation, [and] fit to be produced from another passage refer to one and the same object as the knowledge fit to be produced by passages like 'That thou art,' or to different objects? If it refers to one and the same object, there would be the same mutual interdependence. If it refers to a different object, there would be the impossibility of producing eagerness for that [knowledge], by means of meditation. Furthermore, because meditation depends upon the varied paraphernalia such as the object of meditation, the meditator etc., it is of no use in producing the knowledge of the sense of the passages, having for their object the oneness of Ātman and Brahman, void of worldly existence— And so, in the case of one talking about the cessation of Avidyā merely from the knowledge of the sense of the passages, there would be the meaninglessness of injunctions relating to hearing, thinking and meditation.

Because, on accout of the impossibility of direct knowledge from the passage, Avidyā cannot be turned away by the knowledge of the sense of a

जीवन्मुक्तिरपि दूरोत्सारिता। का च, इयं जीवन्मुक्तिः? सशरीरस्यैव मोक्षः—इति चेत्—'माता मे वन्ध्या' इतिवदसंगतार्थवचनम्, यतः 'सशरीरत्वं' 'बन्धः', 'अशरीरत्वमेव' 'मोक्षः', इति त्वयैव श्रुतिभिरुपपादितम्।

[106] अथ, सशरीरत्वप्रतिभासे वर्तमाने यस्यायं प्रतिभासो मिथ्या, इति प्रत्ययः, तस्य सशरीरत्वानिवृत्तिः—इति—न, मिथ्येति प्रत्ययेन सशरीरत्वं निवृत्तं चेत्, कथं सशरीरस्य मुक्तिः? अजीवतोऽपि मुक्तिः सशरीरत्वमिथ्याप्रतिभासनिवृत्तिः, एवेति कोऽयं जीवन्मुक्त इति विशेषः?

अथ—सशरीरत्वप्रतिभासो बाधितोऽपि यस्य द्विचन्द्रज्ञानवदनुवर्तते स जीवन्मुक्तः—इति चेत्— न, ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तसकलवस्तुविषयकत्वात् बाधकज्ञानस्य। कारणभूताविद्याकर्मादिदोषः सशरीरत्वप्रतिभासेन सह तेनैव बाधितः, इति बाधितानुवृत्तिर्न शक्यते वक्तुम्। द्विचन्द्रादौ तु तत्प्रतिभासहेतुभूतदोषस्य बाधकज्ञानविषयीभूत-चन्द्रैकत्वज्ञानाविषयत्वेनाबाधितत्वात्, द्विचन्द्रप्रतिभासानुवृत्तिर्युक्ता। किं च—

'तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये।' (छा. ६।१४।२)

passage; for the same reason [the question] of Living-salvation also, is flung far away. What again [is] this 'Living-salvation'? If it be argued that salvation belongs to him alone having a body—[Our reply is—this is] a statement involving contradiction in terms like 'my mother is barren;' for, by you yourself has been propounded by means of Śruti passages that 'bondage' is 'being with a body'; 'being without a body itself' is 'salvation'.

[**106**] Now, if it be argued, when there is the appearance of being with a body, for whom there is the apprehension that this appearance is false, in his case [there is] the cessation of being with a body; — [we reply]—No, if being with a body ceases by the mere apprehension that it is false, how could [ever] there be salvation of one with a body? Because in the case of one not living also, salvation is definitely the cessation of the false appearance of being with a body; what is this distinctive entity viz. 'living-liberated'?

If it be argued—He [is] the living—liberated, in whose case the appearance of being with a body although stultified persists like the knowledge of the two moons, [we say]—No, on account of the stultifying knowledge having for its object, everything other than Brahman. The blemish viz. Karman and others due to Avidyā that has become the cause, is stultified by that itself along with the appearance of being with a body— and so, it is not possible to speak of the persistence of the stultified. In [the case of] the two moons etc., however, the persistence of the appearance of two moons, is proper on account of the blemish that has become the cause of the appearance of that, being not-stultified, owing to its not being the object of the knowledge of the oneness of the moon, that has become the object of the stultifying knowledge. Furthermore, this Śruti passage viz.

'For him there is delay only upto that time, till he is freed, and then he becomes merged.' (Chā. 6·14·2)

इति सद्विद्यानिष्ठस्य शरीरपातमात्रमपेक्षते मोक्षः, इति वदन्तीयं श्रुतिर्जीवन्मुक्तिं वारयति। सैषा जीवन्मुक्तिरापस्तम्बेनापि निरस्ता—

*'वेदानिमं लोकममुं च परित्यज्यात्मानमन्विच्छेत्।
बुद्धे क्षेमप्रापणम्। तच्छास्त्रैर्विप्रतिषिद्धम्।
बुद्धे चेत्क्षेमप्रापणमिहैव न दुःखमुपलभेत। एतेन
परं व्याख्यातम्।'* (आ. ध. सू. २।९।२१।१३–१७)

इति। अनेन ज्ञानमात्रान्मोक्षश्च निरस्तः। अतः सकलभेदानिवृत्तिरूपा मुक्तिर्जीवतो न संभवति।

तस्मात्, ध्याननियोगेन ब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञानफलेनैव बन्धनिवृत्तिः। न च नियोगसाध्यत्वेन मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वप्रसक्तिः, प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रस्यैव साध्यत्वात्। किं च, न नियोगेन साक्षाद्बन्धनिवृत्तिः क्रियते, किं तु निष्प्रपञ्चज्ञानैकरसब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञानेन। नियोगस्तु तदपरोक्षं ज्ञानं जनयति।

[107] कथं नियोगस्य ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वम्? —इति चेत्—कथं वा भवतोऽनभिसंहितफलानां कर्मणां वेदनोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वम्?

declaring that salvation stands in need of merely the falling of the body in the case of one well-versed in the knowledge of the Sat, rules out of order living-salvation. This same living-salvation has been set aside by Āpastamba also, in [the following passages]—

'Having abandoned the Vedas, this world and that, one should go in for Ātman; when one is awakened, there is the acquisition of welfare.. That is contradicted by the Śāstras. If there is the acquisition of welfare when there is awakening, then, he would not come across misery even here. By this has been explained the further [stage].' (Ā. D. Sū. 2·9·21·13–17)

Further, by this also, the view that salvation [is] by knowledge alone, is set aside. Hence salvation of the form of the cessation of all difference is not possible while one lives.

Therefore, there [is] the cessation of the bondage by the meditation-injunction having for its fruit the direct knowledge of Brahman. Nor again is the undesirable contingency of salvation being non-eternal because it is to be accomplished by injunction (*niyoga*) because only the cessation of the obstruction is a thing to be accomplished. Furthermore, by the injunction is not effected directly the cessation of bondage, but by the direct knowledge of Brahman, — uniform Jñāna and without worldly existence. The injunction, however, produces that direct knowledge.

[107] If it were asked — How is the injunction the cause of the production of knowledge? [we ask] — How, for the matter of that, can the Karmans sponsored by you, with fruits not hankered after, be the cause of the production of knowledge?

मनोनैर्मल्यद्वारेण—इति चेत्—ममापि तथैव। मम तु निर्मले मनसि शास्त्रेण ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते, तव तु नियोगेन मनसि निर्मले ज्ञानसामग्री वक्तव्या— इति चेत्— ध्याननियोगनिर्मलं मन एव साधनम्, इति ब्रूमः। केनावगम्यते ? —इति चेत्— भवतो वा कर्मभिर्मनो निर्मलं भवति, निर्मले मनसि श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनैः सकलेतरविषयविमुखस्यैव शास्त्रं निवर्तकज्ञानमुत्पादयति, इति केनावगम्यते ?

'*विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन।*' (बृ. ४।४।२२)
'*श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः।*' (बृ. २।४।५)
'*ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति।*' (मु. ३।२।९)

इत्यादिभिः शास्त्रैः —इति चेत्—ममापि—

'*श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः।*' (बृ. २।४।५)
'*ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्।*' (तै. २।१।१)
'*न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा।*' (मु. ३।१।८)
'*मनसा तु विशुद्धेन। हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिक्लृप्तः।*' (का. ६।९)

इत्यादिभिः शास्त्रैर्ध्याननियोगेन मनो निर्मलं भवति।

If [your reply is] — that is because through the channel of the purification of mind, then the same is the case with me as well. If it were argued [the objector says] — for me, however, knowledge is produced by the Śāstra in the pure mind. For you, however, when the mind becomes pure by the injunction, and so you ought to tell us the set of means for the knowledge — [we say] that the mind itself, [made] pure by the meditation-injunction is the means. If it be asked — By what is this known, [we reply] — In your case too, by what is it known that the mind becomes pure by the karmans, [and] in the pure mind the Śāstra produces the remover-knowledge in the case of him alone who is averse to all other objects by hearing, thinking and meditating? If [you say that it is known] by passages like —

'*[The Brahmins] desire to know by means of sacrifice, by charity, by imperishable penance.*' (Bṛ. 4·4·22)

'*[Ātman] should be heard, thought of [and] meditated upon*'. (Bṛ. 2·4·5)

'*He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman itself.*' (Mu. 3·2·9)

— then in my case too, the mind becomes pure by the meditation-injunction in accordance with the Śāstra passages such as —

'*[Ātman] should be heard, thought of [and] meditated upon.*' (Bṛ. 2·4·5)

'*The Brahman-knower secures the Highest.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*Not by the eye is grasped, nor again by speech*'. (Mu. 3·1·8)

'*By the heart, steadfast desire, by the mind, is he apprehended.*' (Kā. 6·9).

निर्मलं च मनो ब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञानं जनयति, इत्यवगम्यते—इति निरवद्यम् ।

'नेदं यदिदमुपासते' (के. ४)

इत्युपास्यत्वं प्रतिषिद्धम्—इति चेत्—मैवम् । न, अत्र ब्रह्मण उपास्यत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, अपि तु ब्रह्मणि जगद्वैरूप्यं प्रतिपाद्यते । यदिदं जगदुपासते प्राणिनो नेदं ब्रह्म, तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते – इति वाक्यार्थः । अन्यथा

'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि ।' (के. ४)

इति विरुध्यते, ध्यानविधिवैयर्थ्यं चात्मनः स्यात् । अतो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारफलेन ध्याननियोगेनैव, अपरमार्थभूतस्य कृत्स्नस्य द्रष्टृदृश्यादिप्रपञ्चरूपबन्धस्य निवृत्तिः ।

[108] यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तम्— भेदाभेदयोर्विरोधो न विद्यते—इति— तदयुक्तम् । न हि शीतोष्णतमःप्रकाशादिवद्भेदाभेदावेकस्मिन्वस्तुनि संगच्छेते । अथोच्येत— सर्वमेव हि वस्तुजातं प्रतीतिव्यवस्थाप्यम् । सर्वं च भिन्नाभिन्नं प्रतीयते,—कारणात्मना जात्यात्मना चाभिन्नम्, कार्यात्मना व्यक्त्यात्मना च भिन्नम् । छायातपादिषु विरोधः

And it is known that the pure mind produces the direct knowledge of Brahman, — [all] this is flawless.

If it were argued — By the passage,

'Not this, what this they worship' (Ke .4)

being the object of worship is denied,—[our reply is]—Not so. Here, Brahman—being the object of worship is not denied, but the nature of being contrary to the world, is propounded in Brahman. What this world, the living beings worship — not this is Brahman; know you that same Brahman that has not been uttered by speech, by which speech is uttered — this is the sense of the passage. Otherwise,

'Know you that same Brahman' (Ke. 4)

would be contradicted. And there would be uselessness of the meditation-injunction in the case of Ātman. Therefore, there is the cessation of bondage as a whole in the form of worldly existence made up of the perceiver, perceivable etc. which is not a reality, by the meditation-injunction alone having for its fruit the realisation of Brahman.

[**108**] As to again what has been said by some viz. there does not exist contradiction between difference and non-difference—That is improper. Not, indeed, difference and non-difference go hand in hand in one object, like cold and heat, like darkness and light. If it were argued — Indeed, the entire aggregate of things, for the matter of that, is to be established in accordance with the apprehension; and everything is apprehended as different and non-different. The object is non-different in the capacity of a cause and in the capacity of a genus ; and different in the capacity of the effect and in the capacity of individuals. The contradiction [noted] in the case of shade and light is characterised by [the two] not invariably staying together, [and]

सहानवस्थाननियमलक्षणः, भिन्नाधारत्वरूपश्च। कार्यकारणयोर्जातिव्यक्त्योश्च तदुभयमपि नोपलभ्यते, प्रत्युत, एकमेव वस्तु द्विरूपं प्रतीयते, यथा 'मृदयं घटः' 'षण्डो गौः' इति। न च, एकरूपं किञ्चिदपि वस्तु लौकिकैर्दृष्टचरम्। न च तृणादेर्ज्वलनादिवदभेदो भेदोपमर्दी दृश्यते, इति न वस्तुविरोधः, मृत्सुवर्णगवाश्वाद्यात्मना, अवस्थितस्यैव घटमुकुट-षण्ढमुण्डगवाद्यात्मना चावस्थानात्। न चाभिन्नस्य भिन्नस्य च वस्तुनोऽभेदो भेदश्चैक एवाकार इतीश्वराज्ञा। प्रतीतत्वादैकरूप्यं चेत्—प्रतीतत्वादेव भिन्नाभिन्नत्वम्, इति द्वैरूप्यमभ्युपगम्यताम्। न हि विस्फारिताक्षः पुरुषो घटशरावषण्ढमुण्डादिषु वस्तुषूप-लभ्यमानेषु 'इयं मृद्' 'अयं च घटः' 'इदं गोत्वम्' 'इयं च व्यक्तिः,' इति विवेक्तुं शक्नोति। अपि तु 'मृदयं घटः', 'षण्ढो गौः,' इत्येव प्रत्येति।

अनुवृत्तिबुद्धिबोध्यं कारणमाकृतिः, च; व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिबोध्यं कार्यं व्यक्तिः, च, इति विविनक्ति—इति चेत्—नैवम्, विविक्ताकारानुपलब्धेः। न हि सूक्ष्ममपि निरीक्षमाणैः, 'इदमनुवर्तमानम्,' 'इदं च व्यावर्तमानम्' इति पुरोऽवस्थिते वस्तुन्याकारभेद उपलभ्यते। यथा संप्रतिपन्नैक्ये कार्यविशेषे च, एकत्वबुद्धिरुपजायते,

---

is of the nature of having different abodes. In the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual, both are not met with, but on the contrary, one thing alone is apprehended as having two forms, as in 'clay, this jar', 'broken-horned bull'. Nor again, is ever seen by the people at large any thing for the matter of that, as having one form only. Nor again is seen non-difference setting at naught difference like the burning etc. of the grass and others — and so, there is no real contradiction on account of things, clay, gold, bull, horse etc. remaining in the form—jar, crown, broken-horned, hornless bull etc. Nor is this Lord's commandment that the difference and the non-difference of things that are different and non-different, should have only one form. If you say that there is oneness of form because it is [so] apprehended, then on the same ground of being [so] apprehended, [the thing] being possessed of two forms viz. different and non-different should be admitted. Not indeed is a person with his eyes fully expanded, able to discriminate as 'this [is] the clay', and 'this [is] a jar ,' 'this [is] the bullness' and 'this [is] the bull individual' in things like jar, pot, broken-horned, hornless, while being perceived. But, on the other hand, he apprehends as 'this jar is clay', 'the bull is broken-horned'.

If it be argued — He does discriminate in the form the cause and the configuration [genus] which are to be understood by the apprehension of persistence, and the effect and the individual are to be understood byw hat is apprehension by exclusion, — [we reply]—Not so, on account of the non-perception of a distinct form. Not, indeed, is perceived in [respect of] a thing lying in front, by a person observing even minutely difference in form such as 'this is what is persisting' and 'this is what is being excluded.' And just as in the case of a particular effect with oneness well-admitted, the

तथैव सकारणे ससामान्ये चैकत्वबुद्धिरविशिष्टोपजायते । एवमेव देशतः, कालतः, आकारतः, च, अत्यन्तविलक्षणेष्वपि वस्तुषु 'तदेवेदम्' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा जायते । अतो द्व्यात्मकमेव वस्तु प्रतीयते, इति कार्यकारणयोर्जातिव्यक्त्योश्चात्यन्तभेदोपपादनं प्रतीतिपराहतम् ।

[109] अथोच्येत,—'मृदयं घटः' 'षण्ढो गौः' इतिवत्, 'देवोऽहम्' 'मनुष्योऽहम्' इति सामानाधिकरण्येनैक्यप्रतीतेः, आत्मशरीरयोरपि भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं स्यात् । अत इदं भेदाभेदोपपादनं निजसदननिहितहुतवहज्वालायते, इति—तदिदम्, अनाकलितभेदाभेदसाधनसामानाधिकरण्यतदर्थयाथात्म्यावबोधविलसितम् । तथाहि—अबाधित एव प्रत्ययः सर्वत्रार्थं व्यवस्थापयति । देवाद्यात्माभिमानः, तु, आत्मयाथात्म्यगोचरैः सर्वैः प्रमाणैर्बाध्यमानो रज्जुसर्पादिबुद्धिवत्, नात्मशरीरयोरभेदं साधयति । 'षण्ढो गौः,' 'मुण्डो गौः', इति सामानाधिकरण्यस्य न केनचित्क्वाचिद्बाधो दृश्यते । तस्मात्, नातिप्रसङ्गः । अत एव जीवोऽपि ब्रह्मणो न, अत्यन्तभिन्नः, अपि तु ब्रह्मांशत्वेन भिन्नाभिन्नः । तत्र, अभेद एव स्वाभाविकः, भेदः, तु, औपाधिकः । कथमिदमवगम्यते—इति चेत्—

---

conception of oneness is produced; similarly is produced without any distinction a conception of oneness in [respect of] a thing along with its cause and along with its generality. In the same manner is produced a recognition in the form 'that same [is] this' in respect of things although poles asunder, in point of space, time and form. Therefore, because a thing is apprehended as necessarily having two forms, the setting forth of the idea of absolute difference between the cause and the effect, and the genus and individual is repudiated by apprehension.

[109] If it be argued — Like 'clay [is] this jar', 'broken-horned [is] this bull', there would be difference-cum-non-difference even between the Ātman and the body, on account of the apprehension of oneness by case-co-ordination in the form 'I am God' 'I am a man'. Therefore, this setting forth of difference-cum-non-difference is acting like the flame of fire placed on one's own house. [Our reply is]—All that is the sport of not understanding the knowledge of difference, non-difference, case-co-ordination, and the nature of its sense as it is. To explain the same— An unstultified cognition alone determines sense everywhere. Attributing the idea of the Ātman to gods and others, however, being stultified by all means of proof pointing out to the real nature of Ātman does not establish the non-difference between the body and the Ātman, like the conception of the rope on the serpent etc. Nowhere is seen the stultification by anybody of the case-co-ordination in the form 'broken-horned bull', 'hornless bull'. Hence, there is no untoward [undesirable] contingency created. For the same reason, the individual soul also is not different from Brahman, but on the other hand, different and also non-different owing to his being a portion of Brahman. There non-difference alone [is] natural [and] the difference, however, [is] accidental [caused by limiting adjuncts]. If it is asked — How is this known ?

'तत्त्वमसि ।' (छा. ६।८।७)
'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा ।' (बृ. ३।७।२३)
'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म ।' (बृ. २।५।१९)

इत्यादिभिः श्रुतिभिः

'ब्रह्मेमे द्यावापृथिवी ।'

इति प्रकृत्य—

'ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म दासा ब्रह्मेमे कितवा उत ।
स्त्रीपुंसौ ब्रह्मणो जातौ स्त्रियो ब्रह्मोत वा पुमान् ॥'

इत्याथर्वणिकानां संहितोपनिषदि ब्रह्मसूक्तेऽभेदश्रवणाच्च ।

'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।' (श्वे. ६।१३)
'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशौ ।' (श्वे. १।९)
'क्रियागुणैरात्मगुणैश्च तेषां संयोगहेतुरपरोऽपि दृष्टः' (श्वे. ५।१२)
'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः ।' (श्वे. ६।१६)

[We reply–It is known] from the following and other Śruti passages —

'*That thou art*'. (Chā. 6·8·7)
'*Not other than this* [*is*] *the Seer.*' (Bṛ. 3·7·23)
'*This Ātman* [*is*] *Brahman*'. (Bṛ. 2·5·1)

and on account of the non-difference being mentioned [heard] in the Brahman-hymn of the 'Saṁhitopaniṣad' of the 'Ātharvaṇikas'; [in the passage] beginning with—

'*Brahman* [*is*] *these* [*two*], *heaven and earth*'.

'*Brahman, fisherman; Brahman, slaves; Brahman, these gamblers in addition; woman and man are born of Brahman; women are Brahman, as also* [*are*] *men.*'

the difference and the non-difference between the individual soul and the Highest have got to be necessarily admitted on account of the statement about the difference in the following and other Sruti passages —

'*The Eternal of the eternals, the Sentient of the sentients, One who grants the desires of the many.*' (Śve. 6·13)

'*The Wise* [*and*] *the unwise, the two unborn, the Lord* [*and*] *the non-lord*'. (Śve. 1·19)

'*Another also is seen as the cause of their union by the qualities of the* [*sacrificial*] *action and the qualities of the Ātman.*' (Śve. 5·12)

'*The Lord of the Pradhāna, and the Kṣetrajña; the Controller of the qualities, the cause of release, existence and bondage of mundane existence*'. (Śve. 6·16)

'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपः ।' (श्वे. ६।९)
'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्न्योऽभिचाकशीति ।' (श्वे. ४।६)
'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् ।' (बृ. ३।७।२२)
'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् ।' (बृ. ४।३।२१)
'प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढ उत्सृजन् याति ।' (बृ. ४।३।३५)
'तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति ।' (श्वे. ३।८)

इत्यादिभिर्भेदश्रवणाच्च जीवपरयोर्भेदाभेदाववश्याश्रयणीयौ । तत्र,—

'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ।' (मु. ३।२।९)

इत्यादिभिर्मोक्षदशायां जीवस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपापत्तिव्यपदेशात्—

'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् ... तत्केन कं पश्येत् ।' (बृ. २।४।१४)

इति तदानीं भेदेन, ईश्वरदर्शननिषेधात्, च, अभेदः स्वाभाविक इति, अवगम्यते । ननु च—

'सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्त्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इति 'सह'श्रुत्या, तदानीमपि भेदः प्रतीयते । वक्ष्यति च—

'He [is] the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense-organs.' (Śve. 6·9)

'One of the two eats the sweet fruit of the Pippala and not eating, another continues to look on'. (Śve. 4·6)

'Who residing in the Ātman'. (Bṛ. 3·7·22)

'Completely united with the intelligent Ātman, neither knows anything outward, nor anything inward'. (Bṛ. 4·3·21)

'Over-ridden by the intelligent Ātman, giving up, he goes.' (Bṛ. 4·3·35)

'Having known him alone, he passes over death.' (Śve. 3·8)

There, on account of the reference to the attainment of the nature of Brahman by the individual soul in the state of release, in passages like,

'He knows Brahman, Brahman alone does he become'. (Mu. 3·2·9)

and on account of the denial of the perception of Īśvara as different at that time [of Release] in passages —

'But where everything has become one's own Ātman ... then by what and whom would one see?' (Bṛ. 2·4·14)

it is apprehended that non-difference is natural. But I say [says the objector]—Even at that time, difference is apprehended in view of the Śruti [mentioning the expression] 'with' in the passage —

'He enjoys all desires along with the wise Brahman' (Tait. 2·1·1)

And further, [the Sūtrakāra] would be saying —

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।१७)
'भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।२१)

न, एतदेवम्,

'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' (बृ. ३।७।२३)

इति, एवमादिश्रुतिशतैरात्मभेदप्रतिषेधात् ।

'सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्त्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता ।' (तै. २।१।१)

इति, सर्वैः कामैः सह ब्रह्माश्नुते, सर्वगुणान्वितं ब्रह्माश्नुते, इत्युक्तं भवति, अन्यथा

'ब्रह्मणा सह'

इति, अप्राधान्यं ब्रह्मणः प्रसज्येत ।

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।१७)

इति, अत्र मुक्तस्य भेदेनावस्थाने सति, ऐश्वर्यस्य न्यूनताप्रसङ्गो वक्ष्यते, अन्यथा

'संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् ।' (ब्र. सू. ४।४।१)

इत्यादिभिर्विरोधात् ।

[110] तस्मात्, अभेद एव स्वाभाविकः । भेदः, तु जीवानां परस्माद्ब्रह्मणः परस्परं च बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहोपाधिकृतः । यद्यपि ब्रह्म निरवयवं सर्वगतं च, तथापि, आकाश इव

'*Barring the dealings with the world, on account of the context and on account of the [their] being near.*' (Br. Sū. 4·4·17)

'*And on account of the characteristic of equality regarding mere enjoyment.*' (Br. Sū. 4·4·21)

—[our reply is] — Not this so, on account of the repudiation of difference in the case of Ātman in hundreds of Sruti passages such as —

'*Not other than this, is the seer.*' (Bṛ. 3·7·23)

In the passage —

'*He enjoys all desires along with the wise Brahman.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

what is said is this—He enjoys Brahman with all the desires, he enjoys Brahman associated with all the qualities; otherwise, there would be the undesirable result of Brahman being subordinate owing to [the expression]

'*With Brahman*'.

Here [in the sūtra]

'*Barring the dealings with the world*' (Br. Sū. 4·4·17)

when the released one remains distinct, there would be stated the undesirable result, — the deficiency of Lordship; otherwise there would be the contradiction with [the sūtra] and others,

'*The manifestation in the merging, on account of the word 'Svena' [by one's own]*', (Br. Sū. 4·4·1)

[110] Therefore, non-difference alone [is] natural. The difference, however, of the individual souls from the Highest Brahman, and their mutual [difference] are caused by the limiting adjuncts, intellect, sense-organs and body. Although Brahman [is] impartite and all-pervading, still difference

घटादिना, बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिना ब्रह्मण्यपि भेदः संभवत्येव । न च, भिन्ने ब्रह्मणि बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिसंयोगः, बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिसंयोगाद्ब्रह्मणि भेदः, इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वम्, उपाधेस्तत्संयोगस्य च कर्मकृतत्वात्, तत्प्रवाहस्य च, अनादित्वात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—'पूर्वकर्म'संबद्धाज्जीवात्स्वसंबद्ध एवोपाधिरुत्पद्यते । तद्युक्तात्कर्म । एवं 'बीजाङ्कुर'न्यायेन कर्मोपाधिसंबन्धस्यानादित्वात्, अदोषः, इति । अतो जीवानां परस्परं ब्रह्मणा च, अभेद एव स्वाभाविकः । भेदः, तु, औपाधिकः । उपाधीनां पुनः परस्परं ब्रह्मणा च, अभेदवत् भेदोऽपि स्वाभाविकः, उपाधीनामुपाध्यन्तराभावात्, तदभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थानाच्च । अतो जीवकर्मानुरूपं ब्रह्मणो भिन्नाभिन्नस्वभावा एवोपाधय उत्पद्यन्ते—इति ।

[111] अत्रोच्यते—अद्वितीयसच्चिदानन्दब्रह्मध्यानविषयविधिपरं वेदान्तवाक्यजातम्, इति वेदान्तवाक्यैरभेदः प्रतीयते । भेदावलम्बिभिः कर्मशास्त्रैः प्रत्यक्षादिभिः, च

is certainly possible even in [the case of] Brahman owing to the limiting adjuncts like intellect etc., as in the Ākāśa, by the jar and others. Neither, is there [the fault of] mutual interdependence as under— when Brahman is different, there is the association of the limiting adjuncts like intellect etc., and owing to the association of the limiting adjuncts like intellect and others, there is difference in Brahman, on account of the limiting adjuncts and the association with those being caused by Karman, and the stream thereof being beginningless. What is intended to be said is this— The limiting adjunct is produced as verily connected with himself, from the individual soul, connected with [his] 'previous Karman,' and Karman [arises from] that [Jīva] associated with it [the limiting adjunct]. Thus, because in consonance with the maxim, 'the seed and the sprout,' there is the beginninglessness of the relation between the Karman and the limiting adjuncts, there is no flaw. Therefore, non-difference alone, between the individual souls mutually and from Brahman is natural. The difference, however, is due to the limiting adjuncts. In the case of the limiting adjuncts, however, like their non-difference, mutual and from Brahman, the difference also is natural, on account of the absence of other limiting adjuncts in the case of the limiting adjuncts, and on account of the fault of endlessness in case that [presence of other limiting adjuncts] is admitted. Therefore, the limiting adjuncts definitely having a nature different and non-different from Brahman, are produced in accordance with the Karman of the individual souls.

[111] Here it is said [in reply]— Non-difference is apprehended from the Vedānta passages, because the aggregate of Vedānta passages concerns with the subject-matter of the injunction viz. the meditation of Brahman, without a second, existence, cit and bliss. And difference is apprehended from the Karmaśātra texts depending upon difference, and, by Direct perception

भेदः प्रतीयते। भेदाभेदयोः परस्परविरोधात्, अनाद्यविद्यामूलतयापि भेदप्रतीत्युपपत्तेः, अभेद एव परमार्थः, इत्युक्तम्। तत्र यदुक्तम्—भेदाभेदयोरुभयोरपि प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात्, न विरोधः—इति, तदयुक्तम्। कस्माच्चित्कस्यचिद्विलक्षणत्वं हि तस्मात्तस्य भेदः; तद्विपरीतत्वं च, अभेदः। तयोस्तथाभावातथाभावरूपयोरेकत्र संभवमनुन्मत्तः को ब्रवीति?

कारणात्मना जात्यात्मना च, अभेदः, कार्यात्मना व्यक्त्यात्मना च भेदः, इत्याकारभेदादविरोधः—इति चेत्—न, विकल्पासहत्वात्। आकारभेदादविरोधः, इति वदतः, किम्, एकस्मिन्नाकारे भेदः, आकारान्तरे च, अभेदः, इत्यभिप्रायः? उत, आकारद्वययोगिवस्तुगतावुभावपि—इति? पूर्वस्मिन्कल्पे, व्यक्तिगतो भेदः, जातिगतश्च, अभेदः, इति, नैकस्य द्व्यात्मकता। जातिर्व्यक्तिः, इति चैकमेव वस्तु—इति चेत्—तर्हि, आकारभेदात्, अविरोधः परित्यक्तः स्यात्। एकस्मिंश्च विलक्षणत्वतद्विपर्ययौ विरुद्धौ, इत्युक्तम्। द्वितीये तु कल्पे, अन्योन्यविलक्षणमाकारद्वयम्, अप्रतिपन्नं च तदाश्रयभूतं

---

etc. It has been [already] stated that non-difference alone is the reality, on account of the apprehension of difference being accounted for, although being rooted in beginningless Avidyā, on account of the mutual contradiction between difference and non-difference. There, as to what has been said [by you]—There is no contradiction on account of even both of them being established by apprehension — [the reply is] — That is improper. Having different characteristics from something on the part of something is, indeed, its difference from that; and being contrary to it is non-difference. Who, not intoxicated, would speak of the possibility of being together of those two, having the form of that kind and not of that kind?

If it be argued— There is non-contradiction on account of the difference of form, as the non-difference is due to the form as cause and the form as generality, [and] the difference [is] due to the form as effect and as being the individual — [we say] — No, on account of the impossibility of entertaining any alternatives. While saying—there is no contradiction owing to the difference in form,— [we ask you] — is [your] intention this viz. difference in respect of one form, and non-difference in respect of another form, or that viz. even both of them belonging to a thing connected with two forms? In respect of the former alternative, there is no two-fold nature in respect of one [and the same thing] because difference belongs to the individual and non-difference belongs to the generality. If it be said — The generality and the individual is only one thing; then in that case the non-contradiction owing to the difference of forms would be abandoned. And it has been [already] said that to have different characteristics and the opposite of that in one [and the same thing] are contradictory. In respect of the second alternative, however, there are two forms mutually

वस्तु, इति त्रितयाभ्युपगमेऽपि त्रयाणामन्योन्यवैलक्षण्यम्, एवोपपादितं स्यात्, न पुनरभेदः।

आकारद्वयनिरूप्यमाणाविरोधं, तदाश्रयभूते वस्तुनि भिन्नाभिन्नत्वम्--इति चेत्—स्वस्माद्विलक्षणं स्वाश्रयम्, आकारद्वयं स्वस्मिन्विरुद्धधर्मद्वयसमावेशानिर्वाहकं कथं भवेत्? अविलक्षणं तु कथंतराम्? आकारद्वयतद्वतोश्च द्व्यात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमे निर्वाहकान्तरापेक्षयानवस्थानात्। न च संप्रतिपन्नैक्यव्यक्तिप्रतीतिवत् ससामान्येऽपि वस्तुनि, एकरूपा प्रतीतिरुपजायते, यतः 'इदमित्थम्' इति सर्वत्र प्रकारप्रकारितयैव सर्वा प्रतीतिः। तत्र प्रकारांशो जातिः, प्रकार्यंशो व्यक्तिः, इति नैकाकारताप्रतीतिः। अत एव जीवस्यापि ब्रह्मणो भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं न संभवति। तस्मात्, अभेदस्यानन्यथासिद्धशास्त्रमूलत्वात्, अनाद्यविद्यामूल एव भेदप्रत्ययः।

[112] ननु—एवं ब्रह्मण एवाज्ञत्वात्तन्मूलाश्च जन्मजरामरणादयो दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः। ततश्च—

---

different and the thing that has become their resort is unapprehended—and so, even when [these] three are admitted, the mutual difference alone of the three would be set forth and not again the non-difference.

If [you speak of] the non-contradiction pointed out by the two forms as being different and non-different from the thing which has become its resort — [We ask] — How could the two forms, the thing different from and abiding in its resort, be competent to carry through the inclusion of two contradictory attributes in itself? How much more, therefore, something non-different ?—on account of [the fault of] endlessness owing to the dependence upon another to carry through, the admitting of two-fold nature of the forms and that possessed of those two forms. Not again, is apprehension about having one form in respect of a thing even though possessed of generality, produced like the apprehension of individuals in whose case oneness is admitted, because all apprehension is produced everywhere as involving the mode, and one possessed of the mode, as in 'This [is] thus'. There the portion dealing with the mode is the generality, and the portion dealing with a thing having the mode is the individual, —and so, there is no apprehension of having one form. For the same reason, in the case of the individual soul also, difference and non-difference from Brahman, are not possible. Therefore, on account of the non-difference rooted in the Śāstra, being not established otherwise, the apprehension of difference is certainly rooted in the beginningless Avidyā.

[112] I say, [says the objector]—In this way Brahman itself being ignorant, the blemishes such as birth, old age, death etc. rooted in it, would contaminate it. And therefore the Sāstra passages such as —

'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् ।' (मु. १।१।९)

'एष आत्मापहतपाप्मा ।' (छा. ८।१।५)

इत्यादीनि शास्त्राणि बाध्येरन् । नैवम्, अज्ञत्वादिदोषाणामपरमार्थत्वात् । भवतस्तूपाधिब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं वस्त्वन्तरमनभ्युपगच्छतो ब्रह्मण्येवोपाधिसंसर्गस्तत्कृताश्च जीवत्वाज्ञत्वादयो दोषाः परमार्थत एव भवेयुः । न हि ब्रह्मणि निरवयवेऽच्छेद्ये संबध्यमाना उपाधयः, तच्छित्त्वा भित्त्वा वा संबध्यन्ते, अपि तु ब्रह्मस्वरूपे संयुज्य तस्मिन्नेव स्वकार्याणि कुर्वन्ति ।

यदि मन्वीत—उपाध्युपहितं ब्रह्म जीवः । स च अणुपरिमाणः, अणुत्वं च, अवच्छेदकस्य मनसोऽणुत्वात् । स च, अवच्छेदकोऽनादिः । एवम्, उपाध्युपहिते देशे संबध्यमाना दोषा अनुपहिते परे ब्रह्मणि न संबध्यन्ते—इति । इहायं प्रष्टव्यः—

(१) किम्, उपाधिना छिन्नो ब्रह्मखण्डः, अणुरूपो जीवः ?

(२) उत, अच्छिन्न एवाणुरूपोपाधिसंयुक्तो ब्रह्मप्रदेशविशेषः ?

'*Who, omniscient, all-knower.*' (Mu. 1·1·9)

'*This self with sins destroyed.*'. (Chā. 8·1·5)

would be stultified.—[We reply]—Not so, on account of the unreal nature of the blemishes, ignorance etc. As for your honour who does not admit another thing over and above Brahman with the limiting adjuncts, the contact with the limiting adjuncts and the blemishes like being the individual soul and being ignorant, caused by it, would be existing definitely in Reality itself. Not, indeed, can the limiting adjuncts being related to the impartite Brahman, incapable of being cut, be related to it by cutting or breaking it, but on the other hand, they would carry on their own work in [Brahman] itself after being associated with the nature of Brahman.

If one were to think— Brahman conditioned by the limiting adjuncts [is] the individual soul, and that [is] atomic in size, the atomic nature being due to the atomic nature of the mind conditioning it, and that conditioning factor [is] beginningless,— in this way the blemishes being related to the region, conditioned by the limiting adjuncts, are not related to the un-conditioned Highest Brahman. In this connection, this [fellow] ought to be asked—

[1] Is the Brahman-portion cut off by the limiting adjunct, the Jīva, of atomic form ?

or

[2] [Is it] a particular portion of Brahman not verily cut off, associated with the limiting adjunct of atomic form ?

(३) उत, उपाधिसंयुक्तं ब्रह्मस्वरूपम् ?

(४) अथ, उपाधिसंयुक्तं चेतनान्तरम् ?

(५) अथ, उपाधिरेव ?

इति। (१) अच्छेद्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः प्रथमः कल्पो न कल्प्यते, आदिमत्त्वं च जीवस्य स्यात्। एकस्य सतो द्वैधीकरणं हि च्छेदनम्। (२) द्वितीये कल्पे ब्रह्मण एव प्रदेशविशेष उपाधिसंबन्धात्, औपाधिकाः सर्वे दोषास्तस्यैव स्युः। उपाधौ गच्छति, उपाधिना स्वसंयुक्तब्रह्मप्रदेशाकर्षणायोगात्, अनुक्षणमुपाधिसंयुक्तब्रह्मप्रदेशाविशेषभेदात्क्षणे क्षणे बन्धमोक्षौ स्याताम्। आकर्षणे च, अच्छिन्नत्वात्कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मण आकर्षणं स्यात्।

[113] निरंशस्य व्यापिन आकर्षणं न संभवति—इति चेत्—तर्हि, उपाधिरेव गच्छति, इति पूर्वोक्त एव दोषः स्यात्। अच्छिन्नब्रह्मप्रदेशेषु सर्वोपाधिसंसर्गे सर्वेषां च जीवानां ब्रह्मण एव प्रदेशत्वेन, एकत्वप्रतिसंधानं स्यात्। प्रदेशभेदादप्रतिसंधाने च, एकस्यापि स्वोपाधौ गच्छति सति प्रतिसंधानं न स्यात्।

---

or

[3] [Is it] the very nature of Brahman associated with the limiting adjuncts ?

or

[4] [Is it] another sentient associated with the limiting adjuncts ?

or

[5] [Is it] the limiting adjunct itself ?

[1] On account of Brahman not being capable of being cut, the first alternative cannot be assumed, and [in that case] there would be the nature of having a beginning for the Jīva. Cutting, indeed, is the division into two of one thing.

[2] According to the second alternative, on account of Brahman itself having relation with the limiting adjunct in a particular portion, all blemishes caused by the limiting adjuncts would pertain to that [Brahman] itself. With the limiting adjuncts passing away on account of the impossibility of attraction of the Brahman portion associated with itself, by the limiting adjuncts, there would be moment after moment bondage and release, on account of the particular Brahman-portions associated with the limiting adjuncts, being different at every moment. And if there be attraction, there would be the attraction of the entire Brahman on account of its not being cut.

[113] If it be argued— No attraction is possible in the case of a portionless pervading [thing], in that case the limiting adjunct itself would pass away— and so, there would [still] be the same blemish spoken of before. When there is the contact of all limiting adjuncts with the uncut Brahman-portions, there would be the apprehension of oneness in respect of all the Jīvas, owing to their being portions of Brahman. And if there be no connected apprehension owing to the different portions, there would be no connected apprehension [as such] even of one thing, when its limiting adjunct is passing away.

(३) तृतीये तु कल्पे, ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैवोपाधिसंबन्धेन जीवत्वापातात्, तद्व्यतिरिक्तानुपहितब्रह्मसिद्धिः स्यात्। सर्वेषु च देहेष्वेक एव जीवः स्यात्। (४) तुरीये तु कल्पे, ब्रह्मणोऽन्य एव जीवः, इति जीवभेदस्यौपाधिकत्वं परित्यक्तं स्यात्। (५) चरमे, चार्वाकपक्ष एव परिगृहीतः स्यात्। तस्मात्, अभेदशास्त्रबलेन कृत्स्नस्य भेदस्याविद्यामूलत्वमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अतः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनपरतयैव शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्येऽपि ध्यानविधिशेषतया वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपे प्रामाण्यमुपपन्नम्, इति—

तदप्ययुक्तम्, ध्यानविधिशेषत्वेऽपि वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्, अर्थसत्यत्वे प्रामाण्यायोगात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—ब्रह्मस्वरूपगोचराणि वाक्यानि किं ध्यानविधिनैकवाक्यतामापन्नानि ब्रह्मस्वरूपे प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्यन्ते ? उत स्वतन्त्राणि, एव ? एकवाक्यत्वे, ध्यानविधिपरत्वेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपे तात्पर्यं न संभवति। भिन्नवाक्यत्वे, प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनविरहात्,

(3) Apropos the third alternative—On account of the nature of Brahman itself, being reduced to the nature of a Jīva owing to the relation with the limiting adjunct, there would be the non-establishment of the unconditioned Brahman over and above that. And there would be only one Jīva in all the bodies.

(4) Apropos the fourth alternative, because the Jīva is altogether different from Brahman, [the position] that the difference of Jīvas is caused by the limiting adjuncts would be [as good as] given up.

[5] Apropos the last [alternative], the Cārvāka-view itself would be [taken to have been] accepted. Thus, on the strength of the Śāstra, propounding the non-difference, the entire [doctrine of] difference being rooted in Avidyā alone would have to be admitted. Therefore, even though the Śāstra is authoritative owing to its being definitely concerned with the purpose in the form of activity and passivity, the authoritative nature of the Vedānta passages is quite reasonable in [respect of] the nature of Brahman, owing to their being subordinate to meditation-injunction—

Even that [is] improper, on account of the impossibility of the Vedānta passages being an authority in respect of the true nature of things, although they be taken as subordinate to meditation-injunction. This is what is intended to be said— Do the [Vedānta] passages dealing with the nature of Brahman, attain to authoritative nature in respect of the nature of Brahman, being looked upon as forming up one passage [importing the same thing] with the meditation-injunction, or [being] quite independent ? If they form one passage, their import in respect of the nature of Brahman is not possible, owing to their being concerned with meditation-injunction. If the passages are separate, there would be the absence of enlightenment itself on their part· owing to the absence of the purpose in the form of activity and passivity,

अनवबोधकत्वमेव। न च वाच्यम्, 'ध्यानं' नाम स्मृतिसंततिरूपम्। तच्च स्मर्तव्यैकनिरूपणीयम्, इति ध्यानविधेः स्मर्तव्यविशेषाकाङ्क्षायां

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा' (बृ. २।४।६)

'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः।' (बृ. २।५।१९)

'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तै. २।१।१)

इत्यादीनि स्वरूपतद्विशेषादीनि समर्पयन्ति। तेन, एकवाक्यतामापन्नानि, अर्थसद्भावे प्रमाणम्—इति—ध्यानविधेः स्मर्तव्यविशेषापेक्षत्वेऽपि

'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' (छा. ३।१८।१)

इत्यादिदृष्टिविधिवत्, असत्येनाप्यर्थविशेषेण ध्याननिर्वृत्त्युपपत्तेः, ध्येयसत्यत्वानपेक्षणात्। अतो वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनविधुरत्वात्, ध्यानविधिशेषत्वेऽपि, ध्येयविषयस्वरूपसमर्पणमात्रपर्यवसानात्, स्वातन्त्र्येणापि बालातुराद्युपच्छन्दनवाक्यवत्, ज्ञानमात्रेणैव पुरुषार्थपर्यन्ततासिद्धेः, च, परिनिष्पन्नवस्तुसत्यतागोचरत्वाभावात्, ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं

Further, it should not be stated [by the objector]— 'Meditation' for the matter of that (*nāma*), is of the form of continuity of remembrance. And that is to be pointed out as the only object to be remembered, and so, when there is the expectancy for a particular thing to be remembered in respect of the meditation injunction [passages] such as—

'*All this* [*is*], *what* [*is*] *this Ātman.*' (Br. 2·4·6)

'*This Ātman* [*is*] *Brahman, the experiencer of all.*' (Br. 2·5·19)

'*Existence, knowledge, infinite* [*is*] *Brahman.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

point out the nature, its particularity etc.— and thus forming one passage, are the authority in proving the existence of the object,— because, even though the meditation-injunction has expectancy for a particular thing to be remembered, carrying through meditation is possible, even by [having recourse to] particular objects though false, like the injunction about 'seeing' [superimposition upon] in a passage like—

'*One should worship mind as Brahman*'. (Chā. 3·18·1)

there being no need for the thing to be meditated upon being real; therefore this is what has been reached [as a prima facie view]— Even though the Vedānta passages are [taken to be] subordinate to the meditation-injunction, being bereft of the purpose in the form of activity and passivity, on account of their culmination in merely pointing out to the nature of the object to be meditated upon,— and on account of the establishment of the farthest limit of human purpose in life by mere knowledge alone,— even though they are regarded as independent,— like the coaxing passages [spoken] to children and patients,— the Śāstra being the authority in the case of Brahman is not

न संभवति—इति प्राप्तम् । तत्र प्रतिपाद्यते—

'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र. सू. १।१।४)

इति । 'समन्वयः' सम्यगन्वयः, पुरुषार्थतयान्वयः— इत्यर्थः । परमपुरुषार्थभूतस्य, अनवधिकातिशयानन्दस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणोऽभिधेयतयान्वयात्, तच्छास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं सिध्यति, एव—इत्यर्थः । निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धनिरतिशयानन्दस्वरूपतया परमप्राप्यं ब्रह्म बोधयन् वेदान्तवाक्यगणः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरताविरहान्न प्रयोजनपर्यवसायी, इति ब्रुवाणो राजकुलवासिनः पुरुषस्य कौलेयककुलाननुप्रवेशेन प्रयोजनशून्यतां ब्रूते । एतदुक्तं भवति— अनादिकर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टनतिरोहितपरावरतत्त्वयाथात्म्यस्वरूपावबोधानां देवासुरगन्धर्वसिद्धविद्याधरकिंनरकिंपुरुषयक्षरक्षःपिशाचमनुजपशुशकुनिसरीसृपवृक्षगुल्मलतादूर्वादीनां स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकभेदभिन्नानां क्षेत्रज्ञानां व्यवस्थितधारकपोषकभोग्यविशेषाणां मुक्तानां स्वस्य चाविशेषेणानुभवसंभवे स्वरूपगुणविभवचेष्टितैरनवधिकातिशयानन्दजनकं परं ब्रह्मास्तीति बोधयदेव वाक्यं प्रयोजनपर्यवसायि । प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिष्ठं तु यावत्पुरुषार्थान्वयबोधं न प्रयोजनपर्यवसायि ।

---

possible, on account of the reality of a completely established thing not coming within its purview. There it is propounded by

'But that [is] on account of co-relation.' (Br. Sū. 1·1·4)

'Samanvayaḥ' [is] the right co-relation, that is, co-relation owing to its being the human purpose in life.— This is the sense. The sense is— The status of the Śāstra as the authority, referred to before, gets fully established owing to its reference to Brahman, which is to be mentioned as the highest human purpose in life, and which has unlimited and unsurpassed bliss. A person saying that the group of Vedānta passages, giving knowledge about Brahman— the highest goal to be reached, as having the nature of unsurpassed bliss with [even] the tinge of every blemish banished away, does not culminate in [accomplishing] the purpose on account of its not being concerned with activity or passivity, speaks of the purposelessness by the non-entrance into the house, of a dog-keeper [or Caṇḍāla] in the case of a man residing in a palace. This is what is intended to be said— In the case of the Kṣetrajñas having the knowledge of the nature of reality as it is, high and low, screened by the robe of Avidyā of the form of beginningless Karman, such as Gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyādharas, Kinnaras, Kimpuruṣas, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas, ghosts, men, beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, thickets, creepers, and Dūrvā-grass— differentiated owing to the difference as female, male and neuter, [and] with particular supporters, nourishers, [and] objects of enjoyment properly ear-marked,— the Vedānta passage directly giving the knowledge viz. there is the Highest Brahman producing unlimited and unsurpassed bliss, by means of its nature, qualities, manifestations [and] actions, there being the experience of itself and of the released [souls], without any difference culminates into the purpose. It [viz. the Vedānta Vākya] concerned with activity and passivity, however, does not culminate in the purpose till the [rise] of knowledge of the co-relation with human purpose in life.

[114] एवंभूतं ब्रह्म कथं प्राप्यते ? इत्यपेक्षायां—

'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् ।' (तै. २।१।१)

'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत ।' (बृ. १।४।१५)

इति वेदनादिशब्दैरुपासनं ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपायतया विधीयते, यथा स्ववेश्मनि निधिरस्तीति वाक्येन निधिसद्भावं ज्ञात्वा तृप्तः सन्पश्चात्तदुपादाने च प्रयतते, यथा च कश्चिद्राजकुमारो बालक्रीडासक्तो नरेन्द्रभवनान्निष्क्रान्तो मार्गाद्भ्रष्टो नष्ट इति राज्ञा विज्ञातः, स्वयं चाज्ञातपितृकः केनचिद्द्विजवर्येण वर्धितोऽधिगतवेदशास्त्रार्थः षोडशवर्षः सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरः, तिष्ठन्, 'पिता ते सर्वलोकाधिपतिः, गाम्भीर्यौदार्यवात्सल्यसौशील्यशौर्यवीर्यधैर्यपराक्रमादिगुणगणसंपन्नः, त्वामेव नष्टं पुत्रं दिदृक्षुः पुरवरे तिष्ठति' इति केनचिदभियुक्ततमेन प्रयुक्तं वाक्यं शृणोति चेत्, तदानीमेव 'अहं तावज्जीवतः पुत्रोऽस्मत्पिता च सर्वसंपत्समृद्धः,' इति निरतिशयहर्षसमन्वितो भवति, राजा च स्वपुत्रं जीवन्तमरोगमतिमनोहरदर्शनं विदितसकलवेद्यं श्रुत्वा, अवाप्तसमस्तपुरुषार्थो भवति, पश्चात्तावुभौ संगच्छेते च—इति ।

यत्पुनः—परिनिष्पन्नवस्तुगोचरस्य वाक्यस्य तज्ज्ञानमात्रेणापि पुरुषार्थपर्यवसानाद्बालातुराद्युपच्छन्दनवाक्यवन्नार्थसद्भावे प्रामाण्यम्—इति—तदसत् । अर्थसद्भावाभावे

---

[114] As regards the expectancy as to how the Brahman of this nature is to be attained, [mental] worship is enjoined as being the means of attainment to Brahman by means of the words 'Vedana' [knowing] etc. in the passages—

'*The Brahman-knower secures the highest.*' (Tait. 2·1·1)

'*One should worship the world as the Ātman himself.*' (Bṛ. 1·4·15)

Just as a person being pleased, having known the existence of a treasure from a sentence [uttered by some one] 'that there is treasure in his house', afterwards makes efforts to secure that; just as some prince being engrossed in child-sports, got out of the royal palace with his way missed, known by the king as lost, and himself not knowing his parentage, brought up by some eminent Brahmin, having grasped the meaning of the Vedas and the Śāstras, sixteen years old, becoming a mine of all auspicious qualities,— if he hears the words uttered by some one extremely clever, 'Your father, the overlord of all people, endowed with the hosts of qualities such as gravity, liberality, affection, good character, bravery, manly strength, fortitude, prowess etc. desirous of seeing you alone— [his] lost son,—is staying in the excellent city, [capital],'— at that very moment becomes full of unsurpassed joy, at the thought 'I, for the matter of that, am the son of one alive, and our father is blessed with every fortune',— the king also, having heard of his son as living, healthy, of an extremely attractive appearance, [and] conversant with everything fit to be known, becomes one who has secured the be-all and the end-all of life, and afterwards the two become united.

Again, as to [what has been stated] viz. the passage having a completely established thing within its purview has no authority in proving the existence of the object on account of its culmination into the human purpose of life even by the mere knowledge of that, like the coaxing words [spoken] to children and patients.— [The reply is]—That [is] false. When the absence

निश्चिते ज्ञातोऽप्यर्थः पुरुषार्थाय न भवति । बालातुरादीनामपि, अर्थसद्भावभ्रान्त्यैव हर्षाद्युत्पत्तिः । तेषामेव तस्मिन्नपि ज्ञाने विद्यमाने यद्यर्थाभावनिश्चयो जायते ततस्तदानीमेव हर्षादयो निवर्तेरन् । औपनिषदेष्वपि वाक्येषु ब्रह्मास्तित्वतात्पर्याभावनिश्चये ब्रह्मज्ञाने सत्यपि पुरुषार्थपर्यवसानं न स्यात् । अतो—

'यतो वा इमानि ।' (तै. ३।१।१)

इत्यादिवाक्यं निखिलजगदेककारणं निरस्तनिखिलदोषगन्धं सर्वज्ञसत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणाकरमनवधिकातिशयानन्दं ब्रह्मास्तीति बोधयति—इति सिद्धम् ॥ ४ ॥

---

of the existence of the object is ascertained, the object though known cannot be for the human purpose in life. In the case of children and patients also, there is the rise of joy etc. by the delusion itself of the existence of objects. If in their case also, although that knowledge exists, there arises the ascertainment of the absence of the object, then at that very moment joy and others would cease. Even in the case of Upaniṣadic passages, when there is the ascertainment of the absence of the import about the existence of Brahman, there would not be [their] culmination into human purpose in life, though the knowledge of Brahman exists. Therefore, it is established that the passage beginning with—

'*From whom, again these* [*beings*].' (Tait. 3·1·1)

gives the knowledge that there exists Brahman with unlimited and unsurpassed bliss, the sole cause of the entire world, with [even] the tinge of every blemish banished away, the mine of infinite auspicious qualities like omni-science with thoughts fulfilled. (4)

NOTES

(Śrī-Bhāṣya)

[1] It is usual with Sanskrit writers, to begin their works with a Maṅgala verse corresponding to the Nāndī verses in Sanskrit drama. Rāmānuja, unlike Śaṅkara and other commentators on the Vedānta-Sūtras, begins his work with Maṅgala verses. (The Śrīkarabhāṣya has as many as fifteen verses).

(1) CONSTRUE :—अखिलभुवनजन्मस्थेमभङ्गादिलीले, विनतविविधभूतव्रातरक्षैकदीक्षे, श्रुतिशिरसि विदीप्ते, श्रीनिवासे, परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि मम भक्तिरूपा शेमुषी भवतु ।

Rāmānuja, in this verse, summarises practically all the important tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of philosophy which he represents. Thus, he describes the Highest as a personal God with Lakṣmī by His side, promising protection and salvation to those who worship Him; and Bhakti is presumably considered as the means of salvation. शेमुषी means 'intellect', 'understanding'. Here, it seems to be used in the sense of 'ardent longing.' Rāmānuja refers to जन्म, स्थेमन् and भङ्ग as the duties of the Highest Brahman–Viṣṇu, while generally Viṣṇu is held responsible only for the स्थेमन् of the world.

(2) CONSTRUE :—उपनिषद्दुग्धाब्धिमध्योद्धृताम्, संसाराग्निविदीपनव्यपगतप्राणात्मसंजीविनीम्, पूर्वाचार्यसुरक्षिताम्, बहुमतिव्याघातदूरस्थिताम्, निजाक्षरैः तु आनीताम् पाराशर्यवचःसुधाम् भौमाः सुमनसः अन्वहम् पिबन्तु ।

पाराशर्य— The Son of Parāśara and Satyavatī, the Vedavyāsa, the reputed author of the Mahābhārata. पाराशर्यवचः refers to the Vedānta-sūtras that are attributed to Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa. Rāmānuja (it is clear, wrongly) considers Vedavyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa as one individual. उपनिषद्दुग्धाब्धि... cf. सर्वोपनिषदो गावो दोग्धा गोपालनन्दनः । पार्थो वत्सः सुधीर्भोक्ता दुग्धं गीतामृतं महत् ॥ गीताध्यानम्.

[2] Rāmānuja refers to his well-known predecessors Baudhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa etc. The 'Vṛtti' of Baudhāyana (which is said to be very extensive) is not so far available. Rāmānuja says that he is following Baudhāyana scrupulously. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा— Rāmānuja, here, points out how 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is to be explained as ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा, where ब्रह्मणः is the objective genitive. It is always better to point out specifically to a thing by name, rather than to describe it in a general way. Hence, it is better to take the षष्ठी in ब्रह्मणः as कर्मणि षष्ठी, rather than सम्बन्धसामान्ये षष्ठी. The objector points out the impossibility of a compound in the case of a प्रतिपदविधाना षष्ठी. The reply is, that it can be compounded as an exception. In the समासप्रकरण, there is a statement that while the शेष or सामान्यषष्ठी can be compounded, प्रतिपदविधाना षष्ठी cannot be compounded. Hunre, in the compound ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, it is compounded on account of another rule which allows a compound even in the case of प्रतिपदविहित षष्ठी when it is associated with a verbal form. So in ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, because

जिज्ञासा is a कृदन्त, though a प्रतिपदविधाना षष्ठी (कर्मणि षष्ठी) we can legitimately have the compound. By the word 'ब्रह्मन्' Rāmānuja understands 'पुरुषोत्तम' or Viṣṇu. The word ब्रह्मन् pointing out to some one else is only metaphorical (औपचारिक). By जिज्ञासा, Rāmānuja here says that ज्ञान is enjoined.

[3] उपरितनभाग refers to the उत्तरमीमांसा which follows the पूर्वमीमांसा dealing with the कर्मकाण्ड.

It is clear that according to Baudhāyana, the knowledge of कर्मन् is necessary before ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा arises. Baudhāyana regards पूर्वमीमांसा and उत्तरमीमांसा as forming one मीमांसाशास्त्र, which begins with 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' (1st सूत्र in the पूर्वमीमांसा) and ends with 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्, अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्।' (the last सूत्र in the उत्तरमीमांसा). The पूर्वमीमांसा of जैमिनि contains twelve अध्यायs or लक्षणs (or, if we include the संकर्षकाण्ड, sixteen अध्यायs), and the उत्तरमीमांसा contains four अध्यायs (जैमिनि is also reputed to have composed the वेदान्तसूत्रs as well). षोडशलक्षण may mean 12 अध्यायs of the पूर्वमीमांसा + 4 अध्यायs of the उत्तरमीमांसा, or 16 अध्यायs of the पूर्वमीमांसा alone. The names of both जैमिनि and बादरायण occur in the पूर्वमीमांसा and उत्तरमीमांसा सूत्रs—Thus though both the मीमांसाs form one Śāstra, the division into पूर्वमीमांसा and उत्तरमीमांसा is rightly made in conformity with the subject-matter dealt with; just as, though भगवद्गीता is one work, it is divided by some into three षट्कs— कर्म, भक्ति and ज्ञान. Rāmānuja points out that the topics dealt with in the उत्तरमीमांसा logically follow those in the पूर्वमीमांसा. प्रौष्ठपद means भाद्रपद. It is quite clear that this उपाकर्मन् ceremony was performed to signify the commencement of studies which were interrupted by the advent of the rainy season.

[4] The अध्ययन to begin with, took the form of the teacher reciting the Vedic hymns (from the शाखाs of the Veda to which the pupils belonged) and making the pupil recite them exactly in the right manner. Great importance was attached to the proper pronunciation of accented words etc. The next step was to understand the meaning of those hymns and this involved the वेदवाक्यविचार.

[5] When the कर्मविधि was subjected to study, it was found that कर्मन्s give अल्प and अस्थिर फल. So naturally a desire to know ब्रह्मन् is created, for the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् ensured अनन्त and स्थिर fruit. Consequently the pupil takes to the study of the उत्तरमीमांसा. The Vedānta Sūtras are also called शारीरकसूत्रs, शारीरक — referring to the soul (शरीरे भवः शारीरः).

[6] The objection against the विचार of the शारीरकमीमांसा is as follows:— Just as कर्मविचार can be skipped over, so, ब्रह्मविचार may also be skipped over. To this objection the answer is given that though the meaning is generally clear from the passages concerned, the विचार is still necessary to bring out the logical sequence and to remove any doubts.

[7] Here begins what is styled as the लघुपूर्वपक्ष and in Paras 12-18, there is the लघुसिद्धान्त. The question discussed here is— What is the पूर्ववृत्त (pre-requisite) of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा? The साधनचतुष्टयवादिन् (Advaitin) states his view in the लघुपूर्वपक्ष. The arguments are briefly as follows—

(1) धर्मविचार cannot be the पूर्ववृत्त; for, वेदान्तवाक्यविचार could surely be made by any one who does not know any कर्मन्. The वेदान्त preaches आत्मैकत्वविज्ञान. To secure this, भेदावलम्बि कर्मज्ञान is not only not helpful but is positively a hindrance. The उद्गीथाद्युपासनाs included in the वेदान्त are really ज्ञानस्वरूप and are not directly connected with कर्मन्.

(2) There cannot be ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय as apparently hinted in 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्.' This सूत्र according to some (i. e. Bhāskarācārya) could be taken to mean that कर्मज्ञान is अपेक्षित and hence वेदान्तवाक्यज्ञान must follow कर्मज्ञान to find out which कर्मन् should be associated with ज्ञान etc. (Bhāskara is a ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवादिन्).

[8-9] (3) The view of ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवादिन्s is wrong. मोक्ष is nothing but अविद्यानिवृत्ति; अनन्तविकल्पास्पद-कर्मन् cannot be the साधन for अविद्यानिवृत्ति which involves सकलभेददर्शनानिवृत्ति. Of course, यज्ञकर्मन् is not perfectly useless, for it produces अन्तःकरणनैर्मल्य, then विविदिषा, and then शम etc. become अन्तरङ्गोपाय.

[10] (4) श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन are useful to secure the ज्ञान of वाक्यs like 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म', 'तत्त्वमसि' etc. In order to produce such a ज्ञान, श्रवण, मनन etc. first have to destroy all भेदवासनाs.

(5) To enable श्रवण, मनन etc. to function properly, the पूर्ववृत्त (prerequisite) अपेक्षित is— (a) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक, (b) शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, (c) इहामुत्रफलभोगविराग, and (d) मुमुक्षुत्व; without these no जिज्ञासा can arise, and thus they are the पूर्ववृत्त.

[11] The भेददर्शन is बन्धमूल, and is produced by Avidyā; बन्ध is अपारमार्थिक, and is removed by ज्ञान, root and branch. This ज्ञान comes from 'तत्त्वमसि' etc. कर्मन् cannot do anything to produce such a ज्ञान. It only produces विविदिषा and सत्त्वशुद्धि and removes the रजस् and तमस् elements which produce पाप. But to attain bliss, one must overcome सत्त्व also.

[12] Rāmānuja controverts the above position of Śaṅkarācārya as under—

(1) We admit that अविद्यानिवृत्ति is मोक्ष, and that it is secured by ब्रह्मविज्ञान.

(2) But this ब्रह्मविज्ञान is *not* वाक्यज्ञान, which could be secured from the वाक्य itself without any injunction.

You cannot say — वाक्य does not produce अविद्यानिवर्तक ज्ञान as long as भेदवासना is not removed, or that even though ज्ञान is produced, it could not remove भेदज्ञान instantly in all cases. Just as though चन्द्रैकत्वज्ञान is produced, द्विचन्द्रज्ञानानिवृत्ति is there; so भेदज्ञान need not trouble one though अनिवृत्त, as it is छिन्नमूल; for if ज्ञानोत्पत्तिसामग्री is there, ज्ञान must be produced. When ज्ञान is there, अनादिवासना cannot produce भेदज्ञान, because the वासना (भेदज्ञानसामग्री) being मिथ्या must be निवृत्त by ज्ञानोत्पत्ति itself. If it is not निवृत्त, there being no other निवर्तक, that वासना would never be निवृत्त. If भेदज्ञान is छिन्नमूल, it surely cannot continue to exist.

(3) The द्विचन्द्रज्ञान goes on because there is परमार्थैतिमिरादिदोष, even when चन्द्रैकत्वज्ञान is there; but the भयादिकार्य does cease to exist.

(4) Again, भेदवासना, being अनादि and अपरिमित, cannot be destroyed by the विरोधिज्ञान which is अल्प.

So, what is enjoined is something different from वाक्यज्ञान, viz. ध्यान, उपासन etc.

[13] (5) In passages like ' प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ' ' विजानामि ' etc. what is enjoined is ध्यान (श्रोतव्य is just an अनुवाद, for श्रवणे स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते; so also मन्तव्य is an अनुवाद).

So, ध्यान or वेदन or उपासन is what is enjoined. This is clear from the fact that √ विद्, √ उपास् are used indiscriminately in the उपक्रम and उपसंहार of the same topic.

[14–15] ध्यान is nothing but ध्रुवानुस्मृति, which is दर्शनसमाकारा, साक्षात्काररूपा. This ध्रुवानुस्मृति attains to the nature of दर्शन owing to भावनाप्रकर्ष. This same ध्रुवानुस्मृति is called भक्ति or उपासना.

Taṅka, the वाक्यकार, has described all this in detail— ' वेदनमसकृदावृत्तं मोक्षसाधनम् ' and it is the same as ध्रुवानुस्मृति.

[16] (6) यज्ञादिकर्मन्s are the साधनs for this ध्रुवानुस्मृति. They are no doubt useful for विविदिषा; still वेदन or ध्यान is ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधन and all आश्रमकर्मन्s should be gone through to secure this ध्यान.

(7) ध्रुवानुस्मृति comes from (1) विवेक, (2) विमोक, (3) अभ्यास, (4) क्रिया, (5) कल्याण, (6) अनवसाद, and (7) अनुद्धर्ष according to the वाक्यकार (Taṅka) who gives authoritative passages (निर्वचनs) from the श्रुतिs supporting the meaning he gives to the above विवेक, विमोक etc.

[17] (8) अविद्या means विद्याविरोधिकर्मन् which enables one to cross मृत्यु (which is the same as प्रमाद, मोह). Both पुण्य and पाप are really पाप. कर्मन् is ज्ञानविरोधि as it increases रजस् and तमस् as opposed to सत्त्व. रजस् and तमस् cover up यथार्थज्ञान which comes from सत्त्व alone. पापकर्मन् must be abandoned; पुण्यकर्मन् must be practised in a निष्काम spirit.

ब्रह्मप्राप्तिसाधन—ज्ञान is सर्वाश्रमधर्मापेक्षकर्मस्वरूपज्ञान; It is to be had from कर्ममीमांसा which is thus the पूर्ववृत्त for ब्रह्ममीमांसा.

[18] (9) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक etc. can come only after मीमांसाश्रवण. The विनियोग of passages can be learnt from the third Adhyāya of पूर्वमीमांसा. उद्गीथाद्युपासनाs are really ब्रह्मज्ञानापेक्ष and ब्रह्मविद्योत्पादक, and so, they are rightly incorporated in the उत्तरमीमांसा. Of course, they are कर्मस्वरूपाभिगमापेक्ष.

It is clear from the above that there is not much difference in the views of Rāmānuja and Śaṅkarācārya (the Pūrvapakṣin in the present case), regarding the पूर्ववृत्त for ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Both agree that मोक्ष is अविद्यानिवृत्ति and results from ज्ञान, कर्मन् being useful only as making the person more fit to secure knowledge. But while Saṅkarācārya is entirely opposed to regard कर्मन्s as

the means of knowledge, Rāmānuja seems to take what he calls ध्यान or उपासना as bringing out the desired salvation. In fact, Rāmānuja goes to the extent of saying that ध्यान can be made a subject of विधि which Saṅkarācārya would never dream of acknowledging. However, even from the point of view of Rāmānuja there should be no objection to accept the four pre-requisites given by Saṅkarācārya. Rāmānuja's acceptance of what the वाक्यकार (Ṭaṅka) says in this respect makes this point clear. We are really unable to understand why Rāmānuja should attach so much importance to this not very important point. It almost looks as if Rāmānuja opposes Śaṅkarācārya for opposition's sake.

Rāmānuja very cleverly points out that the Śruti uses वेदन and उपासन practically in the same sense. And hence, he feels perfectly justified in regarding उपासना as the right means for securing परमार्थ.

(P. 23) यदप्याहुः—From here begins what has been styled as महापूर्वपक्ष and which ends with Para 27. The arguments may be summarised as follows—

(1) ब्रह्मन् which is अशेषविशेषप्रत्यनीकचिन्मात्र is the परमार्थ.

(2) Everything else, ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानभेदादि is परिकल्पित on Brahman, and is मिथ्याभूत.

(3) All this world which is मिथ्याभूत is superimposed upon Brahman (चिन्मात्रवपुः) on account of Avidyā that is सदसदनिर्वचनीय and possessed of आवरण and विक्षेप-शक्तिs.

(4) This Avidyā is turned away (निवृत्त) only through ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान.

(5) बन्ध which is मिथ्यारूप is destroyed along with its कारण by the above ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान.

(6) शास्त्र producing the ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान is more powerful than प्रत्यक्ष which tells us of भेद.

[19] The objector asks, 'How can Sāstra preach contrary to प्रत्यक्ष ?' The answer is—'Does not the निवृत्ति of प्रत्यक्ष-सर्पज्ञान take place by the ज्ञान—' रज्जुरेषा न सर्पः ?' The objector again says— 'विरोध between two प्रत्यक्षs, I can undersand; but how can Sāstra which is प्रत्यक्षमूल contradict प्रत्यक्ष ?' The reply is — In the case of two प्रत्यक्षज्ञानs, one is दुष्टकारणजन्य and the other is not; and the same thing is there in the case of the प्रत्यक्ष and the शास्त्र.

Actually बाध्यबाधकभाव between two प्रमाणs is determined *not* by the considerations of तुल्यत्व, सापेक्षत्व or निरपेक्षत्व, (Does not अनुमान based on प्रत्यक्ष contradict प्रत्यक्षज्ञान about the flame ज्वाला being one ?) but by finding out which प्रमाण is संभाव्यमानान्यथासिद्ध. बाधकप्रमाण is अनन्यथासिद्ध and अनवकाश (not having scope for दोषs) while a बाध्यप्रमाण is अन्यथासिद्ध and संभाव्यमानदोष.

शास्त्र is अविच्छिन्नसंप्रदाय, is not संभाव्यमानदोषयुक्त and so is बाधक; while प्रत्यक्ष is विकल्पभेदप्रपञ्चग्राहि and has अविद्याख्यदोष involving भेदवासना etc.

(7) Between two शास्त्रs, which is बाधक and which is बाध्य ?

This is to be determined by the अपच्छेदन्याय which says that the उत्तरप्रायश्चित्तशास्त्र is more powerful than the पूर्वप्रायश्चित्तशास्त्र, and so is बाधक. In the same way the उत्तरमीमांसा passages are more powerful than those in the पूर्वमीमांसा, and so are बाधक.

The अपच्छेदन्याय or the maxim of disconnection between the priests who follow each other, in the प्रातःसवन of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice ; the order of the priests is as follows—

(i) अध्वर्यु
(ii) प्रस्तोतृ
(iii) प्रतिहर्तृ
(iv) उद्गातृ
(v) ब्रह्मन्
(vi) यजमान

} According to some, यजमान is the fifth and ब्रह्मन् is the sixth (सत्याषाढ ८-४-२२).

While moving in this order, every priest (except the 1st) has to take in his hand the hem of the lower garment of the priest before him.

The following table indicates what प्रायश्चित्त is to be gone through if any of them loses the contact.

ऋत्विक्	प्रायश्चित्त	प्रायश्चित्तप्रतिपादकशास्त्र
(2) प्रस्तोतृ	No प्रायश्चित्त	——
(3) प्रतिहर्तृ	All property to be given as दक्षिणा.	यदि प्रतिहर्ता अपच्छिद्येत...सर्ववेदसं दद्यात् (आप. सू. १४-२६-४)
(4) उद्गातृ	The present sacrifice to be completed without giving anything as दक्षिणा and a fresh Jyotiṣṭoma is to be performed.	यद्युद्गाता अपच्छिद्येत, अदक्षिणः स क्रतुः संस्थाप्यः, अथ, अन्य आहृत्यः । (आप. सू. १४-२६-५).
(5) ब्रह्मन्	No प्रायश्चित्त	——
(6) यजमान	-do-	——

Now the problem is — What प्रायश्चित्त is to be gone through if the disconnection of both प्रतिहर्तृ and उद्गातृ takes place simultaneously? The answer is that any of the two प्रायश्चित्तs can be resorted to (तत्र विप्रतिषेधात् विकल्पः स्यात् । जै. VI. V. 51). But according to the सत्याषाढ श्रौतसूत्र the प्रायश्चित्त which is enjoined for the disconnection of उद्गातृ, is to be gone through — (सत्याषाढ 15-6-41).

The main point in this अपच्छेद maxim for the sake of which this पूर्वमीमांसा maxim has been referred to by other schools of philosophy, is that when the disconnection of these priests is not a simultaneous one, but has

some order, the disconnection which takes place later is considered to be more important and the प्रायश्चित्त enjoined for the latter is to be gone through.

One more point in this connection should be noted; when the disconnection of उद्गातृ takes place after the disconnection of प्रतिहर्तृ, a fresh Jyotiṣṭoma is to be performed. But in the new sacrifice, not the normal दक्षिणा (i. e. 112 cows) but सर्वस्वदक्षिणा (which was enjoined as the atonement for the disconnection of प्रतिहर्तृ) is to be given.

This अपच्छेदन्याय, it should be remembered, is in contrast with the असंजातविरोधन्याय which advocates the importance of the first of the two contrary facts.

The सत्याषाढ श्रौतसूत्र and the आपस्तम्ब श्रौतसूत्र describe in detail the entire procedure. Cf— निःसर्पन्तः समन्वारभते। अध्वर्युं प्रस्तोतान्वारभते। प्रस्तोतारं प्रतिहर्ता, प्रतिहर्तारमुद्गातोद्गातारं ब्रह्मा, ब्रह्माणं यजमानो यजमानं ब्रह्मेत्येकेषाम्। (सत्याषाढ ८-४-२२).

[20] Just as in the case of पूर्वापरच्छेद, the प्रायश्चित्त only for the अपरापच्छेद is to be gone through, in the same way, when there is a contradiction between two शास्त्रs, the अपरशास्त्र is to be accepted, and so it becomes बाधक and the पूर्वशास्त्र becomes बाध्य. Thus the कर्मकाण्ड i. e. the पूर्वमीमांसा becomes बाधित by the मोक्षशास्त्र i. e. उत्तरमीमांसा which comes towards the end, and is निरवकाश.

(8) When there arises contradiction between two passages, say सगुण and निर्गुण, in the same मोक्षशास्त्र or the उत्तरमीमांसा, which is more powerful is the question.

The निर्गुण passages are more powerful in accordance with the अपच्छेदन्याय itself.

(1) Because the very word निर्गुण presupposes गुणs, and so the निर्गुणशास्त्र has come after the सगुणशास्त्र and so is बाधक.

(2) निर्गुणशास्त्र is निरवकाश (the सगुण passages have scope for उपासना purposes). निर्गुणवाक्यानां गुणापेक्षत्वेन परत्वात्।

[21] The meaning of 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म'— सत्य, ज्ञान and अनन्त being in सामानाधिकरण्य, must point out to only one अर्थ. They cannot mean सत्यज्ञानादिगुणs; for, in that case, the object pointed out would be अनेकगुणविशिष्ट, which involves विशेषणभेद and this विशेषणभेद necessarily involves अर्थभेद. Nor can these words be पर्यायशब्दs, if they point out to एकार्थ. Thus सत्य means सत्येतरव्यावृत्ति, ज्ञान means ज्ञानेतरव्यावृत्ति and अनन्त means परिच्छिन्नव्यावृत्ति, by लक्षणा and all these point out to ब्रह्मन्, the same अर्थ. Hence all the expressions are अर्थवत्, एकार्थ and not mere पर्यायs. (This व्यावृत्ति is not a भावरूप or अभावरूप-धर्म of Brahman, but Brahman itself.)

Brahman, which is described in the जगत्कारणवाक्यs, has its real nature described in 'सत्यं ज्ञानं' etc. in accordance with the सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्याय, so as to harmonise with the description of Brahman as निर्गुण, निरञ्जन etc. अद्वितीयश्रुति cannot be explained, merely as denying the existence of some other equal or superior in the possession of qualities, for that would go against the

निर्गुणश्रुति. सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्याय directs that various details about one and the same topic in different शाखाs of the Veda have to be considered and harmonised. If any शाखा gives more details, those details have to be accommodated somehow.

[22] (10) The nature of लक्षणा— All words may have a लाक्षणिक sense. In determining the meaning of words or of a sentence, the तात्पर्य (purport) is the most important and the meanings of words should be determined in accordance with the maxim ' अभिधानवृत्तेस्तात्पर्यवृत्तेर्बलीयस्त्वम् '.

All the words in सामानाधिकरण्य have ऐक्ये तात्पर्यम्, so सत्यं, ज्ञानं etc. have ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यम्.

विषं भुङ्क्ष्व — Do not go to his house; the son is warned by the father, not to go to the house of a particular person. But the son persists in his resolve. The father very much irritated, blurts forth ' Damn you ! Do what you like. Go, drink poison.' In this लौकिक वाक्य, all words are used in a लाक्षणिक sense. In लौकिकवाक्यs all विध्यर्थ and आज्ञार्थ वाक्यs involve लक्षणा in the sense of क्रियाकार्य the मुख्य-अर्थ, अपूर्वकार्य is possible only in वैदिकवाक्यs; so by लक्षणा, we take the sense to be क्रियाकार्य. In the sentence like घटमानय where घट is connected with the आनयनक्रिया according to the अन्विताभिधानवादिन्s, घट is connected with क्रियाकार्य by लक्षणा itself.

इदमेवार्थजातम् (last line-Para 22) such as वस्तुनो निर्विशेषत्वम्, तस्यैव पारमार्थ्यम्, everything else being मिथ्या, due to the सदसदनिर्वचनीय दोष (अविद्या) etc.

[23] (11) Actually there is no विरोध between शास्त्र and प्रत्यक्ष, because प्रत्यक्ष can perceive only सन्मात्र having no विशेषs, though the वस्तुs appear to be नानाकार.

When we cognize ' घटोऽस्ति ,' this perception involves (1) अस्तित्व and (2) भेद. Both cannot be cognized at one and the same time in one moment, which is the time प्रत्यक्षज्ञान takes.

Out of the two,— घटस्वरूप and भेद— which is to come first ? Of course, घटस्वरूप; for भेदज्ञान has अपेक्षा for, and depends upon, the स्वरूपग्रहण and घटप्रतियोगिस्मरण. So, that means भेद is *not* cognized by प्रत्यक्ष, but only the स्वरूप. So भेदव्यवहार is just भ्रान्तिमूल. Actually, you cannot say what exactly the nature of भेद is. It cannot be स्वरूप, otherwise, like स्वरूप everything would furnish the idea of भेद itself. There cannot be प्रतियोगिसव्यपेक्षा for one who believes स्वरूप and भेद to be the same. ' घटः ' and ' भिन्नः ' would be पर्याय words. भेद cannot be स्वरूपधर्म; for this भेद to come into existence, it would require a भेदधर्म for itself and thus there would be अनवस्था, as well as अन्योन्याश्रय.

[24] All पदार्थs are seen to be associated with सत्ता (घटोऽस्ति) and अनुभूति (घटोऽनुभूयते).

सन्मात्रम् which is always अनुवर्तमान is alone the परमार्थ; all the विशेषs are अपरमार्थ, because they are व्यावर्तमान in one place or other. That in घट we have पटाभाव and that in पट we have घटाभाव, show that both घट and पट are व्यावर्तमान and hence अपरमार्थ.

व्यावृत्ति is nothing but विषयनिवृत्ति due to the विषय being बाधित, and proves अपरमार्थत्व as can be seen from the two syllogisms :—

(1) सत् परमार्थम् ।
अनुवर्तमानत्वात्,
रज्जुसर्पादौ रज्ज्वादिवत् ।

(2) घटादयोऽपरमार्थाः ।
व्यावर्तमानत्वात्,
रज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठानसर्पादिवत् ।

In a similar way, अनुभूति is also परमार्थ as it is अनुवर्तमान.

[25] Now सन्मात्र and अनुभूति are not भिन्न (सन्मात्र is not the विषयिन् and अनुभूति is not the विषय) but both are one and the same (भेद is not प्रत्यक्ष as already shown).

अनुभूतिः is स्वतःसिद्धा, otherwise, it would be अननुभूति like जड things. It is स्वसत्तया प्रकाशमान and is not परायत्तप्रकाश.

The objector says—अनुभूति cannot experience itself as the अङ्गुल्यग्र, though capable of touching another object, cannot touch itself; चक्षुरादि-इन्द्रियs or their संनिकर्ष is required for घटादिप्रकाशनिष्पत्ति.

When one has the knowledge ' घटोऽयम् ', one cannot at the same time have the अनुभूति (having no विषय and अनिदंभाव in the form of इमं घटम् etc.). So, अनुभूतिसद्भाव must be the हेतु and अनुभूति has to be inferred from the अर्थगत-प्रकाशातिशयः. This does not mean that अनुभूति becomes जड like घट (अजडत्व does not mean स्वसत्तया प्रकाशाव्यभिचारः otherwise सुख etc. would also be अजड because they are sometimes felt and sometimes not.

[26] The answer to the objector is — This objection cannot stand. No प्रकाश (विषयधर्म) other than the अनुभूति itself can manage all व्यवहार. It is not ज्ञानान्तरसिद्ध. अनुभूति is अनन्याधीनस्वधर्मव्यवहार, because it is the स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहार-हेतु, like रूप etc., which produce चाक्षुषत्व in घट, पट, etc., but do not require any रूपादिसंबन्ध for चाक्षुषत्व etc. for themselves.

अनुभूति is the cause for its own प्रकाशमानत्व and for the व्यवहार viz. प्रकाशते.

This अनुभूति is नित्य, for there can be no प्रागभाव in its case, because it is स्वतःसिद्ध.

How is अनुभूतिप्रागभाव to be known ?

(1) Not by सती-अनुभूतिः—For, how can अनुभूति know its own अभाव ?

(2) Nor by असती (non-existent) अनुभूतिः—For, how can a non-existent thing be the means of proof for proving its own अभाव ? (स्वयमसती कथं स्वाभावे प्रमाणं भवेत् ?)

(3) Not by any other प्रमाण-(अनुभूतेरनन्यगोचरत्वम्).

For any प्रमाण to know its अभाव, it must first have अनुभूति itself for its विषय. अनुभूति can never be a विषय, for it is स्वतःसिद्ध. To know घटाभाव, for

instance, you must have an idea of घट first. So अनुभूति does not come from its प्रागभाव; the six भावविकारs (जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यति — *Nirukta*) connected with उत्पत्ति cannot naturally be spoken of in connection with अनुभूति. अनुभूति is अनुत्पन्न and so being अनुत्पन्न cannot be नाना (न ह्यनुत्पन्नं नानाभूतं दृष्टम्).

[27] भेदs cannot be अनुभूतिधर्मs, as they are अनुभाव्य. अनुभूति is निर्धूतनिखिलभेद, and has no ज्ञातृ apart from its स्वरूप and is स्वप्रकाशरूप—आत्मन् itself as it is अजड.

अनात्मव्याप्तम् — Abhyankarshastri takes it to mean अनात्मत्वस्य व्यापकमित्यर्थः (कर्तरि क्तः). Thus we have,

यत्र अनात्मत्वं (व्याप्य) तत्र जडत्वम् (व्यापक)
Or
अनात्मत्वं व्याप्तं यस्य तत्.

We may take it to mean जडत्व which has व्याप्ति with अनात्मत्व.

ज्ञातृत्व is superimposed upon अनुभूति or आत्मन् and is भ्रान्तिसिद्ध. अनुभूति cannot have any क्रिया in itself. ज्ञातृत्व is ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्व; how could it be possible in the case of चिन्मात्र-आत्मन्? कर्तृत्व etc. cannot be आत्मधर्मs. In सुषुप्ति, मूर्च्छा etc. there is अहंप्रत्ययाभाव, so आत्मन् is not अहंप्रत्ययगोचर. If आत्मन् were कर्तृ and अहंप्रत्ययगोचर, he would be जड and पराक् like देह. Philosophers argue that अहंप्रत्यय is प्रसिद्ध in the case of देह and the भोक्तृ is different from the body. So, in the same way the साक्षिन्-प्रत्यगात्मन् must be different from the ज्ञातृ (connected with अहमर्थ).

जड-अहंकार is the अभिव्यञ्जक of that आत्मन्, being its आश्रय. It is the nature of an अभिव्यञ्जक to reveal the अभिव्यङ्ग्य within itself. The mirror etc. manifest मुख etc. within themselves. जानाम्यहं is a भ्रम caused by अहंकार. स्वप्रकाशानुभूति is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by जड-अहंकार, like करतल which is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by रविकर which is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by करतल.

करतल	रविकर	करतल
(अभिव्यङ्ग्य)	(अभिव्यञ्जक of करतल and अभिव्यङ्ग्य by करतल)	अभिव्यञ्जक

करतल and रविकर are thus both अभिव्यङ्ग्य and अभिव्यञ्जक. करतल makes the रविकर more manifest and is in turn treated likewise by the रविकर. We often see that the rays of the Sun emerging from the lattices are manifested clearly by the palm of the hand which itself becomes manifested by those rays. (जालकरन्ध्रनिष्क्रान्तद्युमणिकिरणानां तदभिव्यङ्ग्येनापि करतलेन स्फुटतरप्रकाशो हि दृष्टचरः ।).

So, अहं जानामि etc. is not the पारमार्थिक धर्म of आत्मन् and does not follow it in the सुषुप्ति state. The consciousness in the सुषुप्ति state is just अनुभवमात्र without the अहमुल्लेख. For this same reason, a waking man observes—'I did not know even myself' (अत एव सुप्तोत्थितः कदाचिन्मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवानिति परामृशति ।). Therefore आत्मन् who is really निरस्तसमस्तभेद, विकल्पनिर्विशेषचिन्मात्रैकरस etc. appears in an illusory manner by भ्रान्ति as having ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानरूपविविधविचित्रभेद. This is due to मूलभूताविद्या for the destruction and uprooting of which the उपनिषद्s want to give instruction.

[28] The महासिद्धान्त begins here—

Rāmānuja now controverts the above position of the पूर्वपक्षिन्. The arguments in brief are—

(1) No प्रमाण can be found to comprehend a निर्विशेष thing. All प्रमाणs deal with things that are possessed of विशेषs. Even the आत्मानुभव of the Advaita-Vedāntin is possessed of साक्षिकसविशेषत्व. The so-called निर्विशेष-अनुभव must possess some विशेषs peculiar to itself—other than its सत्ता (सत्तातिरेकि). So निर्विशेष means void of *some* विशेषs and not of *all* विशेषs.

(It is interesting to note that Rāmānuja regards निर्गुण not as 'void of *all* qualities', but as possessed of qualities opposed to the qualities fit to be abandoned, निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकता).

अनुभव or धी is surely possessed of धीत्व and स्वयंप्रकाशता which enable the knower to know the विशेषs by illumining them.

In swoon, deep sleep etc. also there is सविशेषानुभव.

Again, do you not speak of Brahman as possessed of एकत्व, नित्यत्व etc. ? What are these, if not विशेषs ?

There are again different opinions about Brahman, even though it is regarded as वस्तुमात्र. So, it must be admitted that—

वस्तु is always विशिष्ट by विशेषs which are apprehended by प्रमाणs.

(2) शब्दप्रमाण cannot help us in comprehending a निर्विशेष वस्तु.

(A) पद consists of प्रकृति and प्रत्यय which give a particular meaning to the word. So, पद is विशिष्ट.

(B) वाक्य is made up of पदs, and gives us the particular contacts of different meanings of the various words, giving different meanings.

So, शब्द can never tell us of a निर्विशेष thing.

(3) प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण likewise is powerless.

The निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष is also सविशेष like the सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष. निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष is the perception of a thing as void of some विशेषs and not of all विशेषs.

All प्रतीति is of the nature of 'इदं (विशेष्य) इत्थम् (विशेषण). '

[29] निर्विकल्पक consists of त्रिकोणसास्नादिसंस्थानजातिविशेषग्रहण while the सविकल्पक consists of गोत्वादेरनुवृत्ताकारता in addition to त्रिकोणसास्नादिसंस्थान. अनुवृत्ति only is not seen in the निर्विकल्पक; संस्थानादिजाति is apprehended in the निर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्ष. Without the संस्थान, the संस्थानिन् cannot be apprehended even in the form 'इदमित्थम्' and so in the निर्विकल्पक we do apprehend the संस्थान- configuration also, and not merely इदं किंचित् (This is but a special pleading on the part of Rāmānuja and is against the accepted view. According to Rāmānuja, even जाति etc. are perceived in the निर्विकल्पक and only जात्याद्यनुवृत्ति is added in the सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष. But what is this अनुवृत्ति ? If it is inherent in and forms the स्वभाव of the object, why should it not be perceived along with the जाति ? The view that निर्विकल्पक is जात्यादिहीन

and the सविकल्पक is जात्यादिमत् is evidently more reasonable. In fact, Rāmānuja's 'निर्विकल्पकत्व' is really not different from the 'सविकल्पकत्व' itself).

(4) Those who believe in भेदाभेद, — जातिरूपेण अभेदः, व्यक्तिरूपेण भेदः — are also wrong.

इदमित्थम् — Here the प्रतीति points out to भेद between जाति and व्यक्ति or between विशेषण and विशेष्य and does not point to अभेद or ऐक्य.

व्यावृत्ति is nothing but गोत्वादिसंस्थानविशेषविशिष्टता. Sometimes विशेषणs like दण्ड (as in दण्डी देवदत्तः) are पृथक्संस्थानसंस्थित and विशेषणs like गोत्व (in गोव्यक्तिः) are द्रव्यविशेषतयावस्थित and reside in the द्रव्य itself. But this does not matter. Anyway विशेष्यविशेषणभाव is the same in both the cases.

(5) अनुमान, उपमान etc. (other प्रमाणs admitted by others; the number varies in different schools, but all these) are more or less based upon प्रत्यक्ष itself which gives us only the सविशेषप्रतीति as proved above; and so these cannot help us in perceiving a निर्विशेष thing.

[**30**] (6) The view that प्रत्यक्ष is only सन्मात्रग्राहि and not भेदविशेषग्राहि (for भेद cannot be proved to be either भिन्न or अभिन्न from सत्ता) is disproved; because it is proved that प्रत्यक्ष *is* capable of dealing with जात्यादिविशिष्टवस्तु, and जाति itself is capable of dealing with भेदव्यवहार and प्रतियोगिन्.

What the opponent has said about संवेदन and रूप applies to भेद as well. Thus—संवेदन is अनन्याधीनस्वधर्मत्ववत् (स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्महेतुत्वम्), अनन्याधीनस्वव्यवहारत्ववत् (स्वसंबन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वम्).

(स्वधर्म is प्रकाशमानत्वम्; घट becomes प्रकाशमान through the अनुभूतिसंबन्ध; just as रूप produces चाक्षुषत्वधर्म in घट but requires none else to produce its own चाक्षुषत्व).

So, जाति itself has both धर्म and परत्र व्यवहार; hence there can be no question of अनवस्था or अन्योन्याश्रयण.

In the very first instant, प्रत्यक्षज्ञान comprehends वस्तुभेदरूपतत्संस्थानगोत्वादि and nothing remains to be comprehended in the second क्षण in this matter.

(1) If प्रत्यक्ष does not comprehend संस्थानजात्यादिभेद, why does an अश्वार्थिन् turn away from a महिष ?

(2) If all प्रतिपत्तिs point out to only सन्मात्र, why are not all words that are cognate with the प्रतिपत्तिविषय remembered in every प्रतिपत्ति ?

(3) There would be no स्मृतिवैलक्षण्य if all प्रतिपत्तिs point out to सन्मात्र only.

(4) If विशेषs are admitted in each संवेदन, it amounts to saying that प्रत्यक्ष refers to विशिष्टार्थ.

(5) If all संवेदनs are एकविषय, there would be no distinction between blind, deaf, and dumb people.

सन्मात्र cannot be perceived by the eye which can perceive only

रूपरूपिरूपैकार्थसमवेत things; nor by त्वक् which is स्पर्शवद्वस्तुविषय, nor by श्रोत्र etc. for they are all शब्दरसगन्धलक्षणविशेषविषयs.

So, no ग्राहक for सन्मात्र is available.

If प्रत्यक्ष is सन्मात्रग्राहक—

(a) All शास्त्रs would be useless; they would not be telling us of any thing not seen before (i. e. अपूर्व). They would be just अनुवादकs.

(b) सन्मात्र would be प्रमेय and thus जड and विनाशि. So it is better to say that वस्तुसंस्थानरूपजात्यादिलक्षणभेदविशिष्टविषयमेव प्रत्यक्षम् ।

जाति itself is the संस्थान which is the same as स्वासाधारणरूप and गोत्वादिजाति itself is the भेद and व्यावृत्ति; भेद is pointed out by गोत्वादिव्यवहार. भिन्न इति व्यवहारः is प्रतियोग्यपेक्ष.

[31] (7) As regards the argument that घट, पट etc. being व्यावर्तमान are बाधित, अनित्य and मिथ्या, we reply—

You do not understand the naure of बाध्यबाधकभाव and व्यावृत्ति at all.

बाध्यबाधकभाव obtains between two things, residing in the same thing and at the same time, when the बाधित is squashed by the बलवत्. There cannot be विरोध between घट in one place and घटाभाव in *another* place and at *another* time, (but certainly there is विरोध between घट and घटाभाव, in the *same* place and at the *same* time).

There cannot be अन्यत्र निवृत्ति of a thing which is अन्यत्र निवृत्त.

The बाध्यबाधकभाव between रज्जु and सर्प is all right, but in the case of घट in one place and at one time, and घटाभाव in another place and at another time, व्यावर्तमानत्व is not मिथ्यात्वव्याप्य. So व्यावर्तमानत्व alone is not अपारमार्थ्ये हेतुः.

Whatever is अनुवर्तमान is सत्, is self-evident; but अनुभूति and सत् are shown to be different by प्रत्यक्ष itself ; there is विषयविषयिभाव between the two. So it is wrong to say that अनुभूति alone is परमार्थ.

[32] (8) अनुभूति is स्वयंप्रकाश only when it is concerned with the आत्मन् (ज्ञातृ) at the time of विषयप्रकाशन, but not in all cases.

For परानुभूति depends upon अनुमान as shown by हान, उपादान etc. Even स्वानुभूति is a ज्ञानविषय in respect of अतीतानुभव. So, अनुभूति is not always स्वतःसिद्ध.

(9) As regards the contention that अनुभूति would cease to be अनुभूति, if it is अनुभाव्य, the reply is :—

If the opponent's dictum is accepted—

(1) स्वगतातीतानुभव and परगतानुभव would cease to be अनुभूति.

(2) परानुभव which depends upon अनुमान, would not be able to comprehend शब्दार्थसंबन्ध and there would be समस्तशब्दव्यवहारोच्छेद.

(3) Would any pupil approach the teacher for knowledge under these circumstances ?

अनुभूति does not become अननुभूति, simply because it is अन्यविषय.

अनुभूति has two functions— (a) स्वसत्तयैव वर्तमानतादशायां स्वाश्रयं प्रति प्रकाशमानत्वम्, (b) स्वसत्तयैव स्वविषयसाधनत्वम् (i. e. स्वविषयप्रकाशकत्वम्).

अनुभूति does not cease to be अनुभूति, because these two धर्मs do not disappear even though they may be अनुभवान्तरानुभाव्य. अनुभूतित्व still remains in अनुभूति.

घट though अनुभवविषय and अनुभूतिप्रयोजक is not अनुभूति, because it has not the अनुभूतिस्वभाव, and not because it is अनुभाव्य.

You cannot say—whatever is not अनुभाव्य is अनुभूति, for, then logically गगनकुसुम being not अनुभाव्य would be अनुभूति ! (and अनुभूति which is स्वानुभाव्य would be अननुभूति ! !)

If it be said that in the case of the गगनकुसुम, अननुभूतित्व is असत्त्वप्रयुक्त, then in the case of घट also, we might say अननुभूतित्व to be due to अज्ञानाविरोधित्व and not due to its अनुभाव्यत्व.

In the case of घट also, we might say अननुभूतित्व is due to अज्ञानाविरोधित्व and not due to its अनुभाव्यत्व.

If you say that अनुभूतेरननुभूतित्व is likewise due to अज्ञानाविरोधित्व, then in the case of गगनकुसुम also we may say that the अननुभूतित्व is due to अज्ञानाविरोधित्व !

So, it is ridiculous to assert that अननुभूतित्व is due to अनुभाव्यत्व.

[What is the difference between घट (अनुभाव्य) being अनुभूति and गगनकुसुम अननुभाव्य) being अनुभूति ? The objector says that if अनुभूति is अनुभाव्य it would be like घट which is अनुभाव्य ! The answer is that अनुभाव्यत्व is not the *sine qua non* of अननुभूतित्व. We cannot use अनुभाव्यत्व or अननुभाव्यत्व to prove अननुभूतित्व or अनुभूतित्व of a thing ! For if अनुभूति is अननुभाव्य, it would be like गगनकुसुम which likewise is अननुभाव्य. It is useless to point out that गगनकुसुम *does not exist*, hence it is not अनुभूति, for we can say that the reason why घट is not अनुभूति is that घट has अज्ञानाविरोधित्व. If you say that अनुभूति would also have अज्ञानाविरोधित्व if it is अनुभाव्य, we reply that even if अनुभूति is अननुभाव्य it would have अज्ञानाविरोधित्व like गगनकुसुम।

If on the strength of the घटदृष्टान्त, you are pleased to say that अनुभूति cannot have अनुभाव्यत्व which produces अज्ञानाविरोधित्व, our answer is — अनुभूति cannot have अननुभाव्यत्व which also produces अज्ञानाविरोधित्व on the strength of the गगनकुसुमदृष्टान्त].

[33] (10) As regards the contention that संवित् being स्वतःसिद्ध, it is not produced, owing to the absence of प्रागभाव etc., the reply is :—

This your argument is like asking a born blind man to lead a party of blind men !

प्रागभाव exists and is perceived by अनुभूति itself. There is no rule that

अनुभूति should deal only with contemporary objects. What about अतीतानागत-विषयs ?

If you say,—When अनुभूतिप्रागभाव is being proved, there is समकालभाव, we say that it is nowhere seen that a thing and its प्रागभाव are समकाल; if this is perceived according to you, then प्रागभाव is सिद्ध automatically !

Only इन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्ष perceives स्वसमकाल things, but not other ज्ञानs or प्रमाणs.

स्मरण, अनुमान, योगिप्रत्यक्ष etc. deal with कालान्तरवर्ति things. There is अविनाभाव between प्रमाण and प्रमेय and not between प्रमाण and स्वकालवर्ति-अर्थ.

Only the अर्थ referring to a particular time, space etc. must be other than मिथ्या; for it is to be perceived by a प्रमाण.

This incidentally refutes the argument 'स्मृतिर्न बाह्यविषया, नष्टेऽप्यर्थे स्मृतिदर्शनात्,' for the स्मृति refers to a real object, may be, it is perceived at some other time.

[34] If the पूर्वपक्षिन् says संवित्प्रागभाव cannot be perceived by प्रत्यक्ष as it is अवर्तमान ; nor by अनुमान as there is no लिङ्ग; nor by अनुपलब्धि as there is non-उपलब्धिः; nor by आगम which does not deal with प्रागभाव, — so, प्रागभाव cannot be established owing to प्रमाणाभाव.

The reply is—' You seem to have forgotten your thesis that प्रागभाव or संवित् is स्वतःसिद्ध ! So, you have now climbed down to discuss the प्रमाणs !

Well then, अभाव is proved by योग्यानुपलब्धि itself.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञान deals only with वर्तमान objects, not with पूर्वक्षण or उत्तरक्षण objects-संवेदन is thus conditioned by the time-factor, is सविषय and the विषयs are संविदनुरूपस्वभाव.

If संवेदन is नित्य and स्वतःसिद्ध, घट etc. its विषयs, would also be नित्य and would be experienced as नित्य, but it is not so, for the विषयs are संविदनुरूप. If it were not सविषय, संवित् would just be तुच्छ. We call संवित् as स्वयंप्रकाश, because it has the power for विषयप्रकाशन by its own सत्ता. If it has not this power and अनुभूति cannot be experienced by any other अनुभव, what use is संवित् ?

In the case of स्वाप, मूर्च्छा etc., केवला संवित् is not experienced, because this is disproved by the योग्यानुपलब्धिप्रमाण.

[35] P. 57 — If such a संवित् is there, it ought to have remembrance but that is not there (of course, if there are causes like देहवियोग etc. that prevent such a स्मरण from taking place, then there need be no स्मरण, but in the absence of such causes, why should not there be स्मरण ?).

अस्मरण shows अनुभवाभाव, but we are not banking upon अस्मरण only to prove our point. प्रत्यवमर्श (recollection without effort) also in the case of a सुप्तोत्थित person in the form ' इयन्तं कालं न किञ्चिदज्ञासिषम् ' also points out that अस्मरण shows अनुभवाभाव.

To say that though अनुभव is there, the अस्मरण may be due to विषयावच्छेद

(विषयसंबन्धराहित्य) or due to अहंकारविगम (नाश), is as ridiculous as saying that the experience about A or absence of B, should be the cause of the non-remembrance of C experienced.

Our own view, that — There is सविशेषानुभव in स्वाप etc., and that the सविशेषानुभव is आत्मानुभव, would be proved later on. Here we are trying to show that संवित् which you describe as निराश्रय and सकलविषयविरहिणी cannot be proved.

संवित् cannot be the same as आत्मन्, for it would be proved later on that it is साश्रय. So, अनुभूति cannot by itself disprove the प्रागभाव.

Your statement that प्रागभाव is असिद्ध because there are no प्रमाणs other than the स्वतःसिद्ध-अनुभूति, is wrong, because we have shown that अनुभूति may not be स्वतःसिद्ध as it is at times अनुभाव्य.

So, the statement of the पूर्वपक्षिन् that अनुभूति (संवित्) is not originated because its प्रागभाव is असिद्ध, is wrong.

(11) The पूर्वपक्षिन् had said that when the अनुत्पत्ति of संवित् is there, other विकारs, नाश etc. are surely not there (for whatever is अनुत्पन्न is विकाररहित). But that is wrong, for this proposition is vitiated by प्रागभाव that is अनुत्पन्न and yet has विनाश.

If it be said that this proposition pertains to भाव objects only, then you are a veritable Solomon !

You yourself say that अविद्या which is अनुत्पन्न is विविधविकारास्पद, and is destroyed by तत्त्वज्ञान. Does not the अविद्या-instance vitiate your argument ?

If you say that the अविद्याविकारs are मिथ्या, we ask you not to be so shy ! According to you *all* विकारs are मिथ्या; why do you specially qualify the अविद्या-विकारs as such ?

A परमार्थविकार is not admitted by you.

(12) अनुभूति being अज does not admit of any विभाग— This is the view held by the पूर्वपक्षिन्. To this the reply is :—

The अज-आत्मन् is विभक्त from देहेन्द्रियs etc.

The अनाद्यविद्या is over and above the आत्मन्. You cannot say that this विभाग is मिथ्यारूप, for where could you see a परमार्थविभाग not associated with उत्पत्ति ? And if such a विभाग is not admitted, अविद्या itself would be आत्मन्. So just as छेदनभेद is proved by छेद्यभेद, the सिद्धदृश्यभेद (घटादि) which is अबाधित proves दर्शनभेद.

[36] (13) The पूर्वपक्षिन् says — अनुभूति being दृशिस्वरूप with स्वगतभेद denied, cannot have दृश्यधर्मः the धर्मs being दृश्य cannot belong to दृशि. The reply is—

You yourself admit नित्यत्व, स्वयंप्रकाशत्व, एकत्व etc. as धर्मs established by प्रमाणs so, both the above propositions are invalid. Being of a different nature

(स्वरूप), नित्यत्व etc. are not संवेदन. संवेदन is स्वसत्तयैव स्वाश्रयं प्रति विषयस्य प्रकाशनम्, स्वयंप्रकाशता is स्वाश्रयाय-प्रकाशमानता; प्रकाश is common to both चित् and अचित् पदार्थs; नित्यत्व is conditioned by सर्वकाल and एकत्व by एकसंख्या. Even if these धर्मs are spoken of as the absence of जडत्व etc i. e. negatively, still they would continue to be चैतन्यधर्मs.

If these धर्मs—भावरूप or अभावरूप—are not admitted in संवित्, because संवित् is opposed to जडत्व as they are different from its स्वरूप, then their निषेध has no meaning at all.

(14) The question now is—Is संवित् established or not ? If established, it has धर्मता, and if not, it will be तुच्छ. If सिद्धि of a thing is the संवित्, you should point out the आश्रय and the विषय of the सिद्धि or प्रतीति. For सिद्धि is a relation which has a reference to two factors—(1) Whose it is and (2) for whom it is.

If 'for whom' refers to the आत्मन्, आत्मन् cannot be संवित्; how can संवित् have संबन्ध with itself? (आत्मसंबन्धिनी संवित् cannot be आत्मरूप.)

अनुभूति is a धर्मविशेष of आत्मन्, and that it is स्वयंप्रकाश has been admitted by you, as it is आत्मसाक्षिक.

[37] संवित् is अस्थिर and has उत्पत्ति etc. like सुख. 'अहं जानामि' 'ज्ञानं नष्टम्' etc. show that उत्पत्ति etc. of संवित् are प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध. The आत्मन्, the कर्तृ of संवित्, is स्थिर; and this स्थिरत्व of the आत्मन् is proved by प्रत्यभिज्ञा.

If the momentary संवित् were the आत्मन्, प्रत्यभिज्ञा would not have been possible. 'A' cannot recognize what 'B' has seen.

If अनुभूति is आत्मन्, no प्रतिसंधान is possible. प्रतिसंधान is not mere अनुभूति but presentation to some अनुभवितृ.

गमनक्रिया has no गन्तृत्व, so ज्ञान can have no ज्ञातृत्व. 'अहं जानामि' etc. definitely show the उपलब्धि of a ज्ञातृ. So, अनुभूति which is just ज्ञान cannot be ज्ञातृ.

The objector seems to think that even the सिद्धान्तिन् must admit संवित, (may be, सविशेषा and साश्रया), so why not call that संवित्, आत्मन्? Why should we recognize आत्मन् as over and above संवित्?

The reply is— उपलब्धि is a powerful प्रमाण; it shows that there must be one possessed of ज्ञातृत्व which संवित् does not possess.

The पूर्वपक्षिन् now attacks the उपलब्धि argument referred to above, which was shown to prove a ज्ञातृ-आत्मन् to be different from ज्ञान.

'अहं जानामि'—Here in अहं, there is अनिदं-अंश which is प्रत्यगर्थ, and चित्, i. e. आत्मन्, and not the अहमर्थ. चित् is स्वप्रकाश, the अहमर्थ is प्रकाशित by ज्ञानबल and is really युष्मदर्थ.

So, in अहं जानामि, the प्रत्यक्-आत्मन् is not the ज्ञातृ, the पराक्-अहमर्थ is the ज्ञातृ.

The reply is—The प्रतीति definitely is 'अहं जानामि.' If the contention of

the पूर्वपाक्षिन् is accepted, i. e. if आत्मन् were not ज्ञातृ but ज्ञान, the प्रतीति would have been 'अहं ज्ञानम्.' The प्रतीति shows that अहम् is the धर्मिन् and ज्ञान is the धर्म.

If अहमर्थ is not the आत्मन्, आत्मन् would not be प्रत्यक् (स्वस्मै प्रकाशमान) i. e. subjective. परागर्थ is परस्मै प्रकाशमान (i. e. objective). The अहंबुद्धि or the अहमर्थ differentiates the प्रत्यगर्थ from परागर्थ, and ज्ञान is पराक्. Hence in the ज्ञानात्मवाद itself, आत्मन् would cease to be प्रत्यक्. If अहमर्थ is not there, केवलज्ञप्ति also cannot exist, as its संबन्ध would be cut off. No छेदन can take place when the cutter and the thing to be cut are absent.

So, आत्मन् is not ज्ञप्ति, but ज्ञातृ. विज्ञातारमरे केन जानाति—This श्रुति quotation is from the बृहदारण्यक, and it is 'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्.' (Is not Rāmānuja twisting the meaning here? The passage really means — How can the knower be known? How can the subject of knowledge be the object of the same? It does not show that आत्मन् is ज्ञातृ.)

अहंप्रत्यय shows अस्मदर्थ and not surely युष्मदर्थ, which is shown by युष्मत्प्रत्यय.

[38] This ज्ञातृ is स्वयंप्रकाश (चैतन्यस्वभाव implies that) and not dependent upon others for its प्रकाश.

घट shines, being illumined by दीप, but दीप does not require any aid for its illumination. आत्मन् is both चिद्रूप and चैतन्यगुण, just as तेजोद्रव्य is both प्रभावद्द्रव्य and प्रभागुण.

The प्रभा is not a गुण, because it is possessed of रूप and it can stay away from its मूलद्रव्य, unlike a गुण.

As we have the प्रतिपत्ति 'The flame is one whole' (ज्वालैक्य), we must not say that प्रभा is the scattered अवयवs which cannot be reasonably expected to be wise enough to form into a group and to scatter themselves all over!

प्रभा is just conventionally called गुण, and its nature as a गुण follows from नित्यतद्(तेजोद्रव्य)आश्रयत्वतच्छेषत्व. So we must suppose that so many दीपs are produced and are destroyed every moment. प्रभा like अग्नि is hotter when you go near it. This shows that the अवयवs are not scattered away.

What the दृष्टान्त is meant to clarify is as follows—

आत्मन् is like दीप: तेजोद्रव्य (दीप) is both a प्रभावद्द्रव्य and has प्रभा as its (conventionally so called) गुण. So, आत्मन् is चैतन्यवत्, i. e. चिद्रूप and also चैतन्य. चिद्रूपता means स्वयंप्रकाशता. In the case of the तेजोद्रव्य, the अवयवs of the द्रव्य do not go away from it; in the same way the चैतन्यगुण of the आत्मन् is never separated from it.

This is clear from the various श्रुति passages.

एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमा: etc.— The षोडशकलाs according to the प्रश्नोपनिषद् are:— (1) प्राण; (2) श्रद्धा (3-7) five महाभूतs, (8) इन्द्रियम्, (9) मन: (10) अन्नम् (11) वीर्यम् (12) तप: (13) मन्त्रा: (14) कर्मन् (15) लोका: (16) नाम. (स प्राणमसृजत प्राणाच्छ्रद्धां खं वायुर्ज्योतिराप: पृथिवीन्द्रियं मनोऽन्नमन्नाद्वीर्यं तपो मन्त्रा: कर्म लोका लोकेषु च नाम च । प्रश्नोपनिषद् ६।४)

Thus आत्मन् is *not* संवित्, आत्मन् is स्वयंप्रकाश and also ज्ञातृ and not प्रकाशमात्रम्. Now संवित्, अनुभूति etc. are संबन्धिशब्दs and they have आकाङ्क्षा for कर्तृ and कर्मन्. Not in the Vedas nor in लोक can you find the use of जानाति without the object and the subject.

[39] (15) As regards the contention of the पूर्वपक्षिन्, that संवित् is आत्मन्, because it is अजड, the reply is —

What is this अजडत्व ?

If it is स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वम्, then दीप etc. would also be आत्मन् and as you do not admit प्रकाश over and above संवित्, this definition would be विरुद्ध to your doctrine.

If it is अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकत्वम्, then सुख, दुःख etc. would be आत्मन्. If it is amended as स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्व so as to exclude सुख etc. that are परस्मै प्रकाशमान like घट etc, then the reply is that ज्ञान is also परस्मै प्रकाशमान. This पर is the अहमर्थ-ज्ञातृ. So this स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्व is not found in संवित्.

So, the अजड-अहमर्थ is alone the आत्मन्. संवित् or ज्ञान has प्रकाशता on account of its संबन्ध with आत्मन्. This आत्मसंबन्ध makes ज्ञान etc. प्रकट to its स्वाश्रय-चेतन.

(16) As regards the contention, that अनुभूति which is really निर्विषय and निराश्रय appears as the knower, owing to भ्रान्ति or illusion ; भ्रम must have an अधिष्ठान and अनुभूति is the अधिष्ठान,— thus

	अधिष्ठान		भ्रमज्ञान
(1)	शुक्तिः	→	रजतम्
(2)	अनुभूतिः	→	अहं जानामि,—

The reply is that the भ्रमज्ञान in the second case ought to be अहमनुभूतिः, since अधिष्ठान and भ्रमज्ञान ought to be in सामानाधिकरण्य. Thus the contention of the पूर्वपक्षिन् is wrong. Actually the प्रतीति is that अनुभूति is the विशेषण and अहमर्थ is विशेष्य, as we have दण्ड as the विशेषण of देवदत्त, the विशेष्य (in the प्रतीति, दण्डी देवदत्तः).

So, we have अनुभूतिविशिष्टज्ञान. To say that only अनुभूति is the ज्ञान, is saying that we have only दण्डज्ञान when you see दण्डी-देवदत्त. So in ' अनुभवामि,' the प्रत्यय must not depend upon the विशेषणभूतानुभूति. The प्रत्यय ought to be अनुभूतिविशिष्टोऽहमर्थः.

[40] (17) As regards the contention that ज्ञातृत्व is मिथ्या because it is प्रतिभासित to one who is a देहात्माभिमानिन्, the answer is— In that case अनुभूति which is आत्मतयाभिमत would also be मिथ्या as it is apprehended exactly in the same way.

If you say that अनुभूतिज्ञान is अबाधित and so true, the answer is that ज्ञातृत्व also is equally अबाधित, and hence true.

(18) As regards the contention that आत्मन् is अविक्रियः he cannot have ज्ञानकर्तृत्व or ज्ञातृत्वः ज्ञातृत्व belongs to अहंकार which is अन्तःकरणरूप, विकारास्पद and अव्यक्त-

परिणाम; कर्तृत्व is evidently a दृश्यधर्म i. e. a quality of perceivable objects. If आत्मन् has this कर्तृत्व (a दृश्यधर्म) then आत्मन्, like देह would be अनात्मन्, पराक्, जड etc.; the answer is—

This is not right, for अन्तःकरणरूप-अहंकार is जड etc. like देह and ज्ञातृत्व is the peculiar property of the चेतन only.

Just as देह is different from what is possessed of द्रष्टृत्व प्रत्यक्त्व, etc. so अन्तःकरणरूपाहंकार is different from what is possessed of द्रष्टृत्व, प्रत्यक्त्व etc., and so अहंकार cannot have ज्ञातृत्व which is different from it, just as it cannot have दृशित्व. अहंकार is the object of consciousness, similarly ज्ञातृत्व cannot be associated with अहंकार which is the object of knowledge.

ज्ञातृत्व is not विक्रियात्मक but is ज्ञानगुणाश्रय. आत्मन् is ज्ञानस्वरूप as well as ज्ञानाश्रय, just as मणि etc. are प्रभा as well as प्रभाश्रय. आत्मन् is नित्य and ज्ञान is also नित्य. But this ज्ञान is संकोचविकासार्ह due to कर्मन् through the इन्द्रियs.

आत्मन् has कर्तृत्व (which is not स्वाभाविक) for ज्ञानप्रसर which is really कर्मकृत Hence आत्मन् remains अविक्रिय. Such a ज्ञातृत्व can never belong to जड-अहंकार.

[41] If the पूर्वपक्षिन् says that the जड-अहंकार can have ज्ञातृत्व owing to the proximity of चित् or चिच्छायापत्ति, the point arises — Does 'चित' encompass अहंकार or vice versa? 'चित' cannot encompass अहंकार, for according to the पूर्वपक्षिन् संवित् has no ज्ञातृत्व. अहंकार also cannot encompass चित्, for अहंकार being जड cannot have ज्ञातृत्व either. Both चित् and अहंकार are अचाक्षुष and a छाया is possible only in the case of the चाक्षुष things. (But surely Rāmānuja knows that दृष्टान्तs are not to be taken literally !)

You (i. e. the पूर्वपक्षिन्) cannot say that just as अग्निसंपर्क produces heat in अयःपिण्ड, चित may produce ज्ञातृत्व in अहंकार, for according to you संवित् has no वास्तव-ज्ञातृत्व. So, how can this false ज्ञातृत्व produce by its संपर्क real ज्ञातृत्व or ज्ञातृत्वोपलब्धि in अहंकार ?

अहंकार is अचेतन and so, has no ghost of a chance to have ज्ञातृत्व. अहंकारसंपर्क cannot produce even in a dream ज्ञातृत्व or ज्ञातृत्वोपलब्धि in संवित् !!

If you say that there is no real ज्ञातृत्व either in संवित् or in अहंकार—what happens is as follows—

अहंकार is the अभिव्यञ्जक of अनुभूति and reveals the अनुभूति within itself like a mirror. A mirror is the अभिव्यञ्जक of the face which it reveals within itself.

The answer is : — This is wrong. What a funny idea of yours, this जडरूप-अहंकार manifests स्वयंज्योतिः-आत्मन् ! This amounts to saying 'an extinguished coal manifests the स्वयंज्योतिः Sun !'

(शान्ताङ्गार etc. The verse occurs in the आत्मसिद्धि of यामुनाचार्य— Rāmānuja's preceptor.)

All objects are proved to be possessed of cognisability by स्वयंप्रकाशानुभव. And here you are bold enough to tell us that अचिदहंकार which is स्वयंप्रकाशायत्तानुभव-

प्रकाश manifests अनुभव which is अशेषार्थसिद्धिभूत, and whose स्वरूप and प्रकाश are नित्य, not capable of being produced or destroyed ! Your own friends would hang down their heads in shame at such a display of your intelligence !

There cannot be व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यभाव between अहंकार and अनुभव, as their स्वभावs are contrary and अनुभूति in that case would be no अनुभूति, but just like घट etc.

As regards the रविकरदृष्टान्त, you have said that रविकरनिकर is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by करतल which is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by रविकरनिकर, and so अनुभव is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by अहंकार which is अभिव्यङ्ग्य by अनुभव itself. But this is wrong.

रविकरनिकर ———— करतल ———— रविकरनिकर
अभिव्यङ्ग्य by अभिव्यङ्ग्य by
अनुभव ———— अहंकार ———— अनुभव

In fact, what happens is this— रविकर is *not* revealed by करतल. The rays of the Sun obstructed by the hand are increasingly huddled together and are more distinctly perceived, that is all. करतल is the cause of producing merely रविकरबाहुल्य.

Further, what is the nature of this अभिव्यञ्जकत्व of संवित् by अहंकार? Is it possible ? The reply is—'No.' The nature can be — (1) उत्पत्ति (2) प्रकाशन, or (3) अनुभवसाधनानुग्रह. It cannot be the first i. e. उत्पत्ति, because संवित् is स्वतःसिद्ध and not produced by anything. Neither can it be (2) प्रकाशन, for संवित् is not अनुभाव्य by अनुभवान्तर; nor can it be अनुभवसाधनानुग्रह for the same reason as for (2) above; for, when अनुभव itself is not there as a means to know संवित्, there cannot be any question about facilitating that अनुभव.

अनुभवसाधनानुग्रह can be two-fold —

(A) Referring to the ज्ञेय—as for instance, a साधन for bringing the घट in contact with the इन्द्रियs, in the case of घटप्रत्यक्ष.

(B) Referring to the ज्ञातृ — as for instance, removing the कल्मष in the eye of the perceiver, just as the Śāstra preaches शम, दम, qualities for knowing the परतत्त्व.

But here अनुभूति, being अननुभाव्य and स्वतःसिद्ध, these two ways are inadmissible.

[42] Supposing that अनुभूति can be obliged, how can अहंकार help in the matter? Can अहंकार remove the अनुभवोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धक thing in the way in which one removes the darkness that obstructs रूपादिग्रहण by the eye, by means of a lamp ?

Here nothing of the kind is possible. What possible removable obstruction could there be in the संवित् (that is आत्मन्) which is opposed to its ज्ञानोत्पत्ति, which could be removed by the material अहंकार ?

It cannot be अज्ञान (in संवित्, to be removed by जड-अहंकार), for according to you अज्ञान can be removed by ज्ञान and not by अहंकार.

Again, how can अज्ञान have संवित् for its आश्रय ? आश्रयत्व is two-fold— (1) विषयत्वेन and (2) आधारत्वेन.

The questions to be discussed are (1) Does अज्ञान reside in संवित् and (2) Is अज्ञान the विषय of संवित्?

Both these are impossible, since संवित् is ज्ञातृभावरहित as well as विषयभावरहित.

It is a rule that ज्ञान and अज्ञान have समानाश्रय and समानविषय. This means that one who is ज्ञानाश्रय, alone can become अज्ञानाश्रय, and one who is ज्ञानविषय, alone can become अज्ञानविषय, according to circumstances.

घट is never the आश्रय of ज्ञान (it may have घटत्व but not ज्ञान). So, it is never the आश्रय of अज्ञान; वन्ध्यापुत्र is never the विषय of ज्ञान, so he cannot be the विषय of अज्ञान as well.

संवित् is ज्ञानमात्र and so never the आश्रय of ज्ञान, and consequently not of अज्ञान. Even if we suppose that संवित् is अज्ञानाश्रय, how can ज्ञान remove the अज्ञान residing in it? ज्ञान can remove अज्ञान in its own विषय; शुक्तिज्ञान cannot remove सर्पभ्रमज्ञान.

Again, अज्ञान is said to be सदसदनिर्वचनीय by you and hence it is दुर्निरूप.

What is अज्ञान exactly? Is it ज्ञानप्रागभावरूप?

But a प्रागभाव is not regarded as उत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धक by anybody. It is just the antecedent negation. Its निरसन does not amount to furnishing अनुग्रहसाधन by the अहंकार. (Actually प्रागभाव is one of the साधारण causes of production).

So, अहंकार cannot be the अभिव्यञ्जक of अनुभूति in any of the three possible ways—(1) उत्पादकत्व (2) प्रकाशकत्व, and (3) अनुग्राहकत्व.

Your idea that अभिव्यञ्जक reveals the अभिव्यङ्ग्य within itself (अभिव्यञ्जक) so that—

अभिव्यञ्जक-अहंकार reveals the अनुभूति within itself (अहंकार),

(अभिव्यञ्जक) दर्पण ,, ,, मुख ,, ,, (दर्पण), } मुख is दर्पणनिष्ठ

,, व्यक्ति ,, ,, जाति ,, ,, (व्यक्ति) } व्यक्ति is जातिनिष्ठ

is wrong, for such is not the nature of the अभिव्यञ्जकs.

प्रदीप does *not* reveal घट within itself i. e. प्रदीप. प्रदीप reveals the घट as it is (यथावस्थित) situated in a place where it really is.

The role of ज्ञान, ज्ञानसाधन and अनुग्राहक, can be made clear as follows—In चाक्षुषज्ञान, चक्षुरिन्द्रिय is ज्ञानसाधन and the आलोक—the अनुग्राहक; they have this same स्वभाव and this is in accordance with the स्वतःप्रामाण्य of ज्ञान; otherwise the अभिव्यञ्जकs would be guilty of giving अप्रमाण knowledge. In the case of the other दृष्टान्तs given by you—

(A) दर्पण is *not* the अभिव्यञ्जक of मुख, but is the cause of चाक्षुषतेजःप्रतिफलनरूप-दोष which causes the अन्यथावभास.

In the case of अनुभूति which is स्वयंप्रकाश, there can be no दोषतापादन as in the case of the मुखदृष्टान्त.

(B) As regards the व्यक्तिदृष्टान्त, जाति is perceived as व्यक्तिनिष्ठ, for जाति is the आकार or धर्म of व्यक्ति.

But अनुभूति is not the आकार or धर्म of अहंकार.

So संवित् cannot be वस्तुत: or दोषत: residing in, or revealed by अन्तःकरणभूत-अहंकार.

So, अहमर्थ is not ज्ञप्तिमात्र, but प्रत्यगात्मन् who is ज्ञातृ self-established.

In the absence of अहंभाव, that ज्ञप्ति itself cannot be प्रत्यक्, has already been stated. ज्ञप्ति cannot be स्वस्मै प्रकाशमान in the absence of अहंभाव. Now, we are going to show that even in सुषुप्ति, there is no disappearance of अहंभाव.

In सुषुप्ति, there is the excess of तमोगुण and absence of the विषयs and so, there is विविक्तप्रतिभासाभाव (i. e. इतरव्यावृत्तत्वेन प्रतिभासाभाव) and स्फुटप्रतिभासाभाव (विशेषण-विशेष्यत्वेन प्रतिभासाभाव); that is all.

But the आत्मस्फुरण only in the form 'अहम्' is surely there. You also have to admit that there is अस्फुटावभास of संवित in सुषुप्ति, for संवित् remains there without the usual ज्ञातृज्ञेयसंबन्ध.

In the present case also, there is the अस्फुटावभास of अहमर्थ as the usual इदमर्थ is absent in सुषुप्ति.

Let us see what the प्रतीति (which ought to be *the* guiding factor for us) is, in the case of a सुप्तोत्थित man.

He does not say: 'I am ज्ञप्ति free from ज्ञातृसंबन्ध, free from all विशेषs and was the witness of 'अज्ञान'.

His प्रतीति is 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' and 'नाहं किंचिदवेदिषम्,' which shows that even in सुषुप्ति, the same अहमर्थ as in the waking state, has सुखित्व and ज्ञातृत्व.

[43] You should not ask — 'Should not 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्,' etc. mean 'I slept as *I feel happy now* ?,' for such is not the प्रतिपत्ति. Your interpretation is absolutely unusual. Neither can you say—अहमर्थ being अस्थिर, सुखित्व cannot be associated with it in the सुषुप्ति stage; and so we have to accept this unusual interpretation;—because अहमर्थ is not अस्थिर. प्रतीतिs like 'मयेदं कृतम्' (कायिक), 'मयेदमनुभूतम्' (मानस) and 'अहमिदमवोचम्' (वाचिक) etc. of the सुप्तोत्थित person, show that अहमर्थ refers to things experienced by itself in the सुषुप्ति stage.

The objector says—But the सुप्तोत्थित also says एतावन्तं कालं न किंचिदवेदिषम्. Does not this show that the अहमर्थ is अस्थिर?—But we ask 'How'? for the अहमर्थ is not denied here.'

If the objector says that 'न किंचित्' means 'nothing whatsoever', that is not even the अहमर्थ is experienced, we reply—You do not understand the real import of न किंचिदवेदिषम्. Here अहमर्थ is not denied, but the वेद्यविषय is denied. If 'न किंचिदवेदिषम्' refers to all things, अनुभूति itself would be denied.

पूर्वपक्षिन्	सिद्धान्तिन्
(1) Are you not pleased to admit the actually अनुवर्तमान (as shown by the use of अहम्) अहमर्थ ?	(1) अहमर्थ is अनुवर्तमान in सुषुप्ति and now by अहमर्थ we understand the ज्ञातृ.
(2) You admit वित्ति (which we think is being प्रतिषिद्ध) even in सुषुप्ति (I knew, may be nothing).	(2) वेद्य-अर्थ and not वेदन is denied in सुषुप्ति.

This is veritably logic 'gone mad.' What is reasonable you do not admit and what is unreasonable you are pleased to accept.

The पूर्वपक्षिन् — What about the प्रतीति 'मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान्?' Is not अहमर्थ denied here?

The reply is—No. The अनुवर्तमान-अहमर्थ is not denied. What is denied is the वर्णाश्रमजात्यादिविशिष्टता associated with 'अहमर्थ' in the waking state. The प्रतीति 'मामप्यहम् etc.' means 'I did not know myself as so and so, belonging to such and such caste, having this name etc.'

(19) As regards your contention that आत्मन् is the साक्षिन् of अज्ञान in the सुषुप्ति state, the reply is—

A साक्षिन् is the साक्षात् ज्ञातृ—This is the sense known to लोक and वेद, sanctioned by पाणिनि. This साक्षिन् is no other than the अस्मदर्थ. The self-luminous always shines as 'अहम्' even in the सुषुप्ति state.

[44] (20) As regards your contention that अहमर्थ is not found in the मोक्ष state, the reply is —

(A) If अहमर्थ does not persist in मोक्षावस्था, अपवर्ग means nothing but आत्मनाश.

(B) अहमर्थ is not merely the धर्म (in which case, in the absence of the धर्म, धर्मिन् could have been said to survive) but the very स्वरूप of आत्मन्; ज्ञान is its धर्म.

(C) Everybody seeks मोक्ष for the अहमर्थ (his आत्मन्); if he were told that his striving for मोक्ष means 'the absence of himself,' he would wash his hands clean of such a मोक्ष.

(D) No मोक्षाधिकारिन्s would be found and all शास्त्र would be अप्रमाण.

(E) To tell a मोक्षार्थिन् that even if he (i e. the अहमर्थ) is gone, प्रकाश remains, would not satisfy any one. His reaction would be—'Damn this प्रकाश'.

So, अहमर्थ is the ज्ञातृ and the प्रत्यगात्मन्.

Even in the मुक्तावस्था, the आत्मन् shines as अहमर्थ and rightly so.

Whatever is स्वस्मै प्रकाशमान, shines as अहमर्थ, just as the संसारि-आत्मन् (accepted by us both) is स्वस्मै प्रकाशमान and so shines as अहमर्थ. Whatever does not shine as अहमर्थ like घट and others, is not स्वस्मै प्रकाशमान.

If you ask what difference is there between संसारि आत्मन् and मुक्तात्मन्, for both are अहमिति प्रकाशमान, and so the मुक्तात्मन् would be अज्ञ and संसारिन्, the reply is—

No. अज्ञत्व is मोक्षविरोधि and अहंप्रत्यय is not the cause of अज्ञत्व.

[45] अज्ञान means (1) स्वरूपाज्ञानम् (तमसि घटः) (2) अन्यथा ज्ञानम् (पीतः शङ्खः) and (3) विपरीतज्ञानम् (शुक्तौ रजतम्).

In the मोक्षावस्था, one secures the right स्वरूपज्ञान (अहमिति) of आत्मन्. How can it cause अज्ञत्व or संसारित्व ? On the contrary, it destroys these two.

वामदेव and others had आत्मानुभव in the form of अहम् (अहं मनुरभवम्); परब्रह्मन् also is described as अहम् (बहु स्यां प्रजायेय). The Lord says in the *Gitā* अहमात्मा गुडाकेश etc.

Here an objector says—If अहम् (अहंकार) is आत्मनः स्वरूपम्, how is it that it is said in the *Gitā*, 'महाभूतान्यहंकारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च'? where अहंकार is included in the क्षेत्र.

The reply is :—अहंकार is really used in two senses (or अहंभाव is different from अहंकार). The senses are (1) आत्मनः स्वरूपम् i. e. आत्मगोचरा-अहंबुद्धिः and (2) अव्यक्त (i. e. प्रकृति)—परिणामभेद. Here अहंकार (अहमिव करोति) is a च्वि form and is the principle of egoity which is the cause of अहंभाव on the non-Ātman body etc. This same word is used in the world (लोके) in the sense of 'pride' etc. which are bad qualities fit to be rejected. This is शरीरगोचरा – अहंबुद्धिः, the same as अविद्या. If ज्ञप्ति were आत्मस्वरूप, we would impose ज्ञप्ति upon शरीर by अहंकार No. 2., and not ज्ञातृत्व. So, this shows that अहमर्थ is ज्ञातृ and आत्मन्.

This is well summarised in the 'आत्मसिद्धि' of यामुनमुनि.

अतःप्रत्यक्ष etc.—That आत्मन् is the ज्ञातृ is proved by प्रत्यक्ष—(by pointing out the धर्मधर्मिभाव), by न्याय (i. e. by अर्थापत्ति etc.), by अविद्यायोग (by showing शरीरे ज्ञातृत्वभ्रान्ति and not ज्ञानभ्रान्ति).

धी is separate from आत्मन्.

[46] (21) As regards the contention that भेदप्रत्यक्ष is बाधित by अद्वैतशास्त्र, the reply is :—

What is the दोष that causes प्रत्यक्ष to give us false knowledge ? If it is अनादिभेदवासना, we ask you if there is any case where this अनादिभेदवासना has caused विपरीत ज्ञान. You cannot produce any instance to prove this. If you say that it is known by शास्त्रविरोध, there would be अन्योन्याश्रय. When शास्त्र is proved to be preaching निर्विशेष Brahman, the भेदवासना is found to be the दोष. When भेदवासना is proved to be a दोष, शास्त्र is proved to preach निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन्.

Lastly, if प्रत्यक्ष is to be discarded as giving विपरीतार्थ on the ground of भेदवासनामूलत्व, शास्त्र also can be proved as fit to be discarded on the same ground.

If you say that even if शास्त्र is दोषमूल, it can be बाधक of प्रत्यक्ष as it gives

the ज्ञान which refutes all भेद known by प्रत्यक्ष. So, शास्त्र coming after प्रत्यक्ष is the बाधक of प्रत्यक्ष ; the reply is :—

If शास्त्र is दोषमूल, whether it comes *after* or *before* प्रत्यक्ष, is immaterial. If a thing is दोषमूल, whatever it teaches must remain दोषमूल. Many a time a man fearing a रज्जुसर्प, does remain full of fear even when told that it is merely रज्जु and not सर्प.

The दोषमूलत्व of शास्त्र is known at the श्रवणवेला itself. The मनन business is dependent upon what is known at the श्रवणवेला itself. So, मनन also gives a दोषमूलज्ञान.

Again, how is it known that शास्त्र is असंभाव्यमानदोष as against प्रत्यक्ष which is संभाव्यमानदोष ?

अनुभूति which is स्वतःसिद्ध and सर्वविषयरहित cannot give this ज्ञान ; it has no partiality for the शास्त्र either.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञान produced from इन्द्रियs cannot give this ज्ञान, because it is दोषमूल and gives विपरीतार्थ. Other प्रमाणs based on प्रत्यक्ष are equally विपरीतार्थोत्पादक.

So, you cannot point out any प्रमाण to substantiate your position.

If you say that before the तत्त्वज्ञान is secured, we accept the व्यावहारिक प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार, the reply is—

If you mean by व्यावहारिक, whatever is proved prima-facie is to be ultimately proved to be otherwise by प्रमाणs, then what is the good of this प्रमाण which produces no प्रमाणकार्य ?

If you say that शास्त्र and प्रत्यक्ष are both अविद्यामूल; but प्रत्यक्ष is बाधित by शास्त्र, while the ब्रह्मज्ञान preached by the शास्त्र is not बाधित; so, ब्रह्मन् is the परमार्थ —The reply is :—

A thing which is दोषमूल, even though it be not known to be बाधित, cannot be the परमार्थ. (A murderer even though his guilt is not proved, does not really become innocent of the crime).

People afflicted with the तिमिर disease and unaware of the same, if kept in a concentration camp far away from other people, would have द्विचन्द्रज्ञान, अबाधित for all time, but surely that is not the true knowledge.

दोष causes अयथार्थज्ञान; अविद्यामूल-ब्रह्मज्ञान must be मिथ्या, and so ब्रह्मन्, the विषय of that मिथ्याज्ञान is equally मिथ्या. Rāmānuja gives some syllogisms to prove the same—

(1) ब्रह्म मिथ्या,
अविद्यावदुत्पन्नज्ञानविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवत् ।

(2) ब्रह्म मिथ्या,
मिथ्याज्ञानविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवत् ।

(3) ब्रह्म मिथ्या,
असत्यहेतुजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वात्,
प्रपञ्चवत् ।

(Saṅkara's reply would be that the हेतुs are all स्वरूपासिद्ध, and do not reside in the पक्ष, ब्रह्मन् which can never be ज्ञानविषय like प्रपञ्च.)

[47] (22) As regards the contention that one can get सत्यज्ञान from असत्य things and the various दृष्टान्तs given in support, the reply is —

असत्यशास्त्र (अविद्यामूल) cannot be the cause of the knowledge of the परमार्थभूतब्रह्मन्.

(A) स्वाप्नज्ञान is *not* असत्य; the विषयs only in the स्वप्न are बाधित and hence they are असत्य. The ज्ञान in स्वप्न is *not* बाधित, and so, is सत्य.

(B) मन्त्रौषधिप्रभव, मायामय-ज्ञान is अबाधित and so सत्य, as it actually produces प्रीति and भय.

(C) रज्जुसर्पज्ञान is सत्य, as it is the cause of भय ; अदृष्टेऽपि दृष्टबुद्धिः is सत्या.

(D) शङ्काविषबुद्धि is सत्य, as it is the cause of मरण.

(E) मुखप्रतिभास in the सत्यजल is सत्य, as it is the cause of वस्तुभूतमुखविशेषनिश्चय.

All these ज्ञानs are सत्य, because they are actually produced and are अर्थक्रियाकारिन्s.

ज्ञान does not depend upon *actual* विषय for its production. What it requires is some आलम्बन (whether real or imaginary), provided that आलम्बन is प्रतिभासमान. (An अतीत घट is ज्ञानविषय, a present घट is not ज्ञानविषय, if it is in darkness).

The प्रतिभासमानता may be due to दोष, but that does not matter. It is सत्या all the same.

अर्थ on the other hand is असत्य, because it is बाधित. अबाधिता बुद्धिः is definitely सत्या.

(23) As regards the रेखादृष्टान्त—from the असत्यरेखा, we know the सत्यवर्ण, the reply is —

(A) Here too रेखा is सत्या and from the सत्यरेखा we have the सत्यवर्णप्रतिपत्ति.

(B) रेखा, even though apprehended as having वर्णात्मता, is still सत्या, for असत्यवर्णात्मता cannot be the उपाय of any प्रतिपत्ति. (Nowhere in the world an असत्य, निरुपाख्य thing is known to be an उपाय !)

(C) If you say, वर्णबुद्धि in that असत्यवर्णात्मता is the उपाय, still we must admit that वर्णबुद्धि is then सत्य; besides, this contention would make उपाय and उपेय one (वर्णबुद्धि is the उपाय, and वर्णबुद्धि or वर्णबुद्धिप्रतिपत्ति is the उपेय; all this is absurd).

(D) If रेखा *were to produce* असत्य *or* अविद्यमान-वर्णात्मता, then one रेखा would produce सर्ववर्णप्रतिपत्ति.

(E) If you modify the above statement by saying that just as a पिण्डविशेष connotes देवदत्त or यज्ञदत्त, there is रेखाविशेष due to वर्णविशेषसंकेत, and so, we have वर्णविशेषप्रतिपत्ति (and not सर्ववर्णप्रातिपत्ति), then as रेखासंकेत is सत्य, our contention that सत्यात्सत्यप्रातिपत्तिः is upheld.

(F) रेखागवय produces सत्यगवयप्रतिपत्ति which depends upon the real सादृश्य.

(G) Even if स्फोट is admitted, the स्फोट is सत्य. It is manifested by the नानानाद and produces अर्थभेदबुद्धि in conformity with the अर्थविशेषs revealed by the sounds.

(H) Again, the स्फोटवाद is really wrong; शब्दs cannot be एकरूप. One गकार heard by the ear does produce अर्थ; no स्फोट is found here.

So, the idea that असत्यशास्त्र may produce सत्यब्रह्मज्ञान is wrong.

[48] If you say that शास्त्र is not असत्य like गगनकुसुम; it is सत्य prior to अद्वैतज्ञान; after अद्वैतज्ञान is produced, शास्त्र ceases to be ब्रह्मज्ञानोपाय; till then शास्त्र is an उपाय—

The reply is—Your real opinion is that the शास्त्र is असत्. What is this अर्धजरतीयन्याय? If the शास्त्र is असत्, to hold that it is सत् is मिथ्या, its विषय ब्रह्मन् is also मिथ्या (Just as अग्निज्ञान from बाष्प mistaken for धूप, is मिथ्या and अग्नि also is मिथ्या).

That this अद्वैतज्ञान is not बाधित is also not proved. It is बाधित by the शून्यवादिन्s who say शून्यमेव तत्त्वम्. If it be argued that this शून्यवाद is भ्रान्तिमूल, then अद्वैत is also भ्रान्तिमूल as admitted by you (शास्त्र is असत्य). Actually the view of the शून्यवादिन्s is अबाधित, for there is nothing to come after शून्य!!

(24) Your idea that वेदान्तवाक्यs teach निर्विशेषब्रह्मन् only, is wrong.

(Rāmānuja now explains various Sruti passages in conformity with the विशिष्टाद्वैत school).

(A) सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् etc.—The context makes it clear that परब्रह्मन् is described as having अनेककल्याणगुणs, and that the जगत् is ब्रह्मात्मक.

(B) अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते etc.—Here also the कल्याणगुणयोग of ब्रह्मन् is described; only प्राकृत (belonging to: प्रकृति) हेयगुणs are denied with reference to ब्रह्मन्.

(C) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म—Here the सामानाधिकरण्य shows एकार्थ which is अनेकविशेषणविशिष्ट. सामानाधिकरण्य shows एकार्थ even when there is प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभेद with reference to individual words. सत्य, ज्ञान and अनन्त mean सत्यत्व, ज्ञानत्व and अनन्तत्व by अभिधा, and even when they are by लक्षणा taken to be व्यावृत्तिपर, निमित्तभेद with reference to individual words has to be admitted; सत्येतरव्यावृत्ति cannot be सत्यस्वरूप, otherwise all the words would mean only one thing; there would be no सामानाधिकरण्य. Many पदs having different विशिष्ट meanings pertaining to one

अर्थ are not antagonistic to the idea of सामानाधिकरण्य. Grammarians also say—भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यम् ।

[49] (D) एकमेवाद्वितीयम्—Here the context shows that अद्वितीयत्व means स्वव्यतिरिक्ताधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिवारण, that there is no other controller or competitor for ब्रह्मन् which is the जगदुपादान, and that ब्रह्मन् has विचित्रशक्तियोग. So, only निमित्तान्तरनिषेध is meant. Somebody might think that there may be निमित्तान्तर which is denied, but obviously no सर्वनिषेध can be meant; for, in that case, even नित्यत्व etc. admitted by you would be denied The argument about the सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययन्याय is in our favour. The न्याय requires other गुणs like the सर्वज्ञत्व etc. to be incorporated, not some गुणs to be denied (सर्वशाखासु कारणान्वयिनां सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां गुणानामत्रोपसंहारहेतुत्वात्). So, on the strength of the कारणवाक्यs ब्रह्मन् is सविशेष. निर्गुणत्व means '*absence of* हेयगुणs.' The श्रुतिs that describe ब्रह्मन् to be ज्ञानमात्र really refer to ज्ञानस्वरूप which belongs to the ज्ञातृ. We have already pointed out that ब्रह्मन् which is ज्ञानस्वरूप, is the ज्ञानाश्रय; just as मणि, being प्रकाशस्वरूप, is प्रकाशाश्रय. The श्रुतिs describe ब्रह्मन् as ज्ञातृ. They refer to all कल्याणगुणs as स्वाभाविक with ब्रह्मन् and also समस्तहेयगुणराहितता in the case of ब्रह्मन्.

[50] There is thus no विरोध between सगुण and निर्गुण वाक्यs; for the सगुणवाक्यs point out to all स्वाभाविक कल्याणगुणs, while the निर्गुणवाक्यs point out to the absence of हेयगुणs; and so, there is no necessity of admitting that either सगुण or निर्गुण वाक्य is मिथ्या. Both are सत्य. The Śruti very earnestly refers to आनन्दगुण and गुणानन्त्य of ब्रह्मन्.

(E) सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता—Here काम means काम्यगुणs; the word सह is used to show गुणप्राधान्य ('ब्रह्मन्' is अमुख्य and 'कामान्' is मुख्य in the sentence), फल and उपासन have प्रकारैक्य (यथाक्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेह प्रेत्य भवति ।).

(In the fourth Sūtra, Rāmānuja says that the word सह is to be taken with सर्वैः कामैः. The meaning of the passage is given as सर्वगुणान्वितं ब्रह्माश्नुते etc.).

(F) यस्यामतं तस्य मतं ... अविज्ञातं विजानताम् does not show that ब्रह्मन् is ज्ञानविषय; for, in that case the श्रुति, which says that ब्रह्मविषयज्ञानासद्भाव means आत्मनाश and ब्रह्मविषयज्ञानसद्भाव means आत्मसत्ता, would be meaningless. All श्रुतिs speak of ब्रह्मविषयवेदन as conducive to अपवर्ग. वेदन is उपासनात्मकज्ञान and the उपास्य is सगुण ब्रह्मन्.

(G) यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते—This means that the अनन्त-अपरिमित ब्रह्मन् cannot be measured out, and so, those who regard ब्रह्मन् as परिच्छिन्न do not know ब्रह्मन्. If ब्रह्मन् is entirely ज्ञानाविषय, how could it be said ... मतम् ... विज्ञातम्, in the same sentence?

(H) न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः ... न मतेर्मन्तारम् etc. This does *not mean* the प्रतिषेध of द्रष्टृ and मन्तृ as apart from दृष्टि and मति. The real meaning is—

(a) Some one may think that ज्ञातृ is अज्ञानस्वरूप on account of ज्ञान being an आगन्तुकगुण. This is wrong. आत्मन् should be regarded as दृष्टिरूप and मतिरूप, although द्रष्टृ and मन्तृ at the same time.

OR

(b) द्रष्ट्ट and मन्तृ refer to जीवात्मन्; जीवात्मन् is denied here and the devotee is asked to worship the सर्वभूतान्तरात्मन् i. e. परब्रह्मन्.

We must explain the passage as above, otherwise 'विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्' would be contradicted.

[51] (I) आनन्दो ब्रह्म—This does not show that ब्रह्मस्वरूप is आनन्दमात्र. Just as ज्ञानाश्रय ब्रह्मन् has ज्ञान as its स्वरूप, so also आनन्दाश्रय ब्रह्मन् has आनन्द as its स्वरूप (आनन्द according to Rāmānuja is अनुकूलज्ञान).

ब्रह्मन् is आनन्दि and ज्ञातृत्वम् is आनन्दित्वम्.

(J) यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति, नेह नानास्ति किंचन etc. which are regarded by the पूर्वपक्षिन् as denying all भेद are to be explained as follows.—

What is denied here, is the नानात्व as opposed to ऐक्य of ब्रह्मन् with the जगत् which is a ब्रह्मकार्य and of which ब्रह्मन् is the अन्तर्यामिन्.

But the नानात्व of ब्रह्मन् as found in 'बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' etc. which is due to ब्रह्मबहुभवनसंकल्प on the part of ब्रह्मन्, is not denied here, as it is श्रुतिसिद्ध.

We cannot regard the श्रुति passage as अपरमार्थविषय, for, it is ridiculous to say that the same नानात्व which is described by the श्रुति as beyond all प्रमाणs is again denied here.

(K) यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते, अथ तस्य भयं भवति—

This does not mean that one who sees नानात्व in ब्रह्मन् is full of fear. It is clear from the context that नानात्वानुसंधान is intended for producing शान्ति. One who knows जगत् to be ब्रह्मात्मक, secures शान्ति and through it अभय.

The भय is caused if there is अन्तर (interruption, अवकाश, विच्छेद) in the प्रतिष्ठा in the ब्रह्मन्. अन्तर does *not* mean *distinction*, नानात्व. This is clear from the passage—

' A moment's interruption in the meditation on वासुदेव is महच्छिद्र, हानि, भ्रान्ति and विच्छेद'.

(L) The Sūtra 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि' does not refer to सर्वविशेषरहित ब्रह्मन् but सविशेष ब्रह्मन् itself.

(Saṅkarācārya interprets the Sūtra as—ब्रह्मन् is not two-fold, even owing to different स्थानs. It is everywhere uniformly निर्विशेष, while Rāmānuja interprets it as — Even though residing in जीव etc. ब्रह्मन् is not contaminated. Everywhere ब्रह्मन् is described as सविशेष and निर्विशेष i. e. कल्याणगुणयुक्त and हेयगुणरहित).

Similarly the Sūtra मायामात्रं etc. also shows the पारमार्थिकत्व of the स्वाप्न-अर्थs. They are मायामात्र in so far as they do not possess the धर्मs of पदार्थs experienced in जाग्रदवस्था.

[52] Rāmānuja now quotes various स्मृति and पुराण passages which speak of ब्रह्मन् as full of कल्याणगुणs.

विष्णुपुराण—6-5-72-75.

In these four verses the word भगवत् is explained.

भगवत्	भ — संभर्ता, भर्ता ग — नेता, गमयिता	} भग is sixfold (verse 74)
	व — वसन्ति यत्र भूतानि etc. स च भूतेष्वशेषेषु	
	त् — ततोऽव्ययः	

The etymology of the word वासुदेव has been given thus—

सर्वत्रासौ समस्तं च वसत्यत्रेति वै यतः ।
ततः स वासुदेवेति विद्वद्भिः परिपठ्यते ॥

The three शक्तिs of विष्णु are—

(1) विष्णुशक्तिः परा, (2) क्षेत्रज्ञा, अपरा, and
(3) अविद्याकर्म, तृतीया.

परब्रह्मन् by nature is निखिलदोषरहित, — controller, maintainer, and destroyer of the world, समस्तकल्याणगुणात्मक; चित् and अचित् in all the conditions (सर्वावस्थावस्थित) constitute the body of the परब्रह्मन्; चित् is its विभूति, चित् + अचित् is the क्षेत्रज्ञ (who is enveloped by अविद्या) and hence unable to have स्वाभाविकज्ञानरूपत्वानुसंधान etc.

ब्रह्मन् is thus सविशेष, and जगत् which is its विभूति is पारमार्थिक.

[53] As regards the interpretation of various passages, we think that your interpretation is wrong.

(A) प्रत्यस्तमितभेदम् etc.—

" The nature of Ātman is void of भेद due to देवमनुष्यादि-परिणामविशेषs; is not गोचर by the words देव, मनुष्य etc.; is characterised by ज्ञान and सत्ता alone and is incomprehensible by योगयुक् and is स्वसंवेद्य. "

This interpretation of the अद्वैतिन्s, which, they say, suggests प्रपञ्चापलाप is wrong.

The real meaning as authorised by the context is as follows—

This is a योगप्रकरण and the author wants to point out to a शुभाश्रय for meditation. He tells us that विष्णु has (two रूपs and) three शक्तिs—viz. मूर्तशक्ति, अमूर्तशक्ति and the अविद्याकर्म शक्ति.

The मूर्तशक्ति is the अचिद्विशिष्ट क्षेत्रज्ञ, and has three भावनाs. (The thee भावनाs are ब्रह्माख्या कर्मसंज्ञा च तथा चैवोभयात्मिका ।). This शक्ति is also अविद्यावेष्टित and hence cannot be the शुभाश्रय.

The अमूर्तशक्ति is वियुक्त, ज्ञानैकाकार, void of अविद्या or कर्मन्. It can be meditated

upon only by the निष्पन्नयोगिन्s and has no power to remove the ध्यातृदोषs and hence it is not a शुभाश्रय.

So, what is शुभाश्रय is the भगवद्साधारणमूर्तरूप which is the आश्रय of these three शक्तिs—(1) परशक्तिरूप-अमूर्त (2) अपरशक्तिरूप-मूर्त and known as क्षेत्रज्ञ and (3) तृतीयशक्तिरूप-कर्मरूपाविद्या which is the क्षेत्रज्ञतापत्तिहेतु of आत्मन्. ब्रह्मदेव is not the शुभाश्रय as he is अविद्यावेष्टित; सनक and other सिद्धयोगिन्s are not the शुभाश्रय, because they were बद्ध before and so are not a hundred percent शुद्ध and सिद्ध.

Other संसारगोचर creatures are not the शुभाश्रय, because they are अविद्यान्तर्गत.

So, the real स्वरूप of Viṣṇu who is the अमल-ब्रह्मन् is alone बोधवत्.

Here there is no भेदापलाप at all.

(All this, however, smacks of special pleading and is unconvincing).

[54] (B) ज्ञानस्वरूपम् etc.—

This according to the अद्वैतिन् shows that all अर्थजात apart from ज्ञान is मिथ्या.

The reply is — The passage simply says that आत्मन् is ज्ञानस्वरूप, and his अर्थाकारेण-अवभास is भ्रान्ति. When one says that there is रजताकारेण-अवभास of शुक्ति, that does not mean that the whole रजतजात in the world is मिथ्या.

The objector says — When we say 'ब्रह्म जगत्' (where there is सामानाधिकरण्येन-ऐक्यम्) it means ब्रह्मणः ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य, अर्थाकारताभ्रान्तिः and so the whole अर्थजात is मिथ्या.

The reply is—It is ridiculous to say so. The शास्त्र deliberately accepts the जगत् as महाविभूति of विष्णु possessed of समस्तकल्याणगुणs etc. So, how can जगत् be भ्रान्ति ?

We shall show later how in 'ब्रह्म जगत्' the ऐक्य is not बाधित and there is no विरोध (as there is शरीरशरीरिभाव between the two).

So, the passage is not बाधक of अर्थस्वरूप. You must interpret the passage in the light of the इतिहास and पुराण testimony (इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् । बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रतरिष्यति ॥).

The position is this—

मैत्रेय asks पराशर—

Question.	Answer.
(1) यन्मयं च जगत् (i. e. किमात्मकम् — — जगत् ?) (2) यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् (This refers to the निमित्त and the उपादानकारण). also (3) (यथा जगद्बभूव यथा भूयश्च भविष्यति.)	जगत् सः

So, the questions relate to the ब्रह्मस्वरूपविशेष, ब्रह्मविभूतिभेदप्रकार and ब्रह्माराधनस्वरूपफलविशेष.

'जगत् च सः' shows that the तादात्म्य is अन्तर्यामिरूपेणात्मतया व्याप्तिकृत and not व्याप्यव्यापकयोर्वस्त्वैक्यकृत.

In यन्मय, मयट् is not विकारार्थ, because then this would be a superfluous question (पृथक्प्रश्नवैयर्थ्यात्), being the same as यतश्चैतच्चराचरम्.

मयट् is also not स्वार्थे, the reply 'जगत् च सः' would be improper in that case; the question would then mean 'Who is जगत' the reply to which would naturally be 'विष्णुः' simply.

So, मयट् is प्राचुर्यार्थे. The question thus would mean — Of what prominently is जगत् constituted? The answer is that the जगत् is ब्रह्मन् i. e. it is prominently constituted of ब्रह्मन् (कृत्स्नं च जगत्तच्छरीरतया तत्प्रचुरमेव) as it forms the body of Brahman.

So, the सामानाधिकरण्य in जगत् सः is associated with जगद्ब्रह्मणोः शरीरात्मभाव.

Otherwise, if only निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् is preached by the शास्त्र, all these questions and answers have no meaning and शास्त्र itself would be meaningless. If that was the intention of शास्त्र, the one question and the one answer would have been respectively—

प्रपञ्चभ्रमस्य किमधिष्ठानम्? and निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन्.

If the सामानाधिकरण्य between ब्रह्मन् and जगत् meant that they two are one द्रव्य, the preaching of the शास्त्र about सत्यसंकल्पादिकल्याणगुणs and हेयगुणप्रत्यनीकता about ब्रह्मन् would be useless. ब्रह्मन् would be सर्वाशुभास्पद! Thus the सामानाधिकरण्य mainly points out to the आत्मशरीरभाव.

The context shows that the श्लोक describes the nature of ब्रह्मन् that is क्षेत्रज्ञव्यष्ट्यात्मनावस्थित and not the निर्विशेष वस्तु.

Further, the question and the answer in the विष्णुपुराण (1-3-1 and 1-3-(2-3). cannot be explained on the निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् theory. The question is—'कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं of ब्रह्मन् that is निर्गुण, अप्रमेय, शुद्ध and अमल?' The answer is that ब्रह्मन् has wonderful powers which are अचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचर.

(This points out to the पारमार्थिकत्व of creation and the possession of powers by ब्रह्मन्.)

On the निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् theory, however, the प्रश्न and the प्रतिवचन ought to have been—

निर्गुणस्य ब्रह्मणः कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वम्? (प्रश्न) and 'न पारमार्थिकः सर्गः but भ्रान्तिकल्पितः' (प्रतिवचन).

It may be said, why should the question कथं सर्गादि etc. be asked at all• because creation is generally associated with one who is possessed of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्, and who is कर्मवश्य and अपरिपूर्ण. But ब्रह्मन् is सत्त्वादिगुणरहित, अकर्मवश्य, कर्मसंबन्धानर्ह and परिपूर्ण. So, how can ब्रह्मन् dabble in कर्मन्? The question is thus quite proper.

The answer is—ब्रह्मन् is सर्वशक्तियुक्त, being different from all other creatures like ब्रह्मदेव and cannot be judged by what is possible for them, just as you cannot say— अग्निरनुष्णः, द्रव्यत्वात्, जलवत्. For, अग्नि is विसदृश from जल and has औष्ण्यादिशक्तियोग and has the स्वभाव to burn.

[C] परमार्थस्त्वमेवैको नान्योऽस्ति जगतः पते—
(a) तवैष महिमा येन व्याप्तमेतच्चराचरम् ।
(b) यदेतद्दृश्यते...
(c) ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलम्...
(d) ये तु ज्ञानविदः etc.

These four verses are taken into consideration in interpreting the verse 'परमार्थस्त्वमेवैको' etc.

(a) (1) This does not mean that the कृत्स्न जगत् is not परमार्थ; what is मिथ्या is जगत् as being apart from the Lord; so the कृत्स्न is the शरीर of the Lord; the Lord, being सर्वात्मन्, is the only परमार्थ.

(2) Look at the second line—The expression is 'तवैष महिमा येन व्याप्तमेतच्चराचरम्'। Otherwise, if the world were not परमार्थ, the expression would have been तवैषा भ्रान्तिः.

(3) जगतः पते would have to be taken in a metaphorical sense. जगत्, a मिथ्या thing, cannot have any पति (जगत् by लक्षणा would thus mean जगदधिष्ठान, अहम् itself ! !)

(4) महावराह's rescuing the earth would be a foolish statement ! !

(b) अयोगिन्s see this त्वदात्मक-मूर्त-जगत्, as केवलदेवमनुष्यादिरूपम्. This is the भ्रान्तिज्ञान, as they think जगत् to be in fact स्वतन्त्र ! This refers to the स्वातन्त्र्यभ्रम.

(c) This refers to the देहात्मभ्रम (to regard ज्ञानाकार-आत्मन् as देवमनुष्याकार).

(d) But the ज्ञानविद्s see this जगत् as शरीरातिरिक्तज्ञानस्वरूपात्मक and as त्वच्छरीर.

The verses, यदेतद्दृश्यते etc. and ज्ञानस्वरूपमखिलम् etc. must refer to the भ्रमs as pointed out above. If the whole जगत् is भ्रम, there would be पौनरुक्त्य in the verses.

[56] (D) तस्यात्मपरदेहेषु etc.

Here what is spoken of as अतथ्य is देवाद्याकारेण द्वैतदर्शन in the case of the आत्मन्s that are ज्ञानाकारेण समान, and not the द्वैत or भेद amongst the objects or the आत्मन्s themselves.

In other words, Rāmānuja believes in प्रकाराद्वैत (प्रकारविशिष्टानां जीवानां द्वैतेऽपि तद्गतप्रकारस्यैक्यात्) and in प्रकार्यद्वैत (प्रकार्याणां जीवानां द्वैतेऽपि तद्विशिष्टस्य प्रकारिणः, ब्रह्मणः, एकत्वात्). आत्मवस्तु is the same or सम everywhere. In the present passage स्वपरविभाग refers to देहातिरिक्त वस्तु viz. the soul as well.

(E) यद्यन्योऽस्ति परः कोऽपि etc.

This does not refer to आत्मैक्य. पर and अन्य must mean two different things. पर means other than oneself (one like another), अन्य means one of

other आकार (one unlike another). Thus the passage means — There is no another like me, no one of a different form from me.

All are ज्ञानैकाकार and so समान.

(F) वेणुरन्ध्रविभेदेन etc.

Here the आकारवैषम्य of the souls is said to be due to देवादिपिण्डप्रवेश. आत्मैक्य is not taught; only आकारसाम्य is indicated.

The airs going through the holes are वायुत्वेन-एकाकार, but have different names due to रन्ध्रभेदs.

वायवीय-अंशs have no स्वरूपभेद; भेद is due to उपाधिs. The sparks etc. of fire have स्वरूपसाम्य with fire, not स्वरूपैक्य.

[57] (G) सोऽहम् , स च त्वम् etc.

Here तत् refers to ज्ञानाकार; अहं, त्वं refer to अर्थानां ज्ञानमेवाकार. भेद is due to देवाद्याकार being superimposed upon the आत्मन्. If so, this श्लोक does not deny जीव-ब्रह्माद्वैत or जीवबहुत्व, but the प्रकारभेद due to देहाद्याकार.

If the भेद refers to everything else, the भेदनिर्देश, अहम् , त्वम् etc. would not be justifiable.

अहम् , त्वम् cannot mean सर्वमेतदात्मस्वरूपम् which is the sense due to सामानाधिकरण्य, for there is clearly भेदनिर्देश.

The उपदेश is about देहात्मविवेक and not about आत्मस्वरूप.

(H) विभेदजनकेऽज्ञाने etc.

This also is not आत्मस्वरूपैक्यपर, nor also जीवपरैक्यपर.

It has been already stated that आत्मस्वरूपैक्य is impossible; ऐक्य between जीव and पर (like that between देह and जीव) also is not possible, as is clear from various passages from the श्रुतिs and the वेदान्तसूत्रs which show that जीव and पर are different; their स्वरूपs are अन्योन्यप्रत्यनीकाकार. Even a मुक्त जीव whose अविद्या is removed by साधनानुष्ठान, cannot be one with the पर who can never be अविद्यासंबन्धार्ह even remotely.

(A prisoner released from jail can never be one with the Inspector-General of Prisons !)

A मुक्त जीव can at the most aspire after साधर्म्य with the Lord. Just as a magnet confers its magnetic power upon लोह, ब्रह्मन् confers its आत्मभाव upon the ध्यायिन् मुनि. आत्मभाव = आत्मनः स्वभावम् , not आत्मस्वरूपम्.

As the श्रुति says, the मुक्त enjoys only a few powers of the Lord, not all of them.

वृत्तिरपि—The वृत्ति of Baudhāyana

कामाशी—Getting food at will.

There are really no निर्गुणविद्याप्रतिपादक श्रुतिs.

[58] The so-called ऐक्यश्रुति ,' ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ' etc. refers to ज्ञानैकाकारतया ब्रह्मप्रकारता (The second word ब्रह्म (in ब्रह्मैव भवति) is not गौण, but refers to ब्रह्मप्रकार).

The three verses immediately preceding विभेदजनके etc. show भेद.

विज्ञानं प्रापके etc.—विज्ञान is आत्मस्वरूपसाक्षात्कार; आत्मन् is like ब्रह्मन्, प्रापणीय, and is void of the three भावनाs.—

(1) कर्मभावना,

(2) ब्रह्मभावना,

(3) उभयभावना.

The three भावनाs are possible only in the साधकावस्था.

क्षेत्रज्ञः करणी etc. करणी = उपासक. Till मुक्ति is obtained, उपासना has to be gone through. So, there is भेद between क्षेत्रज्ञ and ब्रह्मन्. तद्भावभावमापन्नः etc.—तद्भाव is not स्वरूपैक्य; for, in that case, in तद्भावभाव the second ' भाव ' cannot be connected.

In मुक्ति, there is साम्य and you cannot talk of ऐक्य.

The भेद is removed by ज्ञान. The मुक्त is really भिन्न, but is ज्ञानाकारेण, अभिन्न from ब्रह्मन्,

(This अभेद is not seen in the देहात्मैक्यभ्रम ; the देवादिरूपभेद is seen in देहात्मैक्यभ्रम).

When this देहात्मैक्यप्रतीति which is the cause of देवादिभेद is removed, there is ज्ञानाकारेण, अभेद.

एकस्वरूपभेदस्तु— etc. — अनावरणः means without the आवरण of कर्मन्. असन्तम्— अनित्यम्, because caused by देवादिभेद ; स्वाभाविकभेद is नित्य and so does persist.

चतुर्विधभेद is :—देव, तिर्यक्, मनुष्य and स्थावर.

(I) क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि—

Here the ऐक्यविधान is due to the Lord being अन्तर्यामिन् and आत्मन् of all.

Otherwise, there would be विरोध with passages like ' उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः ' etc.

(J) ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन etc.

सर्वभूताशयस्थितः —भूत does not mean only भौतिक things जीवs are also included in the connotation of the word ' भूत '.

(K) न तदस्ति विना—etc.

Here the पृथगवस्थान of all things from the आत्मन् is denied as सर्व is the शरीर of आत्मन्. Thus alone the भगवद्विभूतिकथन can be justified.

So, (1) the शास्त्र does not speak of निर्विशेष वस्तु, (2) the शास्त्र does not speak of अर्थजातस्य भ्रान्तत्व and (3) in the शास्त्र there is no निषेध of the स्वरूपभेद among the चित्, अचित् and ईश्वर.

[59] Now follows the discussion about अविद्या :— What is its exact role, whether the existence of अविद्या can be proved, its nature etc.

The Advaitin's view is as follows—ब्रह्मन् is निर्विशेष and स्वयंप्रकाश. The अनन्त-विकल्पात्मक-जगत् is परिकल्पित (superimposed) upon the निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् owing to the सदसदनिर्वचनीय-अविद्या, which is विविधविचित्रविक्षेपकरी and conceals the real nature of ब्रह्मन्. The श्रुति says 'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः,' where अनृत means nothing but अविद्या. (There is जीव-ब्रह्मैक्य propounded by the Śruti in passages like तत्त्वमसि etc. This is possible only if अविद्या is admitted).

(A) अविद्या is not an entity (i. e. अविद्या cannot be described as भावरूप), for there is no भ्रान्ति about अविद्या or in other words अविद्या cannot be भ्रान्तिविषय. Neither can there be बाध of the अविद्या. भ्रान्ति or बाध is possible only in the case of an entity (यत्र सत्त्वं तत्रैव भ्रान्तिः, बाधश्च); शुक्ति, for instance, is an entity because there can be रजतभ्रान्ति about it, and in that there is शुक्तित्वबाध.

(B) अविद्या is also not a non-entity (i. e. it is not अभावरूप) for there is no ख्याति (प्रसिद्धि) about it.

Neither can there be the बाध, if अविद्या were to be अभावरूप. बाध requires a प्रतियोगिन् which cannot exist in the case of an अभावरूप-अविद्या.

वन्ध्यापुत्र (who is अभावरूप) cannot have a प्रतियोगिन् ; so, no question of बाध arises.

The above view of the पूर्वपक्षिन् who is an अद्वैतिन्, has now been criticised by Rāmānuja. There are seven अनुपपत्तिs pointed out in this connection :—

(1) आश्रयानुपपत्ति
(2) तिरोधानानुपपत्ति
(3) स्वरूपानुपपत्ति
(4) अनिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्ति
(5) प्रमाणानुपपत्ति
(6) निवर्तकानुपपत्ति
(7) निवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति.

These अनुपपत्तिs are taken up, one by one, for discussion—

I आश्रयानुपपत्ति—

The पूर्वपक्षिन् has pointed out that अविद्या causes the भ्रम of जगत् upon ब्रह्मन्. The question posed is—' What is the आश्रय of this अविद्या when it causes the भ्रम ?' Some one must possess that अविद्या, which, being a दोष, cannot stay independently.

जीव cannot be the आश्रय of अविद्या, for the idea of जीव (जीवभाव) is itself the outcome of अविद्या. In the absence of अविद्या, all will be apprehended as ब्रह्मन् alone.

If जीव is the आश्रय of अविद्या, there would be अन्योन्याश्रय. अविद्या produces जीव (-भाव) and जीव in a way produces अविद्या by being its आश्रय.

Neither can ब्रह्मन् be the आश्रय of अविद्या, for ब्रह्मन् is स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानरूप, which is opposed to अज्ञान. You yourself (i. e. the पूर्वपक्षिन्s) admit अविद्या to be ज्ञानबाध्य. Thus ब्रह्मन् is बाधकज्ञानरूप and अविद्या is ज्ञानबाध्य. The बाध्य and the बाधक cannot stay together.

Now, if you say that अविद्या is not ज्ञानबाध्य, then who can remove it? For, परब्रह्मन् is ज्ञानरूप, and if the मृषात्मक-अज्ञान (which ordinarily could be removed by ज्ञान), having ब्रह्मन् for its आश्रय, defies ज्ञान, who can remove it? There is nothing else residing in Brahman which can do that job.

If you say that the ज्ञान viz. 'ज्ञानं ब्रह्म' removes that अविद्या (just as शुक्तिज्ञान removes अज्ञान about itself), then this ज्ञान also, being ब्रह्मप्रकाश and not independent of ब्रह्मन्, cannot be अज्ञाननिवर्तक, like ब्रह्मन् itself.

If you believe that the knowledge of the form 'ज्ञानं ब्रह्म' is separate from ब्रह्मन्, it would be प्रमेय (an object of knowledge) and thus would cease to be स्वतःसिद्ध-अनुभूति. ब्रह्मन् would be अननुभूति then.

If it be said, Brahman has a two-fold knowledge associated with it—(1) स्वरूपभूतज्ञान and (2) 'ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म' इत्याकारकं ज्ञानम्, Both these are अज्ञानाश्रय, but the first is not अविद्याबाधक while the second is certainly so. The reply would be—' How can you say that the स्वरूपभूतज्ञान is not अविद्याबाधक and the 'ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म' इत्याकारकं ज्ञानम् i. e. तद्विषयज्ञान is अविद्याबाधक ?' Both are equally ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रकाश. Whatever ब्रह्मस्वरूप is, that is indicated by the knowledge 'ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म' as a matter of course. Possibly what help can it render here and become अज्ञानाविरोधि? You cannot differentiate between these two ज्ञानs as regards any special form.

It cannot be said that (1) i. e. स्वरूपभूतज्ञान comes first and (2) i. e. 'ज्ञानस्वरूपं ब्रह्म' इति ज्ञान (तद्विषयज्ञान) comes afterwards on the scene; for, whatever extra power you give to (2) must be possessed by (1) as well, the first type of knowledge being स्वयंप्रकाश also.

In order that the फल of ज्ञानs be different, there should be विषयवैषम्य (as for instance in प्रत्यभिज्ञा, there is देशद्वय-कालद्वय-संबन्ध; hence it is different from अभिज्ञा). Here, however, there is no such विशेष.

Again, strictly speaking, according to you, Brahman is अनुभवस्वरूप, so there cannot be ब्रह्मविषयज्ञान as such. If ज्ञान is अज्ञानाविरोधि, it is so by itself; it is not required to say that अविद्या should have ब्रह्माश्रय. ब्रह्माश्रयत्व is impossible for ज्ञान, as also for अज्ञान. (In the case of शुक्ति and others which are परप्रकाश and स्वाज्ञानाविरोधि, a ज्ञानान्तर is required to remove that अज्ञान. ब्रह्मन् does not require any other निवर्तक. Thus ब्रह्मविषयप्रमाणज्ञान cannot be the निवर्तक of अविद्या.

[60] Now if the पूर्वपक्षिन् says that the knowledge of everything else than ब्रह्मन्, being मिथ्या (ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वज्ञान), is अज्ञानाविरोधि, the reply would be:—

(1) Is this ज्ञान opposed to ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यज्ञान? It cannot be so; for, both ज्ञान and अज्ञान must have एकविषय to be opposed to each other. रजतज्ञान cannot be

the निवर्तक of घटाज्ञान, but is the निवर्तक of रजताज्ञान. Thus this ज्ञान can only be the निवर्तक of (or opposed to) प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वाज्ञान and not of ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यज्ञान.

(2) This प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञान is opposed to प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वरूपाज्ञान and so प्रपञ्चसत्यस्वरूपाज्ञान may be destroyed by it; the ब्रह्मस्वरूपाज्ञान remains unaffected.

(3) If you say प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वज्ञान destroys the false सद्वितीयत्वज्ञान about ब्रह्मन्, the ब्रह्मस्वरूप which is स्वतःसिद्ध is not affected,—

The reply would be :—The अद्वितीयत्वज्ञान of ब्रह्मन् is स्वतःसिद्ध; सद्वितीयत्वज्ञान or its बाध cannot be there at all.

(4) If you say that अद्वितीयत्व is a धर्म of ब्रह्मन् (for, one may see a धर्मिन् but not all its धर्मs)—

The reply would be that according to you ब्रह्मन् is just अनुभूति having no अनुभाव्य धर्मs.

So, ब्रह्मन् is ज्ञानस्वरूप and cannot be the आश्रय of अज्ञान or अविद्या which is opposed to it.

II तिरोधानानुपपत्ति—

अविद्या conceals स्वयंप्रकाश-ब्रह्मन् according to the पूर्वपक्षिन्; प्रकाशतिरोधान can be effected in two ways :—

(1) by obstructing the production of light—But this is not possible, since ब्रह्मन् is admitted by the पूर्वपक्षिन् as स्वयंप्रकाश, and this प्रकाश is not at all produced.

(2) by destroying the produced light.

If अविद्या destroys the प्रकाश of ब्रह्मन्, that would mean the स्वरूपनाश of ब्रह्मन् itself, since प्रकाश is the very nature of ब्रह्मन्.

Thus तिरोधान of ब्रह्मन् by अविद्या is not at all possible.

III स्वरूपानुपपत्ति—

According to the Advaitin, निर्विषया, निराश्रया and स्वप्रकाशा, अनुभूति experiences आत्मन् who is अनन्ताविषय and अनन्ताश्रय owing to the अविद्यादोष residing in itself.

This can be criticised as follows :—

Is this स्वाश्रयदोष (i. e. अविद्या) real or unreal?

If अविद्या is real, there would be द्वैत, the other reality being ब्रह्मन्.

If अविद्या were unreal, as the unreal जगत् according to you is ज्ञातृज्ञेयज्ञानरूप, this अविद्या must be of this three-fold variety—

If it is ज्ञानरूप, is it different from अनुभूति or not? If अविद्या (दृशि = ज्ञानरूप) is different from its आश्रय i. e. अनुभूति which also is दृशि, there will be two दृशिs, while अनुभूति must be एकस्वरूप only. दृशिस्वरूपभेद (difference in the nature of knowledge) is not admitted.

If अविद्या is *not* different, then it would be परमार्थ like अनुभूति.

If now the पूर्वपक्षिन् says ' अविद्या is अपरमार्थ; I shall regard अनुभूति, not different from अविद्या also as अपरमार्थ ' the reply is that the दृशि which is the अधिष्ठान of भ्रमरूपाविद्या, would be शून्य and you will be adopting the tenets of the माध्यमिक (शून्यवादि) Bauddhas.

दृशि is अपरमार्थ; द्रष्टृ and दृश्य connected with it would also be काल्पनिक and so you will have to admit a fresh दोषान्तर to account for this and this would lead to अनवस्था !

If you say that this दोषान्तर is परमार्थ — is it भिन्न or अभिन्न from ब्रह्मन् ?

If it is भिन्न, there would be द्वैत, and if अभिन्न, ब्रह्मन् itself will be the cause of प्रपञ्चदर्शन, and not अविद्या—Thus

ब्रह्मन् — through अविद्या — प्रपञ्चदर्शन.
„ — now through itself — प्रपञ्चदर्शन.

अविद्या in this case will be superfluous. It would be just like अजागलस्तन serving no useful purpose.

Both अविद्या and प्रपञ्च are मृषा and owe their existence to this दोषयुक्त ब्रह्मन्.

If ब्रह्मन् is दोषयुक्त, that दोष would be नित्य like ब्रह्मन् and thus there would be no मोक्ष.

Therefore, so long as you do not admit a real परमार्थिक दोष as distinct from ब्रह्मन्, there cannot be any भ्रान्ति.

So, the स्वरूप of अविद्या as you envisage, is impossible.

IV अनिर्वचनीयत्वानुपपत्ति—

What is meant by आनिर्वचनीयत्व ? It cannot mean सदसद्विलक्षण.

All प्रतीति is either सदाकारा (घटविषया) or असदाकारा (वन्ध्यापुत्रविषया).

What is this hybrid सदसद्विलक्षण opposed to all प्रतीति ?

If the प्रतीति has for its विषय, this सदसद्विलक्षण-अविद्या, then everything there would be the object of apprehension of everything.

A सत्-घट would be असत्प्रतीतिविषय.

An असत्-वन्ध्यापुत्र would be सत्प्रतीतिविषय and so on.

V प्रमाणानुपपत्ति—

[61] (a) The Prima-facie (Advaitin's) view is as follows :—

(1) We regard अविद्या as a भाववस्तु, apart from the ज्ञानप्रागभाव which is the उपादान of different अध्यासs and it can be proved by प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान.

(2) अविद्योपहित-ब्रह्मन् is the cause of the superimposition of अहंकार, ज्ञान and ज्ञेय on the प्रत्यगात्मन्.

(3) On the जगत् which also is an अवस्थाविशेषेण-अध्यास of the same अविद्योपाहितब्रह्मन्, arise सर्परजतादिवस्तु-तत्तज्ज्ञानरूप-अध्यासs.

(4) मिथ्याभूतकार्य has मिथ्याभूतकारण; so अविद्या must be मिथ्याभूत.

(5) The expressions 'अहमज्ञः' 'मामन्यं च न जानामि' etc. show the direct perception of the कारणाज्ञान.

This अवभास cannot be construed with ज्ञानप्रागभाव, which is perceived by अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण. It is direct like 'अहं सुखी'.

(6) Even if अभाव is taken to be perceived by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, this consciousness (I am ignorant) does not refer to ज्ञानाभाव in the आत्मन्. For, even at the अनुभववेला this ज्ञान does exist there. If no ज्ञान existed then, there would be no ज्ञानाभावप्रतीति.

In the अनुभव—अहमज्ञः (I am ignorant), is there the अवगति of आत्मन् as possessing अभाव as a धर्म and of ज्ञान as the counter-entity, or not ? If yes, the प्रतीति in the form अहं ज्ञानप्रत्यनीक-ज्ञानाभाववान् would not be there, as ज्ञानाभाव is opposed to ज्ञान.

If no अवगति is there, ज्ञानाभावप्रतीति would not be there at any cost.

Even if the ज्ञानाभाव is to be known by the अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण, this अनुपपत्ति still remains there.

But if अज्ञान is taken as भावरूप, there would be no विरोध, between this भावरूप-अज्ञान, and the ज्ञान of आत्मन्, the प्रतियोगि of ज्ञानाभाव.

(The opponent thinks that the साक्षिन् must always witness only यथार्थ things).

There is no विरोध between this भावरूप-अज्ञान and the साक्षिचैतन्य which can have मिथ्यावस्तु for its विषय, which is concerned not with वस्तुयाथात्म्य but with अज्ञान which is not removed by अज्ञानविषयज्ञान.

You cannot say that साक्षिचैतन्य cannot be concerned with अज्ञान associated with the अस्मदर्थ which is not प्रमाणासिद्ध, as अज्ञान should be विषयविशेषव्यावृत्त; for all things can be विषयs for साक्षिचैतन्य; जड things require प्रमाणव्यवधान, while the अजड things do not require any प्रमाणव्यवधान, for, they are स्वयंसिद्ध. So, the अवभास is associated with अज्ञान.

अनुमान also proves the existence of भावरूप-अज्ञान on the strength of the following syllogism—

प्रमाणज्ञानम् is अविद्यापूर्वकम्
अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात् ,
प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् ।

(तमस् is a द्रव्य, not merely आलोकाभाव or रूपदर्शनाभाव according to some नैयायिकs),

[62] The सिद्धान्तिन् now refutes the prima-facie view stated above—

भावरूप-अज्ञान is *not* experienced by mere प्रत्यक्ष. The विरोध between ज्ञान and अज्ञान still persists there. You prefer भावरूप-अज्ञान to ज्ञानप्रागभाव to get rid of this विरोध between ज्ञान and ज्ञानाभाव, but your attempts are bound to fail.

In the अनुभव-'अहमज्ञः'—

Is not the प्रत्यगर्थ (आत्मन्) experienced as अज्ञानाश्रय and अज्ञानविषय ? If it is experienced, how can अज्ञान which is आत्मस्वरूपनिवर्त्य stay there ? If it is not experienced, how can अज्ञान without any आश्रय or विषयज्ञान be experienced ?

If you say आत्मन् is experienced in an अविशदस्वरूप (only the विशदस्वरूपावभास is अज्ञानविरोधि) and so, there is no विरोध between आश्रयविषयज्ञान and अज्ञानानुभव—

We reply : Then we can equally well argue that ज्ञानप्रागभाव also is विशदस्वरूपविषय and आश्रयप्रतियोगिज्ञान is अविशदस्वरूप.

So, there is no difference between भावरूप-अज्ञान and ज्ञानप्रागभाव.

Again, भावरूप अज्ञान is सापेक्ष like ज्ञानप्रागभाव for its सिद्धि; for अज्ञान may be (1) ज्ञानाभाव (2) ज्ञानादन्यत्व and (3) ज्ञानविरोध. In all these three kinds of अज्ञान, there is स्वरूपज्ञानापेक्षा.

It is true that प्रकाश is not required to know darkness, but to know darkness as opposed to प्रकाश, we must have the knowledge of light !

अज्ञान is never realised in its own nature, but is realised as ' no-knowledge ' which shows that it is ज्ञानापेक्ष, just like ज्ञानाभाव.

We both admit ज्ञानप्रागभाव, so in ' अहमज्ञः ' we realise ज्ञानप्रागभाव, but no positive ज्ञानरूप-अज्ञान.

Brahman is चैतन्यैकस्वरूप; how can it have अज्ञानानुभव ? If you say that ब्रह्मन् can have the अज्ञानानुभव when its स्वरूप is तिरोहित, we ask you—what is this तिरोहितस्वरूपत्वम् ?

(1) It cannot be अप्रकाशितस्वरूपत्वम् ; for how can स्वानुभवस्वरूप be अप्रकाशितस्वरूप ? ब्रह्मन्'s स्वरूप does not require अन्यतः प्रकाश for this purpose. You do not regard प्रकाश as a separate धर्म; so this प्रकाश must be ब्रह्मन्'s स्वरूप itself. Now if this प्रकाश comes from outside, there would be स्वरूपनाश of ब्रह्मन्.

(2) Further, there would be अन्योन्याश्रय. Thus अज्ञान, the cause of, ब्रह्मतिरोधान, after being experienced by ब्रह्मन् conceals ब्रह्मन् and having concealed ब्रह्मन् becomes the object of the experience by Brahman.

(3) If you say—अविद्या conceals ब्रह्मन् after it is experienced, then this means that ब्रह्मन् experiences अज्ञान, even though its स्वरूप is not तिरोहित.

(4) If ब्रह्मन् can do this, what is the use of तिरोधानकल्पना or अज्ञानस्वरूपकल्पना ? If ब्रह्मन् experiences अज्ञान, it can very well experience अज्ञानकार्य, प्रपञ्च etc. of its own accord !

(5) If अज्ञानानुभव of ब्रह्मन् is स्वतः and so स्वरूपप्रयुक्त (i. e.-of its own accord), then there would be अनिर्मोक्ष and ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिवृत्ति would require some other निवर्तकज्ञान to get rid of this अज्ञानानुभूति.

(6) If the अज्ञानानुभव is due to अज्ञानान्तर, there would be अनवस्था.

(7) If ब्रह्मन् becomes itself अनुभवविषय, then this अज्ञान by its own nature would screen ब्रह्मन् and would cease to be ज्ञानबाध्य.

(8) If ब्रह्मन् is अज्ञानानुभवस्वरूप, then just as रजतानुभव is contradicted by मिथ्यारजतबाधकज्ञान, this अज्ञानानुभवस्वरूप of ब्रह्मन् would be बाधित by the निवर्तकज्ञान ! Any way ब्रह्मन् would loose its स्वरूप (same as 5 above).

In order to avoid the faults of अनवस्था etc. it is said by the पूर्वपक्षिन्, that अनादि-अज्ञान does two things simultaneously, (1) ब्रह्मणः स्वसाक्षित्वम् and (2) ब्रह्मतिरस्कृति—

But the सिद्धान्तिन् points out that this is not possible, for the following reasons—

(1) ब्रह्मन्, unless it is तिरस्कृत, would not have अज्ञानानुभव.

(2) If some other हेतु is imagined, then what becomes of the अनादित्व of अज्ञान? And further, there would also be अनवस्था.

(3) If अतिरस्कृतब्रह्मन् becomes अज्ञानसाक्षिन्, it could not be wholly अनुभूति-स्वरूप.

Further, the question is—How does the अविद्यातिरस्कृतब्रह्मन् function?

(1) Does it not illumine at all? In that case, the प्रकाशमात्रस्वरूप of ब्रह्मन् would be merely जड!

(2) Does it illumine a bit? Then you ought to mention the तिरस्कृत and अतिरस्कृत portions of ब्रह्मन् which according to you is सच्चिदानन्दैकरस!

It is only in a सांश and सविशेष thing, that तिरोहितस्वरूप and विशदस्वरूप are possible, and never in ब्रह्मन्!

So, तिरस्कार and प्रकाश cannot take place in the same ब्रह्मन् simultaneously.

[63] What is this तिरोहितस्वरूपत्व and विशदावभासत्व?

विशदावभास refers to a complete अवभास of a thing with its parts and characteristics.

अविशदावभास refers to a partial अवभास of only some portions and only some विशेषs.

The portion not illumined has no प्रकाशवैशद्य, the portion illumined has प्रकाशवैशद्य.

But where there is प्रकाशांश everywhere, अवैशद्य is impossible.

Similarly, विषयवैशद्य means knowing the विषय completely and विषयावैशद्य means knowing a portion of the विषय.

But in ब्रह्मन् both these are impossible. There must be the वैशद्य only of प्रकाश and विषय, and so, no अज्ञानकार्य is possible.

Again, as to the so called अवैशद्य—

(1) Does तत्त्वज्ञान not remove it?

If तत्त्वज्ञान does not remove it, there would be no मोक्ष.

If तत्त्वज्ञान removes it, what does the removal of अवैशद्य mean? If it means that there is विशदस्वरूप, then does that विशदस्वरूप exist before?

(A) If it existed before, there cannot be any अविद्याकार्य-अवैशद्य, and consequently there would be no removal (निवृत्ति) of the अवैशद्य either.

(B) If it did not exist before, मोक्ष would be a कार्य and hence would be अनित्य.

Again, this अज्ञान or अविद्या, as has been already stated, could not possibly have an abode.

Lastly, you Advaitins believe that Brahman can be proved to be the only Reality, for a भ्रम must have some real अधिष्ठान. A निरधिष्ठान भ्रम is impossible.

But by accepting the अविद्या doctrine, the पूर्वपक्षिन् goes against this tenet of his Advaita school. The अपरमार्थ-अविद्या is the अधिष्ठान of प्रपञ्च, जीव etc. which are भ्रमरूप. This means that भ्रम is possible even if the अधिष्ठान is अपरमार्थ. In that case, ब्रह्मन् also would be भ्रमरूप and शून्य.

The syllogism put forward by the पूर्वपक्षिन् to prove the भावरूपाज्ञान is now criticized by Rāmānuja.

The syllogism is—

> विवादाध्यासितं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त-
> स्वविषयावरण-स्वनिवर्त्य-स्वदेशगत-वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम् ।
> अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात् ।
> अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् ।

प्रमाणज्ञानम् is अज्ञानानुभव, it is ... वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, वस्त्वन्तर signifies the भावरूपाविद्या. Thus the अज्ञानानुभव is preceded by भावरूपाविद्या (i. e. it is अविद्यापूर्वकम्); for, it (प्रमाणज्ञान) illumines something not illumined before. A प्रदीपप्रभा, for instance' has तमस् existing prior to or preceding it, for, it illumines something in darkness, not illumined before.

The above हेतु is fallacious, because the हेतु would prove अज्ञानान्तर preceding अज्ञान ! If it is said that the हेतु does not prove अज्ञानान्तर, how would it prove वस्त्वन्तर either ? And if it is admitted that there is अज्ञानान्तर, then this अविद्या would be निष्फल.

[The हेतु is fallacious and proves something not accepted by the पूर्वपक्षिन् himself; for, on the strength of this हेतु, we can say that another अज्ञान (which also illumines प्रपञ्च not प्रकाशित or illumined before)–can be proved even for the first अज्ञान.

If the अज्ञानान्तर is not proved, the हेतु becomes अनैकान्तिक (too wide), for it embraces your अविद्या (साध्य) as also साध्याभाव (no वस्त्वन्तर or a positive entity).

If the हेतु proves another अज्ञान, then that अज्ञान would prevent ब्रह्मन् from becoming a witness (साक्षिन्) of the first अज्ञान.

Hence the theory of अज्ञान would be quite useless.

The दृष्टान्त also is faulty with respect to the हेतु.

प्रदीपप्रभा does *not* illumine अप्रकाशित objects. It is the ज्ञान that does this job. Without this विज्ञान, mere दीप is of no avail, इन्द्रियs are ज्ञानोत्पत्ति-हेतुs and not प्रकाशकs. प्रदीपप्रभा is merely a helper to the eye by driving out the ज्ञानविरोधि तमस्.

[64] दीप is called प्रकाशक, because it is just इन्द्रियोपकारक in producing प्रकाशकज्ञान; प्रकाशकत्व is not merely विरोधिनिरसन, but अर्थपरिच्छेद. This अर्थपरिच्छेद or

व्यवहारयोग्यतापादन belongs to ज्ञान only. If उपकारकs are to be regarded as अप्रकाशितार्थ-प्रकाशक, then इन्द्रियs must also be admitted to be अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशक. And in that case they surely are not स्वनिवर्त्यवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक.

So, the हेतु is अनैकान्तिक.

Moreover, a series of counter-syllogisms can be given, so that अवि [illegible] cannot be proved :—

(1) अज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रयम्
अज्ञानत्वात्,
शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत्.

(2) अज्ञानं न ज्ञानावरणम्
अज्ञानत्वात्,
शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवत् ।

(3) अज्ञानं न ज्ञाननिवर्त्यम्
ज्ञानविषयानावरणत्वात्,
यथा शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानम् ।

(4) ब्रह्म नाज्ञानास्पदम्
ज्ञातृत्वविरहात्,
घटवत् ।

(5) ब्रह्म नाज्ञानावरणम्
ज्ञानविषयत्वात्
यथा शुक्तिकादि ।

(6) ब्रह्म न ज्ञाननिवर्त्याज्ञानम्
ज्ञानाविषयत्वात्,
यथा शुक्तिकादि ।

(7) प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावातिरिक्ताज्ञानपूर्वकं
प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात्,
भवदभिमताज्ञानसाधनप्रमाणज्ञानवत् ।

(8) ज्ञानं न वस्तुनो विनाशकम्
शक्तिविशेषविरहे सति ज्ञानत्वात्,
यथा ईश्वरज्ञानं, मुद्गरादि च ।

(9) भावरूपमज्ञानं न ज्ञानविनाश्यम्
भावरूपत्वात्,
घटवत् ।

The various विशेषणs in the साध्य given by the पूर्वपक्षिन् in his अनुमान are here shown to be entirely fallacious.

Thus 'स्वदेशगत' विशेषण is opposed in 1 and 4 above, 'स्वविषयावरणत्व' in 2 and 5 above, 'स्वनिवर्त्य' in 3, 6, 8 and 9; 'स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तत्व' in the 7th syllogism.

The first three and the 9th अनुमानs have अज्ञान as the पक्ष, the next three have ब्रह्मन् as the पक्ष; and syllogisms 7 and 8 have प्रमाणज्ञान as the पक्ष.

The syllogisms given above can easily be controverted by the अद्वैतिन्. The आश्रय and the विषय of अज्ञान are not ब्रह्मन् itself. So, the शुक्तिकादृष्टान्त does not

serve its purpose. अज्ञान is अनिर्वचनीय (neither सत् nor असत्) in its relation with ब्रह्मन्. Hence, from the शुक्तिकादृष्टान्त no right conclusions can be drawn in respect of ब्रह्मन् or अविद्या.

[65] The सिद्धान्तिन् has given the following syllogism, No. 8. viz.

ज्ञानं न वस्तुनो विनाशकम्
शक्तिविशेषविरहे सति ज्ञानत्वात्
यथा ईश्वरज्ञानं, मुद्गरादि च ।

To this the पूर्वपक्षिन् takes an objection :

He says that by रज्जुसर्पबाधकज्ञान, the fear (which is regarded as a वस्तु) is actually destroyed.

To this replies the सिद्धान्तिन् thus—

बाधकज्ञान does not destroy भय. भय, being क्षणिक, is automatically destroyed in a moment ; when the बाधकज्ञान arises, भय is not produced thereafter.

[When भयकारण is there, भय is produced ; and when the भयकारण is not there, भय is not produced—this shows that भय etc. are क्षणिक.]

If we regard भय as अक्षणिक, there would be a thousand भयs experienced as the भयादिहेतुभूतज्ञान is continuous, till there arises the बाधकाज्ञान.

[Does Rāmānuja seriously bring forward this argument ? If भय is क्षणिक, so also is ज्ञान, and we experience भय as long as the भयहेतुज्ञान is there. If you believe in a thousand भयs, you must admit a thousand ज्ञानs as well. भय may be regarded not as a वस्तु but as a kind of प्रतीति !

So, अनुमान does not prove अविद्या.

The श्रुतिप्रमाण as well as the अर्थापत्तिप्रमाण do not prove the existence of अविद्या. This would be dealt with later.

The argument of the पूर्वपक्षिन् that मिथ्यार्थ must have a मिथ्या-उपादान is wrong. In the विलक्षणत्वाधिकरण (Brahmasūtra II. 1·4) it is proved how कार्य and कारण need not have any सादृश्य. माक्षिक produces कृमि, गोमय produces वृश्चिक, and चेतनपुरुष, नख and केश (अचेतन).

There is no प्रतीति about अनिर्वचनीया अविद्या. What is प्रतीयमान can alone have प्रतीति, भ्रान्ति or बाध. They cannot have for their विषय something that is not known by प्रतीति.

The पूर्वपक्षिन् now says,—we must imagine that some अनिर्वचनीय,—अपूर्व is apprehended. Thus for instance,—we see in शुक्ति the रजत.

Even when we have शुक्तिरजतप्रतीति, रजत is not there, and one thing i. e. शुक्ति cannot be apprehended as रजत; for, A can never be apprehended as B.

So, owing to some दोष, रजत must be imagined to be there and it is अनिर्वचनयि,—अपूर्व.

The सिद्धान्तिन् says — Even then you will have to admit that you are apprehending A as B. It is on such an अवभास that ख्याति-प्रवृत्ति-बाध-भ्रम depend.

It is not fair to imagine something quite unheard of and unknown like this अनिर्वचनीय रजत.

Again, this कल्प्यमान रजत is not apprehended as अनिर्वचनीय; it is apprehended as परमार्थ रजत itself.

If it were known as अनिर्वचनीय, there would not be भ्रान्ति or बाध either.

And so, because प्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिबाधभ्रम would not take place unless 'A is apprehended as B,' which fact is inevitable or अपरिहार्य, you must admit that शुक्ति is apprehended in the form रजत etc.

Whatever ख्यातिवाद is accepted, there must be this apprehension of A as B. [अन्यस्यान्यथावभासः]

ख्याति is a manifestation to consciousness.

(1) सत्ख्याति—It is admitted, in a way, by all. Whatever वस्तु is apprehended, it is apprehended as सत्.

(1) अन्यथाख्याति—Accepted by the Naiyāyikas; this अन्यथावभास is also accepted by all.

(2) असत्ख्याति—असतः प्रतीतिः—If it is असत्य, there would not be भ्रम etc. If it is सत्य, then that proves सदात्मना, अन्यथावभास. Bauddhas, (Śūnyavādins) Mādhvas and Māyādvaitins accept this.

(3) आत्म (विज्ञान) ख्याति—

विज्ञानप्रतीति—If the प्रतीति is विज्ञानात्मिका, then there would be no भ्रम. If the प्रतीति is अर्थात्मिका, that means अर्थात्मना-अन्यथावभास.

Yogācāras (Vijñānavādins, Bauddhas) accept this.

(4) अख्याति—In इदं रजतम्—इदम् is perceived and रजतम् is remembered.

If 'इदं रजतम्' is एकज्ञान, रजतम् which is अन्यविशेषण is apprehended as being a विशेषण of इदम्. And so, there is अन्यविशेषणत्वेनान्यथावभास.

इदं रजतम्—If it is apprehended as ज्ञानद्वय, there would be no भ्रम or प्रवृत्ति possible. If this ज्ञानद्वय is apprehended as एकज्ञान, there would be एकत्वेनान्यथावभास.

The अनिर्वचनीयख्याति of the Advaitins has already been refuted.

Those who say that there is विषयासद्भाव (i. e. there is no object corresponding to conscious perception), for them also, there is अन्यथावभास—विषयविद्यमानत्वेन, अन्यथावभासः ।

How can the अनिर्वचनीय रजत be produced ? रजतप्रतीति cannot be the cause, because रजतप्रतीति has रजत as its विषय and so it cannot exist before रजत is produced.

If you say रजतप्रतीति may be produced without any विषय, and having created that रजत, has the same for its विषय, the answer is that this argument alone would prove that you are the Prince of idiots !

रजत cannot have इन्द्रियदोष for its cause, इन्द्रियदोष is पुरुषनिष्ठ, it may produce something in the पुरुष but not in the शुक्ति.

इन्द्रियs cannot be the cause, for they are ज्ञानकारण, not अर्थकारण.

दुष्ट-इन्द्रियs may produce something in the ज्ञान itself.

(5) मूलाविद्या cannot be the cause (as has been already proved).

[66] If रजत is अनिर्वचनीय, how is it that it is known as रजत, never as घट पट etc. ?


This cannot be due to सादृश्य ; the प्रतीति in that case ought to have been रजतसदृशम् and not रजतम्.

If now the पूर्वपक्षिन् says there is रजतत्वजाति in it, the counter-query would be—Is this जाति परमार्थभूता or is it otherwise ?

(1) It cannot, however, be परमार्थभूता; for, then it cannot be connected with an अपरमार्थव्यक्ति.

(2) Nor can it be अपरमार्थ; for then it cannot have any connection with a परमार्थ or real object.

The right solution is that the रजत is सत्य (cf. यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम्). Everything has an element of everything in this world which has proceeded from Brahman.



Then there followed the त्रिवृत्करण.

The विष्णुपुराण also says that the भूतs by mixing up with one another (i. e. the process of पञ्चीकरण) produced महदादि upto विशेषs (शान्तत्वं घोरत्वं मूढत्वं च विशेषः).

The त्रिवृत्करण is thus explained by आनन्दगिरि, प्रथममेकैकां देवतां द्विधा द्विधा विभज्य, पुनरेकैकं भागं द्विधा द्विधा कृत्वा तदितरभागयोर्निक्षिप्य त्रिवृत्करणं विवक्षितम्. Thus the त्रिवृत्करण of तेजस्, जल and पृथिवी would be as follows :—

तेजस्— $\frac{\text{ते०}}{2} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{4} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{4}$; जल— $\frac{\text{ज०}}{2} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{4} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{4}$; पृथिवी— $\frac{\text{पृ०}}{2} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{4} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{4}$.

When आकाश and वायु are also taken into consideration, the process becomes पञ्चीकरण. Thus —

आकाश— $\frac{\text{आ०}}{2} + \frac{\text{वा०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{8}$; वायु— $\frac{\text{वा०}}{2} + \frac{\text{आ०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{8}$.

तेजस्— $\frac{\text{ते०}}{2} + \frac{\text{वा०}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{8}$; वायु— $\frac{\text{ज०}}{2} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{8} + \frac{\text{वा०}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ०}}{8} + \frac{\text{पृ०}}{8}$

and पृथिवी— $\frac{\text{पृ०}}{2} + \frac{\text{ज०}}{8} + \frac{\text{ते०}}{8} + \frac{\text{वा०}}{8} + \frac{\text{आ०}}{8}$.

Sureśvara thus describes the पञ्चीकरण— पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि प्रत्येकं विभजेद् द्विधा। एकैकं भागमादाय चतुर्धा विभजेत् पुनः ॥ एकैकभागमेकस्मिन्भूते संवेशयेत्क्रमात्। ततश्चाकाशभूतस्य भागाः पञ्च भवन्ति हि ॥ वाय्वादिभागाश्चत्वारो वाय्वादिष्वेवमादिशेत्। पञ्चीकरणमेतत् स्यादित्याहुस्तत्त्ववेदिनः ॥

अभिधाभिदाः—नामभेदाः

पूतीक (a kind of herb) is allowed to be used in the absence of सोम, because पूतीक contains some सोमावयवs.

नीवार contains व्रीहिभाव, and so can be used in place of व्रीहि.

So, शुक्ति contains रजतभाव.

We call something शुक्ति because there is शुक्तिभूयस्त्व and another thing रजत because there is रजतभूयस्त्व.

You mistake शुक्ति for रजत ; this means owing to चक्षुरादि दोष, you perceive the रजतांश without the शुक्त्यंश, that is all.

बाध्यबाधकभाव has nothing to do with सत्यत्व or मिथ्यात्व ; it is dependent upon भूयस्त्ववैकल्यग्रह or भूयस्त्वसाकल्यग्रह.

So, सर्वस्य सर्वत्वे व्यवहारस्थितिः.

(1) As regards things seen in dreams, the Lord himself creates them in accordance with the धर्माधर्म of the people seeing them in dream and they are real.

(a) The Sruti also says so.

(b) The Sūtrakāra in the Sūtra 'मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात' says that the स्रष्टृत्व of things in dreams belongs to the Lord.

[67] When one sees oneself moving about in dream, another similar body is actually created for the time being by the Lord.

(2) When the white conch is seen as yellow by one affected with jaundice, what happens is this—

The नायनरश्मिs mixed up with नयनवर्तिपित्तद्रव्य come into contact with the white conch, but are unable to see शङ्खगतशुक्लिमा, being overpowered with पित्तपीतिमा. So, the white conch is seen as yellow.

People near by do not see the पित्तद्रव्य and its yellowness as they are very सूक्ष्म. A पित्तोपहत person is able to see them as they get out of his own eyes and the दूरस्थ पीतिमा, with the help of the नायनरश्मिs.

(3) जपाकुसुमप्रभा makes the स्फटिकमणि red, and itself appears more distinctly, when associated with a स्वच्छद्रव्य.

(4) मरीचिकाजल is real, because तेजस् and पृथिवी do contain water; but owing to इन्द्रियदोष and अदृष्ट, one fails to see तेजस् and पृथिवी and sees only water.

(5) In the case of the अलातचक्र, one sees it as a circle, because the intervening spaces are not seen owing to the great speed with which it is moved. The circle is real.

(6) In the case of a चक्र, the अन्तरालs are not seen; sometimes, because

there are no अन्तरालs, and so, there is non-apprehension of the अन्तरालs; sometimes the non-apprehension is due to the great speed with which the wheel is moved.

(7) In the mirror, you see your face. The reflected face is real.

The नायनरश्मिs are obstructed by the दर्पणदेश and actually are in contact with दर्पणदेश and निजमुख; but owing to the rapidity with which this happens, the अन्तराल between दर्पण and face is not cognised and one sees only the face.

(8) In the case of a दिङ्भ्रान्त person, owing to अदृष्ट, the man fails to see the proper दिगंश and sees दिगन्तरांश, but the दिगन्तरांशप्रतीति is real enough.

(9) In the case of द्विचन्द्रज्ञान, owing to अङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भ or तिमिर, the नायनरश्मिs have गतिभेद and so, there is सामग्रीभेद or सामग्रीद्वय.

सामग्री (1) sees the चन्द्र in the proper place and सामग्री (2)—the नायनरश्मिs in a वक्रगति—sees चन्द्र and the चन्द्रसमीपदेश, with the चन्द्र separated from the real place of चन्द्र.

This ग्रहणभेद causes ग्राह्याकारभेद and so, one sees two moons.

The association of the moon with the other place is due to the fact that one fails to see the अन्तर about the other देशs and the moon unconnected with the proper place.

सामग्रीद्वित्व is real and the perception of two moons is also real.

Though really there is only one moon, the object of चन्द्रग्रहणद्वय qualified by विशेषणद्वय. the eye has no power to reduce the impression gained, to one moon (as in the case of प्रत्यभिज्ञा, the two ज्ञानs are reduced to one 'This is the same देवदत्त'). We shall have to suppose that there is सामग्रीद्वय due to तिमिरदोष etc. though both the eyes refer to one and the same सामग्री.

Thus the position is :—दोष ⟶ सामग्रीद्वित्व ⟶ ग्रहणद्वित्व ⟶ ग्राह्याकारद्वित्व (Two moons are perceived).

So, all this is real.

Thus it is established 'सर्वं विज्ञानजातं यथार्थम्'.

[68] All प्रमाणजात (प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and आगम) proves that the Lord has created all विषयs; some of the विषयs are सर्वसाधारणानुभवविषयs, others are तत्तत्पुरुषमात्रानुभवविषयs.

बाध्यबाधकभाव is to be determined by what is सर्वानुभवविषय and what is सर्वानुभवाविषय—that is all.

As regards the पूर्वपक्षिन्'s statement that सदसदनिर्वचनीयाज्ञान is श्रुतिसिद्ध, the reply is that it is not so—

(1) अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढा :—Here अनृत does not mean अविद्या, it means 'not ऋत' i. e. not the सांसारिककर्मन् which is ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि.

(2) नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् etc.—Here सत् means चिद्व्यष्टि and असत् (त्यत्) means अचिद्व्यष्टि. सत् and असत् are here said to be non-mixing at the प्रलयकाल. That is all.

तमस् = अचित्समष्टि (as in अक्षरं तमसि लीयते).

The objector now says that it is true that by the word 'तमस्' is indicated the subtle state of the प्रकृति which is अचित्समष्टिरूप and the same is styled as माया; hence तमस् i. e. अज्ञान is अनिर्वचनीय.

तमः = प्रकृतेः सूक्ष्मावस्था = माया.

The reply is :—The word माया never indicates the sense 'अनिर्वचनीय'. It can not be अनिर्वचनीय, because it is a synonym of 'मिथ्या'; for everywhere the word is not used in the sense of 'मिथ्या'. The word माया is also used in the sense of 'असुर', 'राक्षस', 'शस्त्र' etc. In 'मायासहस्र' of शम्बर, the word माया indicates विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्व and hence प्रकृति is also called माया. परमपुरुष is called मायिन् because he is possessed of this wonderful power and not because he is अज्ञ. So माया means विचित्रशक्ति.

In the *Gītā*, माया is the त्रिगुणात्मिका-प्रकृति.

So, the श्रुति nowhere speaks of the अनिर्वचनीय-अज्ञान.

अर्थापत्तिप्रमाण—The पूर्वपक्षिन् wants to make use of this प्रमाण, to prove अविद्या, on the ground that the ऐक्योपदेश in तत्त्वमसि cannot be accounted for, otherwise.

To this the reply is—The ऐक्योपदेश is explained in a far better way, by taking त्वं to mean Brahman having Jīva as its body.

The passage 'अनेन जीवेन' etc. clearly shows that नामरूपभावत्व exists in all things right upto the परमात्मन्. We need not imagine any अनिर्वचनीय—अविद्या (which is so completely opposed to the सर्वज्ञ-सत्यसंकल्प-ब्रह्मन्) to prove this.

[69] इतिहास and पुराण also do not countenance the theory of अज्ञान.

The objector says that the following verses from the Viṣṇupurāṇa do refer to Avidyā. Thus—

(1) ज्योतींषि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णुर्वनानि विष्णुर्गिरयो दिशश्च ।
नद्यः समुद्राश्च स एव सर्वं यदस्ति यन्नास्ति च विप्रवर्य ॥ II. 12·38

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
Here Brahman (विष्णु) is said to be the only Reality.	The सामानाधिकरण्य in 'ज्योतींषि विष्णुः' shows तादात्म्य of the type of शरीरात्मभाव. So the अस्त्यात्मक as well as the नास्त्यात्मक जगत् is विष्णु's body and so विष्ण्वात्मक.

(2) ज्ञानस्वरूपो भगवान्यतोऽसावशेषमूर्तिर्न तु वस्तुभूतः ।
ततो हि शैलाब्धिधरादिभेदान् जानीहि विज्ञानविजृम्भितानि ॥ II. 12·39

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
Here the various distinctions like शैलाब्धिधरा etc. are said to be the outcome (विजृम्भित) of ब्रह्माज्ञान.	The स्वाभाविकस्वरूप of the भगवत् is ज्ञान and not देवमनुष्यादिवस्तुरूप which is a विज्ञानविजृम्भित and कर्ममूल. अचिद्वस्तु is परिणामास्पद and so is said to be नास्ति.

[Both the अद्वैतिन् and रामानुज equate विज्ञान with अविद्या or अज्ञान and explain the word विज्ञान as विविधं or विरुद्धं ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति । respectively.]

(3) यदा तु शुद्धं निजरूपि सर्वकर्मक्षये ज्ञानमपास्तदोषम् ।
तदा हि संकल्पतरोः फलानि भवन्ति नो वस्तुषु वस्तुभेदाः । II. 12·40

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
When ब्रह्मन् stands in its own nature as ज्ञान, there is वस्तुभेदाभाव. So this corroborates the अज्ञानविजम्भितत्व — of the various वस्तुभेदs	When there is कर्मक्षय, everything becomes ज्ञानाकार and शुद्ध, and there can be no वस्तुभेद there. अचिद्वस्तु is कादाचित्कावस्थ and so is called 'नास्ति', चिद्वस्तु is called निजसिद्धज्ञानाकार and so is 'अस्ति.'

[70] (4) वस्त्वस्ति किं कुत्रचिदादिमध्यपर्यन्तहीनं सततैकरूपम् ।
यच्चान्यथात्वं द्विज याति भूयो न तत्तथा कुत्र कुतो हि तत्त्वम् ॥ II 12·41

(5) मही घटत्वं घटतः कपालिका कपालिका चूर्णरजस्ततोऽणवः ।
जनैः स्वकर्मस्तिमितात्मनिश्चयैरालक्ष्यते ब्रूहि किमत्र तत् ॥ II. 12·42

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
The वस्तुभेदs are here shown to be असत्य, जगदुपलब्धिप्रकारेण. This describes the अर्थस्वभाव.	चिद्वस्तु is आदिमध्यान्तहीन and सततैकरूप, but अचिद्वस्तु is changeable and hence becomes different every moment (प्रतिक्षणमन्यथात्वं याति) and so it is called नास्ति. This is actually expressed by people in their देवमनुष्यादिभाव, and so an अचिद्वस्तु is not अस्तिशब्दार्ह.

(6) तस्मान्न विज्ञानमृतेऽस्ति किञ्चित्क्वचित् कदाचिद्द्विज वस्तुजातम् ।
विज्ञानमेकं निजकर्मभेदविभिन्नचित्तैर्बहुधाप्युपेतम् ॥ II. 12·43

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
Here the असत्यत्व of everything other than ब्रह्मन् is summarised, and it is made clear that one's own कर्मन् is the cause of अज्ञान which produces भेददर्शन in the ज्ञानस्वरूप-ब्रह्मन्. The first half shows विजातीय भेदाभाव, and the second half shows सजातीय भेदाभाव.	अचिद्वस्तु which is different from ज्ञानस्वरूपात्मन् can never be called अस्ति. आत्मन् is always ज्ञानैकाकार and the देवादिभेदs cause भिन्नात्मबुद्धि. But आत्मस्वरूप is not the cause of भेदानुसंधान.

(7) ज्ञानं विशुद्धं विमलं विशोकमशेषलोभादिनिरस्तसङ्गम् ।
एकं सदेकं परमं परेशः स वासुदेवो न यतोऽन्यदस्ति ॥ II. 12·44

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
The स्वरूप of ज्ञानस्वरूप-ब्रह्मन् is clearly stated here. The first half shows स्वगतभेदाभाव and the second half shows भेदाभाव.	आत्मस्वरूप is void of कर्म, प्रकृतिस्पर्श, अशेषहेयगुण, उपचयापचय etc. It is the body of वासुदेव and so is वासुदेवात्मक. Nothing that is not वासुदेवात्मक exists.

(8) सद्भाव एवं भवतो मयोक्तो ज्ञानं यथा सत्यमसत्यमन्यत् ।
एतत्तु यत् संव्यवहारभूतं तत्रापि चोक्तं भुवनाश्रितं ते ॥ II. 12.45

अद्वैतिन्	रामानुज
This shows that ज्ञानस्वरूप-ब्रह्मन् alone is the सत्य, everything else is असत्य. The सत्यत्व of things is only व्यावहारिक.	चिदंश is अस्तिशब्दवाच्य, अचिदंश is नाशगर्भ and so is called 'नास्ति'. So जगद्याथात्म्य means चिदचिदात्मकं जगद्वासुदेवशरीरं तदात्मकम्-सत्य and असत्य culminate into अस्ति and नास्ति. कर्मन् is the हेतु of सम्यग्व्यवहारार्हभेद s.

[Rāmānuja's comment on the Viṣṇupurāṇa verses as a whole is as follows—

The passages have to be interpreted in accordance with the context.

Prior to these passages the भुवनाकाश is described in detail. The verse II. 12·37, viz.

यदम्बु वैष्णवः कायस्ततो विप्र वसुन्धरा ।
पद्माकारा समुद्भूता पर्वताब्ध्यादिसंयुता ॥

shows that अम्बु is विष्णुशरीर; the अम्बुपरिणामभूत ब्रह्माण्ड is also विष्णुशरीर, and विष्णु is its आत्मन्.

On the strength of this, the subsequent passages have to be explained:-

'अस्ति' refers to चिदंश which is वाङ्मनसागोचर, ज्ञानैकाकार, अविनाशि and without any प्राकृतभेद s.

'नास्ति' refers to अचिदंश which is a परिणामभेद due to चिदंशकर्मन् and विनाशि, 'नास्ति' does *not* mean ज्ञानबाध्य.

Both constitute विष्णुशरीर, and hence are वासुदेवात्मक.

This, in brief, is the meaning of the passages in question.

The next two verses II. 12 · 46 and 47,

(1) यज्ञः पशुर्वह्निरशेषऋत्विक्संवत्सराः स्वर्गमयश्च कामः ।
इन्यादिकर्माश्रितमार्गदृष्टं भूरादिभोगाश्च फलानि तेषाम् ॥

and

यच्चैतद्भुवनगतं मया तवोक्तं सर्वत्र व्रजति हि कर्मवश्य एकः ।
ज्ञात्वैकं ध्रुवमचलं सदैकरूपं तत्कुर्याद्विशति हि तेन वासुदेवम् ॥

—these also show that कर्मन् is the cause of all भेद s, and that जगद्याथार्थ्यज्ञान leads one to try for मोक्ष]

[71] In all these passages, there is not one word which is favourable to the idea of सदसदनिर्वचनीय-अविद्या having निर्विशेष-ब्रह्मन् for its abode.

The whole जगत् (चित् and अचित्) is the body of विष्णु and is विष्ण्वात्मक. कर्मन् is the cause of the भेद s of आत्मन् (who is ज्ञानैकाकार) and कर्मन् is the cause of अचित्परिणाम.

'अस्ति' and 'नास्ति' cannot mean सदसदनिर्वचनीय. 'नास्ति' does not mean 'opposed to अस्ति' or तुच्छ, and 'असत्य' does not mean 'opposed to सत्य' or मिथ्या; but both these mean विनाशित्व.

In the verses, वस्त्वस्ति किम्...., मही घटत्वम्...., विनाशित्व is proved and not निष्प्रमाणकत्व or ज्ञानबाध्यत्व.

A thing which undergoes modification is said to be 'नास्ति' (while तुच्छत्व would be प्रमाणसंबन्धानर्हत्व).

बाध occurs when a certain thing which is known to exist at a particular time and at a particular place is found to be *not existing at that time and at that place.*

बाध thus does not apply to a thing appearing different at a different time.

So, कालभेद removes the विरोध there. But that does not make the thing मिथ्या.

ज्ञानस्वरूप-आत्मवस्तु is अस्तिशब्दवाच्य; अचेतन, क्षेत्रज्ञ-भोग्य is कर्मानुगुण, परिणामि, विनाशि, and so नास्त्यर्थगर्भ and is नास्ति, असत्यादिशब्दाभिधेय.

आत्मन् is केवलास्तिबुद्धिबोध्य and so is परमार्थ.

अपरमार्थ means 'to see केवलास्तिबुद्धिबोध्यत्व in things whose अस्तित्व and नास्तित्व are dependent upon देश, काल, कर्मविशेषs etc.'

So, the सामानाधिकरण्य in ज्योतींषि विष्णुः is due to आत्मशरीरभाव.

चित् and अचित्-वस्तुs are respectively called 'अस्ति,' 'नास्ति.'

The स्वरूप of ज्ञान or चित् is not dependent upon कर्मन्, and hence is स्वाभाविक and प्रधान.

The स्वरूप of अचिद्वस्तु is dependent upon कर्मन् and is परिणामि.

[72] VI निवर्तकानुपपत्ति—

The argument of the पूर्वपक्षिन् that the श्रुतिs speak of निर्विशेषब्रह्मज्ञान alone as the cause of अविद्यानिवृत्ति, is wrong.

(1) Many passages like वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तम्, तस्य नाम महद्यशः, show ब्रह्मन् to be सविशेष and सगुण.

(2) So, मोक्ष is from सविशेष-ज्ञान alone.

(3) Passages like 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः' show that सविशेषब्रह्मन् is the topic referred to therein.

—तत्त्वमसि—

Here the सामानाधिकरण्य is *not* निर्विशेषवस्त्वैक्यपर, nor स्वरूपपर. For, तत् refers to सर्वज्ञ, सत्यसंकल्प Brahman (as is clear from तदैक्षत, बहु स्याम् etc.) and त्वं refers to अचिद्विशिष्टजीवशरीरक Brahman (in the उपक्रमवाक्य).

So, सामानाधिकरण्य refers to प्रकारद्वयावस्थितैकवस्तु (or, in other words to विशेष्यविशेषणभाव).

(1) If these two प्रकारs are given up, there would be no सामानाधिकरण्य itself, for there would be no प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेद in the absence of the प्रकारs.

(2) Both तत् and त्वम् would have to be understood in a लाक्षणिक sense. (But Rāmānuja allows लक्षणा of all the पदs if necessary, elsewhere)

The Advaitin refers to जहदजहल्लक्षणा in such cases—तत् gives up its सर्वज्ञत्वांश and keeps up the चैतन्य and त्वम् gives up its अल्पज्ञत्वांश and keeps up the चैतन्य).

In ' सोऽयं देवदत्तः ', there is no लक्षणा of both सः and अयम्, for here the ऐक्य is between भूतकालीन-देवदत्त and वर्तमानकालीन-देवदत्त, so, देशभेदविरोध is removed by कालभेदविरोध.

(3) There would be उपक्रमविरोध—the उपक्रम-तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् clearly shows सविशेषत्व of Brahman.

(4) एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा would not be possible. If the whole जगत् is मिथ्या, it cannot be ज्ञानविषय; how could there be सर्वविज्ञान then ?

(5) There would be विरोध with श्रुतिs that speak of Brahman as सर्वज्ञ, without any दोषs, full of कल्याणगुणs etc. How can such a Brahman be the आश्रय of अज्ञान and तत्कार्यानन्तपुरुषार्थ ?

If it be said that the सामानाधिकरण्य in तत्त्वमसि is बाधार्थ—

तत — त्वम् (Here त्वमर्थ ' जीव ' is बाधित),

शुक्ति— रजतम् — shows रजतबाध (नेदं रजतम्),

then the following दोषs would still persist :—

(1) लक्षणा of both the पद्s

(2) सामानाधिकरण्यस्वरूपहानि

(3) उपक्रमविरोध

(4) श्रुत्यन्तरविरोध.

and one more दोष would be there, बाधस्यागत्या परिकल्पनम्.

In शुक्तिः रजतम् — बाध is possible because that is known by other प्रमाणs; बाध is due to our knowing the शुक्तित्वधर्म.

But in 'तत , त्वम्' बाध is अगत्या परिकल्पित.

तत् is निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् according to you; there is no धर्म residing in it (corresponding to it) which would cause this बाध.

If you say तत् means अनाच्छादितस्वरूप which had been आच्छादित before, then if the अधिष्ठान is not प्रकाश, भ्रम and बाध would not take place.

[73] If you say भ्रमाश्रयाधिष्ठान is अतिरोहित, then that itself is भ्रमविरोधि and when that is known, भ्रम and बाध as residing in it would be impossible.

So, as long as you do not admit a real पारमार्थिक धर्म other than the अधिष्ठान and its तिरोधान, भ्रान्ति and बाध would be difficult to prove.

[पुरुष (अधिष्ठान) + राजत्व (धर्म) ⟶ by भ्रम = व्याधत्व.

The भ्रम is removed by perceiving राजत्व, *not* merely पुरुषत्व or पुरुषाकार. पुरुषत्व is प्रकाशमान and need not be described and it is not incapable of destroying the भ्रम].

Thus तत् and त्वम् are used in their primary senses, meaning

जगत्कारणकब्रह्म = तत् and जीवशरीरकं = त्वम् and the सामानाधिकरण्य refers to a प्रकारद्वयविशिष्टैकवस्तु and this also shows that ब्रह्मन् is जीवान्तर्यामि.

The उपक्रम is thus properly taken into account.

The एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा takes proper effect, for ब्रह्मन् as सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीर is the कारण and as स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीर it is the कार्य.

Other श्रुतिs like ' सत्यकाम...' ' परास्य शक्तिः ' etc. are properly explained.

The Advaitin is now asked — How can you explain the उद्देश्य and the विधेय (उपादेय) in ' तत्त्वमसि ' ?

For, your तत् = ब्रह्मन् is not प्रत्यक्ष and so cannot be the उद्देश्य, and त्वम् refers to अचिद्विशिष्टजीवशरीरकब्रह्मन् which also is not प्रत्यक्ष and hence cannot be the उद्देश्य.

The Advaitin would probably say that त्वम् is the औपाधिकजीव and hence is प्रत्यक्ष and therefore the उद्देश्य proper.

The सिद्धान्तिन् says—

' तत्त्वमसि ' does not enjoin upon anyone any thing. The earlier passage ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् has already told what is to be learnt. In this passage there is just the particular conclusion (सामानाधिकरण्येन विशेषेणोपसंहारः), that is all.

In ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्, there was वैयधिकरण्येन-उपदेश in the form-ब्रह्मन् is the आत्मन् of the जगत्.

शास्त्र does not enjoin what is already known.

In ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्—इदं सर्वम् refers to both the चित् and अचित् entities, and by ऐतदात्म्य is pointed out that this is the आत्मन् of इदं सर्वं (चिदचिद्वस्तु).

In the same way various श्रुतिs i. e. तैत्तिरिय, बृहदारण्यक etc. speak of चित् and अचित् on the one hand, and ब्रह्मन् on the other having शरीरात्मभाव. Even in the छान्दोग्य, अनेन जीवेनात्मना etc. shows that all things become what they are (वस्तु) and are शब्दवाच्य, because ब्रह्मात्मकजीव has entered into them.

This must be the meaning of the passage, for it has the same meaning as of the passage, सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् in the तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्.

That जीव is ब्रह्मात्मक is due to ब्रह्मन् having entered into that.

So, everything other than ब्रह्मन् is the शरीर of ब्रह्मन् and words meaning other than ब्रह्मन् refer to a thing right upto ब्रह्मन् or तत्तत्पदार्थविशिष्ट-ब्रह्मन्.

So, the views of—

(1) निर्विशेषवस्त्वैक्यवादिन्s, (2) भेदाभेदवादिन्s, and (3) केवलभेदवादिन्s, as regards ब्रह्मात्मभाव, are fit to be discarded.

[74] (1) निर्विशेषब्रह्मवादिन्'s view can be refuted thus—The question to be put to the holders of the view is — How and to whom तादात्म्य is to be preached by तत्त्वमसि when there is only one thing? Such preaching is known by सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म itself, and so there is no necessity of a further उपदेश. The उपदेश cannot remove the कल्पितभेद; for, सामानाधिकरण्य teaches विशेषणविशेष्य-(प्रकारद्वय)-ऐक्य. If at all, सामानाधिकरण्य may well be said to preach the contrary of तादात्म्य.

(2) भेदाभेदवादिन्s—(1) भास्करीयs and (2) यादवप्रकाशियs (भास्करीयs are the followers of भास्कर, a commentator, on the Brahmasūtras; contemporaneous with Śaṅkara. Possibly औडुलोमि also, referred to in the Brahmasūtras, held the भेदाभेद view. यादवप्रकाशीयs are the followers of यादवप्रकाश, who was once a teacher of Rāmānuja who differed from him on various points).

The refutation is as follows—

(A) Brahman would get contaminated by the जीवगतदोषs, due to उपाधिs. So, how can Brahman be समस्तकल्याणगुणाकर etc. ? (दोष in the औपाधिकभेदवादिन्'s view).

(B) If Brahman without any उपाधिs becomes जीव, जीवदोषs would be स्वाभाविक in Brahman which cannot be called निर्दोष ! (दोष in the स्वाभाविकभेदाभेद-वादिन्'s view).

(3) केवलभेदवादिन्s (वैशेषिकs)—

(They are frankly dualists).

How can there be ऐक्य between two totally different things under any circumstances?

So, according to all these, ब्रह्मात्मभावोपदेश as referred to in the श्रुतिs is impossible. If we accept their views, good-bye to all Vedānta !

If on the contrary, our (विशिष्टाद्वैतिन्'s) view is accepted, everything is so smooth and proper. We can explain the ब्रह्मात्मभावोपदेश by not resorting to लक्षणा even!

Thus—as in

(1) षण्ढः गौः— Here the जाति, गोत्व is a द्रव्यप्रकार or विशेषण and ultimately refers to षण्ढत्वविशिष्टगोव्यक्ति.

(2) पटः शुक्लः— Here गुण-शुक्ल is a द्रव्यप्रकार or विशेषण and ultimately refers to शुक्लगुणविशिष्टपटव्यक्ति.

we have in

मनुष्यः पुरुषः, आत्मा etc. also, मनुष्यदेह, the प्रकार of आत्मन् and ultimately refers to मनुष्यत्वविशिष्ट-आत्मन्.

So, प्रकारत्व is सामानाधिकरण्यनिबन्धन i. e. the cause of सामानाधिकरण्य, and not the mutually exclusive जाति etc.

If जाति is the cause of the सामानाधिकरण्य, then अयं शुक्लः would have no सामानाधिकरण्य; or if गुण is the cause, अयं गौः would not have सामानाधिकरण्य.

In the case of certain द्रव्यs that can remain or be understood as separate, a मत्वर्थीय प्रत्यय is necessary as in दण्डी or कुण्डली देवदत्तः (wherein इन् is a मत्वर्थीय प्रत्यय).

But such a प्रत्यय is not necessary in the case of द्रव्यs that are पृथक्प्रति-पत्तिस्थित्यनर्हे. Their विशेषणत्व is understood from the सामानाधिकरण्य.

It might be objected that if मनुष्यादिशरीर is आत्मप्रकार, just as जाति and गुण are प्रकारs of द्रव्य (प्रकारिन्), then just as जाति or गुण, and द्रव्य (प्रकार-प्रकारिन्s) are comprehended together as a rule, we ought to comprehend मनुष्यशरीर and

8

आत्मन् together, but we cannot do so. So, in 'मनुष्यः, आत्मा,' the सामानाधिकरण्य is लाक्षणिक only.

An answer to this is :—

मनुष्यशरीर in reality does correspond to जाति in all respects. Thus शरीर is आत्मैकाश्रय (शरीर perishes when separated from the Ātman), आत्मैकप्रयोजन (शरीर exists for the enjoyment by आत्मन् alone), and is आत्मैकप्रकार (मनुष्य, देव, etc. are known as just आत्मविशेषणs).

जाति is also व्यक्त्यैकाश्रय, व्यक्त्यैकप्रयोजन and व्यक्त्यैकप्रकार.

So, मनुष्यः, आत्मा is सामानाधिकरण्येन व्यवहार, in the world as also in the वेद.

The reason why गो etc. denote right upto व्यक्ति is exactly this :—

दण्ड etc. have not got these characteristics, so they require a मत्वर्थीय प्रत्यय to become a विशेषण.

जाति and व्यक्ति are seen together simultaneously, because both जाति and व्यक्ति are चाक्षुष and एकसामग्रीवेद्य.

But शरीर and आत्मन् cannot be seen together simultaneously, because while शरीर is चाक्षुष, आत्मन् is not.

But because they are पृथग्ग्रहणयोग्य, you cannot jump to the conclusion that they have no प्रकारतैकस्वरूप.

पृथग्ग्रहणयोग्यत्व has nothing to do with प्रकारतैकस्वरूप.

The eye perceives पृथिवी, but not गन्ध which is समवेत with it; so the eye perceives शरीर but not the आत्मन्, though शरीर is an आत्मप्रकार.

So, seeing or not seeing together is of no consequence. आत्मन् like the body cannot be seen by the eye, but this does not take away from the body its आत्मप्रकारत्वस्वभाव. For सामानाधिकरण्य is due to तत्प्रकारतैकस्वभावत्व alone.

Words therefore denote objects as प्रकारs of आत्मन्.

[75] Here an objector says—But surely we use the word 'शरीर' so many times to mean only शरीर and not आत्मपर्यन्तशरीर.

The answer to this is—When we want specifically to refer to शरीर only, we use that expression that way.

So also we use गोत्व, शुक्लत्व to refer to जाति only for specific purposes, but that does not take away their real import.

So देवमनुष्यशब्दs mean देवमनुष्यशरीर-विशिष्ट-जीव, and the जीवात्मवाचि words mean जीवविशिष्टपरमात्मन्.

So, चित् = चिद्विशिष्ट ब्रह्मन् and अचित् = अचिद्विशिष्ट ब्रह्मन्; hence there is the सामानाधिकरण्य as both चित् and अचित् are the प्रकार of ब्रह्मन्.

The सूत्रकार in the सूत्र 'आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति' refers to this very शरीरात्मभाव, which सूत्र is explained by the वाक्यकार to mean 'आत्मेत्येव तु गृह्णीयात्'.

In the वेदान्तसंग्रह (by रामानुज.) all this has been explained in detail.

It is on the theory of the ब्रह्मप्रकारत्व of चिदचित्, exp'ained above, that the various श्रुति and स्मृति passages referring to the स्वरूपविवेक of the three viz. चित्, अचित् and ब्रह्मन्, कार्यकारणैकत्व, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानत्व can be properly explained.

Thus —

(1) अचित् is described as भोग्य, चित् as भोक्तृ, and ब्रह्मन् as ईशितृ. [These descriptions refer to the स्वरूपभेद].

In the passage मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म etc. the *Gītā* speaks of the creation of the creatures, चित् and अचित् due to चिदचित्संसर्ग produced by the Lord [ईशितृ].

[76] (2) Certain passages speak of चित् and अचित् as the परमपुरुषशरीर, and as being controlled by the परमपुरुष, and thus refer to the अपृथक्स्थिति of चित् and अचित् from the परमात्मन्.

(3) परमपुरुष is the कारणावस्थ-जगत् and is also the कार्यावस्थ-जगत्. This points out to the परमपुरुष's being कार्यकारणरूप. This makes it possible to have कारणविज्ञानेन कार्यविज्ञान i. e. एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान.

In the passage 'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' both चित् and अचित् are intended, and they are the शरीर of the परमात्मन्, विज्ञान is चिद्रूप and अविज्ञान is अचिद्रूप.

So, जीवानामुत्पत्तिः is नामरूपव्याकरणम् and जीवानां प्रलयः is नामरूपव्याकरणाभावः.


[77] As the परमात्मन् has entered all अचिद्वस्तुs by स्वात्मकजीव, all वाचक words denote अचिज्जीवविशिष्टपरमात्मन्.

So, तत् refers to कारणावस्थपरमात्मन्, सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्मन्—i. e. the कारण; and त्वम् refers to कार्यावस्थपरमात्मन्, स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्मन्—i. e. the कार्य.


And hence there is सामानाधिकरण्य and कार्यकारणैक्य.

An objector now asks—If चित् and अचित् are the body of Brahman, and the three together (संघात) are the उपादानकारण, would there not be संकर of the स्वभावs of these three ?

The reply is—There is no स्वभावसंकर, the case being similar to a चित्रपट.



Here the तन्तुसंघात is the उपादान, but the शौक्ल्यादिगुण-संबन्ध is separately in A, B. C.



In the case of the तन्तुs, they are पृथक्स्थितियोग्य and are occasionally brought together by पुरुषेच्छा.

[सूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्मन् is the उपादान (चिदचिदीश्वरसंघात); but in the कार्यावस्था (स्थूलचिदचित्प्रकारकब्रह्मन्), there is no संकर between भोक्तृ-भोग्य-नियन्तृत्व].

But here चित् and अचित् are always परमपुरुषशरीर and are पदार्थs as the प्रकार of the परमपुरुष who is thus always सर्वशब्दवाच्य. This is the only difference between चित्रपट and चिदचिद्ब्रह्मन्. स्वभावभेद and स्वभावासंकर are the same in both.

So, Brahman even when it enters into कार्य, does not change its nature and remains अविकृत as before.

(1) कार्यावस्था is just अवस्थान्तरापत्ति (स्थूल in place of सूक्ष्म).

(2) निर्गुण means 'void of हेयगुणs'.

[78] (3) ज्ञानस्वरूप means ज्ञानैकनिरूपणीय and स्वप्रकाश.

(4) भेदप्रतिषेध means — अब्रह्मात्मक - वस्तु - नानात्व is अतत्त्व and so denied, as Brahman itself is नानाप्रकारावस्थित by its own संकल्प.

This प्रतिषेध does not refer to the नानाप्रकारत्व due to नानानामरूपभाक्त्व of ब्रह्मन् but refers to that due to its own संकल्प as mentioned in श्रुतिs like 'बहु स्याम्, प्रजायेय' etc. and established in निषेधवाक्यs like 'सर्वं तं परादोऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद' etc.

(1) So, the श्रुतिs speaking of स्वरूपभेद and स्वभावभेद of चित्, अचित् and ईश्वर, and

(2) the श्रुतिs speaking of कार्यकारणभाव and कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्व are not विरुद्ध at all. This is known from the श्रुतिs stating—

(1) चित् and अचित् are always the शरीर of परमात्मन्.

(2) चित् and अचित् in the कारणदशा have नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशा.

(3) चित् and अचित् in the कार्यदशा have नामरूपविभागार्हस्थूलदशा.

So, ब्रह्माज्ञानवाद, औपाधिकब्रह्मभेदवाद etc. are all wrong, being opposed to the श्रुतिs.

Though चित्, अचित्, and ईश्वर are described in the श्रुतिs as पृथक्स्वभाव, the श्रुतिs themselves say that they have शरीरात्मभाव or प्रकारप्रकारिभाव.

Thus both कार्यकारणभावप्रतिपादन and कार्यकारणयोरैक्यप्रतिपादन are अविरुद्ध.

The same thing is described in two ways :—

It is like this--Six sacrifices are mentioned independently and separately in six passages; in other passages they are just divided into two groups. But it is the same substance or topic.

Name	Deity	Offering	Time
(1) आग्नेय	अग्नि	in 8 कपालs	New-moon and Full-moon.
(2) अग्निषोमीय	अग्नि and सोम	in 11 कपालs	Full-moon.
{ (3) ऐन्द्र	इन्द्र	(1) Curds	New-moon.
(4) ऐन्द्र }	इन्द्र	(2) Milk	New-moon.
(5) ऐन्द्राग्न	इन्द्र and अग्नि	Curds in 8 कपालs	New-moon
(6) उपांशु	अग्नि and सोम	Ghee	Full-moon day.

These six are grouped in two—

(1)	Full-moon sacrifices (य एवं विद्वान्पौर्णमासीं यजते)	1, 2, 6
(2)	New-moon sacrifices (य एवं विद्वानमावास्यां यजते)	1, 3, 4, 5

So the Śrutis speak of—

(1) चिदचिदीश्वर as having a separate स्वरूप each.

(2) चित्, अचित्, as the परमात्मशरीर; and परमात्मन् as their आत्मन्.

(3) कार्यावस्थ-as well as कारणावस्थ-परमात्मन् as एक एव.

Really परमात्मन् is चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीर, but there is no contradiction in referring to him as परमात्मन् only, just as we say only आत्मा सुखी, though आत्मन् is मनुष्यपिण्डशरीरक.

[79] VII निवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति—

The पूर्वपक्षिन् says —There is अविद्यानिवृत्ति by ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञान.

The reply is as follows—

(1) बन्ध is real and can never be said to be मिथ्या, as it is actually experienced, and so cannot be ज्ञाननिवर्त्य. It could only be removed by उपासना and परमपुरुषप्रसाद.

(2) Actually the ब्रह्मात्मैक्यविज्ञान being 'false' would make the बन्ध more effective and doubly powerful ! ! (Your remedy is worse than the disease).

(3) Your निवर्तकज्ञान is मिथ्या and would require another निवर्तक to remove it.

(4) You cannot say that निवर्तकज्ञान removes all भेदजात opposed to it and itself perishes after this, being क्षणिक; for the स्वरूप, उत्पत्ति, विनाश of निवर्तकज्ञान are all काल्पनिक; we shall still require a निवर्तक for the अविद्या which is विनाशतत्कल्पनाकल्पकरूप.

(5) If निवर्तकज्ञान is real, and its विनाश is ब्रह्मस्वरूप itself, then there cannot be निवर्तकज्ञानोत्पत्ति itself. For, as long as ब्रह्मन् (निवर्तकज्ञानविनाश) is there, how can there be its उत्पत्ति ?

(6) You cannot specify who the knower of this ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तकृत्स्ननिषेधज्ञान is.

The 'knower' cannot be अध्यस्तरूप (and also other than Brahman), for, he being निषिध्य and निवर्तकज्ञानकर्म, cannot be the कर्तृ.

The 'knower' cannot be ब्रह्मस्वरूप (i. e. one with ब्रह्मन्), for, the question is about being the knower of Brahman—Is this Brahman's own nature or is it superimposed [अध्यस्त] ? If it is ब्रह्मन्'s स्वरूप, then you have come over to our side ! As that is *our* doctrine ! And if it is अध्यस्त, then this अध्यास, which is the product of Avidyā cannot be removing that मूलाविद्या. If that requires another निवर्तकज्ञान, there would be अनवस्था.

(7) To say that निवर्तकज्ञान, and its knower are removed by the निवर्तकज्ञान

itself, because they are ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्त, is like saying—"Devadatta cut down everything except भूतल" meaning that in one and the same process of cutting is included 'the cutter Devadatta and the cutting action as well'!!

(8) अध्यस्तज्ञातृ would not try to destroy himself by having the निवर्तकज्ञान! स्वनाश cannot be पुरुषार्थ for anybody!

(9) If that नाश is ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगम, then there is no necessity for admitting भेद or मूलाविद्या, दिष्ट (fate) etc. Why flog a dead horse!

Therefore, बन्ध is real and is removed by ज्ञान which is उपासनात्मक and dependent upon the proper discharge of वर्णाश्रमकर्मन्. बन्ध is caused, not by अनिर्वचनीयाविद्या but by कर्मप्रवाहरूपज्ञान. केवलकर्मन् gives अल्प and अस्थिर फल.

केवलाकारपरित्याग—Mere कर्मन् void of आत्मयाथात्म्यबुद्धिसंस्कार, and सकाम.

Rāmānuja is now controverting in detail the पूर्वमीमांसा view 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्'. It may be admitted that Rāmānuja shows great ingenuity in interpreting क्रियार्थ so as to conform to his own doctrine of उपासना.

[80] अधिकरणपूर्वपक्ष:—[मीमांसक's view about words and their import].

शब्द can point to a कार्यार्थ only. The बोधकत्व of शब्द is known only from the वृद्धव्यवहार, and व्यवहार is all कार्यबुद्धिपूर्वक. Brahman is परिनिष्पन्न and not कार्य. So, शब्द cannot tell us anything about ब्रह्मन्. [आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्।]

[Sacrifices are the 'be-all and end-all' according to the मीमांसकs. Sacrifices can be only known from शास्त्र, as they are अत्यन्ताप्राप्त by other प्रमाणs, and they are कार्यरूप. So whatever is कार्यरूप alone is worth while.]

(1) सिद्धवस्तुs cannot be definitely associated with any अर्थविशेष.

Thus 'पुत्रस्ते जातः'-this meaning cannot be had from the मुखविकासादिहर्षलिङ्गs (for the हर्ष may be due to the child being born at an auspicious time, or to the painless delivery of its mother, or to the child being the first child and so on).

(2) The definite meaning of a word (referring to a सिद्धवस्तु) cannot be had from the meaning of other words in the sentence, or from the meaning of the case, from the use of a case (विभक्ति). For, there also the कार्यांशविशेष exists, and some of the words heard, being known before, do refer to the कार्य idea there too.

(Some मीमांसकs do accept the सिद्धवस्त्वभिधानशक्ति of words),

(3) 'नायं सर्पो रज्जुरेषा' does not as a rule refer to सर्पाभावहेतुत्वनिश्चय, for the भयनिवृत्ति caused by these words may be due to merely knowing 'This something is निश्चेष्ट, निर्विष and अचेतन,' not necessarily 'There is no serpent.'

So, 'Whenever there is प्रवृत्ति, there is कार्यबुद्धि' — this व्याप्ति cannot be challenged. शब्द is प्रवर्तकार्थबोधिन्, and hence it has शक्ति for कार्यान्वितस्वार्थ.

Thus all पदs are कार्यपर and therefore वाचस्पतिमिश्र's view that इतरान्वित-सिद्ध thing can be known to be पदवाच्य, is wrong. वाचस्पतिमिश्र takes this view, because if अर्थ is already कार्यान्वित, it would not be associated with कार्यपद. If it is already कारकान्वित, it would not be associated with the कारकपद; so, शक्ति should be only इतरान्वित. This is really unnecessary, if all words are regarded as कार्यपद.

इष्टसाधनताबुद्धि is not by itself प्रवृत्तिहेतु, for this इष्टसाधनताबुद्धि might refer to past and future things or to वर्तमान things, but through कार्यबुद्धि itself—Nobody goes in for प्रवृत्ति, unless the इष्टसाधनता is possible, so प्रवृत्ति requires not merely इष्टसाधनता but its being reduced to कार्यबुद्धि. So, शब्द refers only to the प्रवर्तक and कार्य is known from वेद्s. The परिनिष्पन्न-ब्रह्मन् and the so-called फल from that, ब्रह्मप्राप्ति-cannot be known from the वेद्s. The knowledge of कर्मन् alone gives स्थिरफल.

So ब्रह्मविचारारम्भ (which according to you gives अनन्तफल and you also hold that कर्मन् gives अल्प and अस्थिर फल; but this is all wrong) need not be undertaken.

वृद्धव्यवहार is the best guide for knowing the शक्ति or denotation of words, for, that is directly connected with प्रवृत्ति and gives definite information.

A (उत्तमवृद्ध) —गामानय (वाचिकव्यवहार)→ B (मध्यम वृद्ध) —गमन, and आनयन of गो. (कायिक व्यवहार)→ C (बाल)

witnessing the procedure has no difficulty in connecting the bringing of the cow with the words गामानय.

The other methods are indefinite—(1) Inference (some मीमांसक्s hold this view)—

A —पुत्रस्ते जातः (वाचिक व्यवहार)→ B —hears and has मुखविकासादि (कायिक व्यवहार)→ C witnessing this infers

from the मुखविकास etc. पुत्रजन्म.

This is wrong, for, from मुखविकास you can only infer that something desirable has happened.

मुखविकास may be due to B's having secured a prize in a lottery or a past remembrance or happy delivery of B's wife etc.

Even if C has inside information that B's wife had been nearing delivery, B's मुखविकास might have been due to the birth of a कन्या (for some regard कन्या as नन्दिनी !). So, the word uttered ' पुत्र ' at best may denote ' some desirable event ', not definitely a ' son '.

(2) Etymological—

The नैयायिक्s hold this and the next two views—

अन्नं पचति—By knowing the etymology of पचति, you can say that अन्न means ' something cooked,' not necessarily ' food which can be eaten ', which is the proper meaning of ' अन्न. '

(3) Meaning of विभक्ति—शस्त्रेण छिनत्ति—शस्त्रेण is instrumental, and so means a करण. But how can we know what *definite* करण is meant by शस्त्र from merely knowing the meaning of the instrumental case ?

(4) Knowing the meaning of other words in the sentence—

Here also no definiteness can be arrived at.

[In all the above cases, the known words must be admitted to be connected with a क्रिया sometime or other, so the unknown words should also be taken to be क्रियार्थ.]

Thus, words are connected with क्रिया and deal with साध्यवस्तुs and not with सिद्धवस्तुs.

Even when A tells B who is सर्पभीत, 'नायं सर्पः' and B's face shows भयनिवृत्ति, you cannot infer that भयनिवृत्ति gives him the सर्पार्थ, for भयनिवृत्ति may be due to his understanding that the thing seen by him is निश्चेष्ट, अचेतन etc. (not necessarily that there is no सर्प.)

चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः etc.—

चातुर्मास्य sacrifices are performed at the commencement of the three seasons—(1) Spring (2) वर्षा (rainy) and (3) Autumn.

(1) वैश्वदेव Performed on the फाल्गुनपूर्णिमासी
(2) वरुणप्रघास ,, ,, ,, आषाढपूर्णिमासी
(3) साकमेध ,, ,, ,, कार्तिकपूर्णिमासी

Sometimes a fourth viz. शुनासीरीय is added. All these sacrifices are हविर्यज्ञs.

[81] Now follows the reply of the सिद्धान्तिन्—

The पूर्वपक्षिन् is preaching something that runs counter to accepted ideas about knowing the meaning of words.

(1) Elders point out to the child a particular object by name and the child realises that a particular word गो has बोध्यबोधकभाव with the गो-object.

(There cannot be जन्यजनकभाव; गोशब्द does not produce गोव्यक्ति or other संबन्ध. गोशब्द has merely a संकेत for गोव्यक्ति, nobody knows who makes that संकेत; the शब्द conveys the meaning, that is all we care for.)

(2) In some cases, the elder directly mentions the meanings themselves of words.

So, there is nothing wrong in सिद्धवस्तुs being referred to by words.

(3) The पूर्वपक्षिन्'s view that वृद्धव्यवहार (वाचिक) shows the meaning of words is wrong. We might know the meaning from the चेष्टा itself, involved in the वृद्धव्यवहार, not necessarily from words; thus—

A —by चेष्टा / कायिक व्यवहार→ —tells→ B —to convey to→ C पिता ते सुखमास्ते

B —goes and tells→ C पिता ते सुखमास्ते

D, witnessing this procedure and knowing the import of the चेष्टा, comes to know later that a particular word means a particular thing.

So, the निर्बन्ध 'कार्यार्थे एव व्युत्पत्तिः' is not universal. Here it is चेष्टार्थे.

Again, A tells B 'अम्बां वन्दस्व'; B goes and salutes his (B's) mother; C seeing this व्यवहार is more likely to understand by अम्बा 'B's mother,' and when told 'अम्बां वन्दस्व' would salute B's mother rather than his own mother !!

So कार्यार्थे व्युत्पत्ति seen from such व्यवहार does not apply to संबन्धिशब्दs. Thus the argument of the पूर्वपक्षिन् is faulty.

The वेदान्त tells us how we should know the परिनिष्पन्न-ब्रह्मन्, how we should worship it, and what the उपासनाफल is.

The ब्रह्मविचार is thus quite in order.

Even if it is held that वेद should be कार्यार्थ, it is easy to prove that passages dealing with ब्रह्मन्, its स्वरूप, विशेषणs (गुणs), फल etc. are quite in order, like similarly situated मीमांसा passages.

The मीमांसकs regard the following types of passages useful for their विधि ideas—(1) Direct विधिवाक्यs, (2) विध्यङ्गभूतवाक्यs that refer to the fruit of the विधि, and (3) विधिफलविशेषणभूतवाक्यs.

(All these are found in the case of the परिनिष्पन्न-ब्रह्मन्).

साध्य (ज्योतिष्टोम)	सिद्ध (ब्रह्मन्)
(1) Direct विधिवाक्य— स्वर्गकामः ज्योतिष्टोमेन जुहुयात् ।	आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः, श्रोतव्यः, मन्तव्यः, निदिध्यासितव्यः ।
(Here the फल is mentioned)	(Here no फल is mentioned)
(2) विध्यङ्गभूतवाक्यs (which refer to the फलविधि) स्वर्गकामः etc.	इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ।
(3) फलविशेषणभूतवाक्यs— like यस्मिन्नोष्णं न शीतं नार्तिः । This is a स्वर्गविशेषण.	सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । (describing the गुणs)

Even though फल is not mentioned, the तात्पर्य of विधिवाक्य does extend to फलविशेषण, as for instance—

रात्रीरुपेयात् (विधि)	
(4) प्रतितिष्ठन्तीह वा एते य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति । This अर्थवादवाक्य refers to प्रतिष्ठाफल and is in order.	Passages pointing out to संसारफल.
(5) Even वाक्यs referring to फल arising from acting contrary to विधि are in order, for, indirectly they help the rigid observance of the विधि.	यस्त्वविज्ञानवान्भवत्यमनस्कः सदाशुचिः । न स तत्पदमाप्नोति संसारं चाधिगच्छति ॥
Thus ब्राह्मणाय नापगुरेत (revile or beat) योऽपगुरुते शतेन (a hundred gold coins or cows) यातयात् (should suffer the penalty)	So, उपासनाविरुद्धवाक्यs pointing to the अनिष्टसंसारफल direct a man's mind to उपासना.
Thus विरुद्धमपि फलं विधेयोपकारकं भवति । (अपगोरण — साधन) शतयातना — साध्य.	

So, all the passages in the उत्तरमीमांसा (वेदान्त) are quite useful in accordance with the पूर्वमीमांसा tenets accepted by the पूर्वपक्षिन्.

[82] Even in the so-called व्यवहारवाक्यs, 'गामानय', etc., the शब्दशक्ति is not a कार्यार्थ. Thus you regard

कार्यम् —कृत्युद्देश्यम् which follows the कृति (आन्तरः प्रयत्नः—mental effort)

= कृतिकर्मत्वम्

= कृत्या प्राप्तुमिष्टतमम्

= सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा.

This इष्टतमत्व cannot reside in शब्दार्थ which is कार्य according to you. इष्टतमत्व resides in सुख.

Even if it is argued that कृतिकर्मत्वम् = कृतिप्रवर्तकत्वम्, so that प्रवर्तकत्व may reside in the शब्दार्थ, as after knowing शब्दार्थ, one goes in for प्रवृत्ति, our answer is—

This कृतिकर्मत्व (as meaning कृतिप्रवर्तकत्व) is nothing but कृतिसाध्येच्छाविषयस्वरूपत्व, so that कृत्युद्देश्य is not different from this इच्छाविषय. No one goes in for प्रवृत्ति, unless he perceives the इष्टत्व and the कृत्यधीनसिद्धत्व of a thing.

The पूर्वपक्षिन् amends the idea of कृत्युद्देश्य to mean 'अनुकूलत्व' so that it may be different from सुख.

But कृत्युद्देश्यत्व cannot mean पुरुषानुकूलत्व, for सुख itself is पुरुषानुकूल. दुःखनिवृत्ति is not a positive गुण; it simply means the cessation of a प्रतिकूल thing.

So, any thing, क्रिया etc. other than सुख, cannot be अनुकूल.

So, in 'गामानय' etc. the क्रिया being void of कृत्युद्देश्य (even though taken in the sense of 'अनुकूल') would cease to be possessed of कार्यत्व and would not be the शब्दार्थ.

Actually far from being अनुकूल, क्रिया etc., cause exhaustion and so are प्रतिकूल.

(3) The पूर्वपक्षिन् says—'In order that कार्य should have कृत्युद्देश्यत्व (कृतिकर्मत्व and पुरुषानुकूलत्व, the meaning I wanted to give to कृत्युद्देश्यत्व, has been proved by the सिद्धान्तिन् to be wrong and useless for my purpose), I would interpret कृत्युद्देश्यत्व to mean कृतिं प्रति शेषित्वम् (being 'principal' to कृति).

The reply is—This would not do.

(1) First, we ask—What is this to be the 'principal' (शेषिन्)? शेषिन् you have never explained.

(2) If you say शेषत्व means fit to be associated with volition for effecting आनयन and शेषित्व would be corresponding to it (in 'गामानय'),


(पर = आनयनः and आनयन would be the शेषिन्);

then this शेष (कृतिसंबन्धयोग्य) being concerned with the शेषिन् only, would not belong to कृति; then आनयन (which is शेषिन् and is कृतिसाध्य), also would cease to be प्रधान connected with कृति. कृति cannot possess the character of a subordinate and so कृतिसाध्य cannot be प्रधान as well.

(3) पर (or आनयन i. e. कृति) cannot be the principal thing as it is dependent upon the desire or volition of another and because, here first what is yet to be ascertained is just the character of the 'aim' of the कृति and things dependent on it cannot therefore be proved as such and even a प्रधान (master, principal thing) is known to possess परोद्देशप्रवृत्त्यर्हता (your definition of शेष).

If it is argued that the master, out of his own volition, acts for भृत्यपोष, our reply is that the servant also out of his own volition acts for प्रधानपोष.

So, you are unable to explain what you mean by कार्य itself; to say then शेष is what is correlated to कार्य (and something साध्य by it, शेषिन् is what is correlated to शेष as its master), is like an attempt to build a superstructure, storey after storey, on no foundations.



So, without telling us what कार्य is, you are as it were taking us round to कार्य itself, through things connected with, or dependent upon the कार्य itself.

(4) The पूर्वपक्षिन् says—now take कृत्युद्देश्यत्व to mean कृतिप्रयोजनत्व. A reply thereto is—

कृतिप्रयोजनत्व (purpose of activity) is nothing but प्रयोजन leading to the rise of कृति and that is obviously इच्छाविषय.

So, कार्य cannot be कृतिसाध्य and कृतिप्रधान, because कृत्युद्देश्य (aim of the volition) cannot be described as any thing other than the desired thing,

As regards the नियोगवाक्य 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत।', we want to state that—

यजेत = यागेनं – यागादुत्पन्नेन, अपूर्वेण स्वर्गं भावयेत् (साधयेत्)

नियोग is shown by the लिङ् 'त्व' in यजेत.

नियोग is different from सुख or दुःखनिवृत्ति (which is the इच्छाविषय) and so must be regarded as सुखप्राप्तिसाधन or दुःखनिवृत्तिसाधन and hence इष्ट and कृतिसाध्य.

It is, therefore, different from क्रिया (कार्य is इच्छाविषय being सुखादिसाधन), otherwise कार्य would be just क्रिया (if नियोग is not regarded as different from क्रिया, as a साधन).

The कार्य of नियोग is just स्वर्गसाधन, and as यागकर्म is क्षणभङ्गि, अपूर्व is said to result from याग, which becomes स्वर्गसाधन.

नियोगकार्य cannot be क्रिया as it cannot be connected with the expression स्वर्गकाम.

If it is not क्रियासाध्य (अपूर्व) which is a स्वर्गादिसाधन, there is no point in admitting any अपूर्व.

The objector says — अपूर्व is इष्ट of its own accord, not as a स्वर्गादिसाधन.

From स्वर्गकामः यजेत, we understand the लिङ्गादिवाच्यकार्य; at that time स्वर्गादिकामान्वय is known, but स्वर्गादिकार्य is not known.

The अपूर्व comes on the scene and refers to स्वर्गादि of its own accord and confirms the स्वर्गादिकार्य. Thus अपूर्व is not स्वर्गसाधन.

Our reply is—But all this is ridiculous, because अपूर्व is directly referred to by the स्वर्गकाम expression, as स्वर्गसाधन.

And even at the outset, according to the अन्विताभिधानवादिन्s, स्वर्ग is prominently understood.

A साध्य must have a साधन; कृतिसाध्यताप्रतिपत्ति can occur only if some साधन for securing सुख or दुःखनिवृत्ति is found out, and अपूर्व fits in that role.

[83] What is exactly the purpose of the utility of this वैदिक नियोग ?

(1) It cannot be अनुकूलत्व. We have proved that अनुकूलत्व is just सुख. नियोग is not सुख.

(2) It cannot be a विलक्षण-सुखान्तर called नियोग. There is no प्रमाण to prove this.

There is no अनुभव of any special नियोगसुख. If you say—As नियोग is declared to lead to पुरुषार्थ by शास्त्र, such a सुख may be experienced later after death !—we ask you—Which शास्त्र tells all this ?

Is there any आप्तवाक्य (लौकिक वाक्य) to that effect ? No; for all such वाक्यs require a man to undergo दुःखात्मक-क्रिया. They refer to कृतिसाध्यता and are सुखसाधन.

No वैदिक वाक्य is available; all these वाक्यs refer to the कार्य as स्वर्गसाधन.

No नित्यनैमित्तिक-शास्त्र is available, for this also admits अपूर्व. So कार्य is just सुखादिसाधनभूत.

All ऐहिककर्मन्s give definite fruits and सुख results. नियोगरूपसुखानुभव is not known to be in any way different from this.

So, नियोग cannot be सुख, but is just स्वर्गसाधन.

Even in अर्थवादवाक्यs (where all sorts of imaginary statements are made) we find no mention of नियोगसुखप्रकारs.

[84] So, the लिङ्गादिवाच्य in the विधिवाक्यs is कर्तृव्यापारसाध्य in accordance with the rules of grammar.

धात्वर्थ = what is साध्य by the activity of the agent. धात्वर्थ (याग) refers to the worship of the Lord, and the फल comes from the Lord as is proved by the वेदान्तसूत्र—' फलमत उपपत्तेः ' So the वेदान्तs teach ब्रह्मन् and the ब्रह्मोपासनफलानन्त्य.

The अक्षय्यफल for the चातुर्मास्ययाजिन् is to be understood in a लाक्षणिक or आपेक्षिक sense, lasting for a relatively longer time than ordinary कर्मन् which gives destructible fruit.

So, केवलकर्मन् gives अल्प-अस्थिर-फल ; ब्रह्मज्ञान gives अनन्त-स्थिर-फल.

So ब्रह्मविचारारम्भ is perfectly proper.

— शाब्दी भावना —

	देवदत्तः पचति	
नैयायिकs :— The Agent (कर्ता) has प्राधान्य	=	देवदत्त is the आश्रय of पाकानुकूलकृत्य
वैय्याकरणs :—		
धात्वर्थ / प्रकृत्यर्थ } has प्राधान्य	=	देवदत्तनिष्ठः पाकः
मीमांसकs :—		
प्रत्ययार्थ has प्राधान्य	=	देवदत्तः पाकं करोति ।
' ति ' is the प्रत्यय —करोति भावयति		

लौकिकवाक्य = गाम् आनय

A ——————— B

A	B
(भावयिता) has इच्छा	(पुरुषप्रवृत्तिजनक or अनुकूल)
भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेष ——	प्रेरणा in B —— प्रवृत्ति of B

A has इच्छा which produces प्रेरणा in B, which produces प्रवृत्ति in B.

वैदिकवाक्य— यजेत स्वर्गकामः = यागाद् उत्पन्नेन, अपूर्वेण स्वर्गं भावयेत्

(As वेद is अपौरुषेय, the इच्छा

belongs to the लिङ् termination.)

त (लिङ्) ——————— स्वर्गकामपुरुष प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलप्रेरणा — प्रवृत्ति— स्वर्ग (कार्य)

(has इच्छा or अभिप्रायविशेष) (कृत्युद्देश्य)

So, technically, just as the कार्य of यजेत is स्वर्ग, of ' आनय ' it would be सुख !

Here ends the Bhāṣya on the first Sūtra in the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya. (I. 1. 1.—The Roman figure refers to the Adhyāya, the second Arabic figure refers to the Pāda, and the third refers to the Sūtra).

The Brahmasūtras are divided into four Adhyāyas; each Adhyāya has four Pādas and each Pāda contains a number of Sūtras, subdivided into Adhikaraṇas or Topics, containing a number of Sūtras, one or many as required.

A Sūtra is thus defined :—

' स्वल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥'

['Sūtra knowers know (that to be) a Sūtra which contains a few syllables, is free from doubt (as to its meaning), contains substantial sense, is of universal application, is free from superfluous words and is blameless (from the grammatical or logical point of view).']

A Bhāṣya is defined as follows :—

'सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥'

['Bhāṣya-knowers know (that to be) a Bhāṣya wherein the meaning of the Sūtras is explained by means of sentences resembling the Sūtras (in style, expression etc.) and where (even) its own words are (further) expanded.']

An Adhikaraṇa is defined as :

' विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरः ।
निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥'

[' An Adhikaraṇa is known in the Śāstra to consist of five members—viz. the subject matter, doubt, the arguments in support of the prima facie view, the reply and the decision.']

विषय is the subject-matter, usually a Śruti passage.

विशय is the prima facie view, which the opponent thinks, is supported by the passage.

पूर्वपक्ष—the arguments advanced by the opponent to support his view.

उत्तर—the refutation of the arguments of the opponent.

निर्णय—the ultimate conclusion drawn after balancing the pros and cons.]

There is only one Sūtra in the first Adhikaraṇa. The five items required in the Adhikaraṇa are not separately shown by separate Sūtras here, as is the case in several Adhikaraṇas, but they are all taken into account in the Bhāṣaya itself.

Rāmānuja in his Bhāṣya on I.1.1 has very elaborately dealt with all the necessary points. In fact, his Bhāṣya on I.1,1 contains everything that is needed to understand his Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. The Bhāṣya on the remaining portion of the Brahmasūtras does not tell much by way of addition to what has already been stated here in the first Sūtra and is comparatively less in importance.

Vallabha takes अतः to mean 'Because Brahmajñāna gives Mokṣa'; अथ shows मङ्गल and अधिकार, not आनन्तर्य. In ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, there is शेषे षष्ठी. According to Madhva, अथ means 'after one has secured the requisite qualifications for the knowledge of Brahman, Viṣṇu.'

I. 1. 2

[85] This is the only Sūtra in the second Adhikaraṇa. Of the well-known Bhāṣyakāras, Vallabha alone combines this Sūtra and the next one—' शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ।'—into one Sūtra. So the group of the first four Sūtras, popularly called 'Catuḥsūtrī' is according to him only the 'Trisūtrī.'

This Sūtra gives the definition of Brahman as 'that from which the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world take place.' As Brahman is already known through etymology ('बृहत्वात् बृंहणत्वात्, वा ब्रह्म ।') सृष्टि, स्थिति and प्रलय can be taken as उपलक्षण as well as विशेषण.

All the Bhāṣyakāras except Vallabha take जन्मादि as a Bahuvrīhi compound of the तद्गुणसंविज्ञान type, where the parts of the compound are taken into consideration. Thus the stock-example of the तद्गुणसंविज्ञान-बहुव्रीहि is लम्बकर्ण. In a sentence like 'लम्बकर्णं देवदत्तमानय' both the words लम्ब and कर्ण are to be taken into account, so that you bring Devadatta along with his hanging ears. In the case of an अतद्गुणसंविज्ञान-बहुव्रीहि—'चित्रगुं देवदत्तमानय ।' the words चित्र and गो have nothing to do with the आनयनक्रिया. You bring only Devadatta, and not his spotted cow. Vallabha takes जन्मादि as an अतद्गुणसंविज्ञान-बहुव्रीहि quite unnecessarily.

Rāmānuja mentions in this connection all the 'Kalyāṇaguṇas' of Brahman which is responsible for the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world.

The question now discussed is whether the expression जन्मादि is to be understood as an उपलक्षण or a विशेषण.

उपलक्षण is उपाध्यनन्तरभूतं सद्व्यावर्तकम्, that is, it distinguishes a thing without being included in it. (This is resorted to in the case of a तटस्थ लक्षण). विशेषण is included in the thing to be distinguished, उपाध्यन्तरभूतं सद्व्यावर्तकम्. (This is resorted to in a स्वरूप-लक्षण).

Here the objector points out that सृष्टि, स्थिति, प्रलय etc. cannot be taken as the विशेषण of Brahman. For, in that case, Brahman would not be one but many corresponding to the many विशेषणs. If it is argued that we can understand a person to be one only, even though possessed of many attributes; when one says 'देवदत्त is young, fair, red-eyed.' etc., we understand that there is only one Devadatta in spite of the many attributes, the answer is—In the case of Devadatta, other Pramāṇas tell us about the oneness, while in the case of Brahman, its oneness cannot be known (by other Pramāṇas).

[86] So, Brahman cannot be known लक्षणतः— To this, the Siddhāntin replies as under :—It is clear from the Śruti passages that जन्मस्थितिलयs of the world can point to Brahman which is their instrumental and material cause. Even if they are taken to be विशेषणs, no harm is done, because the विशेषणs point out to स्वविरोधिव्यावृत्त things.

The Advaita view of Brahman being निर्विशेष, is opposed to the passages ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, जन्माद्यस्य यतः etc. which imply some विशेषs for Brahman, also to the etymology (ब्रह्मन् from बृह् to increase), and to Śruti passages and Sūtras

referring to ईक्षण on the part of Brahman, and to Tarka (for, reasoning involves consideration of Sādhya, Sādhana, Vyāptī etc. which are विशेषणs). प्रकाशत्व, साक्षित्व etc. which the Advaitin boldly asserts about Brahman, cannot exist in any निर्विशेष thing.

[This Sūtra is usually taken advantage of by those who regard the Sūtrakāra as not advocating the Advaita theory. They contend that it is ridiculous to say that the Sūtrakāra regarded the world as mere illusion or 'Bhrānti,' in the face of the statement in the Sūtra, that जन्मस्थितिलयs are due to Brahman. It is easy to refute such criticism. First, the Sūtra does not hint at the reality of the world ; the Śruti passages also speak of the creation of chariots, horses (in the dream-state) which are real enough for the dreamer. Secondly, in view of the impossibility of describing Brahman which is beyond words, some sort of a make-shift arrangement has to be resorted to, in accordance with the 'Arundhatīdarśana nyāya' or उपदेशादयं वाद: as Gauḍapāda admirably puts it. Perhaps the Sūtrakāra has deliberately made the Sūtra vague to admit the Advaita doctrine. The Śruti also describes the 'Jagat' as due to the 'Saṁkalpa' of the Lord ! One might, with equal force, argue that a world created out of thought, cannot be real. Anyway the Advaitin is in good company, regarding his view that the world is from the ultimate point of view, an illusion.]

The Advaitin, in refutation of the above criticism can point out that he admits the 'Viśeṣas' in the 'Vyavahārāvasthā'; they have no 'Paramārthasattā'. Vallabha gives an alternative interpretation for this Sūtra, जन्म-आद्यस्य (आकाशस्य)-यत:, and says: अथवा, किमनया कुसृष्ट्या ? (why should we bother about the wretched world ? Brahman is the cause of the Ākāśa). Madhva takes जन्मादि to mean जन्म, स्थिति, संहार, नियमन, बन्ध and मोक्ष.

I. 1·3

[87] This is the only Sūtra in this Adhikaraṇa.

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्—योनि: is explained as प्रमाणम् by almost all Bhāṣyakāras. Saṅkara as an alternative explanation takes योनि to mean कारण; so does श्रीपति also.

The objector points out that Brahman need not be शास्त्रयोनि as it can be easily known by means of other Pramāṇas.

The Siddhāntin argues that of the well-known accepted means of proof,

(1) प्रत्यक्ष—(a) the normal प्रत्यक्ष by the sense-organs, both external and internal, cannot be made use of in perceiving Brahman, because it depends upon the contact with external objects and the internal प्रत्यक्ष depends upon the association with the external sense-organs.

(b) the प्रत्यक्ष of a Yogin.—This perception is but a remembered knowledge of what had been experienced before. It would be mere भ्रम if it refers to other objects.

Brahman cannot be known by
(2) अनुमान of both the types also—

(a) सामान्यतः दृष्ट and (b) विशेषतः दृष्ट; because no logical mark could be found pointing out to the unique Highest Puruṣa and because Anumāna cannot be connected with super-sensuous objects.

[88] The objector points out that the creation of the world requires an expert agent and the non-sentient world is dependent upon someone who is sentient; and the world obviously is a 'kārya,' therefore by Anumāna one can know Brahman. The Siddhāntin argues that अनुमान can be of no use, because the एकचेतनाधीनत्व (dependence upon some one who is alone and sentient), which is thought highly of by the objector, cannot serve its purpose. If it means—

(a) तदायत्तोत्पत्तिस्थितित्व, this cannot apply to any similar instance. Once own Śarīra requires the अदृष्ट not of one person, but of many. A चेतन is not apart from the peculiar arrangement of the parts; breathing etc. associated with a चेतन are not found in the case of the earth, mountains etc., which would be the पक्ष in your अनुमान.

[89] (b) If it means तदायत्तप्रवृत्तित्व, it is contrary to all experience, because more than one Cetana is required to create big objects like mountains etc.

The कर्तृत्व might be possible in the case of the individual souls in regard to only ordinary objects. That the world is a कार्य is admitted by all, because it is possessed of parts; and this huge world must have some one possessed of extra-ordinary powers of creating, controlling etc., and that can only be the Highest Puruṣa, and the Parama-Puruṣa creates this world by mere Saṁkalpa.

[90] Thus, inference helps us, in postulating a creator of the world and there can be no शास्त्रयोनित्व about him. A Kṣetrajña may not be able to do certain things; that does not mean that the highest Īśvara has no such power and such a power can be rightly inferred from other Pramāṇas.

[91] Inference about Īśvara is concerned only with the power of Īśvara to create and the knowledge of the materials required for the purpose, and has nothing to do with other irrelevant attributes of the effect.

[92] A potter has a body, but Īśavara has none, so how can he have any Saṁkalpa even?—The answer is—Manas is the cause of Saṁkalpa which is not concerned with the body. That Manas can only belong to a person who has a body, can be disproved by the fact that Manas remains even when the body is destroyed. A Jīva, limited in every way, cannot be the creator of the world, but the mighty Puruṣaviśeṣa, Īśvara, can, owing to his Saṁkalpa.

[93] The objection that the instrumental cause (Daṇḍa, Cakra etc.) and the material cause (the clay) are seen to be different. How can

Brahman then be both ?—This is exactly why the Sūtrakāra says शास्त्रयोनित्वात्. We must rely upon S'āstra— But it is inference that tells us about Īśvara being the creator of the world.

The view of the Pūrvapakṣin (Paras 87–93), is refuted by the Siddhāntin as under :—[93–96].

The Siddhāntin mainly emphasises the point that the objections of the Pūrvapakṣin are based upon harping on the Potter-dṛṣṭānta in order to prove that there is *one* intelligent creator. But what is true in the case of an ordinary undertaking by an ordinary person can hardly be true in the case of the work of fashioning the world ! Thus—

(a) A jar is fashioned by one potter at one time; but this is not always the case; many potters produce jars at different times and places.

(b) The individual souls also, backed by their Adṛṣṭa can act in a similar manner.

(c) All things cannot be fashioned or destroyed. Therefore in the case of the syllogism—भूभूधरादि बुद्धिमदेककर्तृकम्

कार्यत्वात्,
घटादिवत्।

the हेतु कार्य is व्याप्त with the साध्य (बुद्धिमदेककर्तृकत्व) and also with the साध्याभाव. The similar instance does not serve its purpose, as it is not known to anybody that there is only one creator.

If all things are created simultaneously, then कार्यत्व has really no meaning; if they are created step by step, then this would only prove अनेककर्तृकत्व.

एककर्तृकत्व is also opposed to प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शास्त्र.

[94] Further, all things created have to depend upon the ज्ञानशक्तिवैचित्र्य depending upon the Karman associated with the qualities Sattva and others. Therefore, that many Jīvas are the fashioners (not, one somebody quite unique) is tenable. Further, the one Īśvara cannot possibly create the world. — If he has no शरीर, he cannot be the creator. Any कार्य by the mind is possible only in the case of one with a body. In the case of the liberated ones, no कार्य is seen without bodies, even though the mind is नित्य.

If he has a body, — it must be either नित्य or अनित्य; it cannot be नित्य because in that case the जगत् also would be नित्य. It cannot be अनित्य, because at that time, no cause for the existence of the body is possible.

If ईश्वर acts himself unaided, this is not possible in the case of one without a body; if he acts with someone else's body, then, व्यापार or no व्यापार is possible in the case of ईश्वर himself.

Therefore, the सर्वेश्वरेश्वर cannot be known by अनुमान.

[95] As regards the objection that the instrumental cause and the material cause cannot be one and that impartite things like Ākāśa cannot be

'Kāryas', we point out that these things are to be known only from the Śāstra and this is made clear by the Sūtrakāra himself.

[96] The सूत्र 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' answers the objection viz. शास्त्र cannot tell us anything about Brahman, because it deals with प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति.

[The word तत्, according to most Bhāṣyakāras refers to Brahman.

According to Rāmānuja तत् means शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्व.

Vijñānabhikṣu understands by तत्, जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्व.

Rāmānuja's interpretation appears most reasonable as it refers to the immediate previous Sūtra.

समन्वयः—means according to	Rāmānuja,	पुरुषार्थतया, अन्वयः
,, ——— ———	Nimbāraka,	मुख्यवृत्त्या, अन्वयः
,, ——— ———	Śrīkaṇṭha,	तात्पर्येण संबन्धः
,, ——— ———	Śrīkara,	तात्पर्यम्
,, ——— ———	Madhva,	उपपत्त्यादिलिङ्गम्

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Vijñānabhikṣu, understand by समन्वय, the agreement of the Vedānta passages generally, regarding Brahman.

Vallabha stands alone in interpreting the Sūtra as—Brahman is the material cause of the world, as is invariably observed in the world that is, he takes समन्वय to mean समवाय].

Against this, it may be briefly stated that all Pramāṇas lead to the proper comprehension of the object; they do not follow the purpose (*Prayojana*); rather the Prayojana should be in conformity with the Pramāṇas. Simply because Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti are absent, a thing does not lose its Prayojana; here actually there is the connection with the main purpose in life. Even in passages like 'A son is born to you,' 'This is not a serpent' there is the Prayojana,—the production of joy and the removal of fear respectively.

[97] Here begins a long पूर्वपक्ष (the view of the Mīmāṁsakas) ending with न संभवति-इति प्राप्तम् (Para 113, P. 245), followed by a brief refutation in Paras 113-114.

The Mīmāṁsaka mentions the views along with their refutation of the following :—

(1) नियोगवादिन्s (Para 98, अत्र कश्चिदाह...विधिर्न संभवति Para 100, P. 220).

(2) ध्यानविधिवादिन्s (Para 100, अन्योऽप्याह ... प्रपञ्चरूपबन्धनस्य निवृत्तिः Para 107); the ध्यानविधिवादिन् refutes the Advaita view, अथोच्येत (Para 101) ...पदसमुदायेन सिध्यति (Para 104) and यतो वाक्या...(Para 105)...मुक्तिर्जीवतो न संभवति (Para 106, P. 230) ;

(3) भास्कर (भेदाभेदवादिन्)—यदपि कैश्चिदुक्तम्...(Para 108)...भिन्नाभिन्नस्वभावा एवोपाधय उत्पद्यन्ते (Para 110). The refutation is in Paras 110-113 (P. 112 ; न संभवति-इति प्राप्तम्).

The Mīmāṁsaka who thinks that the Vedāntavākyas must always be connected with some actual 'Kriyā,' now raises his objections to the thesis that the S'āstra propounds Brahman.

(1) The S'āstra can only refer to either Pravṛtti or Nivṛtti; otherwise it would be useless.

(2) The S'āstra must point out to some definite purpose.

(3) In the case of passages which deal with सिद्ध or परिनिष्पन्न things, it might be pointed out that even in those cases, only knowledge can achieve the 'Puruṣārtha,' even though the entity is not present. So the Śāstra cannot be a 'Pramāṇa' to prove the existence of an entity. Everywhere the Śāstra can enable one to achieve the purpose either by ensuring Pravṛtti or by knowledge; it can never be connected with a परिनिष्पन्नवस्तु like Brahman.

[98] [Now the नियोगवादिन् who thinks that the Vedānta passages must always be pointing to some Niyoga or Vidhi, states his case :—

The अद्वितीयब्रह्मन् can be a विधिविषय through प्रपञ्चविलय. Even the स्वतःसिद्ध ब्रह्मन् can be a 'Sādhya' in its form of Niṣprapañcatā.

The मीमांसक controverts this position of the नियोगवादिन् in the following way—

A नियोगवादिन् must tell us what the नियोग is, what is the नियोज्य-विशेषण, the subject, the means, the procedure and the agent of the Vidhi.

As to the नियोज्य-विशेषण, it can only be either the cause or the effect. The realisation of the nature of Brahman cannot be the cause, because it is not proved. If it is the cause, the realisation, being eternal, would have to be resorted to even after Mokṣa is secured. It cannot be the effect. For it would then be impermanent like heaven etc. which are the fruits of नियोग.

As regards the subject of नियोग, it cannot be Brahman itself, because it is always eternal. The निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मन् cannot be the विधिविषय because it is negative in character. Secondly, साध्यत्व cannot refer to Brahman because it is always 'Siddha'. If the साध्यत्व concerns प्रपञ्चनिवृत्ति, it cannot be the साध्यत्व of Brahman.

[99] प्रपञ्चनिवृत्ति itself is the Mokṣa, and also the purpose of life. It cannot be the subject of a Vidhi. There would also be the fault of mutual interdependence if it is regarded as the subject of Niyoga.—The नियोग produces प्रपञ्चनिवृत्ति, and the प्रपञ्चनिवृत्ति gives rise to नियोग.

Further, if this प्रपञ्च is illusory, it can be removed by Jñāna alone. नियोग can serve no purpose there. If it is argued that नियोग removes the प्रपञ्च through the removing knowledge, then the passage (vākya) itself produces the knowledge and नियोग would remain useless. Again, if this नियोग is of the nature of Brahman itself, it being नित्य, the नियोग would have no scope. If it is different from the nature of Brahman, no प्रयोक्तृ of the विधि can be found as everything other than the nature of Brahman is to be liquidated; so नियोग cannot lead to the fruit—Salvation.

No procedure about this vidhi can be found, whether it is of a negative or of a positive character. Similarly, no means (करण) can be found which can liquidate the entire प्रपञ्च. The knowledge of Brahman as being 'without a second,' cannot be the 'karaṇa'; because the knowledge itself secures Salvation and nothing remains to be done by the करण.

[100] It cannot be argued that the knowledge of Brahman as being 'without a second' can produce the 'karaṇa' in the form of प्रपञ्चनिवृत्ति, for when the same knowledge produces Mokṣa itself, what is the use of the intermediary karaṇa? If the jñāna is अभावरूप, it cannot produce anything, cannot give any help either. Therefore no विधि concerning निष्प्रपञ्च Brahman is possible.

[The ध्यानविधिवादिन्'s case is now stated :—

From the Vedānta passages like 'आत्मा...द्रष्टव्यः, मन्तव्यो...,' it is clear that ध्यानविधि does produce the knowledge of Brahmasvarūpa, and आत्मन् is Brahman. This also means that ब्रह्मस्वरूप is alone the Reality, everything else is false. कर्मशास्त्र being based upon भेदज्ञान, can refer to भेद only. But ब्रह्मज्ञानविधि points only to अभेद as the highest reality. Mere वाक्यार्थज्ञान cannot lead to Mokṣa; for, in that case श्रवणादि injunctions would be useless].

The अद्वैतिन् explains his point of view :— बन्ध is false and ज्ञानबाध्य; वाक्यार्थज्ञान can remove the बन्ध, as the knowledge, 'This is a rope, not a serpent', removes the fear about the serpent, नियोग cannot do this, for in that case Mokṣa would be अनित्य, being नियोगसाध्य. All agree that Mokṣa must be नित्य; it is not, therefore, धर्मसाध्य; it is अशरीरत्व as mentioned in the Śrutis.

[102] Mokṣa cannot be साध्य, in its form of आत्मस्वरूप.

साध्यत्व is usually of a four-fold nature :—

(1) उत्पाद्य—Mokṣa is नित्य and so cannot be a product.

(2) प्राप्य—Mokṣa is always प्राप्त, being आत्मस्वरूप, and a प्राप्त thing cannot be प्राप्य.

(3) विकार्य—Mokṣa would be अनित्य, if it undergoes any change.

(4) संस्कार्य—
A दोषापनयनेन
B गुणाधानेन
or अतिशयाधानेन
or निघर्षणेन

These forms of संस्कार are impossible in the case of Brahman which is नित्यशुद्ध and allows no scope for अतिशय or निघर्षण. शुद्धि etc. belong to देह; आत्मन् is only साक्षिन्.

Therefore, Mokṣa in the form of आत्मस्वरूप cannot be साध्य.

[103] वाक्यार्थज्ञान is responsible for मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्ति only, as is clear from the Śruti passages, and the निवृत्ति once secured, cannot come to an end, being of the nature of प्रध्वंसाभाव. Mokṣa cannot be either विदिक्रियाकर्मन् or ध्यानक्रियाकर्मन्, as these are explicitly repudiated by the Śrutis. This does not make the

Śāstra useless ; it is interested in removing the अविद्यापरिकल्पितभेदनिवृत्ति ; it does not point out to Brahman in the form 'This is Brahman.'

[104] It should not be said that if बन्धनिवृत्ति is from ज्ञान alone, श्रवणादिविधिs serve no purpose ; श्रवणादिविधिs enable one to understand the वाक्यार्थ properly. It is wrong to assert that बन्धनिवृत्ति does not follow from ज्ञान alone, and that it can only come after the fall of the body. शरीरसंबन्ध is not real and there can be no विनाशापेक्षा about it. It is immaterial, whether the body falls or continues to exist ; a person becomes मुक्त, the moment he has वाक्यार्थज्ञान. So, मोक्ष is not नियोगसाध्य and therefore ब्रह्मन् is not ध्यानविधिशेष.

Now follows the refutation of the above view of the Advaitin (P. 227 तदयुक्तम् ...) by the ध्यानवादिन् :—

बन्धनिवृत्ति cannot be had from वाक्यार्थज्ञान alone; बन्ध is अपरोक्ष and cannot be removed by the परोक्ष वाक्यार्थज्ञान (The भयनिवृत्ति of a person who has mistaken the rope for a serpent, is removed by the आप्तोपदेश which is authoritative, because of the अपरोक्ष ज्ञान itself, may be of the आप्त). शब्द being अनिन्द्रिय cannot produce any प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, which is due to the help of the sense-organs.

[105] ध्यान cannot serve as a means to secure वाक्यार्थज्ञान, on account of the fault of इतरेतराश्रय — From वाक्यार्थज्ञान comes तद्विषयध्यान, and from ध्यान comes the वाक्यार्थज्ञान; ध्यान and वाक्यार्थज्ञान do not refer to different matters. ध्यान follows the वाक्यार्थज्ञान and depends upon various factors such as ध्येय-ध्यातृ etc. and as such can hardly help in securing निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मैकत्वज्ञान. If वाक्यार्थज्ञान alone could root out Avidyā, what is the use of श्रवण, मनन, etc. ?

जीवन्मुक्ति thus is a contradiction in terms. If Mokṣa belongs to one who has a body (and to have a body is declared to be a 'Pandha' by the Śrutis), then the expression जीवन्मुक्ति is as absurd as 'My mother is barren.'

[106] If the सशरीरत्व is regarded as illusory, what difference is there between जीवन्मुक्ति and अजीवतो मुक्ति ? The प्रतिभासज्ञान cannot persist after salvation (like the द्विचन्द्रज्ञान of one suffering from eye-disease) as the ज्ञान of every thing else other than Brahman is बाधित.

Therefore, ध्याननियोग removes बन्ध, and it ensures only प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्ति, and that too through the अपरोक्षज्ञान of Brahman, produced by नियोग.

[107] The ज्ञान is produced by नियोग 'मनोनैर्मल्यद्वारेण' as by the निष्कामकर्मन् according to the Advaitins. The passage नेदं यदिदमुपासते does not prohibit उपास्यत्व, but the meaning is 'What these people worship, this world, is not Brahman.'

Thus ध्याननियोग alone leads one to ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार.

[108] The view of the भेदाभेदवादिन् (भास्कर, औडुलोमि) is as under :—

[Everything is भिन्नाभिन्न and it is actually so experienced. घटत्व (जाति) and घट (व्यक्ति) are अभिन्न (as घटत्व cannot be separated from घट) and also भिन्न (the individual घट can be handled and used). There is difference between shade and light, because they do not stay together and have different resorts. If प्रतीति is to be one's guide, द्रैरूप्य भिन्नाभिन्नत्व must be accepted (no one can

discriminate as 'this is clay' and 'this is a jar'). Similarly जाति and व्यक्ति cannot be pointed out as separate.

[109] It can not be argued that just as the सामानाधिकरण्य in देवोऽहम् points out to ऐक्य, there could be ऐक्य between आत्मन् and शरीर (मनुष्योऽहम्), because here the प्रतीति is contradicted by other प्रमाणs. Mere सामानाधिकरण्य cannot produce ऐक्य. So many Śruti passages can be cited to prove this. The truth is that अभेद is स्वाभाविक, and भेद is औपाधिक (the passage सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्त्सह ब्रह्मणा..., does not point to the भेद between Brahman and Jīva, but simply means सर्वगुणान्वितं ब्रह्माश्नुते so as to harmonise with other passages).

[110] As in the case of Ākāśa, भेद is apprehended by the उपाधिs, घट पट etc; so, in the case of the impartite, all-pervading Brahman, भेद is possible, due to the उपाधिs, बुद्धि etc. These उपाधिs which function according to the 'karmans' of the Jīvas, do not in any way contaminate Brahman.

[111] The Vedānta passages propound only अभेद, the Karmaśāstras propound भेद. To say that भेद and अभेद that are absolutely contradictory are one, is the language of an intoxicated person. The idea — कारणात्मना, जात्यात्मना च अभेदः and कार्यात्मना, व्यक्त्यात्मना च भेदः cannot stand scrutiny. If the भेद involves two entities, then एकत्व cannot exist; even if भेद refers to आकार, then still there would be two forms, not one, or three forms (one thing—and two forms). प्रकारांशो जातिः, प्रकार्यंशो व्यक्तिः—these are two प्रतीतिs, not one.

So, Jīva cannot be both भिन्न and अभिन्न from Brahman.

The भेदप्रत्यय is due to the beginningless Avidyā.

[112] Brahman is not affected by Avidyā and the blemishes, old age, death etc.; for these blemishes are illusory. Upādhis cannot effect any change in the Brahman. It is also not right to say that the blemishes connected with the portion covered by the Upādhis, do not affect the unconditioned Brahman; for, if we analyse the matter thoroughly, the following questions arise—

(1) Is the atomic Jīva, a portion of Brahman cut ?

(This is impossible, for Brahman cannot be cut; the Jīva again, would have a beginning).

(2) Is Jīva, a particular part of Brahman not cut off, connected with the अणुरूपत्व ?

[113] (In that case, all the blemishes would affect Brahman. All the Jīvas would be just one Jīva, being in the same place; when a part is dragged, the whole object is also dragged).

(3) Is Jīva, the nature of Brahman, connected with the Upādhis ?

(Then all the bodies would have only one Jīva).

(4) Is Jīva some other Cetana, connected with Upādhis ?

(Then Jīva would be really and truly different from Brahman).

(5) Is Jīva, the Upādhi itself ?

(This would be practically the Cārvāka (materialistic) doctrine).

Thus, though the Śāstra is प्रमाण in regard to the purpose — प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति, the Vedānta passages are प्रमाण in respect of the nature of Brahman, as they are subservient to ध्यानविधि.

(P. 243 — तदयुक्तम् ... न संभवति — P. 245). Here the above ध्यानवादिन्'s view is refuted by the Mīmāṁsaka, the main Pūrvapakṣin :—

Even if the Vedānta passages are subservient to ध्यानविधि, they cannot be प्रमाण regarding the Reality. These passages cannot tell one about the Reality independently, but only through passages propounding Brahmasvarūpa directly. Dhyāna can be associated even with an unreal thing. Jñāna alone can lead one to पुरुषार्थ; a परिनिष्पन्न thing cannot come within the province of ध्यानविधि.

The Siddhāntin now (P. 245) states his position in regard to the above views :—

समन्वय is पुरुषार्थतया, अन्वय and the Śāstra is प्रमाण, because it propounds this समन्वय, tells us that Brahman with all auspicious qualities is the परमप्राप्य, which alone ensures delight in all the Jīvas, by looking after them in every way. And from the Śāstra alone, this knowledge can be had.

[114] And Brahman can be secured from उपासन (which is sometimes described as वेदन etc.). Mere ज्ञान unrelated to the Reality serves no purpose. Passages like यतो वा इमानि authoritatively tell one that the all-auspicious Brahman endowed with all excellent qualities, does exist.

The Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on I. 1·4, practically covers the same ground as covered over by Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara also criticises the views of the Mīmāṁsakas, and of those who hold that Brahman can be the 'Viṣaya' of 'मानसी क्रिया' (Dhyāna), and points out how the four-fold nature of Saṁskāra would make Mokṣa non-eternal. Rāmānuja appears to follow closly Śaṅkara in his treatment of the nature of Mokṣa as not being उत्पाद्य, आप्य, विकार्य and संस्कार्य. Even a superficial comparison of the two Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the समन्वयाधिकरण, would bring home to the reader the difference in their styles. Śaṅkara's treatment is quite lucid and orderly; and the reader has no difficulty in understanding the view of the Bhāṣyakāra, who writes in an easy, flowing style; while Rāmānuja, making a show of his scholarship, gets often involved in some irrelevant matter and the reader is confused, being unable to pick up the essential idea. Rāmānuja's style is undoubtedly laboured and artificial and makes heavy reading on the whole.